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freebsd-dev/sys/security/mac/mac_policy.h

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Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time, and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence, documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added. Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework, and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD 5.1-RELEASE. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
/*-
* Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Robert N. M. Watson
Update NAI copyright to 2003, missed in earlier commits and merges.
2003-04-18 19:57:37 +00:00
* Copyright (c) 2001, 2002, 2003 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time, and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence, documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added. Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework, and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD 5.1-RELEASE. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
* All rights reserved.
*
* This software was developed by Robert Watson for the TrustedBSD Project.
*
License clarification and wording changes: NAI has approved removal of clause three, and NAI Labs now goes by the name Network Associates Laboratories.
2002-11-04 01:42:39 +00:00
* This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project in part by Network
* Associates Laboratories, the Security Research Division of Network
* Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"),
* as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time, and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence, documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added. Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework, and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD 5.1-RELEASE. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $FreeBSD$
*/
/*
* Kernel interface for MAC policy modules.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_MAC_POLICY_H
#define _SYS_MAC_POLICY_H
/*-
* Pluggable access control policy definition structure.
*
* List of operations that are performed as part of the implementation
* of a MAC policy. Policy implementors declare operations with a
* mac_policy_ops structure, and using the MAC_POLICY_SET() macro.
* If an entry point is not declared, then then the policy will be ignored
* during evaluation of that event or check.
*
* Operations are sorted first by general class of operation, then
* alphabetically.
*/
Forward declare a boatload of structures referenced in the MAC policy definition structure; this permits policies to reduce their number of gratuitous includes for required for entry points they don't implement. This also facilitates building the MAC Framework on Darwin. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-06-22 16:36:00 +00:00
struct acl;
struct componentname;
struct devfs_dirent;
Introduce a MAC label reference in 'struct inpcb', which caches the MAC label referenced from 'struct socket' in the IPv4 and IPv6-based protocols. This permits MAC labels to be checked during network delivery operations without dereferencing inp->inp_socket to get to so->so_label, which will eventually avoid our having to grab the socket lock during delivery at the network layer. This change introduces 'struct inpcb' as a labeled object to the MAC Framework, along with the normal circus of entry points: initialization, creation from socket, destruction, as well as a delivery access control check. For most policies, the inpcb label will simply be a cache of the socket label, so a new protocol switch method is introduced, pr_sosetlabel() to notify protocols that the socket layer label has been updated so that the cache can be updated while holding appropriate locks. Most protocols implement this using pru_sosetlabel_null(), but IPv4/IPv6 protocols using inpcbs use the the worker function in_pcbsosetlabel(), which calls into the MAC Framework to perform a cache update. Biba, LOMAC, and MLS implement these entry points, as do the stub policy, and test policy. Reviewed by: sam, bms Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-18 00:39:07 +00:00
struct inpcb;
Forward declare a boatload of structures referenced in the MAC policy definition structure; this permits policies to reduce their number of gratuitous includes for required for entry points they don't implement. This also facilitates building the MAC Framework on Darwin. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-06-22 16:36:00 +00:00
struct ipq;
struct label;
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time, and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence, documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added. Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework, and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD 5.1-RELEASE. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
struct mac_policy_conf;
Forward declare a boatload of structures referenced in the MAC policy definition structure; this permits policies to reduce their number of gratuitous includes for required for entry points they don't implement. This also facilitates building the MAC Framework on Darwin. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-06-22 16:36:00 +00:00
struct mbuf;
struct mount;
struct pipe;
Redesign the externalization APIs from the MAC Framework to the MAC policy modules to improve robustness against C string bugs and vulnerabilities. Following these revisions, all string construction of labels for export to userspace (or elsewhere) is performed using the sbuf API, which prevents the consumer from having to perform laborious and intricate pointer and buffer checks. This substantially simplifies the externalization logic, both at the MAC Framework level, and in individual policies; this becomes especially useful when policies export more complex label data, such as with compartments in Biba and MLS. Bundled in here are some other minor fixes associated with externalization: including avoiding malloc while holding the process mutex in mac_lomac, and hence avoid a failure mode when printing labels during a downgrade operation due to the removal of the M_NOWAIT case. This has been running in the MAC development tree for about three weeks without problems. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-06-23 01:26:34 +00:00
struct sbuf;
Forward declare a boatload of structures referenced in the MAC policy definition structure; this permits policies to reduce their number of gratuitous includes for required for entry points they don't implement. This also facilitates building the MAC Framework on Darwin. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-06-22 16:36:00 +00:00
struct socket;
struct ucred;
struct uio;
struct vnode;
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time, and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence, documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added. Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework, and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD 5.1-RELEASE. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
struct mac_policy_ops {
/*
* Policy module operations.
