2017-12-19 15:49:03 +00:00
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/* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
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2020-02-04 13:12:51 +00:00
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* Copyright(c) 2016-2020 Intel Corporation
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2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
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*/
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#ifndef _RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_H_
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#define _RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_H_
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/**
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* @file rte_crypto_sym.h
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*
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* RTE Definitions for Symmetric Cryptography
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*
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* Defines symmetric cipher and authentication algorithms and modes, as well
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* as supported symmetric crypto operation combinations.
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*/
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#ifdef __cplusplus
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extern "C" {
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#endif
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2016-03-10 15:41:12 +00:00
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#include <string.h>
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2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
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#include <rte_mbuf.h>
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#include <rte_memory.h>
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#include <rte_mempool.h>
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2016-09-08 12:25:06 +00:00
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#include <rte_common.h>
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2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
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2020-02-04 13:12:51 +00:00
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/**
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* Crypto IO Vector (in analogy with struct iovec)
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* Supposed be used to pass input/output data buffers for crypto data-path
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* functions.
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*/
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struct rte_crypto_vec {
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/** virtual address of the data buffer */
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void *base;
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/** IOVA of the data buffer */
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rte_iova_t iova;
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/** length of the data buffer */
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uint32_t len;
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};
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/**
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* Crypto scatter-gather list descriptor. Consists of a pointer to an array
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* of Crypto IO vectors with its size.
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*/
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struct rte_crypto_sgl {
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/** start of an array of vectors */
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struct rte_crypto_vec *vec;
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/** size of an array of vectors */
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uint32_t num;
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};
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/**
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2020-10-11 00:38:51 +00:00
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* Crypto virtual and IOVA address descriptor, used to describe cryptographic
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* data buffer without the length information. The length information is
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* normally predefined during session creation.
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*/
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struct rte_crypto_va_iova_ptr {
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void *va;
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rte_iova_t iova;
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};
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/**
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* Raw data operation descriptor.
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* Supposed to be used with synchronous CPU crypto API call or asynchronous
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* RAW data path API call.
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2020-02-04 13:12:51 +00:00
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*/
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struct rte_crypto_sym_vec {
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2020-10-11 00:38:51 +00:00
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/** number of operations to perform */
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uint32_t num;
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2020-02-04 13:12:51 +00:00
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/** array of SGL vectors */
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struct rte_crypto_sgl *sgl;
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2020-10-11 00:38:51 +00:00
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/** array of pointers to cipher IV */
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struct rte_crypto_va_iova_ptr *iv;
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2020-02-04 13:12:51 +00:00
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/** array of pointers to digest */
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2020-10-11 00:38:51 +00:00
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struct rte_crypto_va_iova_ptr *digest;
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__extension__
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union {
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/** array of pointers to auth IV, used for chain operation */
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struct rte_crypto_va_iova_ptr *auth_iv;
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/** array of pointers to AAD, used for AEAD operation */
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struct rte_crypto_va_iova_ptr *aad;
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};
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2020-02-04 13:12:51 +00:00
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/**
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* array of statuses for each operation:
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2020-10-11 00:38:51 +00:00
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* - 0 on success
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* - errno on error
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2020-02-04 13:12:51 +00:00
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*/
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int32_t *status;
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};
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/**
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* used for cpu_crypto_process_bulk() to specify head/tail offsets
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* for auth/cipher processing.
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*/
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union rte_crypto_sym_ofs {
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uint64_t raw;
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struct {
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struct {
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uint16_t head;
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uint16_t tail;
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} auth, cipher;
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} ofs;
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};
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2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
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2020-10-12 19:21:24 +00:00
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/** Symmetric Cipher Algorithms
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*
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* Note, to avoid ABI breakage across releases
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* - LIST_END should not be added to this enum
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* - the order of enums should not be changed
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* - new algorithms should only be added to the end
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*/
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2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
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enum rte_crypto_cipher_algorithm {
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RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_NULL = 1,
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/**< NULL cipher algorithm. No mode applies to the NULL algorithm. */
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RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_3DES_CBC,
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/**< Triple DES algorithm in CBC mode */
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RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_3DES_CTR,
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/**< Triple DES algorithm in CTR mode */
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RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_3DES_ECB,
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/**< Triple DES algorithm in ECB mode */
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RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_AES_CBC,
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/**< AES algorithm in CBC mode */
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RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_AES_CTR,
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/**< AES algorithm in Counter mode */
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RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_AES_ECB,
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/**< AES algorithm in ECB mode */
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RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_AES_F8,
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/**< AES algorithm in F8 mode */
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RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_AES_XTS,
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/**< AES algorithm in XTS mode */
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RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_ARC4,
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/**< (A)RC4 cipher algorithm */
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RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_KASUMI_F8,
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2016-09-21 01:45:19 +00:00
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/**< KASUMI algorithm in F8 mode */
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2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
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RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_SNOW3G_UEA2,
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2016-09-21 01:45:18 +00:00
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/**< SNOW 3G algorithm in UEA2 mode */
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2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
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2016-03-31 09:32:13 +00:00
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RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_ZUC_EEA3,
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2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
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/**< ZUC algorithm in EEA3 mode */
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2016-03-31 09:32:13 +00:00
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2016-12-02 14:16:00 +00:00
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RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_DES_CBC,
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/**< DES algorithm in CBC mode */
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2017-02-23 14:02:55 +00:00
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RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_AES_DOCSISBPI,
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/**< AES algorithm using modes required by
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* DOCSIS Baseline Privacy Plus Spec.
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2017-04-03 15:51:33 +00:00
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* Chained mbufs are not supported in this mode, i.e. rte_mbuf.next
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* for m_src and m_dst in the rte_crypto_sym_op must be NULL.
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2017-02-23 14:02:55 +00:00
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*/
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2020-10-12 19:21:24 +00:00
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RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_DES_DOCSISBPI
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2017-02-23 14:02:55 +00:00
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/**< DES algorithm using modes required by
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* DOCSIS Baseline Privacy Plus Spec.
