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freebsd-skq/sys/security/mac/mac_system.c
Robert Watson 4d10c0ce5f Un-staticize mac_cred_mmapped_drop_perms() so that it may be used 
by policy modules making use of downgrades in the MAC AST event.  This
is required by the mac_lomac port of LOMAC to the MAC Framework.

Approved by:	re
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-11-26 17:11:57 +00:00

3680 lines
79 KiB
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/*-
* Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Robert N. M. Watson
* Copyright (c) 2001 Ilmar S. Habibulin
* Copyright (c) 2001, 2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
* All rights reserved.
*
* This software was developed by Robert Watson and Ilmar Habibulin for the
* TrustedBSD Project.
*
* This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project in part by Network
* Associates Laboratories, the Security Research Division of Network
* Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"),
* as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $FreeBSD$
*/
/*
* Developed by the TrustedBSD Project.
*
* Framework for extensible kernel access control. Kernel and userland
* interface to the framework, policy registration and composition.
*/
#include "opt_mac.h"
#include "opt_devfs.h"
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/condvar.h>
#include <sys/extattr.h>
#include <sys/imgact.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/lock.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/mutex.h>
#include <sys/mac.h>
#include <sys/module.h>
#include <sys/proc.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/sysproto.h>
#include <sys/sysent.h>
#include <sys/vnode.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/file.h>
#include <sys/namei.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/pipe.h>
#include <sys/socketvar.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <vm/vm.h>
#include <vm/pmap.h>
#include <vm/vm_map.h>
#include <vm/vm_object.h>
#include <sys/mac_policy.h>
#include <fs/devfs/devfs.h>
#include <net/bpfdesc.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <net/if_var.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet/ip_var.h>
#ifdef MAC
/*
* Declare that the kernel provides MAC support, version 1. This permits
* modules to refuse to be loaded if the necessary support isn't present,
* even if it's pre-boot.
*/
MODULE_VERSION(kernel_mac_support, 1);
SYSCTL_DECL(_security);
SYSCTL_NODE(_security, OID_AUTO, mac, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
"TrustedBSD MAC policy controls");
#if MAC_MAX_POLICIES > 32
#error "MAC_MAX_POLICIES too large"
#endif
static unsigned int mac_max_policies = MAC_MAX_POLICIES;
static unsigned int mac_policy_offsets_free = (1 << MAC_MAX_POLICIES) - 1;
SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, max_policies, CTLFLAG_RD,
&mac_max_policies, 0, "");
/*
* Has the kernel started generating labeled objects yet? All read/write
* access to this variable is serialized during the boot process. Following
* the end of serialization, we don't update this flag; no locking.
*/
static int mac_late = 0;
/*
* Warn about EA transactions only the first time they happen.
* Weak coherency, no locking.
*/
static int ea_warn_once = 0;
static int mac_enforce_fs = 1;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_fs, CTLFLAG_RW,
&mac_enforce_fs, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on file system objects");
TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_fs", &mac_enforce_fs);
static int mac_enforce_kld = 1;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_kld, CTLFLAG_RW,
&mac_enforce_kld, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on kld operations");
TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_kld", &mac_enforce_kld);
static int mac_enforce_network = 1;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_network, CTLFLAG_RW,
&mac_enforce_network, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on network packets");
TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_network", &mac_enforce_network);
static int mac_enforce_pipe = 1;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_pipe, CTLFLAG_RW,
&mac_enforce_pipe, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on pipe operations");
TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_pipe", &mac_enforce_pipe);
static int mac_enforce_process = 1;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_process, CTLFLAG_RW,
&mac_enforce_process, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on inter-process operations");
TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_process", &mac_enforce_process);
static int mac_enforce_socket = 1;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_socket, CTLFLAG_RW,
&mac_enforce_socket, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on socket operations");
TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_socket", &mac_enforce_socket);
static int mac_enforce_system = 1;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_system, CTLFLAG_RW,
&mac_enforce_system, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on system operations");
TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_system", &mac_enforce_system);
static int mac_enforce_vm = 1;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_vm, CTLFLAG_RW,
&mac_enforce_vm, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on vm operations");
TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_vm", &mac_enforce_vm);
static int mac_mmap_revocation = 1;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, mmap_revocation, CTLFLAG_RW,
&mac_mmap_revocation, 0, "Revoke mmap access to files on subject "
"relabel");
static int mac_mmap_revocation_via_cow = 0;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, mmap_revocation_via_cow, CTLFLAG_RW,
&mac_mmap_revocation_via_cow, 0, "Revoke mmap access to files via "
"copy-on-write semantics, or by removing all write access");
#ifdef MAC_DEBUG
SYSCTL_NODE(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, debug, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
"TrustedBSD MAC debug info");
static int mac_debug_label_fallback = 0;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_debug, OID_AUTO, label_fallback, CTLFLAG_RW,
&mac_debug_label_fallback, 0, "Filesystems should fall back to fs label"
"when label is corrupted.");
TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.debug_label_fallback",
&mac_debug_label_fallback);
SYSCTL_NODE(_security_mac_debug, OID_AUTO, counters, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
"TrustedBSD MAC object counters");
static unsigned int nmacmbufs, nmaccreds, nmacifnets, nmacbpfdescs,
nmacsockets, nmacmounts, nmactemp, nmacvnodes, nmacdevfsdirents,
nmacipqs, nmacpipes, nmacprocs;
SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, mbufs, CTLFLAG_RD,
&nmacmbufs, 0, "number of mbufs in use");
SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, creds, CTLFLAG_RD,
&nmaccreds, 0, "number of ucreds in use");
SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, ifnets, CTLFLAG_RD,
&nmacifnets, 0, "number of ifnets in use");
SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, ipqs, CTLFLAG_RD,
&nmacipqs, 0, "number of ipqs in use");
SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, bpfdescs, CTLFLAG_RD,
&nmacbpfdescs, 0, "number of bpfdescs in use");
SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, sockets, CTLFLAG_RD,
&nmacsockets, 0, "number of sockets in use");
SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, pipes, CTLFLAG_RD,
&nmacpipes, 0, "number of pipes in use");
SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, procs, CTLFLAG_RD,
&nmacprocs, 0, "number of procs in use");
SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, mounts, CTLFLAG_RD,
&nmacmounts, 0, "number of mounts in use");
SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, temp, CTLFLAG_RD,
&nmactemp, 0, "number of temporary labels in use");
SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, vnodes, CTLFLAG_RD,
&nmacvnodes, 0, "number of vnodes in use");
SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, devfsdirents, CTLFLAG_RD,
&nmacdevfsdirents, 0, "number of devfs dirents inuse");
#endif
static int error_select(int error1, int error2);
static int mac_policy_register(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc);
static int mac_policy_unregister(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc);
static void mac_check_vnode_mmap_downgrade(struct ucred *cred,
struct vnode *vp, int *prot);
static void mac_cred_mmapped_drop_perms_recurse(struct thread *td,
struct ucred *cred, struct vm_map *map);
static void mac_destroy_socket_label(struct label *label);
static int mac_setlabel_vnode_extattr(struct ucred *cred,
struct vnode *vp, struct label *intlabel);
MALLOC_DEFINE(M_MACPIPELABEL, "macpipelabel", "MAC labels for pipes");
MALLOC_DEFINE(M_MACTEMP, "mactemp", "MAC temporary label storage");
/*
* mac_policy_list stores the list of active policies. A busy count is
* maintained for the list, stored in mac_policy_busy. The busy count
* is protected by mac_policy_list_lock; the list may be modified only
* while the busy count is 0, requiring that the lock be held to
* prevent new references to the list from being acquired. For almost
* all operations, incrementing the busy count is sufficient to
* guarantee consistency, as the list cannot be modified while the
* busy count is elevated. For a few special operations involving a
* change to the list of active policies, the lock itself must be held.
* A condition variable, mac_policy_list_not_busy, is used to signal
* potential exclusive consumers that they should try to acquire the
* lock if a first attempt at exclusive access fails.
*/
static struct mtx mac_policy_list_lock;
static struct cv mac_policy_list_not_busy;
static LIST_HEAD(, mac_policy_conf) mac_policy_list;
static int mac_policy_list_busy;
#define MAC_POLICY_LIST_LOCKINIT() do { \
mtx_init(&mac_policy_list_lock, "mac_policy_list_lock", NULL, \
MTX_DEF); \
cv_init(&mac_policy_list_not_busy, "mac_policy_list_not_busy"); \
} while (0)
#define MAC_POLICY_LIST_LOCK() do { \
mtx_lock(&mac_policy_list_lock); \
} while (0)
#define MAC_POLICY_LIST_UNLOCK() do { \
mtx_unlock(&mac_policy_list_lock); \
} while (0)
/*
* We manually invoke WITNESS_SLEEP() to allow Witness to generate
* warnings even if we don't end up ever triggering the wait at
* run-time. The consumer of the exclusive interface must not hold
* any locks (other than potentially Giant) since we may sleep for
* long (potentially indefinite) periods of time waiting for the
* framework to become quiescent so that a policy list change may
* be made.
*/
#define MAC_POLICY_LIST_EXCLUSIVE() do { \
WITNESS_SLEEP(1, NULL); \
mtx_lock(&mac_policy_list_lock); \
while (mac_policy_list_busy != 0) \
cv_wait(&mac_policy_list_not_busy, \
&mac_policy_list_lock); \
} while (0)
#define MAC_POLICY_LIST_BUSY() do { \
MAC_POLICY_LIST_LOCK(); \
mac_policy_list_busy++; \
MAC_POLICY_LIST_UNLOCK(); \
} while (0)
#define MAC_POLICY_LIST_UNBUSY() do { \
MAC_POLICY_LIST_LOCK(); \
mac_policy_list_busy--; \
KASSERT(mac_policy_list_busy >= 0, ("MAC_POLICY_LIST_LOCK")); \
if (mac_policy_list_busy == 0) \
cv_signal(&mac_policy_list_not_busy); \
MAC_POLICY_LIST_UNLOCK(); \
} while (0)
/*
* MAC_CHECK performs the designated check by walking the policy
* module list and checking with each as to how it feels about the
* request. Note that it returns its value via 'error' in the scope
* of the caller.
