freebsd-skq/sys/security/audit/audit_syscalls.c
Pedro F. Giffuni 2e4eeb703a audit(8): leave unsigned comparison for last.
aq64_minfree is unsigned so comparing to find out if it is less
than zero is a nonsense. Move the comparison to the last position
as we don't want to spend time if any of the others triggers first.

hile it would be tempting to just remove it, it may be important to
keep  it for portability with platforms where may be signed(?) or
in case we may want to change it in the future.
2016-04-08 03:26:21 +00:00

874 lines
21 KiB
C

/*-
* Copyright (c) 1999-2009 Apple Inc.
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of Apple Inc. ("Apple") nor the names of
* its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
* from this software without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY APPLE AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL APPLE OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING
* IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
* POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/namei.h>
#include <sys/priv.h>
#include <sys/proc.h>
#include <sys/sysproto.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/vnode.h>
#include <sys/jail.h>
#include <bsm/audit.h>
#include <bsm/audit_kevents.h>
#include <security/audit/audit.h>
#include <security/audit/audit_private.h>
#include <security/mac/mac_framework.h>
#ifdef AUDIT
/*
* System call to allow a user space application to submit a BSM audit record
* to the kernel for inclusion in the audit log. This function does little
* verification on the audit record that is submitted.
*
* XXXAUDIT: Audit preselection for user records does not currently work,
* since we pre-select only based on the AUE_audit event type, not the event
* type submitted as part of the user audit data.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
int
sys_audit(struct thread *td, struct audit_args *uap)
{
int error;
void * rec;
struct kaudit_record *ar;
if (jailed(td->td_ucred))
return (ENOSYS);
error = priv_check(td, PRIV_AUDIT_SUBMIT);
if (error)
return (error);
if ((uap->length <= 0) || (uap->length > audit_qctrl.aq_bufsz))
return (EINVAL);
ar = currecord();
/*
* If there's no current audit record (audit() itself not audited)
* commit the user audit record.
*/
if (ar == NULL) {
/*
* This is not very efficient; we're required to allocate a
* complete kernel audit record just so the user record can
* tag along.
*
* XXXAUDIT: Maybe AUE_AUDIT in the system call context and
* special pre-select handling?
*/
td->td_ar = audit_new(AUE_NULL, td);
if (td->td_ar == NULL)
return (ENOTSUP);
td->td_pflags |= TDP_AUDITREC;
ar = td->td_ar;
}
if (uap->length > MAX_AUDIT_RECORD_SIZE)
return (EINVAL);
rec = malloc(uap->length, M_AUDITDATA, M_WAITOK);
error = copyin(uap->record, rec, uap->length);
if (error)
goto free_out;
/* Verify the record. */
if (bsm_rec_verify(rec) == 0) {
error = EINVAL;
goto free_out;
}
#ifdef MAC
error = mac_system_check_audit(td->td_ucred, rec, uap->length);
if (error)
goto free_out;
#endif
/*
* Attach the user audit record to the kernel audit record. Because
* this system call is an auditable event, we will write the user
* record along with the record for this audit event.
*
* XXXAUDIT: KASSERT appropriate starting values of k_udata, k_ulen,
* k_ar_commit & AR_COMMIT_USER?
*/
ar->k_udata = rec;
ar->k_ulen = uap->length;
ar->k_ar_commit |= AR_COMMIT_USER;
/*
* Currently we assume that all preselection has been performed in
* userspace. We unconditionally set these masks so that the records
* get committed both to the trail and pipe. In the future we will
* want to setup kernel based preselection.
*/
ar->k_ar_commit |= (AR_PRESELECT_USER_TRAIL | AR_PRESELECT_USER_PIPE);
return (0);
free_out:
/*
* audit_syscall_exit() will free the audit record on the thread even
* if we allocated it above.