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2017-04-03 15:51:33 +00:00
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* Chained mbufs are not supported in this mode, i.e. rte_mbuf.next
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* for m_src and m_dst in the rte_crypto_sym_op must be NULL.
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2017-02-23 14:02:55 +00:00
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*/
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2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
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};
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2017-01-25 16:27:32 +00:00
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/** Cipher algorithm name strings */
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extern const char *
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rte_crypto_cipher_algorithm_strings[];
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2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
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/** Symmetric Cipher Direction */
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enum rte_crypto_cipher_operation {
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RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_OP_ENCRYPT,
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/**< Encrypt cipher operation */
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RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_OP_DECRYPT
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/**< Decrypt cipher operation */
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};
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2017-01-25 16:27:32 +00:00
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/** Cipher operation name strings */
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extern const char *
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rte_crypto_cipher_operation_strings[];
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2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
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/**
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* Symmetric Cipher Setup Data.
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*
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* This structure contains data relating to Cipher (Encryption and Decryption)
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* use to create a session.
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*/
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struct rte_crypto_cipher_xform {
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enum rte_crypto_cipher_operation op;
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/**< This parameter determines if the cipher operation is an encrypt or
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* a decrypt operation. For the RC4 algorithm and the F8/CTR modes,
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* only encrypt operations are valid.
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*/
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enum rte_crypto_cipher_algorithm algo;
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/**< Cipher algorithm */
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2016-03-10 15:41:11 +00:00
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struct {
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2019-06-24 13:35:22 +00:00
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const uint8_t *data; /**< pointer to key data */
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uint16_t length; /**< key length in bytes */
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2016-03-10 15:41:11 +00:00
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} key;
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2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
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/**< Cipher key
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*
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* For the RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_AES_F8 mode of operation, key.data will
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* point to a concatenation of the AES encryption key followed by a
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* keymask. As per RFC3711, the keymask should be padded with trailing
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* bytes to match the length of the encryption key used.
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*
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* Cipher key length is in bytes. For AES it can be 128 bits (16 bytes),
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* 192 bits (24 bytes) or 256 bits (32 bytes).
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*
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* For the RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_AES_F8 mode of operation, key.length
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* should be set to the combined length of the encryption key and the
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* keymask. Since the keymask and the encryption key are the same size,
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* key.length should be set to 2 x the AES encryption key length.
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*
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* For the AES-XTS mode of operation:
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* - Two keys must be provided and key.length refers to total length of
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* the two keys.
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2019-03-13 14:52:13 +00:00
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* - key.data must point to the two keys concatenated together
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* (key1 || key2).
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2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
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* - Each key can be either 128 bits (16 bytes) or 256 bits (32 bytes).
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* - Both keys must have the same size.
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**/
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2017-07-02 05:41:14 +00:00
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struct {
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uint16_t offset;
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/**< Starting point for Initialisation Vector or Counter,
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* specified as number of bytes from start of crypto
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* operation (rte_crypto_op).
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*
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* - For block ciphers in CBC or F8 mode, or for KASUMI
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* in F8 mode, or for SNOW 3G in UEA2 mode, this is the
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* Initialisation Vector (IV) value.
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*
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* - For block ciphers in CTR mode, this is the counter.
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*
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* - For CCM mode, the first byte is reserved, and the
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* nonce should be written starting at &iv[1] (to allow
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* space for the implementation to write in the flags
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* in the first byte). Note that a full 16 bytes should
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* be allocated, even though the length field will
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2017-09-21 13:11:14 +00:00
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* have a value less than this. Note that the PMDs may
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* modify the memory reserved (the first byte and the
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* final padding)
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2017-07-02 05:41:14 +00:00
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*
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* - For AES-XTS, this is the 128bit tweak, i, from
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* IEEE Std 1619-2007.
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*
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* For optimum performance, the data pointed to SHOULD
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* be 8-byte aligned.
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*/
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uint16_t length;
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/**< Length of valid IV data.
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*
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* - For block ciphers in CBC or F8 mode, or for KASUMI
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* in F8 mode, or for SNOW 3G in UEA2 mode, this is the
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* length of the IV (which must be the same as the
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* block length of the cipher).
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*
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* - For block ciphers in CTR mode, this is the length
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* of the counter (which must be the same as the block
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* length of the cipher).
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*
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* - For CCM mode, this is the length of the nonce,
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* which can be in the range 7 to 13 inclusive.
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*/
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} iv; /**< Initialisation vector parameters */
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2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
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};
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2020-10-12 19:21:24 +00:00
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/** Symmetric Authentication / Hash Algorithms
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*
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* Note, to avoid ABI breakage across releases
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* - LIST_END should not be added to this enum
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* - the order of enums should not be changed
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* - new algorithms should only be added to the end
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*/
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2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
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enum rte_crypto_auth_algorithm {
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RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_NULL = 1,
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/**< NULL hash algorithm. */
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RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_CBC_MAC,
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/**< AES-CBC-MAC algorithm. Only 128-bit keys are supported. */
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RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_CMAC,
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/**< AES CMAC algorithm. */
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RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC,
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2017-07-02 05:41:19 +00:00
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/**< AES GMAC algorithm. */
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2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
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RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_XCBC_MAC,
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/**< AES XCBC algorithm. */
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RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_KASUMI_F9,
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2016-09-21 01:45:19 +00:00
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/**< KASUMI algorithm in F9 mode. */
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2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
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RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_MD5,
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/**< MD5 algorithm */
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RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_MD5_HMAC,
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/**< HMAC using MD5 algorithm */
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RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SHA1,
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2020-05-21 14:48:53 +00:00
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/**< 160 bit SHA algorithm. */
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2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
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RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SHA1_HMAC,
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2020-05-21 14:48:53 +00:00
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/**< HMAC using 160 bit SHA algorithm.
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* HMAC-SHA-1-96 can be generated by setting
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* digest_length to 12 bytes in auth/aead xforms.