*/
#define MAC_CHECK(check, args...) do { \
struct mac_policy_conf *mpc; \
\
error = 0; \
MAC_POLICY_LIST_BUSY(); \
LIST_FOREACH(mpc, &mac_policy_list, mpc_list) { \
if (mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_ ## check != NULL) \
error = error_select( \
mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_ ## check (args), \
error); \
} \
MAC_POLICY_LIST_UNBUSY(); \
} while (0)
/*
* MAC_BOOLEAN performs the designated boolean composition by walking
* the module list, invoking each instance of the operation, and
* combining the results using the passed C operator. Note that it
* returns its value via 'result' in the scope of the caller, which
* should be initialized by the caller in a meaningful way to get
* a meaningful result.
*/
#define MAC_BOOLEAN(operation, composition, args...) do { \
struct mac_policy_conf *mpc; \
\
MAC_POLICY_LIST_BUSY(); \
LIST_FOREACH(mpc, &mac_policy_list, mpc_list) { \
if (mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_ ## operation != NULL) \
result = result composition \
mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_ ## operation (args); \
} \
MAC_POLICY_LIST_UNBUSY(); \
} while (0)
#define MAC_EXTERNALIZE(type, label, elementlist, outbuf, \
outbuflen) do { \
char *curptr, *curptr_start, *element_name, *element_temp; \
size_t left, left_start, len; \
int claimed, first, first_start, ignorenotfound; \
\
error = 0; \
element_temp = elementlist; \
curptr = outbuf; \
curptr[0] = '\0'; \
left = outbuflen; \
first = 1; \
while ((element_name = strsep(&element_temp, ",")) != NULL) { \
curptr_start = curptr; \
left_start = left; \
first_start = first; \
if (element_name[0] == '?') { \
element_name++; \
ignorenotfound = 1; \
} else \
ignorenotfound = 0; \
claimed = 0; \
if (first) { \
len = snprintf(curptr, left, "%s/", \
element_name); \
first = 0; \
} else \
len = snprintf(curptr, left, ",%s/", \
element_name); \
if (len >= left) { \
error = EINVAL; /* XXXMAC: E2BIG */ \
break; \
} \
curptr += len; \
left -= len; \
\
MAC_CHECK(externalize_ ## type, label, element_name, \
curptr, left, &len, &claimed); \
if (error) \
break; \
if (claimed == 1) { \
if (len >= outbuflen) { \
error = EINVAL; /* XXXMAC: E2BIG */ \
break; \
} \
curptr += len; \
left -= len; \
} else if (claimed == 0 && ignorenotfound) { \
/* \
* Revert addition of the label element \
* name. \
*/ \
curptr = curptr_start; \
*curptr = '\0'; \
left = left_start; \
first = first_start; \
} else { \
error = EINVAL; /* XXXMAC: ENOLABEL */ \
break; \
} \
} \
} while (0)
#define MAC_INTERNALIZE(type, label, instring) do { \
char *element, *element_name, *element_data; \
int claimed; \
\
error = 0; \
element = instring; \
while ((element_name = strsep(&element, ",")) != NULL) { \
element_data = element_name; \
element_name = strsep(&element_data, "/"); \
if (element_data == NULL) { \
error = EINVAL; \
break; \
} \
claimed = 0; \
MAC_CHECK(internalize_ ## type, label, element_name, \
element_data, &claimed); \
if (error) \
break; \
if (claimed != 1) { \
/* XXXMAC: Another error here? */ \
error = EINVAL; \
break; \
} \
} \
} while (0)
/*
* MAC_PERFORM performs the designated operation by walking the policy
* module list and invoking that operation for each policy.
*/
#define MAC_PERFORM(operation, args...) do { \
struct mac_policy_conf *mpc; \
\
MAC_POLICY_LIST_BUSY(); \
LIST_FOREACH(mpc, &mac_policy_list, mpc_list) { \
if (mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_ ## operation != NULL) \
mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_ ## operation (args); \
} \
MAC_POLICY_LIST_UNBUSY(); \
} while (0)
/*
* Initialize the MAC subsystem, including appropriate SMP locks.
*/
static void
mac_init(void)
{
LIST_INIT(&mac_policy_list);
MAC_POLICY_LIST_LOCKINIT();
}
/*
* For the purposes of modules that want to know if they were loaded
* "early", set the mac_late flag once we've processed modules either
* linked into the kernel, or loaded before the kernel startup.
*/
static void
mac_late_init(void)
{
mac_late = 1;
}
/*
* Allow MAC policy modules to register during boot, etc.
*/
int
mac_policy_modevent(module_t mod, int type, void *data)
{
struct mac_policy_conf *mpc;
int error;
error = 0;
mpc = (struct mac_policy_conf *) data;
switch (type) {
case MOD_LOAD:
if (mpc->mpc_loadtime_flags & MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_NOTLATE &&
mac_late) {
printf("mac_policy_modevent: can't load %s policy "
"after booting\n", mpc->mpc_name);
error = EBUSY;
break;
}
error = mac_policy_register(mpc);
break;
case MOD_UNLOAD:
/* Don't unregister the module if it was never registered. */
if ((mpc->mpc_runtime_flags & MPC_RUNTIME_FLAG_REGISTERED)
!= 0)
error = mac_policy_unregister(mpc);
else
error = 0;
break;
default:
break;
}
return (error);
}
static int
mac_policy_register(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc)
{
struct mac_policy_conf *tmpc;
int slot;
MAC_POLICY_LIST_EXCLUSIVE();
LIST_FOREACH(tmpc, &mac_policy_list, mpc_list) {
if (strcmp(tmpc->mpc_name, mpc->mpc_name) == 0) {
MAC_POLICY_LIST_UNLOCK();
return (EEXIST);
}
}
if (mpc->mpc_field_off != NULL) {
slot = ffs(mac_policy_offsets_free);
if (slot == 0) {
MAC_POLICY_LIST_UNLOCK();
return (ENOMEM);
}
slot--;
mac_policy_offsets_free &= ~(1 << slot);
*mpc->mpc_field_off = slot;
}
mpc->mpc_runtime_flags |= MPC_RUNTIME_FLAG_REGISTERED;
LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&mac_policy_list, mpc, mpc_list);
/* Per-policy initialization. */
if (mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_init != NULL)
(*(mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_init))(mpc);
MAC_POLICY_LIST_UNLOCK();
printf("Security policy loaded: %s (%s)\n", mpc->mpc_fullname,
mpc->mpc_name);
return (0);
}
static int
mac_policy_unregister(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc)
{
/*
* If we fail the load, we may get a request to unload. Check
* to see if we did the run-time registration, and if not,
* silently succeed.
*/
MAC_POLICY_LIST_EXCLUSIVE();
if ((mpc->mpc_runtime_flags & MPC_RUNTIME_FLAG_REGISTERED) == 0) {
MAC_POLICY_LIST_UNLOCK();
return (0);
}
#if 0
/*
* Don't allow unloading modules with private data.
*/
if (mpc->mpc_field_off != NULL) {
MAC_POLICY_LIST_UNLOCK();
return (EBUSY);
}
#endif
/*
* Only allow the unload to proceed if the module is unloadable
* by its own definition.
*/
if ((mpc->mpc_loadtime_flags & MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_UNLOADOK) == 0) {
MAC_POLICY_LIST_UNLOCK();
return (EBUSY);
}
if (mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_destroy != NULL)
(*(mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_destroy))(mpc);
LIST_REMOVE(mpc, mpc_list);
mpc->mpc_runtime_flags &= ~MPC_RUNTIME_FLAG_REGISTERED;
MAC_POLICY_LIST_UNLOCK();
printf("Security policy unload: %s (%s)\n", mpc->mpc_fullname,
mpc->mpc_name);
return (0);
}
/*
* Define an error value precedence, and given two arguments, selects the
* value with the higher precedence.