*/
free(rec, M_AUDITDATA);
return (error);
}
/*
* System call to manipulate auditing.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
int
sys_auditon(struct thread *td, struct auditon_args *uap)
{
struct ucred *cred, *newcred, *oldcred;
int error;
union auditon_udata udata;
struct proc *tp;
if (jailed(td->td_ucred))
return (ENOSYS);
AUDIT_ARG_CMD(uap->cmd);
#ifdef MAC
error = mac_system_check_auditon(td->td_ucred, uap->cmd);
if (error)
return (error);
#endif
error = priv_check(td, PRIV_AUDIT_CONTROL);
if (error)
return (error);
if ((uap->length <= 0) || (uap->length > sizeof(union auditon_udata)))
return (EINVAL);
memset((void *)&udata, 0, sizeof(udata));
/*
* Some of the GET commands use the arguments too.
*/
switch (uap->cmd) {
case A_SETPOLICY:
case A_OLDSETPOLICY:
case A_SETKMASK:
case A_SETQCTRL:
case A_OLDSETQCTRL:
case A_SETSTAT:
case A_SETUMASK:
case A_SETSMASK:
case A_SETCOND:
case A_OLDSETCOND:
case A_SETCLASS:
case A_SETPMASK:
case A_SETFSIZE:
case A_SETKAUDIT:
case A_GETCLASS:
case A_GETPINFO:
case A_GETPINFO_ADDR:
case A_SENDTRIGGER:
error = copyin(uap->data, (void *)&udata, uap->length);
if (error)
return (error);
AUDIT_ARG_AUDITON(&udata);
break;
}
/*
* XXXAUDIT: Locking?
*/
switch (uap->cmd) {
case A_OLDGETPOLICY:
case A_GETPOLICY:
if (uap->length == sizeof(udata.au_policy64)) {
if (!audit_fail_stop)
udata.au_policy64 |= AUDIT_CNT;
if (audit_panic_on_write_fail)
udata.au_policy64 |= AUDIT_AHLT;
if (audit_argv)
udata.au_policy64 |= AUDIT_ARGV;
if (audit_arge)
udata.au_policy64 |= AUDIT_ARGE;
break;
}
if (uap->length != sizeof(udata.au_policy))
return (EINVAL);
if (!audit_fail_stop)
udata.au_policy |= AUDIT_CNT;
if (audit_panic_on_write_fail)
udata.au_policy |= AUDIT_AHLT;
if (audit_argv)
udata.au_policy |= AUDIT_ARGV;
if (audit_arge)
udata.au_policy |= AUDIT_ARGE;
break;
case A_OLDSETPOLICY:
case A_SETPOLICY:
if (uap->length == sizeof(udata.au_policy64)) {
if (udata.au_policy & (~AUDIT_CNT|AUDIT_AHLT|
AUDIT_ARGV|AUDIT_ARGE))
return (EINVAL);
audit_fail_stop = ((udata.au_policy64 & AUDIT_CNT) ==
0);
audit_panic_on_write_fail = (udata.au_policy64 &
AUDIT_AHLT);
audit_argv = (udata.au_policy64 & AUDIT_ARGV);
audit_arge = (udata.au_policy64 & AUDIT_ARGE);
break;
}
if (uap->length != sizeof(udata.au_policy))
return (EINVAL);
if (udata.au_policy & ~(AUDIT_CNT|AUDIT_AHLT|AUDIT_ARGV|
AUDIT_ARGE))
return (EINVAL);
/*
* XXX - Need to wake up waiters if the policy relaxes?
