Pablo de Lara 168b9e76f9 drivers/crypto: do not create unique name internally
Crypto devices of the same type could be initialized
with the same name, since internally this name was suffixed
with an index.

Since commit <dda987315ca2> ("vdev: make virtual bus use its
device struct"), this is not allowed anymore.

Therefore, there is no need to create an unique name
at device initialization.

Signed-off-by: Pablo de Lara <pablo.de.lara.guarch@intel.com>
Acked-by: Fan Zhang <roy.fan.zhang@intel.com>
2017-04-20 11:32:45 +02:00

542 lines
15 KiB
C

/*-
* BSD LICENSE
*
* Copyright(c) 2016 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
* * Neither the name of Intel Corporation nor the names of its
* contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
* from this software without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
* "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
* LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
* A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
* OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
* LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
* OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <rte_common.h>
#include <rte_config.h>
#include <rte_hexdump.h>
#include <rte_cryptodev.h>
#include <rte_cryptodev_pmd.h>
#include <rte_vdev.h>
#include <rte_malloc.h>
#include <rte_cpuflags.h>
#include <rte_byteorder.h>
#include "aesni_gcm_pmd_private.h"
/** GCM encode functions pointer table */
static const struct aesni_gcm_ops aesni_gcm_enc[] = {
[AESNI_GCM_KEY_128] = {
aesni_gcm128_init,
aesni_gcm128_enc_update,
aesni_gcm128_enc_finalize
},
[AESNI_GCM_KEY_256] = {
aesni_gcm256_init,
aesni_gcm256_enc_update,
aesni_gcm256_enc_finalize
}
};
/** GCM decode functions pointer table */
static const struct aesni_gcm_ops aesni_gcm_dec[] = {
[AESNI_GCM_KEY_128] = {
aesni_gcm128_init,
aesni_gcm128_dec_update,
aesni_gcm128_dec_finalize
},
[AESNI_GCM_KEY_256] = {
aesni_gcm256_init,
aesni_gcm256_dec_update,
aesni_gcm256_dec_finalize
}
};
/** Parse crypto xform chain and set private session parameters */
int
aesni_gcm_set_session_parameters(struct aesni_gcm_session *sess,
const struct rte_crypto_sym_xform *xform)
{
const struct rte_crypto_sym_xform *auth_xform;
const struct rte_crypto_sym_xform *cipher_xform;
if (xform->next == NULL || xform->next->next != NULL) {
GCM_LOG_ERR("Two and only two chained xform required");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (xform->type == RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_CIPHER &&
xform->next->type == RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_AUTH) {
auth_xform = xform->next;
cipher_xform = xform;
} else if (xform->type == RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_AUTH &&
xform->next->type == RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_CIPHER) {
auth_xform = xform;
cipher_xform = xform->next;
} else {
GCM_LOG_ERR("Cipher and auth xform required");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!(cipher_xform->cipher.algo == RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_AES_GCM &&
(auth_xform->auth.algo == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GCM ||
auth_xform->auth.algo == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC))) {
GCM_LOG_ERR("We only support AES GCM and AES GMAC");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* Select Crypto operation */
if (cipher_xform->cipher.op == RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_OP_ENCRYPT &&
auth_xform->auth.op == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_GENERATE)
sess->op = AESNI_GCM_OP_AUTHENTICATED_ENCRYPTION;
else if (cipher_xform->cipher.op == RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_OP_DECRYPT &&
auth_xform->auth.op == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_OP_VERIFY)
sess->op = AESNI_GCM_OP_AUTHENTICATED_DECRYPTION;
else {
GCM_LOG_ERR("Cipher/Auth operations: Encrypt/Generate or"
" Decrypt/Verify are valid only");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* Check key length and calculate GCM pre-compute. */
switch (cipher_xform->cipher.key.length) {
case 16:
aesni_gcm128_pre(cipher_xform->cipher.key.data, &sess->gdata);
sess->key = AESNI_GCM_KEY_128;
break;
case 32:
aesni_gcm256_pre(cipher_xform->cipher.key.data, &sess->gdata);
sess->key = AESNI_GCM_KEY_256;
break;
default:
GCM_LOG_ERR("Unsupported cipher key length");
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
/** Get gcm session */
static struct aesni_gcm_session *
aesni_gcm_get_session(struct aesni_gcm_qp *qp, struct rte_crypto_sym_op *op)
{
struct aesni_gcm_session *sess = NULL;
if (op->sess_type == RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_OP_WITH_SESSION) {
if (unlikely(op->session->dev_type
!= RTE_CRYPTODEV_AESNI_GCM_PMD))
return sess;
sess = (struct aesni_gcm_session *)op->session->_private;
} else {
void *_sess;
if (rte_mempool_get(qp->sess_mp, &_sess))
return sess;
sess = (struct aesni_gcm_session *)
((struct rte_cryptodev_sym_session *)_sess)->_private;
if (unlikely(aesni_gcm_set_session_parameters(sess,
op->xform) != 0)) {
rte_mempool_put(qp->sess_mp, _sess);
sess = NULL;
}
}
return sess;
}
/**
* Process a crypto operation and complete a JOB_AES_HMAC job structure for
* submission to the multi buffer library for processing.
