f6d4a8a77b
Apple and from the OpenBSM vendor tree. Obtained from: Apple Inc., TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 3 days
488 lines
15 KiB
C
488 lines
15 KiB
C
/*-
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* Copyright (c) 1999-2005 Apple Inc.
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* Copyright (c) 2006-2008 Robert N. M. Watson
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. Neither the name of Apple Inc. ("Apple") nor the names of
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* its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
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* from this software without specific prior written permission.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY APPLE AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL APPLE OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR
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* ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING
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* IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
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* POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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#include <sys/cdefs.h>
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__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
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#include <sys/param.h>
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#include <sys/condvar.h>
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#include <sys/conf.h>
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#include <sys/file.h>
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#include <sys/filedesc.h>
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#include <sys/fcntl.h>
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#include <sys/ipc.h>
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#include <sys/kernel.h>
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#include <sys/kthread.h>
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#include <sys/malloc.h>
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#include <sys/mount.h>
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#include <sys/namei.h>
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#include <sys/proc.h>
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#include <sys/queue.h>
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#include <sys/socket.h>
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#include <sys/socketvar.h>
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#include <sys/protosw.h>
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#include <sys/domain.h>
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#include <sys/sx.h>
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#include <sys/sysproto.h>
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#include <sys/sysent.h>
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#include <sys/systm.h>
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#include <sys/ucred.h>
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#include <sys/uio.h>
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#include <sys/un.h>
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#include <sys/unistd.h>
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#include <sys/vnode.h>
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#include <bsm/audit.h>
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#include <bsm/audit_internal.h>
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#include <bsm/audit_kevents.h>
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#include <netinet/in.h>
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#include <netinet/in_pcb.h>
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#include <security/audit/audit.h>
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#include <security/audit/audit_private.h>
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#include <vm/uma.h>
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/*
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* Worker thread that will schedule disk I/O, etc.
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*/
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static struct proc *audit_thread;
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/*
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* audit_cred and audit_vp are the stored credential and vnode to use for
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* active audit trail. They are protected by audit_worker_sx, which will be
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* held across all I/O and all rotation to prevent them from being replaced
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* (rotated) while in use. The audit_file_rotate_wait flag is set when the
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* kernel has delivered a trigger to auditd to rotate the trail, and is
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* cleared when the next rotation takes place. It is also protected by
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* audit_worker_sx.
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*/
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static int audit_file_rotate_wait;
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static struct sx audit_worker_sx;
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static struct ucred *audit_cred;
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static struct vnode *audit_vp;
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/*
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* Write an audit record to a file, performed as the last stage after both
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* preselection and BSM conversion. Both space management and write failures
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* are handled in this function.
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*
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* No attempt is made to deal with possible failure to deliver a trigger to
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* the audit daemon, since the message is asynchronous anyway.
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*/
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static void
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audit_record_write(struct vnode *vp, struct ucred *cred, void *data,
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size_t len)
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{
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static struct timeval last_lowspace_trigger;
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static struct timeval last_fail;
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static int cur_lowspace_trigger;
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struct statfs *mnt_stat;
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int error, vfslocked;
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static int cur_fail;
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struct vattr vattr;
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long temp;
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sx_assert(&audit_worker_sx, SA_LOCKED); /* audit_file_rotate_wait. */
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if (vp == NULL)
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return;
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mnt_stat = &vp->v_mount->mnt_stat;
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vfslocked = VFS_LOCK_GIANT(vp->v_mount);
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/*
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* First, gather statistics on the audit log file and file system so
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* that we know how we're doing on space. Consider failure of these
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* operations to indicate a future inability to write to the file.
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*/
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error = VFS_STATFS(vp->v_mount, mnt_stat, curthread);
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if (error)
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goto fail;
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vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY);
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error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &vattr, cred, curthread);
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VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0);
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if (error)
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goto fail;
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audit_fstat.af_currsz = vattr.va_size;
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/*
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* We handle four different space-related limits:
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*
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* - A fixed (hard) limit on the minimum free blocks we require on
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* the file system, and results in record loss, a trigger, and
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* possible fail stop due to violating invariants.