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*/
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2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
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RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SHA224,
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/**< 224 bit SHA algorithm. */
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RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SHA224_HMAC,
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/**< HMAC using 224 bit SHA algorithm. */
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RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SHA256,
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/**< 256 bit SHA algorithm. */
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RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SHA256_HMAC,
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/**< HMAC using 256 bit SHA algorithm. */
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RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SHA384,
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/**< 384 bit SHA algorithm. */
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RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SHA384_HMAC,
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/**< HMAC using 384 bit SHA algorithm. */
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RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SHA512,
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/**< 512 bit SHA algorithm. */
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RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SHA512_HMAC,
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/**< HMAC using 512 bit SHA algorithm. */
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RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SNOW3G_UIA2,
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2016-09-21 01:45:18 +00:00
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/**< SNOW 3G algorithm in UIA2 mode. */
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2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
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|
|
RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_ZUC_EIA3,
|
|
|
|
/**< ZUC algorithm in EIA3 mode */
|
2016-03-31 09:32:13 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-03-19 12:23:50 +00:00
|
|
|
RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SHA3_224,
|
|
|
|
/**< 224 bit SHA3 algorithm. */
|
|
|
|
RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SHA3_224_HMAC,
|
|
|
|
/**< HMAC using 224 bit SHA3 algorithm. */
|
|
|
|
RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SHA3_256,
|
|
|
|
/**< 256 bit SHA3 algorithm. */
|
|
|
|
RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SHA3_256_HMAC,
|
|
|
|
/**< HMAC using 256 bit SHA3 algorithm. */
|
|
|
|
RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SHA3_384,
|
|
|
|
/**< 384 bit SHA3 algorithm. */
|
|
|
|
RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SHA3_384_HMAC,
|
|
|
|
/**< HMAC using 384 bit SHA3 algorithm. */
|
|
|
|
RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SHA3_512,
|
|
|
|
/**< 512 bit SHA3 algorithm. */
|
2020-10-12 19:21:24 +00:00
|
|
|
RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SHA3_512_HMAC
|
2018-03-19 12:23:50 +00:00
|
|
|
/**< HMAC using 512 bit SHA3 algorithm. */
|
2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-25 16:27:32 +00:00
|
|
|
/** Authentication algorithm name strings */
|
|
|
|
extern const char *
|
|
|
|
rte_crypto_auth_algorithm_strings[];
|
|
|
|
|
2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
|
|
|
/** Symmetric Authentication / Hash Operations */
|
|
|
|
enum rte_crypto_auth_operation {
|
|
|
|
RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_VERIFY, /**< Verify authentication digest */
|
|
|
|
RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_GENERATE /**< Generate authentication digest */
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-25 16:27:32 +00:00
|
|
|
/** Authentication operation name strings */
|
|
|
|
extern const char *
|
|
|
|
rte_crypto_auth_operation_strings[];
|
|
|
|
|
2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* Authentication / Hash transform data.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This structure contains data relating to an authentication/hash crypto
|
|
|
|
* transforms. The fields op, algo and digest_length are common to all
|
|
|
|
* authentication transforms and MUST be set.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct rte_crypto_auth_xform {
|
|
|
|
enum rte_crypto_auth_operation op;
|
|
|
|
/**< Authentication operation type */
|
|
|
|
enum rte_crypto_auth_algorithm algo;
|
|
|
|
/**< Authentication algorithm selection */
|
|
|
|
|
2016-03-10 15:41:11 +00:00
|
|
|
struct {
|
2019-06-24 13:35:22 +00:00
|
|
|
const uint8_t *data; /**< pointer to key data */
|
|
|
|
uint16_t length; /**< key length in bytes */
|
2016-03-10 15:41:11 +00:00
|
|
|
} key;
|
2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
|
|
|
/**< Authentication key data.
|
|
|
|
* The authentication key length MUST be less than or equal to the
|
|
|
|
* block size of the algorithm. It is the callers responsibility to
|
|
|
|
* ensure that the key length is compliant with the standard being used
|
|
|
|
* (for example RFC 2104, FIPS 198a).
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
2017-07-02 05:41:15 +00:00
|
|
|
struct {
|
|
|
|
uint16_t offset;
|
|
|
|
/**< Starting point for Initialisation Vector or Counter,
|
|
|
|
* specified as number of bytes from start of crypto
|
|
|
|
* operation (rte_crypto_op).
|
|
|
|
*
|
2019-04-17 15:57:51 +00:00
|
|
|
* - For SNOW 3G in UIA2 mode, for ZUC in EIA3 mode
|
|
|
|
* this is the authentication Initialisation Vector
|
|
|
|
* (IV) value. For AES-GMAC IV description please refer
|
|
|
|
* to the field `length` in iv struct.
|
2017-07-02 05:41:15 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
cryptodev: fix KASUMI F9 expected parameters
For KASUMI F9 algorithm, COUNT, FRESH and DIRECTION
input values need to be contiguous with
the message, as described in the KASUMI and QAT PMD
documentation.
Before, the COUNT and FRESH values were set
as part of the AAD (now IV), but always set before
the beginning of the message.
Since now the IV is set after the crypto operation,
it is not possible to have these values in the
expected location.
Therefore, as these are required to be contiguous,
cryptodev API will expect these them to be passed
as a single buffer, already constructed, so
authentication IV parameters not needed anymore.
Fixes: 681f540da52b ("cryptodev: do not use AAD in wireless algorithms")
Signed-off-by: Pablo de Lara <pablo.de.lara.guarch@intel.com>
Acked-by: Fiona Trahe <fiona.trahe@intel.com>
2017-07-14 07:06:52 +00:00
|
|
|
* - For KASUMI in F9 mode and other authentication
|
|
|
|
* algorithms, this field is not used.
|
2017-07-02 05:41:15 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* For optimum performance, the data pointed to SHOULD
|
|
|
|
* be 8-byte aligned.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
uint16_t length;
|
|
|
|
/**< Length of valid IV data.
|
|
|
|
*
|
cryptodev: fix KASUMI F9 expected parameters
For KASUMI F9 algorithm, COUNT, FRESH and DIRECTION
input values need to be contiguous with
the message, as described in the KASUMI and QAT PMD
documentation.
