crypto/armv8: fix authentication session configuration
For key sizes greater than digest length, pad with zero rather than
computing hash of the key itself.
Fixes: 169ca3db55
("crypto/armv8: add PMD optimized for ARMv8 processors")
Cc: stable@dpdk.org
Signed-off-by: Srisivasubramanian S <ssrinivasan@caviumnetworks.com>
This commit is contained in:
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31850d2685
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473174a7da
@ -291,27 +291,14 @@ auth_set_prerequisites(struct armv8_crypto_session *sess,
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* Generate authentication key, i_key_pad and o_key_pad.
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*/
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/* Zero memory under key */
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memset(sess->auth.hmac.key, 0, SHA1_AUTH_KEY_LENGTH);
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memset(sess->auth.hmac.key, 0, SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE);
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if (xform->auth.key.length > SHA1_AUTH_KEY_LENGTH) {
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/*
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* In case the key is longer than 160 bits
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* the algorithm will use SHA1(key) instead.
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*/
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error = sha1_block(NULL, xform->auth.key.data,
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sess->auth.hmac.key, xform->auth.key.length);
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if (error != 0)
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return -1;
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} else {
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/*
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* Now copy the given authentication key to the session
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* key assuming that the session key is zeroed there is
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* no need for additional zero padding if the key is
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* shorter than SHA1_AUTH_KEY_LENGTH.
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*/
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rte_memcpy(sess->auth.hmac.key, xform->auth.key.data,
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xform->auth.key.length);
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}
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/*
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* Now copy the given authentication key to the session
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* key.
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*/
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rte_memcpy(sess->auth.hmac.key, xform->auth.key.data,
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xform->auth.key.length);
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/* Prepare HMAC padding: key|pattern */
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auth_hmac_pad_prepare(sess, xform);
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@ -337,27 +324,14 @@ auth_set_prerequisites(struct armv8_crypto_session *sess,
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* Generate authentication key, i_key_pad and o_key_pad.
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*/
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/* Zero memory under key */
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memset(sess->auth.hmac.key, 0, SHA256_AUTH_KEY_LENGTH);
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memset(sess->auth.hmac.key, 0, SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE);
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if (xform->auth.key.length > SHA256_AUTH_KEY_LENGTH) {
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/*
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* In case the key is longer than 256 bits
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* the algorithm will use SHA256(key) instead.
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*/
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error = sha256_block(NULL, xform->auth.key.data,
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sess->auth.hmac.key, xform->auth.key.length);
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if (error != 0)
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return -1;
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} else {
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/*
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* Now copy the given authentication key to the session
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* key assuming that the session key is zeroed there is
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* no need for additional zero padding if the key is
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* shorter than SHA256_AUTH_KEY_LENGTH.
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*/
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rte_memcpy(sess->auth.hmac.key, xform->auth.key.data,
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xform->auth.key.length);
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}
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/*
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* Now copy the given authentication key to the session
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* key.
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*/
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rte_memcpy(sess->auth.hmac.key, xform->auth.key.data,
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xform->auth.key.length);
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/* Prepare HMAC padding: key|pattern */
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auth_hmac_pad_prepare(sess, xform);
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@ -198,8 +198,8 @@ struct armv8_crypto_session {
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uint8_t o_key_pad[SHA_BLOCK_MAX]
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__rte_cache_aligned;
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/**< outer pad (max supported block length) */
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uint8_t key[SHA_AUTH_KEY_MAX];
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/**< HMAC key (max supported length)*/
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uint8_t key[SHA_BLOCK_MAX];
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/**< HMAC key (max supported block length)*/
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} hmac;
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};
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uint16_t digest_length;
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