*
* @param qp queue pair
* @param op symmetric crypto operation
* @param session GCM session
*
* @return
*
*/
static int
process_gcm_crypto_op(struct rte_crypto_sym_op *op,
struct aesni_gcm_session *session)
{
uint8_t *src, *dst;
struct rte_mbuf *m_src = op->m_src;
uint32_t offset = op->cipher.data.offset;
uint32_t part_len, total_len, data_len;
RTE_ASSERT(m_src != NULL);
while (offset >= m_src->data_len) {
offset -= m_src->data_len;
m_src = m_src->next;
RTE_ASSERT(m_src != NULL);
}
data_len = m_src->data_len - offset;
part_len = (data_len < op->cipher.data.length) ? data_len :
op->cipher.data.length;
/* Destination buffer is required when segmented source buffer */
RTE_ASSERT((part_len == op->cipher.data.length) ||
((part_len != op->cipher.data.length) &&
(op->m_dst != NULL)));
/* Segmented destination buffer is not supported */
RTE_ASSERT((op->m_dst == NULL) ||
((op->m_dst != NULL) &&
rte_pktmbuf_is_contiguous(op->m_dst)));
dst = op->m_dst ?
rte_pktmbuf_mtod_offset(op->m_dst, uint8_t *,
op->cipher.data.offset) :
rte_pktmbuf_mtod_offset(op->m_src, uint8_t *,
op->cipher.data.offset);
src = rte_pktmbuf_mtod_offset(m_src, uint8_t *, offset);
/* sanity checks */
if (op->cipher.iv.length != 16 && op->cipher.iv.length != 12 &&
op->cipher.iv.length != 0) {
GCM_LOG_ERR("iv");
return -1;
}
/*
* GCM working in 12B IV mode => 16B pre-counter block we need
* to set BE LSB to 1, driver expects that 16B is allocated
*/
if (op->cipher.iv.length == 12) {
uint32_t *iv_padd = (uint32_t *)&op->cipher.iv.data[12];
*iv_padd = rte_bswap32(1);
}
if (op->auth.digest.length != 16 &&
op->auth.digest.length != 12 &&
op->auth.digest.length != 8) {
GCM_LOG_ERR("digest");
return -1;
}
if (session->op == AESNI_GCM_OP_AUTHENTICATED_ENCRYPTION) {
aesni_gcm_enc[session->key].init(&session->gdata,
op->cipher.iv.data,
op->auth.aad.data,
(uint64_t)op->auth.aad.length);
aesni_gcm_enc[session->key].update(&session->gdata, dst, src,
(uint64_t)part_len);
total_len = op->cipher.data.length - part_len;
while (total_len) {
dst += part_len;
m_src = m_src->next;
RTE_ASSERT(m_src != NULL);
src = rte_pktmbuf_mtod(m_src, uint8_t *);
part_len = (m_src->data_len < total_len) ?
m_src->data_len : total_len;
aesni_gcm_enc[session->key].update(&session->gdata,
dst, src,
(uint64_t)part_len);
total_len -= part_len;
}
aesni_gcm_enc[session->key].finalize(&session->gdata,
op->auth.digest.data,
(uint64_t)op->auth.digest.length);
} else { /* session->op == AESNI_GCM_OP_AUTHENTICATED_DECRYPTION */
uint8_t *auth_tag = (uint8_t *)rte_pktmbuf_append(op->m_dst ?