Before, the COUNT and FRESH values were set
as part of the AAD (now IV), but always set before
the beginning of the message.
Since now the IV is set after the crypto operation,
it is not possible to have these values in the
expected location.
Therefore, as these are required to be contiguous,
cryptodev API will expect these them to be passed
as a single buffer, already constructed, so
authentication IV parameters not needed anymore.
Fixes: 681f540da52b ("cryptodev: do not use AAD in wireless algorithms")
Signed-off-by: Pablo de Lara <pablo.de.lara.guarch@intel.com>
Acked-by: Fiona Trahe <fiona.trahe@intel.com>
2017-07-14 07:06:52 +00:00
|
|
|
* - For SNOW3G in UIA2 mode, for ZUC in EIA3 mode and
|
|
|
|
* for AES-GMAC, this is the length of the IV.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* - For KASUMI in F9 mode and other authentication
|
|
|
|
* algorithms, this field is not used.
|
2017-07-02 05:41:15 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
2019-04-17 15:57:51 +00:00
|
|
|
* - For GMAC mode, this is either:
|
|
|
|
* 1) Number greater or equal to one, which means that IV
|
|
|
|
* is used and J0 will be computed internally, a minimum
|
|
|
|
* of 16 bytes must be allocated.
|
|
|
|
* 2) Zero, in which case data points to J0. In this case
|
|
|
|
* 16 bytes of J0 should be passed where J0 is defined
|
|
|
|
* by NIST SP800-38D.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2017-07-02 05:41:15 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
} iv; /**< Initialisation vector parameters */
|
2017-07-17 08:29:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
uint16_t digest_length;
|
|
|
|
/**< Length of the digest to be returned. If the verify option is set,
|
|
|
|
* this specifies the length of the digest to be compared for the
|
|
|
|
* session.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* It is the caller's responsibility to ensure that the
|
|
|
|
* digest length is compliant with the hash algorithm being used.
|
|
|
|
* If the value is less than the maximum length allowed by the hash,
|
|
|
|
* the result shall be truncated.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2017-07-02 05:41:20 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-10-12 19:21:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/** Symmetric AEAD Algorithms
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Note, to avoid ABI breakage across releases
|
|
|
|
* - LIST_END should not be added to this enum
|
|
|
|
* - the order of enums should not be changed
|
|
|
|
* - new algorithms should only be added to the end
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-07-02 05:41:20 +00:00
|
|
|
enum rte_crypto_aead_algorithm {
|
|
|
|
RTE_CRYPTO_AEAD_AES_CCM = 1,
|
|
|
|
/**< AES algorithm in CCM mode. */
|
|
|
|
RTE_CRYPTO_AEAD_AES_GCM,
|
|
|
|
/**< AES algorithm in GCM mode. */
|
2020-10-12 19:21:24 +00:00
|
|
|
RTE_CRYPTO_AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305
|
2020-05-07 10:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
/**< Chacha20 cipher with poly1305 authenticator */
|
2017-07-02 05:41:20 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** AEAD algorithm name strings */
|
|
|
|
extern const char *
|
|
|
|
rte_crypto_aead_algorithm_strings[];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** Symmetric AEAD Operations */
|
|
|
|
enum rte_crypto_aead_operation {
|
|
|
|
RTE_CRYPTO_AEAD_OP_ENCRYPT,
|
|
|
|
/**< Encrypt and generate digest */
|
|
|
|
RTE_CRYPTO_AEAD_OP_DECRYPT
|
|
|
|
/**< Verify digest and decrypt */
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** Authentication operation name strings */
|
|
|
|
extern const char *
|
|
|
|
rte_crypto_aead_operation_strings[];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct rte_crypto_aead_xform {
|
|
|
|
enum rte_crypto_aead_operation op;
|
|
|
|
/**< AEAD operation type */
|
|
|
|
enum rte_crypto_aead_algorithm algo;
|
|
|
|
/**< AEAD algorithm selection */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct {
|
2019-06-24 13:35:22 +00:00
|
|
|
const uint8_t *data; /**< pointer to key data */
|
|
|
|
uint16_t length; /**< key length in bytes */
|
2017-07-02 05:41:20 +00:00
|
|
|
} key;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct {
|
|
|
|
uint16_t offset;
|
|
|
|
/**< Starting point for Initialisation Vector or Counter,
|
|
|
|
* specified as number of bytes from start of crypto
|
|
|
|
* operation (rte_crypto_op).
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* - For CCM mode, the first byte is reserved, and the
|
|
|
|
* nonce should be written starting at &iv[1] (to allow
|
|
|
|
* space for the implementation to write in the flags
|
|
|
|
* in the first byte). Note that a full 16 bytes should
|
|
|
|
* be allocated, even though the length field will
|
|
|
|
* have a value less than this.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2020-05-07 10:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
* - For Chacha20-Poly1305 it is 96-bit nonce.
|
|
|
|
* PMD sets initial counter for Poly1305 key generation
|
|
|
|
* part to 0 and for Chacha20 encryption to 1 as per
|
|
|
|
* rfc8439 2.8. AEAD construction.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2017-07-02 05:41:20 +00:00
|
|
|
* For optimum performance, the data pointed to SHOULD
|
|
|
|
* be 8-byte aligned.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
uint16_t length;
|
|
|
|
/**< Length of valid IV data.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2019-04-17 15:57:51 +00:00
|
|
|
* - For GCM mode, this is either:
|
|
|
|
* 1) Number greater or equal to one, which means that IV
|
|
|
|
* is used and J0 will be computed internally, a minimum
|
|
|
|
* of 16 bytes must be allocated.
|
|
|
|
* 2) Zero, in which case data points to J0. In this case
|
|
|
|
* 16 bytes of J0 should be passed where J0 is defined
|
|
|
|
* by NIST SP800-38D.
