The current logic is a fine choice for a system administrator modifying
process cpusets or a process creating a new cpuset(2), but not ideal for
processes attaching to a jail.
Currently, when a process attaches to a jail, it does exactly what any other
process does and loses any mask it might have applied in the process of
doing so because cpuset_setproc() is entirely based around the assumption
that non-anonymous cpusets in the process can be replaced with the new
parent set.
This approach slightly improves the jail attach integration by modifying
cpuset_setproc() callers to indicate if they should rebase their cpuset to
the indicated set or not (i.e. cpuset_setproc_update_set).
If we're rebasing and the process currently has a cpuset assigned that is
not the containing jail's root set, then we will now create a new base set
for it hanging off the jail's root with the existing mask applied instead of
using the jail's root set as the new base set.
Note that the common case will be that the process doesn't have a cpuset
within the jail root, but the system root can freely assign a cpuset from
a jail to a process outside of the jail with no restriction. We assume that
that may have happened or that it could happen due to a race when we drop
the proc lock, so we must recheck both within the loop to gather up
sufficient freed cpusets and after the loop.
To recap, here's how it worked before in all cases:
0 4 <-- jail 0 4 <-- jail / process
| |
1 -> 1
|
3 <-- process
Here's how it works now:
0 4 <-- jail 0 4 <-- jail
| | |
1 -> 1 5 <-- process
|
3 <-- process
or
0 4 <-- jail 0 4 <-- jail / process
| |
1 <-- process -> 1
More importantly, in both cases, the attaching process still retains the
mask it had prior to attaching or the attach fails with EDEADLK if it's
left with no CPUs to run on or the domain policy is incompatible. The
author of this patch considers this almost a security feature, because a MAC
policy could grant PRIV_JAIL_ATTACH to an unprivileged user that's
restricted to some subset of available CPUs the ability to attach to a jail,
which might lift the user's restrictions if they attach to a jail with a
wider mask.
In most cases, it's anticipated that admins will use this to be able to,
for example, `cpuset -c -l 1 jail -c path=/ command=/long/running/cmd`,
and avoid the need for contortions to spawn a command inside a jail with a
more limited cpuset than the jail.
Reviewed by: jamie
MFC after: 1 month (maybe)
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D27298
857a4b0ab0