*/
void (*mpo_destroy)(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc);
void (*mpo_init)(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc);
Provide an implementation of mac_syscall() so that security modules can offer new services without reserving system call numbers, or augmented versions of existing services. User code requests a target policy by name, and specifies the policy-specific API plus target. This is required in particular for our port of SELinux/FLASK to the MAC framework since it offers additional security services. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 17:59:48 +00:00
/*
* General policy-directed security system call so that policies
* may implement new services without reserving explicit
* system call numbers.
*/
int (*mpo_syscall)(struct thread *td, int call, void *arg);
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time, and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence, documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added. Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework, and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD 5.1-RELEASE. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
/*
* Label operations.
*/
Begin another merge from the TrustedBSD MAC branch: - Change mpo_init_foo(obj, label) and mpo_destroy_foo(obj, label) policy entry points to mpo_init_foo_label(label) and mpo_destroy_foo_label(label). This will permit the use of the same entry points for holding temporary type-specific label during internalization and externalization, as well as for caching purposes. - Because of this, break out mpo_{init,destroy}_socket() and mpo_{init,destroy}_mount() into seperate entry points for socket main/peer labels and mount main/fs labels. - Since the prototype for label initialization is the same across almost all entry points, implement these entry points using common implementations for Biba, MLS, and Test, reducing the number of almost identical looking functions. This simplifies policy implementation, as well as preparing us for the merge of the new flexible userland API for managing labels on objects. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-05 15:10:00 +00:00
void (*mpo_init_bpfdesc_label)(struct label *label);
void (*mpo_init_cred_label)(struct label *label);
void (*mpo_init_devfsdirent_label)(struct label *label);
void (*mpo_init_ifnet_label)(struct label *label);
Introduce a MAC label reference in 'struct inpcb', which caches the MAC label referenced from 'struct socket' in the IPv4 and IPv6-based protocols. This permits MAC labels to be checked during network delivery operations without dereferencing inp->inp_socket to get to so->so_label, which will eventually avoid our having to grab the socket lock during delivery at the network layer. This change introduces 'struct inpcb' as a labeled object to the MAC Framework, along with the normal circus of entry points: initialization, creation from socket, destruction, as well as a delivery access control check. For most policies, the inpcb label will simply be a cache of the socket label, so a new protocol switch method is introduced, pr_sosetlabel() to notify protocols that the socket layer label has been updated so that the cache can be updated while holding appropriate locks. Most protocols implement this using pru_sosetlabel_null(), but IPv4/IPv6 protocols using inpcbs use the the worker function in_pcbsosetlabel(), which calls into the MAC Framework to perform a cache update. Biba, LOMAC, and MLS implement these entry points, as do the stub policy, and test policy. Reviewed by: sam, bms Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-18 00:39:07 +00:00
int (*mpo_init_inpcb_label)(struct label *label, int flag);
Modify the mac_init_ipq() MAC Framework entry point to accept an additional flags argument to indicate blocking disposition, and pass in M_NOWAIT from the IP reassembly code to indicate that blocking is not OK when labeling a new IP fragment reassembly queue. This should eliminate some of the WITNESS warnings that have started popping up since fine-grained IP stack locking started going in; if memory allocation fails, the creation of the fragment queue will be aborted. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-26 15:12:03 +00:00
int (*mpo_init_ipq_label)(struct label *label, int flag);
Begin another merge from the TrustedBSD MAC branch: - Change mpo_init_foo(obj, label) and mpo_destroy_foo(obj, label) policy entry points to mpo_init_foo_label(label) and mpo_destroy_foo_label(label). This will permit the use of the same entry points for holding temporary type-specific label during internalization and externalization, as well as for caching purposes. - Because of this, break out mpo_{init,destroy}_socket() and mpo_{init,destroy}_mount() into seperate entry points for socket main/peer labels and mount main/fs labels. - Since the prototype for label initialization is the same across almost all entry points, implement these entry points using common implementations for Biba, MLS, and Test, reducing the number of almost identical looking functions. This simplifies policy implementation, as well as preparing us for the merge of the new flexible userland API for managing labels on objects. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-05 15:10:00 +00:00