*/
static int
error_select(int error1, int error2)
{
/* Certain decision-making errors take top priority. */
if (error1 == EDEADLK || error2 == EDEADLK)
return (EDEADLK);
/* Invalid arguments should be reported where possible. */
if (error1 == EINVAL || error2 == EINVAL)
return (EINVAL);
/* Precedence goes to "visibility", with both process and file. */
if (error1 == ESRCH || error2 == ESRCH)
return (ESRCH);
if (error1 == ENOENT || error2 == ENOENT)
return (ENOENT);
/* Precedence goes to DAC/MAC protections. */
if (error1 == EACCES || error2 == EACCES)
return (EACCES);
/* Precedence goes to privilege. */
if (error1 == EPERM || error2 == EPERM)
return (EPERM);
/* Precedence goes to error over success; otherwise, arbitrary. */
if (error1 != 0)
return (error1);
return (error2);
}
static void
mac_init_label(struct label *label)
{
bzero(label, sizeof(*label));
label->l_flags = MAC_FLAG_INITIALIZED;
}
static void
mac_destroy_label(struct label *label)
{
KASSERT(label->l_flags & MAC_FLAG_INITIALIZED,
("destroying uninitialized label"));
bzero(label, sizeof(*label));
/* implicit: label->l_flags &= ~MAC_FLAG_INITIALIZED; */
}
void
mac_init_bpfdesc(struct bpf_d *bpf_d)
{
mac_init_label(&bpf_d->bd_label);
MAC_PERFORM(init_bpfdesc_label, &bpf_d->bd_label);
#ifdef MAC_DEBUG
atomic_add_int(&nmacbpfdescs, 1);
#endif
}
static void
mac_init_cred_label(struct label *label)
{
mac_init_label(label);
MAC_PERFORM(init_cred_label, label);
#ifdef MAC_DEBUG
atomic_add_int(&nmaccreds, 1);
#endif
}
void
mac_init_cred(struct ucred *cred)
{
mac_init_cred_label(&cred->cr_label);
}
void
mac_init_devfsdirent(struct devfs_dirent *de)
{
mac_init_label(&de->de_label);
MAC_PERFORM(init_devfsdirent_label, &de->de_label);
#ifdef MAC_DEBUG
atomic_add_int(&nmacdevfsdirents, 1);
#endif
}
static void
mac_init_ifnet_label(struct label *label)
{
mac_init_label(label);
MAC_PERFORM(init_ifnet_label, label);
#ifdef MAC_DEBUG
atomic_add_int(&nmacifnets, 1);
#endif
}
void
mac_init_ifnet(struct ifnet *ifp)
{
mac_init_ifnet_label(&ifp->if_label);
}
void
mac_init_ipq(struct ipq *ipq)
{
mac_init_label(&ipq->ipq_label);
MAC_PERFORM(init_ipq_label, &ipq->ipq_label);
#ifdef MAC_DEBUG
atomic_add_int(&nmacipqs, 1);
#endif
}
int
mac_init_mbuf(struct mbuf *m, int flag)
{
int error;
KASSERT(m->m_flags & M_PKTHDR, ("mac_init_mbuf on non-header mbuf"));
mac_init_label(&m->m_pkthdr.label);
MAC_CHECK(init_mbuf_label, &m->m_pkthdr.label, flag);
if (error) {
MAC_PERFORM(destroy_mbuf_label, &m->m_pkthdr.label);
mac_destroy_label(&m->m_pkthdr.label);
}
#ifdef MAC_DEBUG
if (error == 0)
atomic_add_int(&nmacmbufs, 1);
#endif
return (error);
}
void
mac_init_mount(struct mount *mp)
{
mac_init_label(&mp->mnt_mntlabel);
mac_init_label(&mp->mnt_fslabel);
MAC_PERFORM(init_mount_label, &mp->mnt_mntlabel);
MAC_PERFORM(init_mount_fs_label, &mp->mnt_fslabel);
#ifdef MAC_DEBUG
atomic_add_int(&nmacmounts, 1);
#endif
}
static void
mac_init_pipe_label(struct label *label)
{
mac_init_label(label);
MAC_PERFORM(init_pipe_label, label);
#ifdef MAC_DEBUG
atomic_add_int(&nmacpipes, 1);
#endif
}
void
mac_init_pipe(struct pipe *pipe)
{
struct label *label;
label = malloc(sizeof(struct label), M_MACPIPELABEL, M_ZERO|M_WAITOK);
pipe->pipe_label = label;
pipe->pipe_peer->pipe_label = label;
mac_init_pipe_label(label);
}
void
mac_init_proc(struct proc *p)
{
mac_init_label(&p->p_label);
MAC_PERFORM(init_proc_label, &p->p_label);
#ifdef MAC_DEBUG
atomic_add_int(&nmacprocs, 1);
#endif
}
static int
mac_init_socket_label(struct label *label, int flag)
{
int error;
mac_init_label(label);
MAC_CHECK(init_socket_label, label, flag);
if (error) {
MAC_PERFORM(destroy_socket_label, label);
mac_destroy_label(label);
}
#ifdef MAC_DEBUG
if (error == 0)
atomic_add_int(&nmacsockets, 1);
#endif
return (error);
}
static int
mac_init_socket_peer_label(struct label *label, int flag)
{
int error;
mac_init_label(label);
MAC_CHECK(init_socket_peer_label, label, flag);
if (error) {
MAC_PERFORM(destroy_socket_label, label);
mac_destroy_label(label);
}
return (error);
}
int
mac_init_socket(struct socket *socket, int flag)
{
int error;
error = mac_init_socket_label(&socket->so_label, flag);
if (error)
return (error);
error = mac_init_socket_peer_label(&socket->so_peerlabel, flag);
if (error)
mac_destroy_socket_label(&socket->so_label);
return (error);
}
void
mac_init_vnode_label(struct label *label)
{
mac_init_label(label);
MAC_PERFORM(init_vnode_label, label);
#ifdef MAC_DEBUG
atomic_add_int(&nmacvnodes, 1);
#endif
}
void
mac_init_vnode(struct vnode *vp)
{
mac_init_vnode_label(&vp->v_label);
}
void
mac_destroy_bpfdesc(struct bpf_d *bpf_d)
{
MAC_PERFORM(destroy_bpfdesc_label, &bpf_d->bd_label);
mac_destroy_label(&bpf_d->bd_label);
#ifdef MAC_DEBUG
atomic_subtract_int(&nmacbpfdescs, 1);
#endif
}
static void
mac_destroy_cred_label(struct label *label)
{
MAC_PERFORM(destroy_cred_label, label);
mac_destroy_label(label);
#ifdef MAC_DEBUG
atomic_subtract_int(&nmaccreds, 1);
#endif
}
void
mac_destroy_cred(struct ucred *cred)
{
mac_destroy_cred_label(&cred->cr_label);
}
void
mac_destroy_devfsdirent(struct devfs_dirent *de)
{
MAC_PERFORM(destroy_devfsdirent_label, &de->de_label);
mac_destroy_label(&de->de_label);
#ifdef MAC_DEBUG
atomic_subtract_int(&nmacdevfsdirents, 1);
#endif
}
static void
mac_destroy_ifnet_label(struct label *label)
{
MAC_PERFORM(destroy_ifnet_label, label);
mac_destroy_label(label);
#ifdef MAC_DEBUG
atomic_subtract_int(&nmacifnets, 1);
#endif
}
void
mac_destroy_ifnet(struct ifnet *ifp)
{
mac_destroy_ifnet_label(&ifp->if_label);
}
void
mac_destroy_ipq(struct ipq *ipq)
{
MAC_PERFORM(destroy_ipq_label, &ipq->ipq_label);
mac_destroy_label(&ipq->ipq_label);
#ifdef MAC_DEBUG
atomic_subtract_int(&nmacipqs, 1);
#endif
}
void
mac_destroy_mbuf(struct mbuf *m)
{
MAC_PERFORM(destroy_mbuf_label, &m->m_pkthdr.label);
mac_destroy_label(&m->m_pkthdr.label);
#ifdef MAC_DEBUG
atomic_subtract_int(&nmacmbufs, 1);
#endif
}
void
mac_destroy_mount(struct mount *mp)
{
MAC_PERFORM(destroy_mount_label, &mp->mnt_mntlabel);
MAC_PERFORM(destroy_mount_fs_label, &mp->mnt_fslabel);
mac_destroy_label(&mp->mnt_fslabel);
mac_destroy_label(&mp->mnt_mntlabel);
#ifdef MAC_DEBUG
atomic_subtract_int(&nmacmounts, 1);
#endif
}
static void
mac_destroy_pipe_label(struct label *label)
{
MAC_PERFORM(destroy_pipe_label, label);
mac_destroy_label(label);
#ifdef MAC_DEBUG
atomic_subtract_int(&nmacpipes, 1);
#endif
}
void
mac_destroy_pipe(struct pipe *pipe)
{
mac_destroy_pipe_label(pipe->pipe_label);
free(pipe->pipe_label, M_MACPIPELABEL);
}
void
mac_destroy_proc(struct proc *p)
{
MAC_PERFORM(destroy_proc_label, &p->p_label);
mac_destroy_label(&p->p_label);
#ifdef MAC_DEBUG
atomic_subtract_int(&nmacprocs, 1);
#endif
}
static void
mac_destroy_socket_label(struct label *label)
{
MAC_PERFORM(destroy_socket_label, label);
mac_destroy_label(label);
#ifdef MAC_DEBUG
atomic_subtract_int(&nmacsockets, 1);
#endif
}
static void
mac_destroy_socket_peer_label(struct label *label)
{
MAC_PERFORM(destroy_socket_peer_label, label);
mac_destroy_label(label);
}
void
mac_destroy_socket(struct socket *socket)
{
mac_destroy_socket_label(&socket->so_label);
mac_destroy_socket_peer_label(&socket->so_peerlabel);
}
void
mac_destroy_vnode_label(struct label *label)
{
MAC_PERFORM(destroy_vnode_label, label);
mac_destroy_label(label);
#ifdef MAC_DEBUG
atomic_subtract_int(&nmacvnodes, 1);
#endif
}
void
mac_destroy_vnode(struct vnode *vp)
{
mac_destroy_vnode_label(&vp->v_label);
}
static void
mac_copy_pipe_label(struct label *src, struct label *dest)
{
MAC_PERFORM(copy_pipe_label, src, dest);
}
void
mac_copy_vnode_label(struct label *src, struct label *dest)
{
MAC_PERFORM(copy_vnode_label, src, dest);
}
static int
mac_check_structmac_consistent(struct mac *mac)
{
if (mac->m_buflen > MAC_MAX_LABEL_BUF_LEN)
return (EINVAL);
return (0);
}
static int
mac_externalize_cred_label(struct label *label, char *elements,
char *outbuf, size_t outbuflen, int flags)
{
int error;
MAC_EXTERNALIZE(cred_label, label, elements, outbuf, outbuflen);
return (error);
}
static int
mac_externalize_ifnet_label(struct label *label, char *elements,
char *outbuf, size_t outbuflen, int flags)
{
int error;
MAC_EXTERNALIZE(ifnet_label, label, elements, outbuf, outbuflen);
return (error);
}
static int
mac_externalize_pipe_label(struct label *label, char *elements,
char *outbuf, size_t outbuflen, int flags)
{
int error;
MAC_EXTERNALIZE(pipe_label, label, elements, outbuf, outbuflen);
return (error);
}
static int
mac_externalize_socket_label(struct label *label, char *elements,
char *outbuf, size_t outbuflen, int flags)
{
int error;
MAC_EXTERNALIZE(socket_label, label, elements, outbuf, outbuflen);
return (error);
}
static int
mac_externalize_socket_peer_label(struct label *label, char *elements,
char *outbuf, size_t outbuflen, int flags)
{
int error;
MAC_EXTERNALIZE(socket_peer_label, label, elements, outbuf, outbuflen);
return (error);
}
static int
mac_externalize_vnode_label(struct label *label, char *elements,
char *outbuf, size_t outbuflen, int flags)
{
int error;
MAC_EXTERNALIZE(vnode_label, label, elements, outbuf, outbuflen);
return (error);
}
static int
mac_internalize_cred_label(struct label *label, char *string)
{
int error;
MAC_INTERNALIZE(cred_label, label, string);
return (error);
}
static int
mac_internalize_ifnet_label(struct label *label, char *string)
{
int error;
MAC_INTERNALIZE(ifnet_label, label, string);
return (error);
}
static int
mac_internalize_pipe_label(struct label *label, char *string)
{
int error;
MAC_INTERNALIZE(pipe_label, label, string);
return (error);
}
static int
mac_internalize_socket_label(struct label *label, char *string)
{
int error;
MAC_INTERNALIZE(socket_label, label, string);
return (error);
}
static int
mac_internalize_vnode_label(struct label *label, char *string)
{
int error;
MAC_INTERNALIZE(vnode_label, label, string);
return (error);
}
/*
* Initialize MAC label for the first kernel process, from which other
* kernel processes and threads are spawned.