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*
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* - An administrative (soft) limit, which when fallen below, results
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* in the kernel notifying the audit daemon of low space.
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*
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* - An audit trail size limit, which when gone above, results in the
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* kernel notifying the audit daemon that rotation is desired.
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*
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* - The total depth of the kernel audit record exceeding free space,
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* which can lead to possible fail stop (with drain), in order to
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* prevent violating invariants. Failure here doesn't halt
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* immediately, but prevents new records from being generated.
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*
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* Possibly, the last of these should be handled differently, always
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* allowing a full queue to be lost, rather than trying to prevent
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* loss.
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*
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* First, handle the hard limit, which generates a trigger and may
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* fail stop. This is handled in the same manner as ENOSPC from
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* VOP_WRITE, and results in record loss.
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*/
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if (mnt_stat->f_bfree < AUDIT_HARD_LIMIT_FREE_BLOCKS) {
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error = ENOSPC;
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goto fail_enospc;
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}
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/*
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* Second, handle falling below the soft limit, if defined; we send
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* the daemon a trigger and continue processing the record. Triggers
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* are limited to 1/sec.
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*/
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if (audit_qctrl.aq_minfree != 0) {
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temp = mnt_stat->f_blocks / (100 / audit_qctrl.aq_minfree);
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if (mnt_stat->f_bfree < temp) {
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if (ppsratecheck(&last_lowspace_trigger,
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&cur_lowspace_trigger, 1)) {
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(void)audit_send_trigger(
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AUDIT_TRIGGER_LOW_SPACE);
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printf("Warning: disk space low (< %d%% free) "
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"on audit log file-system\n",
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audit_qctrl.aq_minfree);
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}
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}
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}
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/*
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* If the current file is getting full, generate a rotation trigger
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* to the daemon. This is only approximate, which is fine as more
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* records may be generated before the daemon rotates the file.
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*/
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if ((audit_fstat.af_filesz != 0) && (audit_file_rotate_wait == 0) &&
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(vattr.va_size >= audit_fstat.af_filesz)) {
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sx_assert(&audit_worker_sx, SA_XLOCKED);
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audit_file_rotate_wait = 1;
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(void)audit_send_trigger(AUDIT_TRIGGER_ROTATE_KERNEL);
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}
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/*
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* If the estimated amount of audit data in the audit event queue
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* (plus records allocated but not yet queued) has reached the amount
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* of free space on the disk, then we need to go into an audit fail
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* stop state, in which we do not permit the allocation/committing of
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* any new audit records. We continue to process records but don't
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* allow any activities that might generate new records. In the
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* future, we might want to detect when space is available again and
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* allow operation to continue, but this behavior is sufficient to
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* meet fail stop requirements in CAPP.
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*/
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if (audit_fail_stop) {
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if ((unsigned long)((audit_q_len + audit_pre_q_len + 1) *
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MAX_AUDIT_RECORD_SIZE) / mnt_stat->f_bsize >=
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(unsigned long)(mnt_stat->f_bfree)) {
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if (ppsratecheck(&last_fail, &cur_fail, 1))
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printf("audit_record_write: free space "
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"below size of audit queue, failing "
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"stop\n");
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audit_in_failure = 1;
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} else if (audit_in_failure) {
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/*
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* Note: if we want to handle recovery, this is the
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* spot to do it: unset audit_in_failure, and issue a
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* wakeup on the cv.
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*/
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}
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}
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error = vn_rdwr(UIO_WRITE, vp, data, len, (off_t)0, UIO_SYSSPACE,
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IO_APPEND|IO_UNIT, cred, NULL, NULL, curthread);
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if (error == ENOSPC)
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goto fail_enospc;
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else if (error)
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goto fail;
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/*
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* Catch completion of a queue drain here; if we're draining and the
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* queue is now empty, fail stop. That audit_fail_stop is implicitly
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* true, since audit_in_failure can only be set of audit_fail_stop is
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* set.
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*
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* Note: if we handle recovery from audit_in_failure, then we need to
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* make panic here conditional.
