crypto/aesni_gcm: support all truncated digest sizes

The full digest size of GCM/GMAC algorithms is 16 bytes.
However, it is sometimes truncated to a smaller size (such as in IPSec).
This commit allows a user to generate a digest of any size
up to the full size.

Signed-off-by: Pablo de Lara <pablo.de.lara.guarch@intel.com>
Acked-by: Marko Kovacevic <marko.kovacevic@intel.com>
This commit is contained in:
Pablo de Lara 2018-08-14 01:54:30 +01:00 committed by Akhil Goyal
parent c7c29f1058
commit ceb8639387
3 changed files with 65 additions and 28 deletions

View File

@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ aesni_gcm_set_session_parameters(const struct aesni_gcm_ops *gcm_ops,
{
const struct rte_crypto_sym_xform *auth_xform;
const struct rte_crypto_sym_xform *aead_xform;
uint16_t digest_length;
uint8_t key_length;
uint8_t *key;
@ -47,7 +46,7 @@ aesni_gcm_set_session_parameters(const struct aesni_gcm_ops *gcm_ops,
key_length = auth_xform->auth.key.length;
key = auth_xform->auth.key.data;
digest_length = auth_xform->auth.digest_length;
sess->req_digest_length = auth_xform->auth.digest_length;
/* AES-GCM */
} else if (xform->type == RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_AEAD) {
@ -73,7 +72,7 @@ aesni_gcm_set_session_parameters(const struct aesni_gcm_ops *gcm_ops,
key = aead_xform->aead.key.data;
sess->aad_length = aead_xform->aead.aad_length;
digest_length = aead_xform->aead.digest_length;
sess->req_digest_length = aead_xform->aead.digest_length;
} else {
AESNI_GCM_LOG(ERR, "Wrong xform type, has to be AEAD or authentication");
return -ENOTSUP;
@ -106,13 +105,28 @@ aesni_gcm_set_session_parameters(const struct aesni_gcm_ops *gcm_ops,
gcm_ops[sess->key].precomp(key, &sess->gdata_key);
/* Digest check */
if (digest_length != 16 &&
digest_length != 12 &&
digest_length != 8) {
if (sess->req_digest_length > 16) {
AESNI_GCM_LOG(ERR, "Invalid digest length");
return -EINVAL;
}
sess->digest_length = digest_length;
/*
* Multi-buffer lib supports digest sizes from 4 to 16 bytes
* in version 0.50 and sizes of 8, 12 and 16 bytes,
* in version 0.49.
* If size requested is different, generate the full digest
* (16 bytes) in a temporary location and then memcpy
* the requested number of bytes.
*/
#if IMB_VERSION_NUM >= IMB_VERSION(0, 50, 0)
if (sess->req_digest_length < 4)
#else
if (sess->req_digest_length != 16 &&
sess->req_digest_length != 12 &&
sess->req_digest_length != 8)
#endif
sess->gen_digest_length = 16;
else
sess->gen_digest_length = sess->req_digest_length;
return 0;
}
@ -180,6 +194,7 @@ process_gcm_crypto_op(struct aesni_gcm_qp *qp, struct rte_crypto_op *op,
struct rte_mbuf *m_src = sym_op->m_src;
uint32_t offset, data_offset, data_length;
uint32_t part_len, total_len, data_len;
uint8_t *tag;
if (session->op == AESNI_GCM_OP_AUTHENTICATED_ENCRYPTION ||
session->op == AESNI_GCM_OP_AUTHENTICATED_DECRYPTION) {
@ -254,13 +269,16 @@ process_gcm_crypto_op(struct aesni_gcm_qp *qp, struct rte_crypto_op *op,
total_len -= part_len;
}
if (session->req_digest_length != session->gen_digest_length)
tag = qp->temp_digest;
else
tag = sym_op->aead.digest.data;