*/
void
mac_create_proc0(struct ucred *cred)
{
MAC_PERFORM(create_proc0, cred);
}
/*
* Initialize MAC label for the first userland process, from which other
* userland processes and threads are spawned.
*/
void
mac_create_proc1(struct ucred *cred)
{
MAC_PERFORM(create_proc1, cred);
}
void
mac_thread_userret(struct thread *td)
{
MAC_PERFORM(thread_userret, td);
}
/*
* When a new process is created, its label must be initialized. Generally,
* this involves inheritence from the parent process, modulo possible
* deltas. This function allows that processing to take place.
*/
void
mac_create_cred(struct ucred *parent_cred, struct ucred *child_cred)
{
MAC_PERFORM(create_cred, parent_cred, child_cred);
}
void
mac_update_devfsdirent(struct devfs_dirent *de, struct vnode *vp)
{
MAC_PERFORM(update_devfsdirent, de, &de->de_label, vp, &vp->v_label);
}
void
mac_associate_vnode_devfs(struct mount *mp, struct devfs_dirent *de,
struct vnode *vp)
{
MAC_PERFORM(associate_vnode_devfs, mp, &mp->mnt_fslabel, de,
&de->de_label, vp, &vp->v_label);
}
int
mac_associate_vnode_extattr(struct mount *mp, struct vnode *vp)
{
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_associate_vnode_extattr");
MAC_CHECK(associate_vnode_extattr, mp, &mp->mnt_fslabel, vp,
&vp->v_label);
return (error);
}
void
mac_associate_vnode_singlelabel(struct mount *mp, struct vnode *vp)
{
MAC_PERFORM(associate_vnode_singlelabel, mp, &mp->mnt_fslabel, vp,
&vp->v_label);
}
int
mac_create_vnode_extattr(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp,
struct vnode *dvp, struct vnode *vp, struct componentname *cnp)
{
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(dvp, "mac_create_vnode_extattr");
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_create_vnode_extattr");
error = VOP_OPENEXTATTR(vp, cred, curthread);
if (error == EOPNOTSUPP) {
/* XXX: Optionally abort if transactions not supported. */
if (ea_warn_once == 0) {
printf("Warning: transactions not supported "
"in EA write.\n");
ea_warn_once = 1;
}
} else if (error)
return (error);
MAC_CHECK(create_vnode_extattr, cred, mp, &mp->mnt_fslabel,
dvp, &dvp->v_label, vp, &vp->v_label, cnp);
if (error) {
VOP_CLOSEEXTATTR(vp, 0, NOCRED, curthread);
return (error);
}
error = VOP_CLOSEEXTATTR(vp, 1, NOCRED, curthread);
if (error == EOPNOTSUPP)
error = 0; /* XXX */
return (error);
}
static int
mac_setlabel_vnode_extattr(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *intlabel)
{
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_setlabel_vnode_extattr");
error = VOP_OPENEXTATTR(vp, cred, curthread);
if (error == EOPNOTSUPP) {
/* XXX: Optionally abort if transactions not supported. */
if (ea_warn_once == 0) {
printf("Warning: transactions not supported "
"in EA write.\n");
ea_warn_once = 1;
}
} else if (error)
return (error);
MAC_CHECK(setlabel_vnode_extattr, cred, vp, &vp->v_label, intlabel);
if (error) {
VOP_CLOSEEXTATTR(vp, 0, NOCRED, curthread);
return (error);
}
error = VOP_CLOSEEXTATTR(vp, 1, NOCRED, curthread);
if (error == EOPNOTSUPP)
error = 0; /* XXX */
return (error);
}
int
mac_execve_enter(struct image_params *imgp, struct mac *mac_p,
struct label *execlabelstorage)
{
struct mac mac;
char *buffer;
int error;
if (mac_p == NULL)
return (0);
error = copyin(mac_p, &mac, sizeof(mac));
if (error)
return (error);
error = mac_check_structmac_consistent(&mac);
if (error)
return (error);
buffer = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK);
error = copyinstr(mac.m_string, buffer, mac.m_buflen, NULL);
if (error) {
free(buffer, M_MACTEMP);
return (error);
}
mac_init_cred_label(execlabelstorage);
error = mac_internalize_cred_label(execlabelstorage, buffer);
free(buffer, M_MACTEMP);
if (error) {
mac_destroy_cred_label(execlabelstorage);
return (error);
}
imgp->execlabel = execlabelstorage;
return (0);
}
void
mac_execve_exit(struct image_params *imgp)
{
if (imgp->execlabel != NULL)
mac_destroy_cred_label(imgp->execlabel);
}
void
mac_execve_transition(struct ucred *old, struct ucred *new, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *interpvnodelabel, struct image_params *imgp)
{
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_execve_transition");
if (!mac_enforce_process && !mac_enforce_fs)
return;
MAC_PERFORM(execve_transition, old, new, vp, &vp->v_label,
interpvnodelabel, imgp, imgp->execlabel);
}
int
mac_execve_will_transition(struct ucred *old, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *interpvnodelabel, struct image_params *imgp)
{
int result;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_execve_will_transition");
if (!mac_enforce_process && !mac_enforce_fs)
return (0);
result = 0;
MAC_BOOLEAN(execve_will_transition, ||, old, vp, &vp->v_label,
interpvnodelabel, imgp, imgp->execlabel);
return (result);
}
int
mac_check_vnode_access(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, int acc_mode)
{
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_access");
if (!mac_enforce_fs)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_access, cred, vp, &vp->v_label, acc_mode);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_vnode_chdir(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp)
{
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(dvp, "mac_check_vnode_chdir");
if (!mac_enforce_fs)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_chdir, cred, dvp, &dvp->v_label);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_vnode_chroot(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp)
{
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(dvp, "mac_check_vnode_chroot");
if (!mac_enforce_fs)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_chroot, cred, dvp, &dvp->v_label);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_vnode_create(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
struct componentname *cnp, struct vattr *vap)
{
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(dvp, "mac_check_vnode_create");
if (!mac_enforce_fs)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_create, cred, dvp, &dvp->v_label, cnp, vap);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_vnode_delete(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp, struct vnode *vp,
struct componentname *cnp)
{
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(dvp, "mac_check_vnode_delete");
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_delete");
if (!mac_enforce_fs)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_delete, cred, dvp, &dvp->v_label, vp,
&vp->v_label, cnp);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_vnode_deleteacl(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
acl_type_t type)
{
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_deleteacl");
if (!mac_enforce_fs)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_deleteacl, cred, vp, &vp->v_label, type);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_vnode_exec(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct image_params *imgp)
{
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_exec");
if (!mac_enforce_process && !mac_enforce_fs)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_exec, cred, vp, &vp->v_label, imgp,
imgp->execlabel);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_vnode_getacl(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, acl_type_t type)
{
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_getacl");
if (!mac_enforce_fs)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_getacl, cred, vp, &vp->v_label, type);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_vnode_getextattr(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
int attrnamespace, const char *name, struct uio *uio)
{
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_getextattr");
if (!mac_enforce_fs)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_getextattr, cred, vp, &vp->v_label,
attrnamespace, name, uio);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_vnode_link(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
struct vnode *vp, struct componentname *cnp)
{
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(dvp, "mac_check_vnode_link");
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_link");
if (!mac_enforce_fs)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_link, cred, dvp, &dvp->v_label, vp,
&vp->v_label, cnp);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_vnode_lookup(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
struct componentname *cnp)
{
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(dvp, "mac_check_vnode_lookup");
if (!mac_enforce_fs)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_lookup, cred, dvp, &dvp->v_label, cnp);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_vnode_mmap(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, int prot)
{
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_mmap");
if (!mac_enforce_fs || !mac_enforce_vm)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_mmap, cred, vp, &vp->v_label, prot);
return (error);
}
void
mac_check_vnode_mmap_downgrade(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, int *prot)
{
int result = *prot;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_mmap_downgrade");
if (!mac_enforce_fs || !mac_enforce_vm)
return;
MAC_PERFORM(check_vnode_mmap_downgrade, cred, vp, &vp->v_label,
&result);
*prot = result;
}
int
mac_check_vnode_mprotect(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, int prot)
{
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_mprotect");
if (!mac_enforce_fs || !mac_enforce_vm)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_mprotect, cred, vp, &vp->v_label, prot);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_vnode_open(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, int acc_mode)
{
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_open");
if (!mac_enforce_fs)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_open, cred, vp, &vp->v_label, acc_mode);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_vnode_poll(struct ucred *active_cred, struct ucred *file_cred,
struct vnode *vp)
{
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_poll");
if (!mac_enforce_fs)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_poll, active_cred, file_cred, vp,
&vp->v_label);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_vnode_read(struct ucred *active_cred, struct ucred *file_cred,
struct vnode *vp)
{
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_read");
if (!mac_enforce_fs)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_read, active_cred, file_cred, vp,
&vp->v_label);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_vnode_readdir(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp)
{
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(dvp, "mac_check_vnode_readdir");
if (!mac_enforce_fs)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_readdir, cred, dvp, &dvp->v_label);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_vnode_readlink(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp)
{
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_readlink");
if (!mac_enforce_fs)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_readlink, cred, vp, &vp->v_label);
return (error);
}
static int
mac_check_vnode_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *newlabel)
{
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_relabel");
MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_relabel, cred, vp, &vp->v_label, newlabel);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_vnode_rename_from(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
struct vnode *vp, struct componentname *cnp)
{
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(dvp, "mac_check_vnode_rename_from");
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_rename_from");
if (!mac_enforce_fs)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_rename_from, cred, dvp, &dvp->v_label, vp,
&vp->v_label, cnp);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_vnode_rename_to(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
struct vnode *vp, int samedir, struct componentname *cnp)
{
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(dvp, "mac_check_vnode_rename_to");
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_rename_to");
if (!mac_enforce_fs)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_rename_to, cred, dvp, &dvp->v_label, vp,
vp != NULL ? &vp->v_label : NULL, samedir, cnp);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_vnode_revoke(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp)
{
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_revoke");
if (!mac_enforce_fs)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_revoke, cred, vp, &vp->v_label);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_vnode_setacl(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, acl_type_t type,
struct acl *acl)
{
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_setacl");
if (!mac_enforce_fs)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_setacl, cred, vp, &vp->v_label, type, acl);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_vnode_setextattr(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
int attrnamespace, const char *name, struct uio *uio)
{
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_setextattr");
if (!mac_enforce_fs)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_setextattr, cred, vp, &vp->v_label,
attrnamespace, name, uio);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_vnode_setflags(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, u_long flags)
{
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_setflags");
if (!mac_enforce_fs)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_setflags, cred, vp, &vp->v_label, flags);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_vnode_setmode(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, mode_t mode)
{
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_setmode");
if (!mac_enforce_fs)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_setmode, cred, vp, &vp->v_label, mode);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_vnode_setowner(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, uid_t uid,
gid_t gid)
{
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_setowner");
if (!mac_enforce_fs)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_setowner, cred, vp, &vp->v_label, uid, gid);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_vnode_setutimes(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct timespec atime, struct timespec mtime)
{
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_setutimes");
if (!mac_enforce_fs)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_setutimes, cred, vp, &vp->v_label, atime,
mtime);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_vnode_stat(struct ucred *active_cred, struct ucred *file_cred,
struct vnode *vp)
{
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_stat");
if (!mac_enforce_fs)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_stat, active_cred, file_cred, vp,
&vp->v_label);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_vnode_write(struct ucred *active_cred, struct ucred *file_cred,
struct vnode *vp)
{
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_vnode_write");
if (!mac_enforce_fs)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_vnode_write, active_cred, file_cred, vp,
&vp->v_label);
return (error);
}
/*
* When relabeling a process, call out to the policies for the maximum
* permission allowed for each object type we know about in its
* memory space, and revoke access (in the least surprising ways we
* know) when necessary. The process lock is not held here.
