cjc ed673bb689 It was possible for an unprivileged user to tie up the password ... information (no one else can vipw(8), chpass(1), or even passwd(1)), either on purpose or by accident, until an administrator manually intervened. Instead, do not lock the master.passwd file while a user is editing his information. But once we go to write the new information, check that the modified user's information has not changed in the password database since we started. Abort the changes if it has. Add a $FreeBSD$ to pw_copy.h. PR: i386/35816 Obtained from: NetBSD MFC after: 1 week		2002-03-18 02:22:53 +00:00
..
chpass.1	mdoc(7) police: s/BSD/.Bx/ where appropriate.	2001-08-14 10:01:54 +00:00
chpass.c	It was possible for an unprivileged user to tie up the password	2002-03-18 02:22:53 +00:00
chpass.h
edit.c	Prevent chpass(1) from writing -1 in the UID or GID fields	2001-07-26 23:27:10 +00:00
field.c	Tweaks to allow compiling -Wall (mostly adding "const" to char rcsid[]).	1998-12-06 22:58:23 +00:00
Makefile	Set BINOWN=root explicitly for setuid root binaries.	2001-09-13 06:48:18 +00:00
pathnames.h
pw_copy.c	It was possible for an unprivileged user to tie up the password	2002-03-18 02:22:53 +00:00
pw_copy.h	It was possible for an unprivileged user to tie up the password	2002-03-18 02:22:53 +00:00
pw_yp.c	ANSIfy and remove some dead code.	2002-02-06 15:26:07 +00:00
pw_yp.h	Apply the following mechanical transformations in preparation for	2002-02-06 13:30:31 +00:00
table.c	Change the prompt for the office location field from "Location:"	1999-02-23 02:41:26 +00:00
util.c	$Id$ -> $FreeBSD$	1999-08-28 01:08:13 +00:00