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*/
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if (audit_in_failure) {
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if (audit_q_len == 0 && audit_pre_q_len == 0) {
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VOP_LOCK(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY);
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(void)VOP_FSYNC(vp, MNT_WAIT, curthread);
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VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0);
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panic("Audit store overflow; record queue drained.");
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}
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}
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VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
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return;
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fail_enospc:
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/*
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* ENOSPC is considered a special case with respect to failures, as
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* this can reflect either our preemptive detection of insufficient
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* space, or ENOSPC returned by the vnode write call.
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*/
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if (audit_fail_stop) {
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VOP_LOCK(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY);
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(void)VOP_FSYNC(vp, MNT_WAIT, curthread);
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VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0);
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panic("Audit log space exhausted and fail-stop set.");
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}
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(void)audit_send_trigger(AUDIT_TRIGGER_NO_SPACE);
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audit_suspended = 1;
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/* FALLTHROUGH */
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fail:
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/*
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* We have failed to write to the file, so the current record is
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* lost, which may require an immediate system halt.
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*/
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if (audit_panic_on_write_fail) {
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VOP_LOCK(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY);
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(void)VOP_FSYNC(vp, MNT_WAIT, curthread);
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VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0);
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panic("audit_worker: write error %d\n", error);
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} else if (ppsratecheck(&last_fail, &cur_fail, 1))
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printf("audit_worker: write error %d\n", error);
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VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
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}
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/*
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* Given a kernel audit record, process as required. Kernel audit records
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* are converted to one, or possibly two, BSM records, depending on whether
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* there is a user audit record present also. Kernel records need be
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* converted to BSM before they can be written out. Both types will be
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* written to disk, and audit pipes.
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*/
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static void
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audit_worker_process_record(struct kaudit_record *ar)
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{
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struct au_record *bsm;
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au_class_t class;
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au_event_t event;
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au_id_t auid;
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int error, sorf;
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int trail_locked;
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/*
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* We hold the audit_worker_sx lock over both writes, if there are
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* two, so that the two records won't be split across a rotation and
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* end up in two different trail files.
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*/
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if (((ar->k_ar_commit & AR_COMMIT_USER) &&
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(ar->k_ar_commit & AR_PRESELECT_USER_TRAIL)) ||
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(ar->k_ar_commit & AR_PRESELECT_TRAIL)) {
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sx_xlock(&audit_worker_sx);
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trail_locked = 1;
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} else
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trail_locked = 0;
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/*
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* First, handle the user record, if any: commit to the system trail
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* and audit pipes as selected.
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*/
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if ((ar->k_ar_commit & AR_COMMIT_USER) &&
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(ar->k_ar_commit & AR_PRESELECT_USER_TRAIL)) {
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sx_assert(&audit_worker_sx, SA_XLOCKED);
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audit_record_write(audit_vp, audit_cred, ar->k_udata,
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ar->k_ulen);
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}
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if ((ar->k_ar_commit & AR_COMMIT_USER) &&
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(ar->k_ar_commit & AR_PRESELECT_USER_PIPE))
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audit_pipe_submit_user(ar->k_udata, ar->k_ulen);
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if (!(ar->k_ar_commit & AR_COMMIT_KERNEL) ||
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((ar->k_ar_commit & AR_PRESELECT_PIPE) == 0 &&
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(ar->k_ar_commit & AR_PRESELECT_TRAIL) == 0))
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goto out;
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auid = ar->k_ar.ar_subj_auid;
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event = ar->k_ar.ar_event;
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class = au_event_class(event);
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if (ar->k_ar.ar_errno == 0)
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sorf = AU_PRS_SUCCESS;
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else
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sorf = AU_PRS_FAILURE;
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error = kaudit_to_bsm(ar, &bsm);
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switch (error) {
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case BSM_NOAUDIT:
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goto out;
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case BSM_FAILURE:
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printf("audit_worker_process_record: BSM_FAILURE\n");
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goto out;
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case BSM_SUCCESS:
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break;
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default:
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panic("kaudit_to_bsm returned %d", error);
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}
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if (ar->k_ar_commit & AR_PRESELECT_TRAIL) {
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sx_assert(&audit_worker_sx, SA_XLOCKED);
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audit_record_write(audit_vp, audit_cred, bsm->data, bsm->len);
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}
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if (ar->k_ar_commit & AR_PRESELECT_PIPE)
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audit_pipe_submit(auid, event, class, sorf,
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ar->k_ar_commit & AR_PRESELECT_TRAIL, bsm->data,
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bsm->len);
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kau_free(bsm);
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out:
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if (trail_locked)
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sx_xunlock(&audit_worker_sx);
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}
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/*
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* The audit_worker thread is responsible for watching the event queue,
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* dequeueing records, converting them to BSM format, and committing them to
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* disk. In order to minimize lock thrashing, records are dequeued in sets
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* to a thread-local work queue.