*/
void
mac_cred_mmapped_drop_perms(struct thread *td, struct ucred *cred)
{
/* XXX freeze all other threads */
mac_cred_mmapped_drop_perms_recurse(td, cred,
&td->td_proc->p_vmspace->vm_map);
/* XXX allow other threads to continue */
}
static __inline const char *
prot2str(vm_prot_t prot)
{
switch (prot & VM_PROT_ALL) {
case VM_PROT_READ:
return ("r--");
case VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_WRITE:
return ("rw-");
case VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_EXECUTE:
return ("r-x");
case VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_WRITE | VM_PROT_EXECUTE:
return ("rwx");
case VM_PROT_WRITE:
return ("-w-");
case VM_PROT_EXECUTE:
return ("--x");
case VM_PROT_WRITE | VM_PROT_EXECUTE:
return ("-wx");
default:
return ("---");
}
}
static void
mac_cred_mmapped_drop_perms_recurse(struct thread *td, struct ucred *cred,
struct vm_map *map)
{
struct vm_map_entry *vme;
int result;
vm_prot_t revokeperms;
vm_object_t object;
vm_ooffset_t offset;
struct vnode *vp;
if (!mac_mmap_revocation)
return;
vm_map_lock_read(map);
for (vme = map->header.next; vme != &map->header; vme = vme->next) {
if (vme->eflags & MAP_ENTRY_IS_SUB_MAP) {
mac_cred_mmapped_drop_perms_recurse(td, cred,
vme->object.sub_map);
continue;
}
/*
* Skip over entries that obviously are not shared.
*/
if (vme->eflags & (MAP_ENTRY_COW | MAP_ENTRY_NOSYNC) ||
!vme->max_protection)
continue;
/*
* Drill down to the deepest backing object.
*/
offset = vme->offset;
object = vme->object.vm_object;
if (object == NULL)
continue;
while (object->backing_object != NULL) {
object = object->backing_object;
offset += object->backing_object_offset;
}
/*
* At the moment, vm_maps and objects aren't considered
* by the MAC system, so only things with backing by a
* normal object (read: vnodes) are checked.
*/
if (object->type != OBJT_VNODE)
continue;
vp = (struct vnode *)object->handle;
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td);
result = vme->max_protection;
mac_check_vnode_mmap_downgrade(cred, vp, &result);
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td);
/*
* Find out what maximum protection we may be allowing
* now but a policy needs to get removed.
*/
revokeperms = vme->max_protection & ~result;
if (!revokeperms)
continue;
printf("pid %ld: revoking %s perms from %#lx:%ld "
"(max %s/cur %s)\n", (long)td->td_proc->p_pid,
prot2str(revokeperms), (u_long)vme->start,
(long)(vme->end - vme->start),
prot2str(vme->max_protection), prot2str(vme->protection));
vm_map_lock_upgrade(map);
/*
* This is the really simple case: if a map has more
* max_protection than is allowed, but it's not being
* actually used (that is, the current protection is
* still allowed), we can just wipe it out and do
* nothing more.
*/
if ((vme->protection & revokeperms) == 0) {
vme->max_protection -= revokeperms;
} else {
if (revokeperms & VM_PROT_WRITE) {
/*
* In the more complicated case, flush out all
* pending changes to the object then turn it
* copy-on-write.
*/
vm_object_reference(object);
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td);
vm_object_page_clean(object,
OFF_TO_IDX(offset),
OFF_TO_IDX(offset + vme->end - vme->start +
PAGE_MASK),
OBJPC_SYNC);
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td);
vm_object_deallocate(object);
/*
* Why bother if there's no read permissions
* anymore? For the rest, we need to leave
* the write permissions on for COW, or
* remove them entirely if configured to.
*/
if (!mac_mmap_revocation_via_cow) {
vme->max_protection &= ~VM_PROT_WRITE;
vme->protection &= ~VM_PROT_WRITE;
} if ((revokeperms & VM_PROT_READ) == 0)
vme->eflags |= MAP_ENTRY_COW |
MAP_ENTRY_NEEDS_COPY;
}
if (revokeperms & VM_PROT_EXECUTE) {
vme->max_protection &= ~VM_PROT_EXECUTE;
vme->protection &= ~VM_PROT_EXECUTE;
}
if (revokeperms & VM_PROT_READ) {
vme->max_protection = 0;
vme->protection = 0;
}
pmap_protect(map->pmap, vme->start, vme->end,
vme->protection & ~revokeperms);
vm_map_simplify_entry(map, vme);
}
vm_map_lock_downgrade(map);
}
vm_map_unlock_read(map);
}
/*
* When the subject's label changes, it may require revocation of privilege
* to mapped objects. This can't be done on-the-fly later with a unified
* buffer cache.
*/
static void
mac_relabel_cred(struct ucred *cred, struct label *newlabel)
{
MAC_PERFORM(relabel_cred, cred, newlabel);
}
void
mac_relabel_vnode(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, struct label *newlabel)
{
MAC_PERFORM(relabel_vnode, cred, vp, &vp->v_label, newlabel);
}
void
mac_create_ifnet(struct ifnet *ifnet)
{
MAC_PERFORM(create_ifnet, ifnet, &ifnet->if_label);
}
void
mac_create_bpfdesc(struct ucred *cred, struct bpf_d *bpf_d)
{
MAC_PERFORM(create_bpfdesc, cred, bpf_d, &bpf_d->bd_label);
}
void
mac_create_socket(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *socket)
{
MAC_PERFORM(create_socket, cred, socket, &socket->so_label);
}
void
mac_create_pipe(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe)
{
MAC_PERFORM(create_pipe, cred, pipe, pipe->pipe_label);
}
void
mac_create_socket_from_socket(struct socket *oldsocket,
struct socket *newsocket)
{
MAC_PERFORM(create_socket_from_socket, oldsocket, &oldsocket->so_label,
newsocket, &newsocket->so_label);
}
static void
mac_relabel_socket(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *socket,
struct label *newlabel)
{
MAC_PERFORM(relabel_socket, cred, socket, &socket->so_label, newlabel);
}
static void
mac_relabel_pipe(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe, struct label *newlabel)
{
MAC_PERFORM(relabel_pipe, cred, pipe, pipe->pipe_label, newlabel);
}
void
mac_set_socket_peer_from_mbuf(struct mbuf *mbuf, struct socket *socket)
{
MAC_PERFORM(set_socket_peer_from_mbuf, mbuf, &mbuf->m_pkthdr.label,
socket, &socket->so_peerlabel);
}
void
mac_set_socket_peer_from_socket(struct socket *oldsocket,
struct socket *newsocket)
{
MAC_PERFORM(set_socket_peer_from_socket, oldsocket,
&oldsocket->so_label, newsocket, &newsocket->so_peerlabel);
}
void
mac_create_datagram_from_ipq(struct ipq *ipq, struct mbuf *datagram)
{
MAC_PERFORM(create_datagram_from_ipq, ipq, &ipq->ipq_label,
datagram, &datagram->m_pkthdr.label);
}
void
mac_create_fragment(struct mbuf *datagram, struct mbuf *fragment)
{
MAC_PERFORM(create_fragment, datagram, &datagram->m_pkthdr.label,
fragment, &fragment->m_pkthdr.label);
}
void
mac_create_ipq(struct mbuf *fragment, struct ipq *ipq)
{
MAC_PERFORM(create_ipq, fragment, &fragment->m_pkthdr.label, ipq,
&ipq->ipq_label);
}
void
mac_create_mbuf_from_mbuf(struct mbuf *oldmbuf, struct mbuf *newmbuf)
{
MAC_PERFORM(create_mbuf_from_mbuf, oldmbuf, &oldmbuf->m_pkthdr.label,
newmbuf, &newmbuf->m_pkthdr.label);
}
void
mac_create_mbuf_from_bpfdesc(struct bpf_d *bpf_d, struct mbuf *mbuf)
{
MAC_PERFORM(create_mbuf_from_bpfdesc, bpf_d, &bpf_d->bd_label, mbuf,
&mbuf->m_pkthdr.label);
}
void
mac_create_mbuf_linklayer(struct ifnet *ifnet, struct mbuf *mbuf)
{
MAC_PERFORM(create_mbuf_linklayer, ifnet, &ifnet->if_label, mbuf,
&mbuf->m_pkthdr.label);
}
void
mac_create_mbuf_from_ifnet(struct ifnet *ifnet, struct mbuf *mbuf)
{
MAC_PERFORM(create_mbuf_from_ifnet, ifnet, &ifnet->if_label, mbuf,
&mbuf->m_pkthdr.label);
}
void
mac_create_mbuf_multicast_encap(struct mbuf *oldmbuf, struct ifnet *ifnet,
struct mbuf *newmbuf)
{
MAC_PERFORM(create_mbuf_multicast_encap, oldmbuf,
&oldmbuf->m_pkthdr.label, ifnet, &ifnet->if_label, newmbuf,
&newmbuf->m_pkthdr.label);
}
void
mac_create_mbuf_netlayer(struct mbuf *oldmbuf, struct mbuf *newmbuf)
{
MAC_PERFORM(create_mbuf_netlayer, oldmbuf, &oldmbuf->m_pkthdr.label,
newmbuf, &newmbuf->m_pkthdr.label);
}
int
mac_fragment_match(struct mbuf *fragment, struct ipq *ipq)
{
int result;
result = 1;
MAC_BOOLEAN(fragment_match, &&, fragment, &fragment->m_pkthdr.label,
ipq, &ipq->ipq_label);
return (result);
}
void
mac_update_ipq(struct mbuf *fragment, struct ipq *ipq)
{
MAC_PERFORM(update_ipq, fragment, &fragment->m_pkthdr.label, ipq,
&ipq->ipq_label);
}
void
mac_create_mbuf_from_socket(struct socket *socket, struct mbuf *mbuf)
{
MAC_PERFORM(create_mbuf_from_socket, socket, &socket->so_label, mbuf,
&mbuf->m_pkthdr.label);
}
void
mac_create_mount(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp)
{
MAC_PERFORM(create_mount, cred, mp, &mp->mnt_mntlabel,
&mp->mnt_fslabel);
}
void
mac_create_root_mount(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp)
{
MAC_PERFORM(create_root_mount, cred, mp, &mp->mnt_mntlabel,
&mp->mnt_fslabel);
}
int
mac_check_bpfdesc_receive(struct bpf_d *bpf_d, struct ifnet *ifnet)
{
int error;
if (!mac_enforce_network)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_bpfdesc_receive, bpf_d, &bpf_d->bd_label, ifnet,
&ifnet->if_label);
return (error);
}
static int
mac_check_cred_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct label *newlabel)
{
int error;
MAC_CHECK(check_cred_relabel, cred, newlabel);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_cred_visible(struct ucred *u1, struct ucred *u2)
{
int error;
if (!mac_enforce_process)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_cred_visible, u1, u2);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_ifnet_transmit(struct ifnet *ifnet, struct mbuf *mbuf)
{
int error;
if (!mac_enforce_network)
return (0);
KASSERT(mbuf->m_flags & M_PKTHDR, ("packet has no pkthdr"));
if (!(mbuf->m_pkthdr.label.l_flags & MAC_FLAG_INITIALIZED))
if_printf(ifnet, "not initialized\n");
MAC_CHECK(check_ifnet_transmit, ifnet, &ifnet->if_label, mbuf,
&mbuf->m_pkthdr.label);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_kenv_dump(struct ucred *cred)
{
int error;
if (!mac_enforce_system)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_kenv_dump, cred);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_kenv_get(struct ucred *cred, char *name)
