freebsd-skq/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c
Kris Kennaway a09221f83c Patches backported from later development version of OpenSSH which prevent
(instead of just mitigating through connection limits) the Bleichenbacher
attack which can lead to guessing of the server key (not host key) by
regenerating it when an RSA failure is detected.

Reviewed by:	rwatson
2001-02-12 06:44:51 +00:00

826 lines
20 KiB
C

/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.37 2000/09/21 11:07:51 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* The authentication agent program.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
* SSH2 implementation,
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.37 2000/09/21 11:07:51 markus Exp $");
RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
#include "ssh.h"
#include "rsa.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "bufaux.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "getput.h"
#include "mpaux.h"
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include "key.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "dsa.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "compat.h"
typedef struct {
int fd;
enum {
AUTH_UNUSED, AUTH_SOCKET, AUTH_CONNECTION
} type;
Buffer input;
Buffer output;
} SocketEntry;
unsigned int sockets_alloc = 0;
SocketEntry *sockets = NULL;
typedef struct {
Key *key;
char *comment;
} Identity;
typedef struct {
int nentries;
Identity *identities;
} Idtab;
/* private key table, one per protocol version */
Idtab idtable[3];
int max_fd = 0;
/* pid of shell == parent of agent */
pid_t parent_pid = -1;
/* pathname and directory for AUTH_SOCKET */
char socket_name[1024];
char socket_dir[1024];
extern char *__progname;
void
idtab_init(void)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i <=2; i++){
idtable[i].identities = NULL;
idtable[i].nentries = 0;
}
}
/* return private key table for requested protocol version */
Idtab *
idtab_lookup(int version)
{
if (version < 1 || version > 2)
fatal("internal error, bad protocol version %d", version);
return &idtable[version];
}
/* return matching private key for given public key */
Key *
lookup_private_key(Key *key, int *idx, int version)
{
int i;
Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version);
for (i = 0; i < tab->nentries; i++) {
if (key_equal(key, tab->identities[i].key)) {
if (idx != NULL)
*idx = i;
return tab->identities[i].key;
}
}
return NULL;
}
/* send list of supported public keys to 'client' */
void
process_request_identities(SocketEntry *e, int version)
{
Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version);
Buffer msg;
int i;
buffer_init(&msg);
buffer_put_char(&msg, (version == 1) ?
SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER : SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER);
buffer_put_int(&msg, tab->nentries);
for (i = 0; i < tab->nentries; i++) {
Identity *id = &tab->identities[i];
if (id->key->type == KEY_RSA) {
buffer_put_int(&msg, BN_num_bits(id->key->rsa->n));
buffer_put_bignum(&msg, id->key->rsa->e);
buffer_put_bignum(&msg, id->key->rsa->n);
} else {
unsigned char *blob;
unsigned int blen;
dsa_make_key_blob(id->key, &blob, &blen);
buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen);
xfree(blob);
}
buffer_put_cstring(&msg, id->comment);
}
buffer_put_int(&e->output, buffer_len(&msg));
buffer_append(&e->output, buffer_ptr(&msg), buffer_len(&msg));
buffer_free(&msg);
}
/* ssh1 only */
void
process_authentication_challenge1(SocketEntry *e)
{
Key *key, *private;
BIGNUM *challenge;
int i, len;
Buffer msg;
MD5_CTX md;
unsigned char buf[32], mdbuf[16], session_id[16];
unsigned int response_type;
buffer_init(&msg);
key = key_new(KEY_RSA);
challenge = BN_new();
buffer_get_int(&e->input); /* ignored */
buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, key->rsa->e);
buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, key->rsa->n);
buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, challenge);
/* Only protocol 1.1 is supported */
if (buffer_len(&e->input) == 0)
goto failure;
buffer_get(&e->input, (char *) session_id, 16);
response_type = buffer_get_int(&e->input);
if (response_type != 1)
goto failure;
private = lookup_private_key(key, NULL, 1);
if (private != NULL) {
/* Decrypt the challenge using the private key. */
if (rsa_private_decrypt(challenge, challenge, private->rsa) <= 0)
goto failure;
/* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */
len = BN_num_bytes(challenge);
if (len <= 0 || len > 32) {
log("process_authentication_challenge: bad challenge length %d", len);
goto failure;
}
memset(buf, 0, 32);
BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + 32 - len);
MD5_Init(&md);
MD5_Update(&md, buf, 32);
MD5_Update(&md, session_id, 16);
MD5_Final(mdbuf, &md);
/* Send the response. */
buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE);
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
buffer_put_char(&msg, mdbuf[i]);
goto send;
}
failure:
/* Unknown identity or protocol error. Send failure. */
buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
send:
buffer_put_int(&e->output, buffer_len(&msg));
buffer_append(&e->output, buffer_ptr(&msg), buffer_len(&msg));
key_free(key);
BN_clear_free(challenge);
buffer_free(&msg);
}
/* ssh2 only */
void
process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e)
{
extern int datafellows;
Key *key, *private;
unsigned char *blob, *data, *signature = NULL;
unsigned int blen, dlen, slen = 0;
int flags;
Buffer msg;
int ok = -1;
datafellows = 0;
blob = buffer_get_string(&e->input, &blen);
data = buffer_get_string(&e->input, &dlen);
flags = buffer_get_int(&e->input);
if (flags & SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE)
datafellows = SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB;
key = dsa_key_from_blob(blob, blen);
if (key != NULL) {
private = lookup_private_key(key, NULL, 2);
if (private != NULL)
ok = dsa_sign(private, &signature, &slen, data, dlen);
}
key_free(key);
buffer_init(&msg);
if (ok == 0) {
buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE);
buffer_put_string(&msg, signature, slen);
} else {
buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
}
buffer_put_int(&e->output, buffer_len(&msg));
buffer_append(&e->output, buffer_ptr(&msg),
buffer_len(&msg));
buffer_free(&msg);
xfree(data);
xfree(blob);
if (signature != NULL)
xfree(signature);
}
/* shared */
void
process_remove_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version)
{
Key *key = NULL, *private;
unsigned char *blob;
unsigned int blen;
unsigned int bits;
int success = 0;
switch(version){
case 1:
key = key_new(KEY_RSA);
bits = buffer_get_int(&e->input);
buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, key->rsa->e);
buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, key->rsa->n);
if (bits != key_size(key))
log("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %d",
key_size(key), bits);
break;
case 2:
blob = buffer_get_string(&e->input, &blen);
key = dsa_key_from_blob(blob, blen);
xfree(blob);
break;
}
if (key != NULL) {
int idx;
private = lookup_private_key(key, &idx, version);
if (private != NULL) {
/*
* We have this key. Free the old key. Since we
* don\'t want to leave empty slots in the middle of
* the array, we actually free the key there and copy
* data from the last entry.
*/
Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version);
key_free(tab->identities[idx].key);
xfree(tab->identities[idx].comment);
if (idx != tab->nentries)
tab->identities[idx] = tab->identities[tab->nentries];
tab->nentries--;
success = 1;
}
key_free(key);
}
buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1);
buffer_put_char(&e->output,
success ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
}
void
process_remove_all_identities(SocketEntry *e, int version)
{
unsigned int i;
Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version);
/* Loop over all identities and clear the keys. */
for (i = 0; i < tab->nentries; i++) {
key_free(tab->identities[i].key);
xfree(tab->identities[i].comment);
}
/* Mark that there are no identities. */
tab->nentries = 0;
/* Send success. */
buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1);
buffer_put_char(&e->output, SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS);
return;
}
void
process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version)
{
Key *k = NULL;
RSA *rsa;
BIGNUM *aux;
BN_CTX *ctx;
char *type;
char *comment;
int success = 0;
Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version);
switch (version) {
case 1:
k = key_new(KEY_RSA);
rsa = k->rsa;
/* allocate mem for private key */
/* XXX rsa->n and rsa->e are already allocated */
rsa->d = BN_new();
rsa->iqmp = BN_new();
rsa->q = BN_new();
rsa->p = BN_new();
rsa->dmq1 = BN_new();
rsa->dmp1 = BN_new();
buffer_get_int(&e->input); /* ignored */
buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, rsa->n);
buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, rsa->e);
buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, rsa->d);
buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, rsa->iqmp);
/* SSH and SSL have p and q swapped */
buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, rsa->q); /* p */
buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, rsa->p); /* q */
/* Generate additional parameters */
aux = BN_new();
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
BN_sub(aux, rsa->q, BN_value_one());
BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, rsa->d, aux, ctx);
BN_sub(aux, rsa->p, BN_value_one());
BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, rsa->d, aux, ctx);
BN_clear_free(aux);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
break;
case 2:
type = buffer_get_string(&e->input, NULL);
if (strcmp(type, KEX_DSS)) {
buffer_clear(&e->input);
xfree(type);
goto send;
}
xfree(type);
k = key_new(KEY_DSA);
/* allocate mem for private key */
k->dsa->priv_key = BN_new();
buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->dsa->p);
buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->dsa->q);
buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->dsa->g);
buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->dsa->pub_key);
buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->dsa->priv_key);
break;
}
comment = buffer_get_string(&e->input, NULL);
if (k == NULL) {
xfree(comment);
goto send;
}
success = 1;
if (lookup_private_key(k, NULL, version) == NULL) {
if (tab->nentries == 0)
tab->identities = xmalloc(sizeof(Identity));
else
tab->identities = xrealloc(tab->identities,
(tab->nentries + 1) * sizeof(Identity));
tab->identities[tab->nentries].key = k;
tab->identities[tab->nentries].comment = comment;
/* Increment the number of identities. */
tab->nentries++;
} else {
key_free(k);
xfree(comment);
}
send:
buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1);
buffer_put_char(&e->output,
success ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
}
/* dispatch incoming messages */
void
process_message(SocketEntry *e)
{
unsigned int msg_len;
unsigned int type;
unsigned char *cp;
if (buffer_len(&e->input) < 5)
return; /* Incomplete message. */
cp = (unsigned char *) buffer_ptr(&e->input);
msg_len = GET_32BIT(cp);
if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) {
shutdown(e->fd, SHUT_RDWR);
close(e->fd);
e->type = AUTH_UNUSED;
return;
}
if (buffer_len(&e->input) < msg_len + 4)
return;
buffer_consume(&e->input, 4);
type = buffer_get_char(&e->input);
switch (type) {
/* ssh1 */
case SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE:
process_authentication_challenge1(e);
break;
case SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES:
process_request_identities(e, 1);
break;
case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY:
process_add_identity(e, 1);
break;
case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY:
process_remove_identity(e, 1);
break;
case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES:
process_remove_all_identities(e, 1);
break;
/* ssh2 */
case SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST:
process_sign_request2(e);
break;
case SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES:
process_request_identities(e, 2);
break;
case SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY:
process_add_identity(e, 2);
break;
case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY:
process_remove_identity(e, 2);
break;
case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES:
process_remove_all_identities(e, 2);
break;
default:
/* Unknown message. Respond with failure. */
error("Unknown message %d", type);
buffer_clear(&e->input);
buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1);
buffer_put_char(&e->output, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
break;
}
}
void
new_socket(int type, int fd)
{
unsigned int i, old_alloc;
if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) < 0)
error("fcntl O_NONBLOCK: %s", strerror(errno));
if (fd > max_fd)
max_fd = fd;
for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++)
if (sockets[i].type == AUTH_UNUSED) {
sockets[i].fd = fd;
sockets[i].type = type;
buffer_init(&sockets[i].input);
buffer_init(&sockets[i].output);
return;
}
old_alloc = sockets_alloc;
sockets_alloc += 10;
if (sockets)
sockets = xrealloc(sockets, sockets_alloc * sizeof(sockets[0]));
else
sockets = xmalloc(sockets_alloc * sizeof(sockets[0]));
for (i = old_alloc; i < sockets_alloc; i++)
sockets[i].type = AUTH_UNUSED;
sockets[old_alloc].type = type;
sockets[old_alloc].fd = fd;
buffer_init(&sockets[old_alloc].input);
buffer_init(&sockets[old_alloc].output);
}
void
prepare_select(fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++)
switch (sockets[i].type) {
case AUTH_SOCKET:
case AUTH_CONNECTION:
FD_SET(sockets[i].fd, readset);
if (buffer_len(&sockets[i].output) > 0)
FD_SET(sockets[i].fd, writeset);
break;
case AUTH_UNUSED:
break;
default:
fatal("Unknown socket type %d", sockets[i].type);
break;
}
}
void
after_select(fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
unsigned int i;
int len, sock;
socklen_t slen;
char buf[1024];
struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++)
switch (sockets[i].type) {
case AUTH_UNUSED:
break;
case AUTH_SOCKET:
if (FD_ISSET(sockets[i].fd, readset)) {
slen = sizeof(sunaddr);
sock = accept(sockets[i].fd, (struct sockaddr *) & sunaddr, &slen);
if (sock < 0) {
perror("accept from AUTH_SOCKET");
break;
}
new_socket(AUTH_CONNECTION, sock);
}
break;
case AUTH_CONNECTION:
if (buffer_len(&sockets[i].output) > 0 &&
FD_ISSET(sockets[i].fd, writeset)) {
len = write(sockets[i].fd, buffer_ptr(&sockets[i].output),
buffer_len(&sockets[i].output));
if (len <= 0) {
shutdown(sockets[i].fd, SHUT_RDWR);
close(sockets[i].fd);
sockets[i].type = AUTH_UNUSED;
buffer_free(&sockets[i].input);
buffer_free(&sockets[i].output);
break;
}
buffer_consume(&sockets[i].output, len);
}
if (FD_ISSET(sockets[i].fd, readset)) {
len = read(sockets[i].fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (len <= 0) {