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*
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* Note: this means that the effect bound on the size of the pending record
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* queue is 2x the length of the global queue.
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*/
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static void
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audit_worker(void *arg)
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{
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struct kaudit_queue ar_worklist;
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struct kaudit_record *ar;
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int lowater_signal;
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TAILQ_INIT(&ar_worklist);
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mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
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while (1) {
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mtx_assert(&audit_mtx, MA_OWNED);
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/*
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* Wait for a record.
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*/
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while (TAILQ_EMPTY(&audit_q))
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cv_wait(&audit_worker_cv, &audit_mtx);
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/*
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* If there are records in the global audit record queue,
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* transfer them to a thread-local queue and process them
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* one by one. If we cross the low watermark threshold,
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* signal any waiting processes that they may wake up and
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* continue generating records.
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*/
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lowater_signal = 0;
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while ((ar = TAILQ_FIRST(&audit_q))) {
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TAILQ_REMOVE(&audit_q, ar, k_q);
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audit_q_len--;
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if (audit_q_len == audit_qctrl.aq_lowater)
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lowater_signal++;
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TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&ar_worklist, ar, k_q);
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}
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if (lowater_signal)
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cv_broadcast(&audit_watermark_cv);
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mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
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while ((ar = TAILQ_FIRST(&ar_worklist))) {
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TAILQ_REMOVE(&ar_worklist, ar, k_q);
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audit_worker_process_record(ar);
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audit_free(ar);
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}
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mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
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}
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}
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/*
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* audit_rotate_vnode() is called by a user or kernel thread to configure or
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* de-configure auditing on a vnode. The arguments are the replacement
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* credential (referenced) and vnode (referenced and opened) to substitute
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* for the current credential and vnode, if any. If either is set to NULL,
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* both should be NULL, and this is used to indicate that audit is being
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* disabled. Any previous cred/vnode will be closed and freed. We re-enable
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* generating rotation requests to auditd.
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*/
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void
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audit_rotate_vnode(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp)
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{
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struct ucred *old_audit_cred;
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struct vnode *old_audit_vp;
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int vfslocked;
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KASSERT((cred != NULL && vp != NULL) || (cred == NULL && vp == NULL),
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("audit_rotate_vnode: cred %p vp %p", cred, vp));
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/*
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* Rotate the vnode/cred, and clear the rotate flag so that we will
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* send a rotate trigger if the new file fills.
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*/
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sx_xlock(&audit_worker_sx);
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old_audit_cred = audit_cred;
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old_audit_vp = audit_vp;
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audit_cred = cred;
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audit_vp = vp;
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audit_file_rotate_wait = 0;
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audit_enabled = (audit_vp != NULL);
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sx_xunlock(&audit_worker_sx);
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/*
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* If there was an old vnode/credential, close and free.
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*/
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if (old_audit_vp != NULL) {
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vfslocked = VFS_LOCK_GIANT(old_audit_vp->v_mount);
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vn_close(old_audit_vp, AUDIT_CLOSE_FLAGS, old_audit_cred,
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curthread);
|
|
VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
|
|
crfree(old_audit_cred);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
audit_worker_init(void)
|
|
{
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
sx_init(&audit_worker_sx, "audit_worker_sx");
|
|
error = kproc_create(audit_worker, NULL, &audit_thread, RFHIGHPID,
|
|
0, "audit");
|
|
if (error)
|
|
panic("audit_worker_init: kproc_create returned %d", error);
|
|
}
|