int (*mpo_init_mbuf_label)(struct label *label, int flag);
void (*mpo_init_mount_label)(struct label *label);
void (*mpo_init_mount_fs_label)(struct label *label);
Modify label allocation semantics for sockets: pass in soalloc's malloc flags so that we can call malloc with M_NOWAIT if necessary, avoiding potential sleeps while holding mutexes in the TCP syncache code. Similar to the existing support for mbuf label allocation: if we can't allocate all the necessary label store in each policy, we back out the label allocation and fail the socket creation. Sync from MAC tree. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-05 21:23:47 +00:00
int (*mpo_init_socket_label)(struct label *label, int flag);
int (*mpo_init_socket_peer_label)(struct label *label, int flag);
Begin another merge from the TrustedBSD MAC branch: - Change mpo_init_foo(obj, label) and mpo_destroy_foo(obj, label) policy entry points to mpo_init_foo_label(label) and mpo_destroy_foo_label(label). This will permit the use of the same entry points for holding temporary type-specific label during internalization and externalization, as well as for caching purposes. - Because of this, break out mpo_{init,destroy}_socket() and mpo_{init,destroy}_mount() into seperate entry points for socket main/peer labels and mount main/fs labels. - Since the prototype for label initialization is the same across almost all entry points, implement these entry points using common implementations for Biba, MLS, and Test, reducing the number of almost identical looking functions. This simplifies policy implementation, as well as preparing us for the merge of the new flexible userland API for managing labels on objects. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-05 15:10:00 +00:00
void (*mpo_init_pipe_label)(struct label *label);
Introduce p_label, extensible security label storage for the MAC framework in struct proc. While the process label is actually stored in the struct ucred pointed to by p_ucred, there is a need for transient storage that may be used when asynchronous (deferred) updates need to be performed on the "real" label for locking reasons. Unlike other label storage, this label has no locking semantics, relying on policies to provide their own protection for the label contents, meaning that a policy leaf mutex may be used, avoiding lock order issues. This permits policies that act based on historical process behavior (such as audit policies, the MAC Framework port of LOMAC, etc) can update process properties even when many existing locks are held without violating the lock order. No currently committed policies implement use of this label storage. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-11-20 15:41:25 +00:00
void (*mpo_init_proc_label)(struct label *label);
Begin another merge from the TrustedBSD MAC branch: - Change mpo_init_foo(obj, label) and mpo_destroy_foo(obj, label) policy entry points to mpo_init_foo_label(label) and mpo_destroy_foo_label(label). This will permit the use of the same entry points for holding temporary type-specific label during internalization and externalization, as well as for caching purposes. - Because of this, break out mpo_{init,destroy}_socket() and mpo_{init,destroy}_mount() into seperate entry points for socket main/peer labels and mount main/fs labels. - Since the prototype for label initialization is the same across almost all entry points, implement these entry points using common implementations for Biba, MLS, and Test, reducing the number of almost identical looking functions. This simplifies policy implementation, as well as preparing us for the merge of the new flexible userland API for managing labels on objects. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-05 15:10:00 +00:00
void (*mpo_init_vnode_label)(struct label *label);
void (*mpo_destroy_bpfdesc_label)(struct label *label);
void (*mpo_destroy_cred_label)(struct label *label);
void (*mpo_destroy_devfsdirent_label)(struct label *label);
void (*mpo_destroy_ifnet_label)(struct label *label);