{
int error;
if (!mac_enforce_system)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_kenv_get, cred, name);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_kenv_set(struct ucred *cred, char *name, char *value)
{
int error;
if (!mac_enforce_system)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_kenv_set, cred, name, value);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_kenv_unset(struct ucred *cred, char *name)
{
int error;
if (!mac_enforce_system)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_kenv_unset, cred, name);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_kld_load(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp)
{
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_kld_load");
if (!mac_enforce_kld)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_kld_load, cred, vp, &vp->v_label);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_kld_stat(struct ucred *cred)
{
int error;
if (!mac_enforce_kld)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_kld_stat, cred);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_kld_unload(struct ucred *cred)
{
int error;
if (!mac_enforce_kld)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_kld_unload, cred);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_mount_stat(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mount)
{
int error;
if (!mac_enforce_fs)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_mount_stat, cred, mount, &mount->mnt_mntlabel);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_pipe_ioctl(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe, unsigned long cmd,
void *data)
{
int error;
PIPE_LOCK_ASSERT(pipe, MA_OWNED);
if (!mac_enforce_pipe)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_pipe_ioctl, cred, pipe, pipe->pipe_label, cmd, data);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_pipe_poll(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe)
{
int error;
PIPE_LOCK_ASSERT(pipe, MA_OWNED);
if (!mac_enforce_pipe)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_pipe_poll, cred, pipe, pipe->pipe_label);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_pipe_read(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe)
{
int error;
PIPE_LOCK_ASSERT(pipe, MA_OWNED);
if (!mac_enforce_pipe)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_pipe_read, cred, pipe, pipe->pipe_label);
return (error);
}
static int
mac_check_pipe_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,
struct label *newlabel)
{
int error;
PIPE_LOCK_ASSERT(pipe, MA_OWNED);
if (!mac_enforce_pipe)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_pipe_relabel, cred, pipe, pipe->pipe_label, newlabel);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_pipe_stat(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe)
{
int error;
PIPE_LOCK_ASSERT(pipe, MA_OWNED);
if (!mac_enforce_pipe)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_pipe_stat, cred, pipe, pipe->pipe_label);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_pipe_write(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe)
{
int error;
PIPE_LOCK_ASSERT(pipe, MA_OWNED);
if (!mac_enforce_pipe)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_pipe_write, cred, pipe, pipe->pipe_label);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_proc_debug(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc)
{
int error;
PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(proc, MA_OWNED);
if (!mac_enforce_process)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_proc_debug, cred, proc);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_proc_sched(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc)
{
int error;
PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(proc, MA_OWNED);
if (!mac_enforce_process)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_proc_sched, cred, proc);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_proc_signal(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc, int signum)
{
int error;
PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(proc, MA_OWNED);
if (!mac_enforce_process)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_proc_signal, cred, proc, signum);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_socket_bind(struct ucred *ucred, struct socket *socket,
struct sockaddr *sockaddr)
{
int error;
if (!mac_enforce_socket)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_socket_bind, ucred, socket, &socket->so_label,
sockaddr);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_socket_connect(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *socket,
struct sockaddr *sockaddr)
{
int error;
if (!mac_enforce_socket)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_socket_connect, cred, socket, &socket->so_label,
sockaddr);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_socket_deliver(struct socket *socket, struct mbuf *mbuf)
{
int error;
if (!mac_enforce_socket)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_socket_deliver, socket, &socket->so_label, mbuf,
&mbuf->m_pkthdr.label);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_socket_listen(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *socket)
{
int error;
if (!mac_enforce_socket)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_socket_listen, cred, socket, &socket->so_label);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_socket_receive(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so)
{
int error;
if (!mac_enforce_socket)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_socket_receive, cred, so, &so->so_label);
return (error);
}
static int
mac_check_socket_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *socket,
struct label *newlabel)
{
int error;
MAC_CHECK(check_socket_relabel, cred, socket, &socket->so_label,
newlabel);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_socket_send(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so)
{
int error;
if (!mac_enforce_socket)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_socket_send, cred, so, &so->so_label);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_socket_visible(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *socket)
{
int error;
if (!mac_enforce_socket)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_socket_visible, cred, socket, &socket->so_label);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_system_acct(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp)
{
int error;
if (vp != NULL) {
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_system_acct");
}
if (!mac_enforce_system)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_system_acct, cred, vp,
vp != NULL ? &vp->v_label : NULL);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_system_nfsd(struct ucred *cred)
{
int error;
if (!mac_enforce_system)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_system_nfsd, cred);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_system_reboot(struct ucred *cred, int howto)
{
int error;
if (!mac_enforce_system)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_system_reboot, cred, howto);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_system_settime(struct ucred *cred)
{
int error;
if (!mac_enforce_system)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_system_settime, cred);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_system_swapon(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp)
{
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_system_swapon");
if (!mac_enforce_system)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_system_swapon, cred, vp, &vp->v_label);
return (error);
}
int
mac_check_system_sysctl(struct ucred *cred, int *name, u_int namelen,
void *old, size_t *oldlenp, int inkernel, void *new, size_t newlen)
{
int error;
/*
* XXXMAC: We're very much like to assert the SYSCTL_LOCK here,
* but since it's not exported from kern_sysctl.c, we can't.
*/
if (!mac_enforce_system)
return (0);
MAC_CHECK(check_system_sysctl, cred, name, namelen, old, oldlenp,
inkernel, new, newlen);
return (error);
}
int
mac_ioctl_ifnet_get(struct ucred *cred, struct ifreq *ifr,
struct ifnet *ifnet)
{
char *elements, *buffer;
struct mac mac;
int error;
error = copyin(ifr->ifr_ifru.ifru_data, &mac, sizeof(mac));
if (error)
return (error);
error = mac_check_structmac_consistent(&mac);
if (error)
return (error);
elements = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK);
error = copyinstr(mac.m_string, elements, mac.m_buflen, NULL);
if (error) {
free(elements, M_MACTEMP);
return (error);
}
buffer = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
error = mac_externalize_ifnet_label(&ifnet->if_label, elements,
buffer, mac.m_buflen, M_WAITOK);
if (error == 0)
error = copyout(buffer, mac.m_string, strlen(buffer)+1);
free(buffer, M_MACTEMP);
free(elements, M_MACTEMP);
return (error);
}
int
mac_ioctl_ifnet_set(struct ucred *cred, struct ifreq *ifr,
struct ifnet *ifnet)
{
struct label intlabel;
struct mac mac;
char *buffer;
int error;
error = copyin(ifr->ifr_ifru.ifru_data, &mac, sizeof(mac));
if (error)
return (error);
error = mac_check_structmac_consistent(&mac);
if (error)
return (error);
buffer = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK);
error = copyinstr(mac.m_string, buffer, mac.m_buflen, NULL);
if (error) {
free(buffer, M_MACTEMP);
return (error);
}
mac_init_ifnet_label(&intlabel);
error = mac_internalize_ifnet_label(&intlabel, buffer);
free(buffer, M_MACTEMP);
if (error) {
mac_destroy_ifnet_label(&intlabel);
return (error);
}
/*
* XXX: Note that this is a redundant privilege check, since
* policies impose this check themselves if required by the
* policy. Eventually, this should go away.