|
2017-07-02 05:41:20 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* - For CCM mode, this is the length of the nonce,
|
|
|
|
* which can be in the range 7 to 13 inclusive.
|
2020-05-07 10:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* - For Chacha20-Poly1305 this field is always 12.
|
2017-07-02 05:41:20 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
} iv; /**< Initialisation vector parameters */
|
|
|
|
|
2017-07-17 08:29:51 +00:00
|
|
|
uint16_t digest_length;
|
2017-07-02 05:41:20 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-07-17 08:29:52 +00:00
|
|
|
uint16_t aad_length;
|
2017-09-21 13:11:19 +00:00
|
|
|
/**< The length of the additional authenticated data (AAD) in bytes.
|
|
|
|
* For CCM mode, this is the length of the actual AAD, even though
|
|
|
|
* it is required to reserve 18 bytes before the AAD and padding
|
|
|
|
* at the end of it, so a multiple of 16 bytes is allocated.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-07-02 05:41:20 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
|
|
|
/** Crypto transformation types */
|
|
|
|
enum rte_crypto_sym_xform_type {
|
|
|
|
RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_NOT_SPECIFIED = 0, /**< No xform specified */
|
|
|
|
RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_AUTH, /**< Authentication xform */
|
2017-07-02 05:41:20 +00:00
|
|
|
RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_CIPHER, /**< Cipher xform */
|
|
|
|
RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_AEAD /**< AEAD xform */
|
2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* Symmetric crypto transform structure.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This is used to specify the crypto transforms required, multiple transforms
|
|
|
|
* can be chained together to specify a chain transforms such as authentication
|
|
|
|
* then cipher, or cipher then authentication. Each transform structure can
|
|
|
|
* hold a single transform, the type field is used to specify which transform
|
|
|
|
* is contained within the union
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct rte_crypto_sym_xform {
|
|
|
|
struct rte_crypto_sym_xform *next;
|
|
|
|
/**< next xform in chain */
|
|
|
|
enum rte_crypto_sym_xform_type type
|
|
|
|
; /**< xform type */
|
2016-09-08 12:25:06 +00:00
|
|
|
RTE_STD_C11
|
2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
|
|
|
union {
|
|
|
|
struct rte_crypto_auth_xform auth;
|
|
|
|
/**< Authentication / hash xform */
|
|
|
|
struct rte_crypto_cipher_xform cipher;
|
|
|
|
/**< Cipher xform */
|
2017-07-02 05:41:20 +00:00
|
|
|
struct rte_crypto_aead_xform aead;
|
|
|
|
/**< AEAD xform */
|
2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2016-03-10 15:41:12 +00:00
|
|
|
struct rte_cryptodev_sym_session;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
2016-03-10 15:41:12 +00:00
|
|
|
* Symmetric Cryptographic Operation.
|
2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
2016-03-10 15:41:12 +00:00
|
|
|
* This structure contains data relating to performing symmetric cryptographic
|
|
|
|
* processing on a referenced mbuf data buffer.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* When a symmetric crypto operation is enqueued with the device for processing
|
|
|
|
* it must have a valid *rte_mbuf* structure attached, via m_src parameter,
|
|
|
|
* which contains the source data which the crypto operation is to be performed
|
|
|
|
* on.
|
2016-11-02 17:53:46 +00:00
|
|
|
* While the mbuf is in use by a crypto operation no part of the mbuf should be
|
|
|
|
* changed by the application as the device may read or write to any part of the
|
|
|
|
* mbuf. In the case of hardware crypto devices some or all of the mbuf
|
|
|
|
* may be DMAed in and out of the device, so writing over the original data,
|
|
|
|
* though only the part specified by the rte_crypto_sym_op for transformation
|
|
|
|
* will be changed.
|
|
|
|
* Out-of-place (OOP) operation, where the source mbuf is different to the
|
|
|
|
* destination mbuf, is a special case. Data will be copied from m_src to m_dst.
|
|
|
|
* The part copied includes all the parts of the source mbuf that will be
|
|
|
|
* operated on, based on the cipher.data.offset+cipher.data.length and
|
|
|
|
* auth.data.offset+auth.data.length values in the rte_crypto_sym_op. The part
|
|
|
|
* indicated by the cipher parameters will be transformed, any extra data around
|
|
|
|
* this indicated by the auth parameters will be copied unchanged from source to
|
|
|
|
* destination mbuf.
|
|
|
|
* Also in OOP operation the cipher.data.offset and auth.data.offset apply to
|
|
|
|
* both source and destination mbufs. As these offsets are relative to the
|
|
|
|
* data_off parameter in each mbuf this can result in the data written to the
|
|
|
|
* destination buffer being at a different alignment, relative to buffer start,
|
|
|
|
* to the data in the source buffer.
|
2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct rte_crypto_sym_op {
|
2016-03-10 15:41:12 +00:00
|
|
|
struct rte_mbuf *m_src; /**< source mbuf */
|
|
|
|
struct rte_mbuf *m_dst; /**< destination mbuf */
|
2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-09-08 12:25:06 +00:00
|
|
|
RTE_STD_C11
|
2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
|
|
|
union {
|
|
|
|
struct rte_cryptodev_sym_session *session;
|
|
|
|
/**< Handle for the initialised session context */
|
|
|
|
struct rte_crypto_sym_xform *xform;
|
|
|
|
/**< Session-less API crypto operation parameters */
|
2017-10-25 15:07:18 +00:00
|
|
|
struct rte_security_session *sec_session;
|
|
|
|
/**< Handle for the initialised security session context */
|
2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-04 11:56:22 +00:00
|
|
|
RTE_STD_C11
|
2017-07-02 05:41:21 +00:00
|
|
|
union {
|
2016-03-10 15:41:12 +00:00
|
|
|
struct {
|
2017-07-02 05:41:21 +00:00
|
|
|
struct {
|
|
|
|
uint32_t offset;
|
|
|
|
/**< Starting point for AEAD processing, specified as
|
|
|
|
* number of bytes from start of packet in source
|
|
|
|
* buffer.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
uint32_t length;
|
|
|
|
/**< The message length, in bytes, of the source buffer
|
|
|
|
* on which the cryptographic operation will be
|
|
|
|
* computed. This must be a multiple of the block size
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
} data; /**< Data offsets and length for AEAD */
|
|
|
|
struct {
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *data;
|
|
|
|
/**< This points to the location where the digest result
|
|
|
|
* should be inserted (in the case of digest generation)
|
|
|
|
* or where the purported digest exists (in the case of
|
|
|
|
* digest verification).