*/
audit_fail_stop = ((udata.au_policy & AUDIT_CNT) == 0);
audit_panic_on_write_fail = (udata.au_policy & AUDIT_AHLT);
audit_argv = (udata.au_policy & AUDIT_ARGV);
audit_arge = (udata.au_policy & AUDIT_ARGE);
break;
case A_GETKMASK:
if (uap->length != sizeof(udata.au_mask))
return (EINVAL);
udata.au_mask = audit_nae_mask;
break;
case A_SETKMASK:
if (uap->length != sizeof(udata.au_mask))
return (EINVAL);
audit_nae_mask = udata.au_mask;
break;
case A_OLDGETQCTRL:
case A_GETQCTRL:
if (uap->length == sizeof(udata.au_qctrl64)) {
udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_hiwater =
(u_int64_t)audit_qctrl.aq_hiwater;
udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_lowater =
(u_int64_t)audit_qctrl.aq_lowater;
udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_bufsz =
(u_int64_t)audit_qctrl.aq_bufsz;
udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_minfree =
(u_int64_t)audit_qctrl.aq_minfree;
break;
}
if (uap->length != sizeof(udata.au_qctrl))
return (EINVAL);
udata.au_qctrl = audit_qctrl;
break;
case A_OLDSETQCTRL:
case A_SETQCTRL:
if (uap->length == sizeof(udata.au_qctrl64)) {
if ((udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_hiwater > AQ_MAXHIGH) ||
(udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_lowater >=
udata.au_qctrl.aq_hiwater) ||
(udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_bufsz > AQ_MAXBUFSZ) ||
(udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_minfree > 100) ||
(udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_minfree < 0))
return (EINVAL);
audit_qctrl.aq_hiwater =
(int)udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_hiwater;
audit_qctrl.aq_lowater =
(int)udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_lowater;
audit_qctrl.aq_bufsz =
(int)udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_bufsz;
audit_qctrl.aq_minfree =
(int)udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_minfree;
audit_qctrl.aq_delay = -1; /* Not used. */
break;
}
if (uap->length != sizeof(udata.au_qctrl))
return (EINVAL);
if ((udata.au_qctrl.aq_hiwater > AQ_MAXHIGH) ||
(udata.au_qctrl.aq_lowater >= udata.au_qctrl.aq_hiwater) ||
(udata.au_qctrl.aq_bufsz > AQ_MAXBUFSZ) ||
(udata.au_qctrl.aq_minfree < 0) ||
(udata.au_qctrl.aq_minfree > 100))
return (EINVAL);
audit_qctrl = udata.au_qctrl;
/* XXX The queue delay value isn't used with the kernel. */
audit_qctrl.aq_delay = -1;
break;
case A_GETCWD:
return (ENOSYS);
break;
case A_GETCAR:
return (ENOSYS);
break;
case A_GETSTAT:
return (ENOSYS);
break;
case A_SETSTAT:
return (ENOSYS);
break;
case A_SETUMASK:
return (ENOSYS);
break;
case A_SETSMASK:
return (ENOSYS);
break;
case A_OLDGETCOND:
case A_GETCOND:
if (uap->length == sizeof(udata.au_cond64)) {
if (audit_enabled && !audit_suspended)
udata.au_cond64 = AUC_AUDITING;
else
udata.au_cond64 = AUC_NOAUDIT;
break;
}
if (uap->length != sizeof(udata.au_cond))
return (EINVAL);
if (audit_enabled && !audit_suspended)
udata.au_cond = AUC_AUDITING;
else
udata.au_cond = AUC_NOAUDIT;
break;
case A_OLDSETCOND:
case A_SETCOND:
if (uap->length == sizeof(udata.au_cond64)) {
if (udata.au_cond64 == AUC_NOAUDIT)
audit_suspended = 1;
if (udata.au_cond64 == AUC_AUDITING)
audit_suspended = 0;
if (udata.au_cond64 == AUC_DISABLED) {
audit_suspended = 1;
audit_shutdown(NULL, 0);
}
break;
}
if (uap->length != sizeof(udata.au_cond))
return (EINVAL);
if (udata.au_cond == AUC_NOAUDIT)
audit_suspended = 1;
if (udata.au_cond == AUC_AUDITING)
audit_suspended = 0;
if (udata.au_cond == AUC_DISABLED) {
audit_suspended = 1;
audit_shutdown(NULL, 0);
}
break;
case A_GETCLASS:
if (uap->length != sizeof(udata.au_evclass))
return (EINVAL);
udata.au_evclass.ec_class = au_event_class(
udata.au_evclass.ec_number);
break;
case A_SETCLASS:
if (uap->length != sizeof(udata.au_evclass))
return (EINVAL);
au_evclassmap_insert(udata.au_evclass.ec_number,
udata.au_evclass.ec_class);
break;
case A_GETPINFO:
if (uap->length != sizeof(udata.au_aupinfo))
return (EINVAL);
if (udata.au_aupinfo.ap_pid < 1)
return (ESRCH);
if ((tp = pfind(udata.au_aupinfo.ap_pid)) == NULL)
return (ESRCH);
if ((error = p_cansee(td, tp)) != 0) {
PROC_UNLOCK(tp);
return (error);
}
cred = tp->p_ucred;
if (cred->cr_audit.ai_termid.at_type == AU_IPv6) {
PROC_UNLOCK(tp);
return (EINVAL);
}
udata.au_aupinfo.ap_auid = cred->cr_audit.ai_auid;
udata.au_aupinfo.ap_mask.am_success =
cred->cr_audit.ai_mask.am_success;
udata.au_aupinfo.ap_mask.am_failure =
cred->cr_audit.ai_mask.am_failure;
udata.au_aupinfo.ap_termid.machine =
cred->cr_audit.ai_termid.at_addr[0];
udata.au_aupinfo.ap_termid.port =
(dev_t)cred->cr_audit.ai_termid.at_port;
udata.au_aupinfo.ap_asid = cred->cr_audit.ai_asid;
PROC_UNLOCK(tp);
break;
case A_SETPMASK:
if (uap->length != sizeof(udata.au_aupinfo))
return (EINVAL);
if (udata.au_aupinfo.ap_pid < 1)
return (ESRCH);
newcred = crget();
if ((tp = pfind(udata.au_aupinfo.ap_pid)) == NULL) {
crfree(newcred);
return (ESRCH);
}
if ((error = p_cansee(td, tp)) != 0) {
PROC_UNLOCK(tp);
crfree(newcred);
return (error);
}
oldcred = tp->p_ucred;
crcopy(newcred, oldcred);
newcred->cr_audit.ai_mask.am_success =
udata.au_aupinfo.ap_mask.am_success;
newcred->cr_audit.ai_mask.am_failure =
udata.au_aupinfo.ap_mask.am_failure;
proc_set_cred(tp, newcred);
PROC_UNLOCK(tp);
crfree(oldcred);
break;
case A_SETFSIZE:
if (uap->length != sizeof(udata.au_fstat))
return (EINVAL);
if ((udata.au_fstat.af_filesz != 0) &&
(udata.au_fstat.af_filesz < MIN_AUDIT_FILE_SIZE))
return (EINVAL);
audit_fstat.af_filesz = udata.au_fstat.af_filesz;
break;
case A_GETFSIZE:
if (uap->length != sizeof(udata.au_fstat))
return (EINVAL);
udata.au_fstat.af_filesz = audit_fstat.af_filesz;
udata.au_fstat.af_currsz = audit_fstat.af_currsz;
break;
case A_GETPINFO_ADDR:
if (uap->length != sizeof(udata.au_aupinfo_addr))
return (EINVAL);
if (udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_pid < 1)
return (ESRCH);
if ((tp = pfind(udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_pid)) == NULL)
return (ESRCH);
cred = tp->p_ucred;
udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_auid = cred->cr_audit.ai_auid;
udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_mask.am_success =
cred->cr_audit.ai_mask.am_success;
udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_mask.am_failure =
cred->cr_audit.ai_mask.am_failure;
udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_termid = cred->cr_audit.ai_termid;
udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_asid = cred->cr_audit.ai_asid;
PROC_UNLOCK(tp);
break;
case A_GETKAUDIT:
if (uap->length != sizeof(udata.au_kau_info))
return (EINVAL);
audit_get_kinfo(&udata.au_kau_info);
break;
case A_SETKAUDIT:
if (uap->length != sizeof(udata.au_kau_info))
return (EINVAL);
if (udata.au_kau_info.ai_termid.at_type != AU_IPv4 &&
udata.au_kau_info.ai_termid.at_type != AU_IPv6)
return (EINVAL);
audit_set_kinfo(&udata.au_kau_info);
break;
case A_SENDTRIGGER:
if (uap->length != sizeof(udata.au_trigger))
return (EINVAL);
if ((udata.au_trigger < AUDIT_TRIGGER_MIN) ||
(udata.au_trigger > AUDIT_TRIGGER_MAX))
return (EINVAL);
return (audit_send_trigger(udata.au_trigger));
default:
return (EINVAL);
}
/*
* Copy data back to userspace for the GET comands.