op->m_dst : op->m_src,
op->auth.digest.length);
if (!auth_tag) {
GCM_LOG_ERR("auth_tag");
return -1;
}
aesni_gcm_dec[session->key].init(&session->gdata,
op->cipher.iv.data,
op->auth.aad.data,
(uint64_t)op->auth.aad.length);
aesni_gcm_dec[session->key].update(&session->gdata, dst, src,
(uint64_t)part_len);
total_len = op->cipher.data.length - part_len;
while (total_len) {
dst += part_len;
m_src = m_src->next;
RTE_ASSERT(m_src != NULL);
src = rte_pktmbuf_mtod(m_src, uint8_t *);
part_len = (m_src->data_len < total_len) ?
m_src->data_len : total_len;
aesni_gcm_dec[session->key].update(&session->gdata,
dst, src,
(uint64_t)part_len);
total_len -= part_len;
}
aesni_gcm_dec[session->key].finalize(&session->gdata,
auth_tag,
(uint64_t)op->auth.digest.length);
}
return 0;
}
/**
* Process a completed job and return rte_mbuf which job processed
*
* @param job JOB_AES_HMAC job to process
*
* @return
* - Returns processed mbuf which is trimmed of output digest used in
* verification of supplied digest in the case of a HASH_CIPHER operation
* - Returns NULL on invalid job
*/
static void
post_process_gcm_crypto_op(struct rte_crypto_op *op)
{
struct rte_mbuf *m = op->sym->m_dst ? op->sym->m_dst : op->sym->m_src;
struct aesni_gcm_session *session =
(struct aesni_gcm_session *)op->sym->session->_private;
op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_SUCCESS;
/* Verify digest if required */
if (session->op == AESNI_GCM_OP_AUTHENTICATED_DECRYPTION) {
uint8_t *tag = rte_pktmbuf_mtod_offset(m, uint8_t *,
m->data_len - op->sym->auth.digest.length);
#ifdef RTE_LIBRTE_PMD_AESNI_GCM_DEBUG
rte_hexdump(stdout, "auth tag (orig):",
op->sym->auth.digest.data, op->sym->auth.digest.length);
rte_hexdump(stdout, "auth tag (calc):",
tag, op->sym->auth.digest.length);
#endif
if (memcmp(tag, op->sym->auth.digest.data,
op->sym->auth.digest.length) != 0)
op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
/* trim area used for digest from mbuf */
rte_pktmbuf_trim(m, op->sym->auth.digest.length);
}
}
/**
* Process a completed GCM request
*
* @param qp Queue Pair to process
* @param job JOB_AES_HMAC job
*
* @return
* - Number of processed jobs
*/
static void
handle_completed_gcm_crypto_op(struct aesni_gcm_qp *qp,
struct rte_crypto_op *op)
{
post_process_gcm_crypto_op(op);
/* Free session if a session-less crypto op */
if (op->sym->sess_type == RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_OP_SESSIONLESS) {
rte_mempool_put(qp->sess_mp, op->sym->session);
op->sym->session = NULL;
}
}
static uint16_t
aesni_gcm_pmd_dequeue_burst(void *queue_pair,
struct rte_crypto_op **ops, uint16_t nb_ops)
{
struct aesni_gcm_session *sess;
struct aesni_gcm_qp *qp = queue_pair;
int retval = 0;
unsigned int i, nb_dequeued;
nb_dequeued = rte_ring_dequeue_burst(qp->processed_pkts,
(void **)ops, nb_ops, NULL);
for (i = 0; i < nb_dequeued; i++) {
sess = aesni_gcm_get_session(qp, ops[i]->sym);
if (unlikely(sess == NULL)) {
ops[i]->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_INVALID_ARGS;
qp->qp_stats.dequeue_err_count++;
break;
}
retval = process_gcm_crypto_op(ops[i]->sym, sess);
if (retval < 0) {
ops[i]->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_INVALID_ARGS;
qp->qp_stats.dequeue_err_count++;
break;
}
handle_completed_gcm_crypto_op(qp, ops[i]);
}
qp->qp_stats.dequeued_count += i;