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* At session creation time, the client specified the
|
|
|
|
* digest result length with the digest_length member
|
|
|
|
* of the @ref rte_crypto_auth_xform structure. For
|
|
|
|
* physical crypto devices the caller must allocate at
|
|
|
|
* least digest_length of physically contiguous memory
|
|
|
|
* at this location.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* For digest generation, the digest result will
|
|
|
|
* overwrite any data at this location.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @note
|
|
|
|
* For GCM (@ref RTE_CRYPTO_AEAD_AES_GCM), for
|
|
|
|
* "digest result" read "authentication tag T".
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-10-20 12:31:31 +00:00
|
|
|
rte_iova_t phys_addr;
|
2017-07-02 05:41:21 +00:00
|
|
|
/**< Physical address of digest */
|
|
|
|
} digest; /**< Digest parameters */
|
|
|
|
struct {
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *data;
|
|
|
|
/**< Pointer to Additional Authenticated Data (AAD)
|
|
|
|
* needed for authenticated cipher mechanisms (CCM and
|
|
|
|
* GCM)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Specifically for CCM (@ref RTE_CRYPTO_AEAD_AES_CCM),
|
|
|
|
* the caller should setup this field as follows:
|
|
|
|
*
|
2017-09-21 13:11:14 +00:00
|
|
|
* - the additional authentication data itself should
|
2017-07-02 05:41:21 +00:00
|
|
|
* be written starting at an offset of 18 bytes into
|
2017-09-21 13:11:14 +00:00
|
|
|
* the array, leaving room for the first block (16 bytes)
|
|
|
|
* and the length encoding in the first two bytes of the
|
|
|
|
* second block.
|
2017-07-02 05:41:21 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* - the array should be big enough to hold the above
|
2017-09-21 13:11:14 +00:00
|
|
|
* fields, plus any padding to round this up to the
|
|
|
|
* nearest multiple of the block size (16 bytes).
|
|
|
|
* Padding will be added by the implementation.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* - Note that PMDs may modify the memory reserved
|
|
|
|
* (first 18 bytes and the final padding).
|
2017-07-02 05:41:21 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Finally, for GCM (@ref RTE_CRYPTO_AEAD_AES_GCM), the
|
|
|
|
* caller should setup this field as follows:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* - the AAD is written in starting at byte 0
|
|
|
|
* - the array must be big enough to hold the AAD, plus
|
|
|
|
* any space to round this up to the nearest multiple
|
|
|
|
* of the block size (16 bytes).
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-10-20 12:31:31 +00:00
|
|
|
rte_iova_t phys_addr; /**< physical address */
|
2017-07-02 05:41:21 +00:00
|
|
|
} aad;
|
|
|
|
/**< Additional authentication parameters */
|
|
|
|
} aead;
|
2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-03-10 15:41:12 +00:00
|
|
|
struct {
|
2017-07-02 05:41:21 +00:00
|
|
|
struct {
|
|
|
|
struct {
|
|
|
|
uint32_t offset;
|
|
|
|
/**< Starting point for cipher processing,
|
|
|
|
* specified as number of bytes from start
|
|
|
|
* of data in the source buffer.
|
|
|
|
* The result of the cipher operation will be
|
|
|
|
* written back into the output buffer
|
|
|
|
* starting at this location.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @note
|
|
|
|
* For SNOW 3G @ RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_SNOW3G_UEA2,
|
|
|
|
* KASUMI @ RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_KASUMI_F8
|
|
|
|
* and ZUC @ RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_ZUC_EEA3,
|
2019-10-22 13:20:16 +00:00
|
|
|
* this field should be in bits. For
|
|
|
|
* digest-encrypted cases this must be
|
|
|
|
* an 8-bit multiple.
|
2017-07-02 05:41:21 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
uint32_t length;
|
|
|
|
/**< The message length, in bytes, of the
|
|
|
|
* source buffer on which the cryptographic
|
|
|
|
* operation will be computed.
|
|
|
|
* This must be a multiple of the block size
|
|
|
|
* if a block cipher is being used. This is
|
|
|
|
* also the same as the result length.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @note
|
|
|
|
* For SNOW 3G @ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SNOW3G_UEA2,
|
|
|
|
* KASUMI @ RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_KASUMI_F8
|
|
|
|
* and ZUC @ RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_ZUC_EEA3,
|
2019-10-22 13:20:16 +00:00
|
|
|
* this field should be in bits. For
|
|
|
|
* digest-encrypted cases this must be
|
|
|
|
* an 8-bit multiple.
|
2017-07-02 05:41:21 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
} data; /**< Data offsets and length for ciphering */
|
|
|
|
} cipher;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct {
|
|
|
|
struct {
|
|
|
|
uint32_t offset;
|
|
|
|
/**< Starting point for hash processing,
|
|
|
|
* specified as number of bytes from start of
|
|
|
|
* packet in source buffer.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @note
|
|
|
|
* For SNOW 3G @ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SNOW3G_UIA2,
|
|
|
|
* KASUMI @ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_KASUMI_F9
|
|
|
|
* and ZUC @ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_ZUC_EIA3,
|
2019-10-22 13:20:16 +00:00
|
|
|
* this field should be in bits. For
|
|
|
|
* digest-encrypted cases this must be
|
|
|
|
* an 8-bit multiple.
|
cryptodev: fix KASUMI F9 expected parameters
For KASUMI F9 algorithm, COUNT, FRESH and DIRECTION
input values need to be contiguous with
the message, as described in the KASUMI and QAT PMD
documentation.