shutdown(sockets[i].fd, SHUT_RDWR);
close(sockets[i].fd);
sockets[i].type = AUTH_UNUSED;
buffer_free(&sockets[i].input);
buffer_free(&sockets[i].output);
break;
}
buffer_append(&sockets[i].input, buf, len);
process_message(&sockets[i]);
}
break;
default:
fatal("Unknown type %d", sockets[i].type);
}
}
void
check_parent_exists(int sig)
{
if (parent_pid != -1 && kill(parent_pid, 0) < 0) {
/* printf("Parent has died - Authentication agent exiting.\n"); */
exit(1);
}
signal(SIGALRM, check_parent_exists);
alarm(10);
}
void
cleanup_socket(void)
{
remove(socket_name);
rmdir(socket_dir);
}
void
cleanup_exit(int i)
{
cleanup_socket();
exit(i);
}
void
usage()
{
fprintf(stderr, "ssh-agent version %s\n", SSH_VERSION);
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [-c | -s] [-k] [command {args...]]\n",
__progname);
exit(1);
}
int
main(int ac, char **av)
{
fd_set readset, writeset;
int sock, c_flag = 0, k_flag = 0, s_flag = 0, ch;
struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
pid_t pid;
char *shell, *format, *pidstr, pidstrbuf[1 + 3 * sizeof pid];
/* check if RSA support exists */
if (rsa_alive() == 0) {
fprintf(stderr,
"%s: no RSA support in libssl and libcrypto. See ssl(8).\n",
__progname);
exit(1);
}
while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cks")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
case 'c':
if (s_flag)
usage();
c_flag++;
break;
case 'k':
k_flag++;
break;
case 's':
if (c_flag)
usage();
s_flag++;
break;
default:
usage();
}
}
ac -= optind;
av += optind;
if (ac > 0 && (c_flag || k_flag || s_flag))
usage();
if (ac == 0 && !c_flag && !k_flag && !s_flag) {
shell = getenv("SHELL");
if (shell != NULL && strncmp(shell + strlen(shell) - 3, "csh", 3) == 0)
c_flag = 1;
}
if (k_flag) {
pidstr = getenv(SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
if (pidstr == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s not set, cannot kill agent\n",
SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
exit(1);
}
pid = atoi(pidstr);
if (pid < 1) { /* XXX PID_MAX check too */
/* Yes, PID_MAX check please */
fprintf(stderr, "%s=\"%s\", which is not a good PID\n",
SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstr);
exit(1);
}
if (kill(pid, SIGTERM) == -1) {
perror("kill");
exit(1);
}
format = c_flag ? "unsetenv %s;\n" : "unset %s;\n";
printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
printf(format, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
printf("echo Agent pid %d killed;\n", pid);
exit(0);
}
parent_pid = getpid();
/* Create private directory for agent socket */
strlcpy(socket_dir, "/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXX", sizeof socket_dir);
if (mkdtemp(socket_dir) == NULL) {
perror("mkdtemp: private socket dir");
exit(1);
}
snprintf(socket_name, sizeof socket_name, "%s/agent.%d", socket_dir,
parent_pid);
/*
* Create socket early so it will exist before command gets run from
* the parent.
*/
sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (sock < 0) {
perror("socket");
cleanup_exit(1);
}
memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr));
sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, socket_name, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path));
sunaddr.sun_len = SUN_LEN(&sunaddr) + 1;
if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sunaddr.sun_len) < 0) {
perror("bind");
cleanup_exit(1);
}
if (listen(sock, 5) < 0) {
perror("listen");
cleanup_exit(1);
}
/*
* Fork, and have the parent execute the command, if any, or present
* the socket data. The child continues as the authentication agent.
*/
pid = fork();
if (pid == -1) {
perror("fork");
exit(1);
}
if (pid != 0) { /* Parent - execute the given command. */
close(sock);
snprintf(pidstrbuf, sizeof pidstrbuf, "%d", pid);
if (ac == 0) {
format = c_flag ? "setenv %s %s;\n" : "%s=%s; export %s;\n";
printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name,
SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
printf(format, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstrbuf,
SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
printf("echo Agent pid %d;\n", pid);
exit(0);
}
if (setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name, 1) == -1 ||
setenv(SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstrbuf, 1) == -1) {
perror("setenv");
exit(1);
}
execvp(av[0], av);
perror(av[0]);
exit(1);
}
close(0);
close(1);
close(2);
if (setsid() == -1) {
perror("setsid");
cleanup_exit(1);
}
if (atexit(cleanup_socket) < 0) {
perror("atexit");
cleanup_exit(1);
}
new_socket(AUTH_SOCKET, sock);
if (ac > 0) {
signal(SIGALRM, check_parent_exists);
alarm(10);
}
idtab_init();
signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
signal(SIGHUP, cleanup_exit);
signal(SIGTERM, cleanup_exit);
while (1) {
FD_ZERO(&readset);
FD_ZERO(&writeset);
prepare_select(&readset, &writeset);
if (select(max_fd + 1, &readset, &writeset, NULL, NULL) < 0) {
if (errno == EINTR)
continue;
exit(1);
}
after_select(&readset, &writeset);
}
/* NOTREACHED */
}