Introduce a MAC label reference in 'struct inpcb', which caches the MAC label referenced from 'struct socket' in the IPv4 and IPv6-based protocols. This permits MAC labels to be checked during network delivery operations without dereferencing inp->inp_socket to get to so->so_label, which will eventually avoid our having to grab the socket lock during delivery at the network layer. This change introduces 'struct inpcb' as a labeled object to the MAC Framework, along with the normal circus of entry points: initialization, creation from socket, destruction, as well as a delivery access control check. For most policies, the inpcb label will simply be a cache of the socket label, so a new protocol switch method is introduced, pr_sosetlabel() to notify protocols that the socket layer label has been updated so that the cache can be updated while holding appropriate locks. Most protocols implement this using pru_sosetlabel_null(), but IPv4/IPv6 protocols using inpcbs use the the worker function in_pcbsosetlabel(), which calls into the MAC Framework to perform a cache update. Biba, LOMAC, and MLS implement these entry points, as do the stub policy, and test policy. Reviewed by: sam, bms Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-18 00:39:07 +00:00
void (*mpo_destroy_inpcb_label)(struct label *label);
Begin another merge from the TrustedBSD MAC branch: - Change mpo_init_foo(obj, label) and mpo_destroy_foo(obj, label) policy entry points to mpo_init_foo_label(label) and mpo_destroy_foo_label(label). This will permit the use of the same entry points for holding temporary type-specific label during internalization and externalization, as well as for caching purposes. - Because of this, break out mpo_{init,destroy}_socket() and mpo_{init,destroy}_mount() into seperate entry points for socket main/peer labels and mount main/fs labels. - Since the prototype for label initialization is the same across almost all entry points, implement these entry points using common implementations for Biba, MLS, and Test, reducing the number of almost identical looking functions. This simplifies policy implementation, as well as preparing us for the merge of the new flexible userland API for managing labels on objects. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-05 15:10:00 +00:00
void (*mpo_destroy_ipq_label)(struct label *label);
void (*mpo_destroy_mbuf_label)(struct label *label);
void (*mpo_destroy_mount_label)(struct label *label);
void (*mpo_destroy_mount_fs_label)(struct label *label);
void (*mpo_destroy_socket_label)(struct label *label);
void (*mpo_destroy_socket_peer_label)(struct label *label);
void (*mpo_destroy_pipe_label)(struct label *label);
Introduce p_label, extensible security label storage for the MAC framework in struct proc. While the process label is actually stored in the struct ucred pointed to by p_ucred, there is a need for transient storage that may be used when asynchronous (deferred) updates need to be performed on the "real" label for locking reasons. Unlike other label storage, this label has no locking semantics, relying on policies to provide their own protection for the label contents, meaning that a policy leaf mutex may be used, avoiding lock order issues. This permits policies that act based on historical process behavior (such as audit policies, the MAC Framework port of LOMAC, etc) can update process properties even when many existing locks are held without violating the lock order. No currently committed policies implement use of this label storage. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-11-20 15:41:25 +00:00
void (*mpo_destroy_proc_label)(struct label *label);
Begin another merge from the TrustedBSD MAC branch: - Change mpo_init_foo(obj, label) and mpo_destroy_foo(obj, label) policy entry points to mpo_init_foo_label(label) and mpo_destroy_foo_label(label). This will permit the use of the same entry points for holding temporary type-specific label during internalization and externalization, as well as for caching purposes. - Because of this, break out mpo_{init,destroy}_socket() and mpo_{init,destroy}_mount() into seperate entry points for socket main/peer labels and mount main/fs labels. - Since the prototype for label initialization is the same across almost all entry points, implement these entry points using common implementations for Biba, MLS, and Test, reducing the number of almost identical looking functions. This simplifies policy implementation, as well as preparing us for the merge of the new flexible userland API for managing labels on objects. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-05 15:10:00 +00:00
void (*mpo_destroy_vnode_label)(struct label *label);
Rename mac_create_cred() MAC Framework entry point to mac_copy_cred(), and the mpo_create_cred() MAC policy entry point to mpo_copy_cred_label(). This is more consistent with similar entry points for creation and label copying, as mac_create_cred() was called from crdup() as opposed to during process creation. For a number of policies, this removes the requirement for special handling when copying credential labels, and improves consistency. Approved by: re (scottl) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-12-06 21:48:03 +00:00