*/
switch (uap->cmd) {
case A_GETPOLICY:
case A_OLDGETPOLICY:
case A_GETKMASK:
case A_GETQCTRL:
case A_OLDGETQCTRL:
case A_GETCWD:
case A_GETCAR:
case A_GETSTAT:
case A_GETCOND:
case A_OLDGETCOND:
case A_GETCLASS:
case A_GETPINFO:
case A_GETFSIZE:
case A_GETPINFO_ADDR:
case A_GETKAUDIT:
error = copyout((void *)&udata, uap->data, uap->length);
if (error)
return (error);
break;
}
return (0);
}
/*
* System calls to manage the user audit information.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
int
sys_getauid(struct thread *td, struct getauid_args *uap)
{
int error;
if (jailed(td->td_ucred))
return (ENOSYS);
error = priv_check(td, PRIV_AUDIT_GETAUDIT);
if (error)
return (error);
return (copyout(&td->td_ucred->cr_audit.ai_auid, uap->auid,
sizeof(td->td_ucred->cr_audit.ai_auid)));
}
/* ARGSUSED */
int
sys_setauid(struct thread *td, struct setauid_args *uap)
{
struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred;
au_id_t id;
int error;
if (jailed(td->td_ucred))
return (ENOSYS);
error = copyin(uap->auid, &id, sizeof(id));
if (error)
return (error);
audit_arg_auid(id);
newcred = crget();
PROC_LOCK(td->td_proc);
oldcred = td->td_proc->p_ucred;
crcopy(newcred, oldcred);
#ifdef MAC
error = mac_cred_check_setauid(oldcred, id);
if (error)
goto fail;
#endif
error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_AUDIT_SETAUDIT, 0);
if (error)
goto fail;
newcred->cr_audit.ai_auid = id;
proc_set_cred(td->td_proc, newcred);
PROC_UNLOCK(td->td_proc);
crfree(oldcred);
return (0);
fail:
PROC_UNLOCK(td->td_proc);
crfree(newcred);
return (error);
}
/*
* System calls to get and set process audit information.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
int
sys_getaudit(struct thread *td, struct getaudit_args *uap)
{
struct auditinfo ai;
struct ucred *cred;
int error;
cred = td->td_ucred;
if (jailed(cred))
return (ENOSYS);
error = priv_check(td, PRIV_AUDIT_GETAUDIT);
if (error)
return (error);
if (cred->cr_audit.ai_termid.at_type == AU_IPv6)
return (E2BIG);
bzero(&ai, sizeof(ai));
ai.ai_auid = cred->cr_audit.ai_auid;
ai.ai_mask = cred->cr_audit.ai_mask;
ai.ai_asid = cred->cr_audit.ai_asid;
ai.ai_termid.machine = cred->cr_audit.ai_termid.at_addr[0];
ai.ai_termid.port = cred->cr_audit.ai_termid.at_port;
return (copyout(&ai, uap->auditinfo, sizeof(ai)));
}
/* ARGSUSED */
int
sys_setaudit(struct thread *td, struct setaudit_args *uap)
{
struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred;
struct auditinfo ai;
int error;
if (jailed(td->td_ucred))
return (ENOSYS);
error = copyin(uap->auditinfo, &ai, sizeof(ai));
if (error)
return (error);
audit_arg_auditinfo(&ai);
newcred = crget();
PROC_LOCK(td->td_proc);
oldcred = td->td_proc->p_ucred;
crcopy(newcred, oldcred);
#ifdef MAC
error = mac_cred_check_setaudit(oldcred, &ai);
if (error)
goto fail;
#endif
error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_AUDIT_SETAUDIT, 0);
if (error)
goto fail;
bzero(&newcred->cr_audit, sizeof(newcred->cr_audit));
newcred->cr_audit.ai_auid = ai.ai_auid;
newcred->cr_audit.ai_mask = ai.ai_mask;
newcred->cr_audit.ai_asid = ai.ai_asid;
newcred->cr_audit.ai_termid.at_addr[0] = ai.ai_termid.machine;
newcred->cr_audit.ai_termid.at_port = ai.ai_termid.port;
newcred->cr_audit.ai_termid.at_type = AU_IPv4;
proc_set_cred(td->td_proc, newcred);
PROC_UNLOCK(td->td_proc);
crfree(oldcred);
return (0);
fail:
PROC_UNLOCK(td->td_proc);
crfree(newcred);
return (error);
}
/* ARGSUSED */
int
sys_getaudit_addr(struct thread *td, struct getaudit_addr_args *uap)
