crypto/aesni_mb: support Chacha20-Poly1305

Add support for Chacha20-Poly1305 AEAD algorithm.

Signed-off-by: Pablo de Lara <pablo.de.lara.guarch@intel.com>
This commit is contained in:
Pablo de Lara 2020-10-09 12:05:21 +00:00 committed by Akhil Goyal
parent e45847d8fd
commit 010230a154
5 changed files with 95 additions and 12 deletions

View File

@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ AEAD algorithms:
* RTE_CRYPTO_AEAD_AES_CCM
* RTE_CRYPTO_AEAD_AES_GCM
* RTE_CRYPTO_AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305
Protocol offloads:

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@ -64,11 +64,11 @@ KASUMI F9 = Y
; Supported AEAD algorithms of the 'aesni_mb' crypto driver.
;
[AEAD]
AES CCM (128) = Y
AES GCM (128) = Y
AES GCM (192) = Y
AES GCM (256) = Y
AES CCM (128) = Y
AES GCM (128) = Y
AES GCM (192) = Y
AES GCM (256) = Y
CHACHA20-POLY1305 = Y
;
; Supported Asymmetric algorithms of the 'aesni_mb' crypto driver.
;

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@ -158,6 +158,7 @@ New Features
* Added support for ZUC-EEA3/EIA3 algorithms.
* Added support for SNOW3G-UEA2/UIA2 algorithms.
* Added support for KASUMI-F8/F9 algorithms.
* Added support for Chacha20-Poly1305.
* **Updated the aesni_gcm crypto PMD.**

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@ -125,6 +125,18 @@ aesni_mb_get_chain_order(const struct rte_crypto_sym_xform *xform)
return AESNI_MB_OP_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
static inline int
is_aead_algo(JOB_HASH_ALG hash_alg, JOB_CIPHER_MODE cipher_mode)
{
#if IMB_VERSION(0, 54, 3) <= IMB_VERSION_NUM
return (hash_alg == IMB_AUTH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 || hash_alg == AES_CCM ||
(hash_alg == AES_GMAC && cipher_mode == GCM));
#else
return ((hash_alg == AES_GMAC && cipher_mode == GCM) ||
hash_alg == AES_CCM);
#endif
}
/** Set session authentication parameters */
static int
aesni_mb_set_session_auth_parameters(const MB_MGR *mb_mgr,
@ -721,6 +733,24 @@ aesni_mb_set_session_aead_parameters(const MB_MGR *mb_mgr,
}
break;
#if IMB_VERSION(0, 54, 3) <= IMB_VERSION_NUM
case RTE_CRYPTO_AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
sess->cipher.mode = IMB_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305;
sess->auth.algo = IMB_AUTH_CHACHA20_POLY1305;
if (xform->aead.key.length != 32) {
AESNI_MB_LOG(ERR, "Invalid key length");
return -EINVAL;
}
sess->cipher.key_length_in_bytes = 32;
memcpy(sess->cipher.expanded_aes_keys.encode,
xform->aead.key.data, 32);
if (sess->auth.req_digest_len != 16) {
AESNI_MB_LOG(ERR, "Invalid digest size\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
break;
#endif
default:
AESNI_MB_LOG(ERR, "Unsupported aead mode parameter");
return -ENOTSUP;
@ -1220,6 +1250,8 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
/* Set authentication parameters */
job->hash_alg = session->auth.algo;
const int aead = is_aead_algo(job->hash_alg, job->cipher_mode);
switch (job->hash_alg) {
case AES_XCBC:
job->u.XCBC._k1_expanded = session->auth.xcbc.k1_expanded;
@ -1279,6 +1311,14 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
case IMB_AUTH_KASUMI_UIA1:
job->u.KASUMI_UIA1._key = (void *) &session->auth.pKeySched_kasumi_auth;
break;
#endif
#if IMB_VERSION(0, 54, 3) <= IMB_VERSION_NUM
case IMB_AUTH_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
job->u.CHACHA20_POLY1305.aad = op->sym->aead.aad.data;
job->u.CHACHA20_POLY1305.aad_len_in_bytes = session->aead.aad_len;
job->aes_enc_key_expanded = session->cipher.expanded_aes_keys.encode;
job->aes_dec_key_expanded = session->cipher.expanded_aes_keys.encode;
break;
#endif
default:
job->u.HMAC._hashed_auth_key_xor_ipad = session->auth.pads.inner;
@ -1297,8 +1337,7 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
}
}
if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || (job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC &&
session->cipher.mode == GCM))
if (aead)
m_offset = op->sym->aead.data.offset;
else
m_offset = op->sym->cipher.data.offset;
@ -1336,8 +1375,7 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
job->auth_tag_output = qp->temp_digests[*digest_idx];
*digest_idx = (*digest_idx + 1) % MAX_JOBS;
} else {
if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM || (job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC &&
session->cipher.mode == GCM))
if (aead)
job->auth_tag_output = op->sym->aead.digest.data;
else
job->auth_tag_output = op->sym->auth.digest.data;
@ -1397,6 +1435,19 @@ set_mb_job_params(JOB_AES_HMAC *job, struct aesni_mb_qp *qp,
session->iv.offset);
break;
#if IMB_VERSION(0, 54, 3) <= IMB_VERSION_NUM
case IMB_AUTH_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
job->cipher_start_src_offset_in_bytes = op->sym->aead.data.offset;
job->hash_start_src_offset_in_bytes = op->sym->aead.data.offset;
job->msg_len_to_cipher_in_bytes =
op->sym->aead.data.length;
job->msg_len_to_hash_in_bytes =
op->sym->aead.data.length;
job->iv = rte_crypto_op_ctod_offset(op, uint8_t *,
session->iv.offset);
break;
#endif
default:
/* For SNOW3G, length and offsets are already in bits */
job->cipher_start_src_offset_in_bytes =
@ -1595,9 +1646,7 @@ post_process_mb_job(struct aesni_mb_qp *qp, JOB_AES_HMAC *job)
break;
if (sess->auth.operation == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_VERIFY) {
if (job->hash_alg == AES_CCM ||
(job->hash_alg == AES_GMAC &&
sess->cipher.mode == GCM))
if (is_aead_algo(job->hash_alg, sess->cipher.mode))
verify_digest(job,
op->sym->aead.digest.data,
sess->auth.req_digest_len,

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@ -647,6 +647,38 @@ static const struct rte_cryptodev_capabilities aesni_mb_pmd_capabilities[] = {
}, }
}, }
},
#endif
#if IMB_VERSION(0, 54, 3) <= IMB_VERSION_NUM
{ /* CHACHA20-POLY1305 */
.op = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_TYPE_SYMMETRIC,
{.sym = {
.xform_type = RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_AEAD,
{.aead = {
.algo = RTE_CRYPTO_AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
.block_size = 64,
.key_size = {
.min = 32,
.max = 32,
.increment = 0
},
.digest_size = {
.min = 16,
.max = 16,
.increment = 0
},
.aad_size = {
.min = 0,
.max = 240,
.increment = 1
},
.iv_size = {
.min = 12,
.max = 12,
.increment = 0
},
}, }
}, }
},
#endif
RTE_CRYPTODEV_END_OF_CAPABILITIES_LIST()
};