*/
error = suser_cred(cred, 0);
if (error) {
mac_destroy_ifnet_label(&intlabel);
return (error);
}
MAC_CHECK(check_ifnet_relabel, cred, ifnet, &ifnet->if_label,
&intlabel);
if (error) {
mac_destroy_ifnet_label(&intlabel);
return (error);
}
MAC_PERFORM(relabel_ifnet, cred, ifnet, &ifnet->if_label, &intlabel);
mac_destroy_ifnet_label(&intlabel);
return (0);
}
void
mac_create_devfs_device(dev_t dev, struct devfs_dirent *de)
{
MAC_PERFORM(create_devfs_device, dev, de, &de->de_label);
}
void
mac_create_devfs_symlink(struct ucred *cred, struct devfs_dirent *dd,
struct devfs_dirent *de)
{
MAC_PERFORM(create_devfs_symlink, cred, dd, &dd->de_label, de,
&de->de_label);
}
void
mac_create_devfs_directory(char *dirname, int dirnamelen,
struct devfs_dirent *de)
{
MAC_PERFORM(create_devfs_directory, dirname, dirnamelen, de,
&de->de_label);
}
int
mac_setsockopt_label_set(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so,
struct mac *mac)
{
struct label intlabel;
char *buffer;
int error;
error = mac_check_structmac_consistent(mac);
if (error)
return (error);
buffer = malloc(mac->m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK);
error = copyinstr(mac->m_string, buffer, mac->m_buflen, NULL);
if (error) {
free(buffer, M_MACTEMP);
return (error);
}
mac_init_socket_label(&intlabel, M_WAITOK);
error = mac_internalize_socket_label(&intlabel, buffer);
free(buffer, M_MACTEMP);
if (error) {
mac_destroy_socket_label(&intlabel);
return (error);
}
mac_check_socket_relabel(cred, so, &intlabel);
if (error) {
mac_destroy_socket_label(&intlabel);
return (error);
}
mac_relabel_socket(cred, so, &intlabel);
mac_destroy_socket_label(&intlabel);
return (0);
}
int
mac_pipe_label_set(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe, struct label *label)
{
int error;
PIPE_LOCK_ASSERT(pipe, MA_OWNED);
error = mac_check_pipe_relabel(cred, pipe, label);
if (error)
return (error);
mac_relabel_pipe(cred, pipe, label);
return (0);
}
int
mac_getsockopt_label_get(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so,
struct mac *mac)
{
char *buffer, *elements;
int error;
error = mac_check_structmac_consistent(mac);
if (error)
return (error);
elements = malloc(mac->m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK);
error = copyinstr(mac->m_string, elements, mac->m_buflen, NULL);
if (error) {
free(elements, M_MACTEMP);
return (error);
}
buffer = malloc(mac->m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
error = mac_externalize_socket_label(&so->so_label, elements,
buffer, mac->m_buflen, M_WAITOK);
if (error == 0)
error = copyout(buffer, mac->m_string, strlen(buffer)+1);
free(buffer, M_MACTEMP);
free(elements, M_MACTEMP);
return (error);
}
int
mac_getsockopt_peerlabel_get(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so,
struct mac *mac)
{
char *elements, *buffer;
int error;
error = mac_check_structmac_consistent(mac);
if (error)
return (error);
elements = malloc(mac->m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK);
error = copyinstr(mac->m_string, elements, mac->m_buflen, NULL);
if (error) {
free(elements, M_MACTEMP);
return (error);
}
buffer = malloc(mac->m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
error = mac_externalize_socket_peer_label(&so->so_peerlabel,
elements, buffer, mac->m_buflen, M_WAITOK);
if (error == 0)
error = copyout(buffer, mac->m_string, strlen(buffer)+1);
free(buffer, M_MACTEMP);
free(elements, M_MACTEMP);
return (error);
}
/*
* Implementation of VOP_SETLABEL() that relies on extended attributes
* to store label data. Can be referenced by filesystems supporting
* extended attributes.
*/
int
vop_stdsetlabel_ea(struct vop_setlabel_args *ap)
{
struct vnode *vp = ap->a_vp;
struct label *intlabel = ap->a_label;
int error;
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "vop_stdsetlabel_ea");
if ((vp->v_mount->mnt_flag & MNT_MULTILABEL) == 0)
return (EOPNOTSUPP);
error = mac_setlabel_vnode_extattr(ap->a_cred, vp, intlabel);
if (error)
return (error);
mac_relabel_vnode(ap->a_cred, vp, intlabel);
return (0);
}
static int
vn_setlabel(struct vnode *vp, struct label *intlabel, struct ucred *cred)
{
int error;
if (vp->v_mount == NULL) {
/* printf("vn_setlabel: null v_mount\n"); */
if (vp->v_type != VNON)
printf("vn_setlabel: null v_mount with non-VNON\n");
return (EBADF);
}
if ((vp->v_mount->mnt_flag & MNT_MULTILABEL) == 0)
return (EOPNOTSUPP);
/*
* Multi-phase commit. First check the policies to confirm the
* change is OK. Then commit via the filesystem. Finally,
* update the actual vnode label. Question: maybe the filesystem
* should update the vnode at the end as part of VOP_SETLABEL()?
*/
error = mac_check_vnode_relabel(cred, vp, intlabel);
if (error)
return (error);
/*
* VADMIN provides the opportunity for the filesystem to make
* decisions about who is and is not able to modify labels
* and protections on files. This might not be right. We can't
* assume VOP_SETLABEL() will do it, because we might implement
* that as part of vop_stdsetlabel_ea().
*/
error = VOP_ACCESS(vp, VADMIN, cred, curthread);
if (error)
return (error);
error = VOP_SETLABEL(vp, intlabel, cred, curthread);
if (error)
return (error);
return (0);
}
int
__mac_get_pid(struct thread *td, struct __mac_get_pid_args *uap)
{
char *elements, *buffer;
struct mac mac;
struct proc *tproc;
struct ucred *tcred;
int error;
error = copyin(SCARG(uap, mac_p), &mac, sizeof(mac));
if (error)
return (error);
error = mac_check_structmac_consistent(&mac);
if (error)
return (error);
tproc = pfind(uap->pid);
if (tproc == NULL)
return (ESRCH);
tcred = NULL; /* Satisfy gcc. */
error = p_cansee(td, tproc);
if (error == 0)
tcred = crhold(tproc->p_ucred);
PROC_UNLOCK(tproc);
if (error)
return (error);
elements = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK);
error = copyinstr(mac.m_string, elements, mac.m_buflen, NULL);
if (error) {
free(elements, M_MACTEMP);
crfree(tcred);
return (error);
}
buffer = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
error = mac_externalize_cred_label(&tcred->cr_label, elements,
buffer, mac.m_buflen, M_WAITOK);
if (error == 0)
error = copyout(buffer, mac.m_string, strlen(buffer)+1);
free(buffer, M_MACTEMP);
free(elements, M_MACTEMP);
crfree(tcred);
return (error);
}
/*
* MPSAFE
*/
int
__mac_get_proc(struct thread *td, struct __mac_get_proc_args *uap)
{
char *elements, *buffer;
struct mac mac;
int error;
error = copyin(uap->mac_p, &mac, sizeof(mac));
if (error)
return (error);
error = mac_check_structmac_consistent(&mac);
if (error)
return (error);
elements = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK);
error = copyinstr(mac.m_string, elements, mac.m_buflen, NULL);
if (error) {
free(elements, M_MACTEMP);
return (error);
}
buffer = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
error = mac_externalize_cred_label(&td->td_ucred->cr_label,
elements, buffer, mac.m_buflen, M_WAITOK);
if (error == 0)
error = copyout(buffer, mac.m_string, strlen(buffer)+1);
free(buffer, M_MACTEMP);
free(elements, M_MACTEMP);
return (error);
}
/*
* MPSAFE
*/
int
__mac_set_proc(struct thread *td, struct __mac_set_proc_args *uap)
{
struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred;
struct label intlabel;
struct proc *p;
struct mac mac;
char *buffer;
int error;
error = copyin(uap->mac_p, &mac, sizeof(mac));
if (error)
return (error);
error = mac_check_structmac_consistent(&mac);
if (error)
return (error);
buffer = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK);
error = copyinstr(mac.m_string, buffer, mac.m_buflen, NULL);
if (error) {
free(buffer, M_MACTEMP);
return (error);
}
mac_init_cred_label(&intlabel);
error = mac_internalize_cred_label(&intlabel, buffer);
free(buffer, M_MACTEMP);
if (error) {
mac_destroy_cred_label(&intlabel);
return (error);
}
newcred = crget();
p = td->td_proc;
PROC_LOCK(p);
oldcred = p->p_ucred;
error = mac_check_cred_relabel(oldcred, &intlabel);
if (error) {
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
crfree(newcred);
goto out;
}
setsugid(p);
crcopy(newcred, oldcred);
mac_relabel_cred(newcred, &intlabel);
p->p_ucred = newcred;
/*
* Grab additional reference for use while revoking mmaps, prior
* to releasing the proc lock and sharing the cred.