Before, the COUNT and FRESH values were set
as part of the AAD (now IV), but always set before
the beginning of the message.
Since now the IV is set after the crypto operation,
it is not possible to have these values in the
expected location.
Therefore, as these are required to be contiguous,
cryptodev API will expect these them to be passed
as a single buffer, already constructed, so
authentication IV parameters not needed anymore.
Fixes: 681f540da52b ("cryptodev: do not use AAD in wireless algorithms")
Signed-off-by: Pablo de Lara <pablo.de.lara.guarch@intel.com>
Acked-by: Fiona Trahe <fiona.trahe@intel.com>
2017-07-14 07:06:52 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @note
|
|
|
|
* For KASUMI @ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_KASUMI_F9,
|
|
|
|
* this offset should be such that
|
|
|
|
* data to authenticate starts at COUNT.
|
2020-07-03 12:39:28 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @note
|
|
|
|
* For DOCSIS security protocol, this
|
|
|
|
* offset is the DOCSIS header length
|
|
|
|
* and, therefore, also the CRC offset
|
|
|
|
* i.e. the number of bytes into the
|
|
|
|
* packet at which CRC calculation
|
|
|
|
* should begin.
|
2017-07-02 05:41:21 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
uint32_t length;
|
|
|
|
/**< The message length, in bytes, of the source
|
|
|
|
* buffer that the hash will be computed on.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @note
|
|
|
|
* For SNOW 3G @ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_SNOW3G_UIA2,
|
|
|
|
* KASUMI @ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_KASUMI_F9
|
|
|
|
* and ZUC @ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_ZUC_EIA3,
|
2019-10-22 13:20:16 +00:00
|
|
|
* this field should be in bits. For
|
|
|
|
* digest-encrypted cases this must be
|
|
|
|
* an 8-bit multiple.
|
cryptodev: fix KASUMI F9 expected parameters
For KASUMI F9 algorithm, COUNT, FRESH and DIRECTION
input values need to be contiguous with
the message, as described in the KASUMI and QAT PMD
documentation.
Before, the COUNT and FRESH values were set
as part of the AAD (now IV), but always set before
the beginning of the message.
Since now the IV is set after the crypto operation,
it is not possible to have these values in the
expected location.
Therefore, as these are required to be contiguous,
cryptodev API will expect these them to be passed
as a single buffer, already constructed, so
authentication IV parameters not needed anymore.
Fixes: 681f540da52b ("cryptodev: do not use AAD in wireless algorithms")
Signed-off-by: Pablo de Lara <pablo.de.lara.guarch@intel.com>
Acked-by: Fiona Trahe <fiona.trahe@intel.com>
2017-07-14 07:06:52 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @note
|
|
|
|
* For KASUMI @ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_KASUMI_F9,
|
|
|
|
* the length should include the COUNT,
|
|
|
|
* FRESH, message, direction bit and padding
|
|
|
|
* (to be multiple of 8 bits).
|
2020-07-03 12:39:28 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @note
|
|
|
|
* For DOCSIS security protocol, this
|
|
|
|
* is the CRC length i.e. the number of
|
|
|
|
* bytes in the packet over which the
|
|
|
|
* CRC should be calculated
|
2017-07-02 05:41:21 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
} data;
|
|
|
|
/**< Data offsets and length for authentication */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct {
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *data;
|
|
|
|
/**< This points to the location where
|
|
|
|
* the digest result should be inserted
|
|
|
|
* (in the case of digest generation)
|
|
|
|
* or where the purported digest exists
|
|
|
|
* (in the case of digest verification).
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* At session creation time, the client
|
|
|
|
* specified the digest result length with
|
|
|
|
* the digest_length member of the
|
|
|
|
* @ref rte_crypto_auth_xform structure.
|
|
|
|
* For physical crypto devices the caller
|
|
|
|
* must allocate at least digest_length of
|
|
|
|
* physically contiguous memory at this
|
|
|
|
* location.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* For digest generation, the digest result
|
|
|
|
* will overwrite any data at this location.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2019-07-03 11:15:51 +00:00
|
|
|
* @note
|
|
|
|
* Digest-encrypted case.
|
|
|
|
* Digest can be generated, appended to
|
|
|
|
* the end of raw data and encrypted
|
|
|
|
* together using chained digest
|
|
|
|
* generation
|
|
|
|
* (@ref RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_GENERATE)
|
|
|
|
* and encryption
|
|
|
|
* (@ref RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_OP_ENCRYPT)
|
|
|
|
* xforms. Similarly, authentication
|
|
|
|
* of the raw data against appended,
|
|
|
|
* decrypted digest, can be performed
|
|
|
|
* using decryption
|
|
|
|
* (@ref RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_OP_DECRYPT)
|
|
|
|
* and digest verification
|
|
|
|
* (@ref RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_VERIFY)
|
|
|
|
* chained xforms.
|
|
|
|
* To perform those operations, a few
|
|
|
|
* additional conditions must be met:
|
|
|
|
* - caller must allocate at least
|
|
|
|
* digest_length of memory at the end of
|
|
|
|
* source and (in case of out-of-place
|
|
|
|
* operations) destination buffer; those
|
|
|
|
* buffers can be linear or split using
|
|
|
|
* scatter-gather lists,
|
|
|
|
* - digest data pointer must point to
|
|
|
|
* the end of source or (in case of
|
|
|
|
* out-of-place operations) destination
|
|
|
|
* data, which is pointer to the
|
|
|
|
* data buffer + auth.data.offset +
|
|
|
|
* auth.data.length,
|
|
|
|
* - cipher.data.offset +
|
|
|
|
* cipher.data.length must be greater
|
|
|
|
* than auth.data.offset +
|
|
|
|
* auth.data.length and is typically
|
|
|
|
* equal to auth.data.offset +
|
|
|
|
* auth.data.length + digest_length.
