b7aa600c41
I have worked hard to reduce diffs against the vendor branch. One notable change in that respect is that we no longer prefer DSA over RSA - the reasons for doing so went away years ago. This may cause some surprises, as ssh will warn about unknown host keys even for hosts whose keys haven't changed. MFC after: 6 weeks
189 lines
4.9 KiB
C
189 lines
4.9 KiB
C
/* $OpenBSD: mac.c,v 1.15 2008/06/13 00:51:47 dtucker Exp $ */
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/*
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* Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
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* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
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* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
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* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
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* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
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* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
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* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
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* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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#include "includes.h"
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <openssl/hmac.h>
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#include <stdarg.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <signal.h>
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#include "xmalloc.h"
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#include "log.h"
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#include "cipher.h"
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#include "buffer.h"
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#include "key.h"
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#include "kex.h"
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#include "mac.h"
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#include "misc.h"
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#include "umac.h"
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#define SSH_EVP 1 /* OpenSSL EVP-based MAC */
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#define SSH_UMAC 2 /* UMAC (not integrated with OpenSSL) */
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struct {
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char *name;
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int type;
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const EVP_MD * (*mdfunc)(void);
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int truncatebits; /* truncate digest if != 0 */
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int key_len; /* just for UMAC */
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int len; /* just for UMAC */
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} macs[] = {
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{ "hmac-sha1", SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 0, -1, -1 },
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{ "hmac-sha1-96", SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 96, -1, -1 },
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{ "hmac-md5", SSH_EVP, EVP_md5, 0, -1, -1 },
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{ "hmac-md5-96", SSH_EVP, EVP_md5, 96, -1, -1 },
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{ "hmac-ripemd160", SSH_EVP, EVP_ripemd160, 0, -1, -1 },
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{ "hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com", SSH_EVP, EVP_ripemd160, 0, -1, -1 },
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{ "umac-64@openssh.com", SSH_UMAC, NULL, 0, 128, 64 },
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{ NULL, 0, NULL, 0, -1, -1 }
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};
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static void
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mac_setup_by_id(Mac *mac, int which)
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{
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int evp_len;
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mac->type = macs[which].type;
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if (mac->type == SSH_EVP) {
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mac->evp_md = (*macs[which].mdfunc)();
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if ((evp_len = EVP_MD_size(mac->evp_md)) <= 0)
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fatal("mac %s len %d", mac->name, evp_len);
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mac->key_len = mac->mac_len = (u_int)evp_len;
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} else {
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mac->mac_len = macs[which].len / 8;
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mac->key_len = macs[which].key_len / 8;
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mac->umac_ctx = NULL;
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}
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if (macs[which].truncatebits != 0)
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mac->mac_len = macs[which].truncatebits / 8;
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}
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int
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mac_setup(Mac *mac, char *name)
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{
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int i;
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for (i = 0; macs[i].name; i++) {
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if (strcmp(name, macs[i].name) == 0) {
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if (mac != NULL)
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mac_setup_by_id(mac, i);
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debug2("mac_setup: found %s", name);
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return (0);
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}
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}
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debug2("mac_setup: unknown %s", name);
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return (-1);
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}
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int
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mac_init(Mac *mac)
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{
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if (mac->key == NULL)
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fatal("mac_init: no key");
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switch (mac->type) {
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case SSH_EVP:
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if (mac->evp_md == NULL)
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return -1;
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HMAC_Init(&mac->evp_ctx, mac->key, mac->key_len, mac->evp_md);
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return 0;
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case SSH_UMAC:
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mac->umac_ctx = umac_new(mac->key);
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return 0;
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default:
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return -1;
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}
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}
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u_char *
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mac_compute(Mac *mac, u_int32_t seqno, u_char *data, int datalen)
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{
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static u_char m[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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u_char b[4], nonce[8];
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if (mac->mac_len > sizeof(m))
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fatal("mac_compute: mac too long %u %lu",
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mac->mac_len, (u_long)sizeof(m));
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switch (mac->type) {
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case SSH_EVP:
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put_u32(b, seqno);
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/* reset HMAC context */
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HMAC_Init(&mac->evp_ctx, NULL, 0, NULL);
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HMAC_Update(&mac->evp_ctx, b, sizeof(b));
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HMAC_Update(&mac->evp_ctx, data, datalen);
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HMAC_Final(&mac->evp_ctx, m, NULL);
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break;
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case SSH_UMAC:
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put_u64(nonce, seqno);
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umac_update(mac->umac_ctx, data, datalen);
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umac_final(mac->umac_ctx, m, nonce);
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break;
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default:
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fatal("mac_compute: unknown MAC type");
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}
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return (m);
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}
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void
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mac_clear(Mac *mac)
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{
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if (mac->type == SSH_UMAC) {
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if (mac->umac_ctx != NULL)
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umac_delete(mac->umac_ctx);
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} else if (mac->evp_md != NULL)
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HMAC_cleanup(&mac->evp_ctx);
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mac->evp_md = NULL;
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mac->umac_ctx = NULL;
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}
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/* XXX copied from ciphers_valid */
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#define MAC_SEP ","
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int
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mac_valid(const char *names)
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{
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char *maclist, *cp, *p;
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if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
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return (0);
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maclist = cp = xstrdup(names);
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for ((p = strsep(&cp, MAC_SEP)); p && *p != '\0';
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(p = strsep(&cp, MAC_SEP))) {
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if (mac_setup(NULL, p) < 0) {
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debug("bad mac %s [%s]", p, names);
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xfree(maclist);
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return (0);
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} else {
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debug3("mac ok: %s [%s]", p, names);
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}
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}
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debug3("macs ok: [%s]", names);
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xfree(maclist);
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return (1);
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}
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