*/
crhold(newcred);
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
if (mac_enforce_vm) {
mtx_lock(&Giant);
mac_cred_mmapped_drop_perms(td, newcred);
mtx_unlock(&Giant);
}
crfree(newcred); /* Free revocation reference. */
crfree(oldcred);
out:
mac_destroy_cred_label(&intlabel);
return (error);
}
/*
* MPSAFE
*/
int
__mac_get_fd(struct thread *td, struct __mac_get_fd_args *uap)
{
char *elements, *buffer;
struct label intlabel;
struct file *fp;
struct mac mac;
struct vnode *vp;
struct pipe *pipe;
short label_type;
int error;
error = copyin(uap->mac_p, &mac, sizeof(mac));
if (error)
return (error);
error = mac_check_structmac_consistent(&mac);
if (error)
return (error);
elements = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK);
error = copyinstr(mac.m_string, elements, mac.m_buflen, NULL);
if (error) {
free(elements, M_MACTEMP);
return (error);
}
buffer = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
mtx_lock(&Giant); /* VFS */
error = fget(td, SCARG(uap, fd), &fp);
if (error)
goto out;
label_type = fp->f_type;
switch (fp->f_type) {
case DTYPE_FIFO:
case DTYPE_VNODE:
vp = (struct vnode *)fp->f_data;
mac_init_vnode_label(&intlabel);
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td);
mac_copy_vnode_label(&vp->v_label, &intlabel);
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td);
break;
case DTYPE_PIPE:
pipe = (struct pipe *)fp->f_data;
mac_init_pipe_label(&intlabel);
PIPE_LOCK(pipe);
mac_copy_pipe_label(pipe->pipe_label, &intlabel);
PIPE_UNLOCK(pipe);
break;
default:
error = EINVAL;
fdrop(fp, td);
goto out;
}
fdrop(fp, td);
switch (label_type) {
case DTYPE_FIFO:
case DTYPE_VNODE:
if (error == 0)
error = mac_externalize_vnode_label(&intlabel,
elements, buffer, mac.m_buflen, M_WAITOK);
mac_destroy_vnode_label(&intlabel);
break;
case DTYPE_PIPE:
error = mac_externalize_pipe_label(&intlabel, elements,
buffer, mac.m_buflen, M_WAITOK);
mac_destroy_pipe_label(&intlabel);
break;
default:
panic("__mac_get_fd: corrupted label_type");
}
if (error == 0)
error = copyout(buffer, mac.m_string, strlen(buffer)+1);
out:
mtx_unlock(&Giant); /* VFS */
free(buffer, M_MACTEMP);
free(elements, M_MACTEMP);
return (error);
}
/*
* MPSAFE
*/
int
__mac_get_file(struct thread *td, struct __mac_get_file_args *uap)
{
char *elements, *buffer;
struct nameidata nd;
struct label intlabel;
struct mac mac;
int error;
error = copyin(uap->mac_p, &mac, sizeof(mac));
if (error)
return (error);
error = mac_check_structmac_consistent(&mac);
if (error)
return (error);
elements = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK);
error = copyinstr(mac.m_string, elements, mac.m_buflen, NULL);
if (error) {
free(elements, M_MACTEMP);
return (error);
}
buffer = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
mtx_lock(&Giant); /* VFS */
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, LOCKLEAF | FOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->path_p,
td);
error = namei(&nd);
if (error)
goto out;
mac_init_vnode_label(&intlabel);
mac_copy_vnode_label(&nd.ni_vp->v_label, &intlabel);
error = mac_externalize_vnode_label(&intlabel, elements, buffer,
mac.m_buflen, M_WAITOK);
NDFREE(&nd, 0);
mac_destroy_vnode_label(&intlabel);
if (error == 0)
error = copyout(buffer, mac.m_string, strlen(buffer)+1);
out:
mtx_unlock(&Giant); /* VFS */
free(buffer, M_MACTEMP);
free(elements, M_MACTEMP);
return (error);
}
/*
* MPSAFE
*/
int
__mac_get_link(struct thread *td, struct __mac_get_link_args *uap)
{
char *elements, *buffer;
struct nameidata nd;
struct label intlabel;
struct mac mac;
int error;
error = copyin(uap->mac_p, &mac, sizeof(mac));
if (error)
return (error);
error = mac_check_structmac_consistent(&mac);
if (error)
return (error);
elements = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK);
error = copyinstr(mac.m_string, elements, mac.m_buflen, NULL);
if (error) {
free(elements, M_MACTEMP);
return (error);
}
buffer = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
mtx_lock(&Giant); /* VFS */
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, LOCKLEAF | NOFOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->path_p,
td);
error = namei(&nd);
if (error)
goto out;
mac_init_vnode_label(&intlabel);
mac_copy_vnode_label(&nd.ni_vp->v_label, &intlabel);
error = mac_externalize_vnode_label(&intlabel, elements, buffer,
mac.m_buflen, M_WAITOK);
NDFREE(&nd, 0);
mac_destroy_vnode_label(&intlabel);
if (error == 0)
error = copyout(buffer, mac.m_string, strlen(buffer)+1);
out:
mtx_unlock(&Giant); /* VFS */
free(buffer, M_MACTEMP);
free(elements, M_MACTEMP);
return (error);
}
/*
* MPSAFE
*/
int
__mac_set_fd(struct thread *td, struct __mac_set_fd_args *uap)
{
struct label intlabel;
struct pipe *pipe;
struct file *fp;
struct mount *mp;
struct vnode *vp;
struct mac mac;
char *buffer;
int error;
error = copyin(uap->mac_p, &mac, sizeof(mac));
if (error)
return (error);
error = mac_check_structmac_consistent(&mac);
if (error)
return (error);
buffer = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK);
error = copyinstr(mac.m_string, buffer, mac.m_buflen, NULL);
if (error) {
free(buffer, M_MACTEMP);
return (error);
}
mtx_lock(&Giant); /* VFS */
error = fget(td, SCARG(uap, fd), &fp);
if (error)
goto out;
switch (fp->f_type) {
case DTYPE_FIFO:
case DTYPE_VNODE:
mac_init_vnode_label(&intlabel);
error = mac_internalize_vnode_label(&intlabel, buffer);
if (error) {
mac_destroy_vnode_label(&intlabel);
break;
}
vp = (struct vnode *)fp->f_data;
error = vn_start_write(vp, &mp, V_WAIT | PCATCH);
if (error != 0) {
mac_destroy_vnode_label(&intlabel);
break;
}
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td);
error = vn_setlabel(vp, &intlabel, td->td_ucred);
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td);
vn_finished_write(mp);
mac_destroy_vnode_label(&intlabel);
break;
case DTYPE_PIPE:
mac_init_pipe_label(&intlabel);
error = mac_internalize_pipe_label(&intlabel, buffer);
if (error == 0) {
pipe = (struct pipe *)fp->f_data;
PIPE_LOCK(pipe);
error = mac_pipe_label_set(td->td_ucred, pipe,
&intlabel);
PIPE_UNLOCK(pipe);
}
mac_destroy_pipe_label(&intlabel);
break;
default:
error = EINVAL;
}
fdrop(fp, td);
out:
mtx_unlock(&Giant); /* VFS */
free(buffer, M_MACTEMP);
return (error);
}
/*
* MPSAFE
*/
int
__mac_set_file(struct thread *td, struct __mac_set_file_args *uap)
{
struct label intlabel;
struct nameidata nd;
struct mount *mp;
struct mac mac;
char *buffer;
int error;
error = copyin(uap->mac_p, &mac, sizeof(mac));
if (error)
return (error);
error = mac_check_structmac_consistent(&mac);
if (error)
return (error);
buffer = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK);
error = copyinstr(mac.m_string, buffer, mac.m_buflen, NULL);
if (error) {
free(buffer, M_MACTEMP);
return (error);
}
mac_init_vnode_label(&intlabel);
error = mac_internalize_vnode_label(&intlabel, buffer);
free(buffer, M_MACTEMP);
if (error) {
mac_destroy_vnode_label(&intlabel);
return (error);
}
mtx_lock(&Giant); /* VFS */
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, LOCKLEAF | FOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->path_p,
td);
error = namei(&nd);
if (error == 0) {
error = vn_start_write(nd.ni_vp, &mp, V_WAIT | PCATCH);
if (error == 0)
error = vn_setlabel(nd.ni_vp, &intlabel,
td->td_ucred);
vn_finished_write(mp);
}
NDFREE(&nd, 0);
mtx_unlock(&Giant); /* VFS */
mac_destroy_vnode_label(&intlabel);
return (error);
}
/*
* MPSAFE
*/
int
__mac_set_link(struct thread *td, struct __mac_set_link_args *uap)
{
struct label intlabel;
struct nameidata nd;
struct mount *mp;
struct mac mac;
char *buffer;
int error;
error = copyin(uap->mac_p, &mac, sizeof(mac));
if (error)
return (error);
error = mac_check_structmac_consistent(&mac);
if (error)
return (error);
buffer = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK);
error = copyinstr(mac.m_string, buffer, mac.m_buflen, NULL);
if (error) {
free(buffer, M_MACTEMP);
return (error);
}
mac_init_vnode_label(&intlabel);
error = mac_internalize_vnode_label(&intlabel, buffer);
free(buffer, M_MACTEMP);
if (error) {
mac_destroy_vnode_label(&intlabel);
return (error);
}
mtx_lock(&Giant); /* VFS */
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, LOCKLEAF | NOFOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->path_p,
td);
error = namei(&nd);
if (error == 0) {
error = vn_start_write(nd.ni_vp, &mp, V_WAIT | PCATCH);
if (error == 0)
error = vn_setlabel(nd.ni_vp, &intlabel,
td->td_ucred);
vn_finished_write(mp);
}
NDFREE(&nd, 0);
mtx_unlock(&Giant); /* VFS */
mac_destroy_vnode_label(&intlabel);
return (error);
}
/*
* MPSAFE
*/
int
mac_syscall(struct thread *td, struct mac_syscall_args *uap)
{
struct mac_policy_conf *mpc;
char target[MAC_MAX_POLICY_NAME];
int error;
error = copyinstr(SCARG(uap, policy), target, sizeof(target), NULL);
if (error)
return (error);
error = ENOSYS;
MAC_POLICY_LIST_BUSY();
LIST_FOREACH(mpc, &mac_policy_list, mpc_list) {
if (strcmp(mpc->mpc_name, target) == 0 &&
mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_syscall != NULL) {
error = mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_syscall(td,
SCARG(uap, call), SCARG(uap, arg));
goto out;
}
}
out:
MAC_POLICY_LIST_UNBUSY();
return (error);
}
SYSINIT(mac, SI_SUB_MAC, SI_ORDER_FIRST, mac_init, NULL);
SYSINIT(mac_late, SI_SUB_MAC_LATE, SI_ORDER_FIRST, mac_late_init, NULL);
#else /* !MAC */
int
__mac_get_pid(struct thread *td, struct __mac_get_pid_args *uap)
{
return (ENOSYS);
}
int
__mac_get_proc(struct thread *td, struct __mac_get_proc_args *uap)
{
return (ENOSYS);
}
int
__mac_set_proc(struct thread *td, struct __mac_set_proc_args *uap)
{
return (ENOSYS);
}
int
__mac_get_fd(struct thread *td, struct __mac_get_fd_args *uap)
{
return (ENOSYS);
}
int
__mac_get_file(struct thread *td, struct __mac_get_file_args *uap)
{
return (ENOSYS);
}
int
__mac_get_link(struct thread *td, struct __mac_get_link_args *uap)
{
return (ENOSYS);
}
int
__mac_set_fd(struct thread *td, struct __mac_set_fd_args *uap)
{
return (ENOSYS);
}
int
__mac_set_file(struct thread *td, struct __mac_set_file_args *uap)
{
return (ENOSYS);
}
int
__mac_set_link(struct thread *td, struct __mac_set_link_args *uap)
{
return (ENOSYS);
}
int
mac_syscall(struct thread *td, struct mac_syscall_args *uap)
{
return (ENOSYS);
}
#endif
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