|
2019-10-22 13:20:16 +00:00
|
|
|
* - for wireless algorithms, i.e.
|
|
|
|
* SNOW 3G, KASUMI and ZUC, as the
|
|
|
|
* cipher.data.length,
|
|
|
|
* cipher.data.offset,
|
|
|
|
* auth.data.length and
|
|
|
|
* auth.data.offset are in bits, they
|
|
|
|
* must be 8-bit multiples.
|
2019-07-03 11:15:51 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Note, that for security reasons, it
|
|
|
|
* is PMDs' responsibility to not
|
|
|
|
* leave an unencrypted digest in any
|
|
|
|
* buffer after performing auth-cipher
|
|
|
|
* operations.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2017-07-02 05:41:21 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-10-20 12:31:31 +00:00
|
|
|
rte_iova_t phys_addr;
|
2017-07-02 05:41:21 +00:00
|
|
|
/**< Physical address of digest */
|
|
|
|
} digest; /**< Digest parameters */
|
|
|
|
} auth;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
};
|
2017-07-02 05:41:06 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
2016-03-10 15:41:12 +00:00
|
|
|
* Reset the fields of a symmetric operation to their default values.
|
2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @param op The crypto operation to be reset.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static inline void
|
|
|
|
__rte_crypto_sym_op_reset(struct rte_crypto_sym_op *op)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2016-03-10 15:41:12 +00:00
|
|
|
memset(op, 0, sizeof(*op));
|
2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-03-10 15:41:12 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* Allocate space for symmetric crypto xforms in the private data space of the
|
|
|
|
* crypto operation. This also defaults the crypto xform type to
|
|
|
|
* RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_NOT_SPECIFIED and configures the chaining of the xforms
|
|
|
|
* in the crypto operation
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @return
|
|
|
|
* - On success returns pointer to first crypto xform in crypto operations chain
|
|
|
|
* - On failure returns NULL
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static inline struct rte_crypto_sym_xform *
|
|
|
|
__rte_crypto_sym_op_sym_xforms_alloc(struct rte_crypto_sym_op *sym_op,
|
|
|
|
void *priv_data, uint8_t nb_xforms)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct rte_crypto_sym_xform *xform;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sym_op->xform = xform = (struct rte_crypto_sym_xform *)priv_data;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
do {
|
|
|
|
xform->type = RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_NOT_SPECIFIED;
|
|
|
|
xform = xform->next = --nb_xforms > 0 ? xform + 1 : NULL;
|
|
|
|
} while (xform);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return sym_op->xform;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* Attach a session to a symmetric crypto operation
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @param sym_op crypto operation
|
|
|
|
* @param sess cryptodev session
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static inline int
|
|
|
|
__rte_crypto_sym_op_attach_sym_session(struct rte_crypto_sym_op *sym_op,
|
2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
|
|
|
struct rte_cryptodev_sym_session *sess)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2016-03-10 15:41:12 +00:00
|
|
|
sym_op->session = sess;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-02-04 13:12:51 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* Converts portion of mbuf data into a vector representation.
|
|
|
|
* Each segment will be represented as a separate entry in *vec* array.
|
|
|
|
* Expects that provided *ofs* + *len* not to exceed mbuf's *pkt_len*.
|
|
|
|
* @param mb
|
|
|
|
* Pointer to the *rte_mbuf* object.
|
|
|
|
* @param ofs
|
|
|
|
* Offset within mbuf data to start with.
|
|
|
|
* @param len
|
|
|
|
* Length of data to represent.
|
|
|
|
* @param vec
|
2020-02-06 12:36:02 +00:00
|
|
|
* Pointer to an output array of IO vectors.
|
2020-02-04 13:12:51 +00:00
|
|
|
* @param num
|
2020-02-06 12:36:02 +00:00
|
|
|
* Size of an output array.
|
2020-02-04 13:12:51 +00:00
|
|
|
* @return
|
|
|
|
* - number of successfully filled entries in *vec* array.
|
|
|
|
* - negative number of elements in *vec* array required.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
__rte_experimental
|
|
|
|
static inline int
|
|
|
|
rte_crypto_mbuf_to_vec(const struct rte_mbuf *mb, uint32_t ofs, uint32_t len,
|
|
|
|
struct rte_crypto_vec vec[], uint32_t num)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
uint32_t i;
|
|
|
|
struct rte_mbuf *nseg;
|
|
|
|
uint32_t left;
|
|
|
|
uint32_t seglen;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* assuming that requested data starts in the first segment */
|
|
|
|
RTE_ASSERT(mb->data_len > ofs);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (mb->nb_segs > num)
|
|
|
|
return -mb->nb_segs;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vec[0].base = rte_pktmbuf_mtod_offset(mb, void *, ofs);
|
|
|
|
vec[0].iova = rte_pktmbuf_iova_offset(mb, ofs);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* whole data lies in the first segment */
|
|
|
|
seglen = mb->data_len - ofs;
|
|
|
|
if (len <= seglen) {
|
|
|
|
vec[0].len = len;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* data spread across segments */
|
|
|
|
vec[0].len = seglen;
|
|
|
|
left = len - seglen;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 1, nseg = mb->next; nseg != NULL; nseg = nseg->next, i++) {
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vec[i].base = rte_pktmbuf_mtod(nseg, void *);
|
|
|
|
vec[i].iova = rte_pktmbuf_iova(nseg);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
seglen = nseg->data_len;
|
|
|
|
if (left <= seglen) {
|
|
|
|
/* whole requested data is completed */
|
|
|
|
vec[i].len = left;
|
|
|
|
left = 0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* use whole segment */
|
|
|
|
vec[i].len = seglen;
|
|
|
|
left -= seglen;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
RTE_ASSERT(left == 0);
|
|
|
|
return i + 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-03-10 15:41:12 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-03-10 15:41:10 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef __cplusplus
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif /* _RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_H_ */
|