{
int error;
if (jailed(td->td_ucred))
return (ENOSYS);
if (uap->length < sizeof(*uap->auditinfo_addr))
return (EOVERFLOW);
error = priv_check(td, PRIV_AUDIT_GETAUDIT);
if (error)
return (error);
return (copyout(&td->td_ucred->cr_audit, uap->auditinfo_addr,
sizeof(*uap->auditinfo_addr)));
}
/* ARGSUSED */
int
sys_setaudit_addr(struct thread *td, struct setaudit_addr_args *uap)
{
struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred;
struct auditinfo_addr aia;
int error;
if (jailed(td->td_ucred))
return (ENOSYS);
error = copyin(uap->auditinfo_addr, &aia, sizeof(aia));
if (error)
return (error);
audit_arg_auditinfo_addr(&aia);
if (aia.ai_termid.at_type != AU_IPv6 &&
aia.ai_termid.at_type != AU_IPv4)
return (EINVAL);
newcred = crget();
PROC_LOCK(td->td_proc);
oldcred = td->td_proc->p_ucred;
crcopy(newcred, oldcred);
#ifdef MAC
error = mac_cred_check_setaudit_addr(oldcred, &aia);
if (error)
goto fail;
#endif
error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_AUDIT_SETAUDIT, 0);
if (error)
goto fail;
newcred->cr_audit = aia;
proc_set_cred(td->td_proc, newcred);
PROC_UNLOCK(td->td_proc);
crfree(oldcred);
return (0);
fail:
PROC_UNLOCK(td->td_proc);
crfree(newcred);
return (error);
}
/*
* Syscall to manage audit files.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
int
sys_auditctl(struct thread *td, struct auditctl_args *uap)
{
struct nameidata nd;
struct ucred *cred;
struct vnode *vp;
int error = 0;
int flags;
if (jailed(td->td_ucred))
return (ENOSYS);
error = priv_check(td, PRIV_AUDIT_CONTROL);
if (error)
return (error);
vp = NULL;
cred = NULL;
/*
* If a path is specified, open the replacement vnode, perform
* validity checks, and grab another reference to the current
* credential.
*
* On Darwin, a NULL path argument is also used to disable audit.
*/
if (uap->path == NULL)
return (EINVAL);
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW | LOCKLEAF | AUDITVNODE1,
UIO_USERSPACE, uap->path, td);
flags = AUDIT_OPEN_FLAGS;
error = vn_open(&nd, &flags, 0, NULL);
if (error)
return (error);
vp = nd.ni_vp;
#ifdef MAC
error = mac_system_check_auditctl(td->td_ucred, vp);
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0);
if (error) {
vn_close(vp, AUDIT_CLOSE_FLAGS, td->td_ucred, td);
return (error);
}
#else
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0);
#endif
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
if (vp->v_type != VREG) {
vn_close(vp, AUDIT_CLOSE_FLAGS, td->td_ucred, td);
return (EINVAL);
}
cred = td->td_ucred;
crhold(cred);
/*
* XXXAUDIT: Should audit_suspended actually be cleared by
* audit_worker?
*/
audit_suspended = 0;
audit_rotate_vnode(cred, vp);
return (error);
}
#else /* !AUDIT */
int
sys_audit(struct thread *td, struct audit_args *uap)
{
return (ENOSYS);
}
int
sys_auditon(struct thread *td, struct auditon_args *uap)
{
return (ENOSYS);
}
int
sys_getauid(struct thread *td, struct getauid_args *uap)
{
return (ENOSYS);
}
int
sys_setauid(struct thread *td, struct setauid_args *uap)
{
return (ENOSYS);
}
int
sys_getaudit(struct thread *td, struct getaudit_args *uap)
{
return (ENOSYS);
}
int
sys_setaudit(struct thread *td, struct setaudit_args *uap)
{
return (ENOSYS);
}
int
sys_getaudit_addr(struct thread *td, struct getaudit_addr_args *uap)
{
return (ENOSYS);
}
int
sys_setaudit_addr(struct thread *td, struct setaudit_addr_args *uap)
{
return (ENOSYS);
}
int
sys_auditctl(struct thread *td, struct auditctl_args *uap)
{
return (ENOSYS);
}
#endif /* AUDIT */