qp->ops[session->key].finalize(&session->gdata_key,
&qp->gdata_ctx,
sym_op->aead.digest.data,
(uint64_t)session->digest_length);
tag,
session->gen_digest_length);
} else if (session->op == AESNI_GCM_OP_AUTHENTICATED_DECRYPTION) {
uint8_t *auth_tag = qp->temp_digest;
qp->ops[session->key].init(&session->gdata_key,
&qp->gdata_ctx,
iv_ptr,
@ -289,33 +307,41 @@ process_gcm_crypto_op(struct aesni_gcm_qp *qp, struct rte_crypto_op *op,
total_len -= part_len;
}
tag = qp->temp_digest;
qp->ops[session->key].finalize(&session->gdata_key,
&qp->gdata_ctx,
auth_tag,
(uint64_t)session->digest_length);
tag,
session->gen_digest_length);
} else if (session->op == AESNI_GMAC_OP_GENERATE) {
qp->ops[session->key].init(&session->gdata_key,
&qp->gdata_ctx,
iv_ptr,
src,
(uint64_t)data_length);
if (session->req_digest_length != session->gen_digest_length)
tag = qp->temp_digest;
else
tag = sym_op->auth.digest.data;
qp->ops[session->key].finalize(&session->gdata_key,
&qp->gdata_ctx,
sym_op->auth.digest.data,
(uint64_t)session->digest_length);
tag,
session->gen_digest_length);
} else { /* AESNI_GMAC_OP_VERIFY */
uint8_t *auth_tag = qp->temp_digest;
qp->ops[session->key].init(&session->gdata_key,
&qp->gdata_ctx,
iv_ptr,
src,
(uint64_t)data_length);
/*
* Generate always 16 bytes and later compare only
* the bytes passed.
*/
tag = qp->temp_digest;
qp->ops[session->key].finalize(&session->gdata_key,
&qp->gdata_ctx,
auth_tag,
(uint64_t)session->digest_length);
tag,
session->gen_digest_length);
}
return 0;
@ -352,13 +378,22 @@ post_process_gcm_crypto_op(struct aesni_gcm_qp *qp,
#ifdef RTE_LIBRTE_PMD_AESNI_GCM_DEBUG
rte_hexdump(stdout, "auth tag (orig):",
digest, session->digest_length);
digest, session->req_digest_length);
rte_hexdump(stdout, "auth tag (calc):",
tag, session->digest_length);
tag, session->req_digest_length);
#endif
if (memcmp(tag, digest, session->digest_length) != 0)
if (memcmp(tag, digest, session->req_digest_length) != 0)
op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
} else {
if (session->req_digest_length != session->gen_digest_length) {
if (session->op == AESNI_GCM_OP_AUTHENTICATED_ENCRYPTION)
memcpy(op->sym->aead.digest.data, qp->temp_digest,
session->req_digest_length);
else
memcpy(op->sym->auth.digest.data, qp->temp_digest,
session->req_digest_length);
}
}
}

View File

@ -24,9 +24,9 @@ static const struct rte_cryptodev_capabilities aesni_gcm_pmd_capabilities[] = {
.increment = 8
},
.digest_size = {
.min = 8,
.min = 1,
.max = 16,
.increment = 4
.increment = 1
},
.iv_size = {
.min = 12,
@ -49,9 +49,9 @@ static const struct rte_cryptodev_capabilities aesni_gcm_pmd_capabilities[] = {
.increment = 8
},
.digest_size = {
.min = 8,
.min = 1,
.max = 16,
.increment = 4
.increment = 1
},
.aad_size = {
.min = 0,

View File

@ -76,8 +76,10 @@ struct aesni_gcm_session {
/**< IV parameters */
uint16_t aad_length;
/**< AAD length */
uint16_t digest_length;
/**< Digest length */
uint16_t req_digest_length;
/**< Requested digest length */
uint16_t gen_digest_length;
/**< Generated digest length */
enum aesni_gcm_operation op;
/**< GCM operation type */
enum aesni_gcm_key key;