crypto/armv8: fix authentication session configuration

For key sizes greater than digest length, pad with zero rather than
computing hash of the key itself.

Fixes: 169ca3db55 ("crypto/armv8: add PMD optimized for ARMv8 processors")
Cc: stable@dpdk.org

Signed-off-by: Srisivasubramanian S <ssrinivasan@caviumnetworks.com>
This commit is contained in:
Srisivasubramanian S 2017-07-30 16:53:00 +05:30 committed by Thomas Monjalon
parent 31850d2685
commit 473174a7da
2 changed files with 16 additions and 42 deletions

View File

@ -291,27 +291,14 @@ auth_set_prerequisites(struct armv8_crypto_session *sess,
* Generate authentication key, i_key_pad and o_key_pad.
*/
/* Zero memory under key */
memset(sess->auth.hmac.key, 0, SHA1_AUTH_KEY_LENGTH);
memset(sess->auth.hmac.key, 0, SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE);
if (xform->auth.key.length > SHA1_AUTH_KEY_LENGTH) {
/*
* In case the key is longer than 160 bits
* the algorithm will use SHA1(key) instead.
*/
error = sha1_block(NULL, xform->auth.key.data,
sess->auth.hmac.key, xform->auth.key.length);
if (error != 0)
return -1;
} else {
/*
* Now copy the given authentication key to the session
* key assuming that the session key is zeroed there is
* no need for additional zero padding if the key is
* shorter than SHA1_AUTH_KEY_LENGTH.
*/
rte_memcpy(sess->auth.hmac.key, xform->auth.key.data,
xform->auth.key.length);
}
/*
* Now copy the given authentication key to the session
* key.
*/
rte_memcpy(sess->auth.hmac.key, xform->auth.key.data,
xform->auth.key.length);
/* Prepare HMAC padding: key|pattern */
auth_hmac_pad_prepare(sess, xform);
@ -337,27 +324,14 @@ auth_set_prerequisites(struct armv8_crypto_session *sess,
* Generate authentication key, i_key_pad and o_key_pad.
*/
/* Zero memory under key */
memset(sess->auth.hmac.key, 0, SHA256_AUTH_KEY_LENGTH);
memset(sess->auth.hmac.key, 0, SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE);
if (xform->auth.key.length > SHA256_AUTH_KEY_LENGTH) {
/*
* In case the key is longer than 256 bits
* the algorithm will use SHA256(key) instead.
*/
error = sha256_block(NULL, xform->auth.key.data,
sess->auth.hmac.key, xform->auth.key.length);
if (error != 0)
return -1;
} else {
/*
* Now copy the given authentication key to the session
* key assuming that the session key is zeroed there is
* no need for additional zero padding if the key is
* shorter than SHA256_AUTH_KEY_LENGTH.
*/
rte_memcpy(sess->auth.hmac.key, xform->auth.key.data,
xform->auth.key.length);
}
/*
* Now copy the given authentication key to the session
* key.
*/
rte_memcpy(sess->auth.hmac.key, xform->auth.key.data,
xform->auth.key.length);
/* Prepare HMAC padding: key|pattern */
auth_hmac_pad_prepare(sess, xform);

View File

@ -198,8 +198,8 @@ struct armv8_crypto_session {
uint8_t o_key_pad[SHA_BLOCK_MAX]
__rte_cache_aligned;
/**< outer pad (max supported block length) */
uint8_t key[SHA_AUTH_KEY_MAX];
/**< HMAC key (max supported length)*/
uint8_t key[SHA_BLOCK_MAX];
/**< HMAC key (max supported block length)*/
} hmac;
};
uint16_t digest_length;