return i;
}
static uint16_t
aesni_gcm_pmd_enqueue_burst(void *queue_pair,
struct rte_crypto_op **ops, uint16_t nb_ops)
{
struct aesni_gcm_qp *qp = queue_pair;
unsigned int nb_enqueued;
nb_enqueued = rte_ring_enqueue_burst(qp->processed_pkts,
(void **)ops, nb_ops, NULL);
qp->qp_stats.enqueued_count += nb_enqueued;
return nb_enqueued;
}
static int aesni_gcm_remove(struct rte_vdev_device *vdev);
static int
aesni_gcm_create(const char *name,
struct rte_vdev_device *vdev,
struct rte_crypto_vdev_init_params *init_params)
{
struct rte_cryptodev *dev;
struct aesni_gcm_private *internals;
if (init_params->name[0] == '\0')
snprintf(init_params->name, sizeof(init_params->name),
"%s", name);
/* Check CPU for support for AES instruction set */
if (!rte_cpu_get_flag_enabled(RTE_CPUFLAG_AES)) {
GCM_LOG_ERR("AES instructions not supported by CPU");
return -EFAULT;
}
dev = rte_cryptodev_pmd_virtual_dev_init(init_params->name,
sizeof(struct aesni_gcm_private), init_params->socket_id);
if (dev == NULL) {
GCM_LOG_ERR("failed to create cryptodev vdev");
goto init_error;
}
dev->dev_type = RTE_CRYPTODEV_AESNI_GCM_PMD;
dev->dev_ops = rte_aesni_gcm_pmd_ops;
/* register rx/tx burst functions for data path */
dev->dequeue_burst = aesni_gcm_pmd_dequeue_burst;
dev->enqueue_burst = aesni_gcm_pmd_enqueue_burst;
dev->feature_flags = RTE_CRYPTODEV_FF_SYMMETRIC_CRYPTO |
RTE_CRYPTODEV_FF_SYM_OPERATION_CHAINING |
RTE_CRYPTODEV_FF_CPU_AESNI |
RTE_CRYPTODEV_FF_MBUF_SCATTER_GATHER;
internals = dev->data->dev_private;
internals->max_nb_queue_pairs = init_params->max_nb_queue_pairs;
internals->max_nb_sessions = init_params->max_nb_sessions;
return 0;
init_error:
GCM_LOG_ERR("driver %s: create failed", init_params->name);
aesni_gcm_remove(vdev);
return -EFAULT;
}
static int
aesni_gcm_probe(struct rte_vdev_device *vdev)
{
struct rte_crypto_vdev_init_params init_params = {
RTE_CRYPTODEV_VDEV_DEFAULT_MAX_NB_QUEUE_PAIRS,
RTE_CRYPTODEV_VDEV_DEFAULT_MAX_NB_SESSIONS,
rte_socket_id(),
{0}
};
const char *name;
const char *input_args;
name = rte_vdev_device_name(vdev);
if (name == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
input_args = rte_vdev_device_args(vdev);
rte_cryptodev_parse_vdev_init_params(&init_params, input_args);
RTE_LOG(INFO, PMD, "Initialising %s on NUMA node %d\n", name,
init_params.socket_id);
if (init_params.name[0] != '\0')
RTE_LOG(INFO, PMD, " User defined name = %s\n",
init_params.name);
RTE_LOG(INFO, PMD, " Max number of queue pairs = %d\n",
init_params.max_nb_queue_pairs);
RTE_LOG(INFO, PMD, " Max number of sessions = %d\n",
init_params.max_nb_sessions);
return aesni_gcm_create(name, vdev, &init_params);
}
static int
aesni_gcm_remove(struct rte_vdev_device *vdev)
{
const char *name;
name = rte_vdev_device_name(vdev);
if (name == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
GCM_LOG_INFO("Closing AESNI crypto device %s on numa socket %u\n",
name, rte_socket_id());
return 0;
}
static struct rte_vdev_driver aesni_gcm_pmd_drv = {
.probe = aesni_gcm_probe,
.remove = aesni_gcm_remove
};
RTE_PMD_REGISTER_VDEV(CRYPTODEV_NAME_AESNI_GCM_PMD, aesni_gcm_pmd_drv);
RTE_PMD_REGISTER_ALIAS(CRYPTODEV_NAME_AESNI_GCM_PMD, cryptodev_aesni_gcm_pmd);
RTE_PMD_REGISTER_PARAM_STRING(CRYPTODEV_NAME_AESNI_GCM_PMD,
"max_nb_queue_pairs=<int> "
"max_nb_sessions=<int> "
"socket_id=<int>");