void (*mpo_copy_cred_label)(struct label *src,
struct label *dest);
Move MAC label storage for mbufs into m_tags from the m_pkthdr structure, returning some additional room in the first mbuf in a chain, and avoiding feature-specific contents in the mbuf header. To do this: - Modify mbuf_to_label() to extract the tag, returning NULL if not found. - Introduce mac_init_mbuf_tag() which does most of the work mac_init_mbuf() used to do, except on an m_tag rather than an mbuf. - Scale back mac_init_mbuf() to perform m_tag allocation and invoke mac_init_mbuf_tag(). - Replace mac_destroy_mbuf() with mac_destroy_mbuf_tag(), since m_tag's are now GC'd deep in the m_tag/mbuf code rather than at a higher level when mbufs are directly free()'d. - Add mac_copy_mbuf_tag() to support m_copy_pkthdr() and related notions. - Generally change all references to mbuf labels so that they use mbuf_to_label() rather than &mbuf->m_pkthdr.label. This required no changes in the MAC policies (yay!). - Tweak mbuf release routines to not call mac_destroy_mbuf(), tag destruction takes care of it for us now. - Remove MAC magic from m_copy_pkthdr() and m_move_pkthdr() -- the existing m_tag support does all this for us. Note that we can no longer just zero the m_tag list on the target mbuf, rather, we have to delete the chain because m_tag's will already be hung off freshly allocated mbuf's. - Tweak m_tag copying routines so that if we're copying a MAC m_tag, we don't do a binary copy, rather, we initialize the new storage and do a deep copy of the label. - Remove use of MAC_FLAG_INITIALIZED in a few bizarre places having to do with mbuf header copies previously. - When an mbuf is copied in ip_input(), we no longer need to explicitly copy the label because it will get handled by the m_tag code now. - No longer any weird handling of MAC labels in if_loop.c during header copies. - Add MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS flag to Biba, MLS, mac_test. In mac_test, handle the label==NULL case, since it can be dynamically loaded. In order to improve performance with this change, introduce the notion of "lazy MAC label allocation" -- only allocate m_tag storage for MAC labels if we're running with a policy that uses MAC labels on mbufs. Policies declare this intent by setting the MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS flag in their load-time flags field during declaration. Note: this opens up the possibility of post-boot policy modules getting back NULL slot entries even though they have policy invariants of non-NULL slot entries, as the policy might have been loaded after the mbuf was allocated, leaving the mbuf without label storage. Policies that cannot handle this case must be declared as NOTLATE, or must be modified. - mac_labelmbufs holds the current cumulative status as to whether any policies require mbuf labeling or not. This is updated whenever the active policy set changes by the function mac_policy_updateflags(). The function iterates the list and checks whether any have the flag set. Write access to this variable is protected by the policy list; read access is currently not protected for performance reasons. This might change if it causes problems. - Add MAC_POLICY_LIST_ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE() to permit the flags update function to assert appropriate locks. - This makes allocation in mac_init_mbuf() conditional on the flag. Reviewed by: sam Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-04-14 20:39:06 +00:00
void (*mpo_copy_mbuf_label)(struct label *src,
struct label *dest);
Revised APIs for user process label management; the existing APIs relied on all label parsing occuring in userland, and knowledge of the loaded policies in the user libraries. This revision of the API pushes that parsing into the kernel, avoiding the need for shared library support of policies in userland, permitting statically linked binaries (such as ls, ps, and ifconfig) to use MAC labels. In these API revisions, high level parsing of the MAC label is done in the MAC Framework, and interpretation of label elements is delegated to the MAC policy modules. This permits modules to export zero or more label elements to user space if desired, and support them in the manner they want and with the semantics they want. This is believed to be the final revision of this interface: from the perspective of user applications, the API has actually not changed, although the ABI has. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-22 14:27:44 +00:00
void (*mpo_copy_pipe_label)(struct label *src,
struct label *dest);
Implement sockets support for __mac_get_fd() and __mac_set_fd() system calls, and prefer these calls over getsockopt()/setsockopt() for ABI reasons. When addressing UNIX domain sockets, these calls retrieve and modify the socket label, not the label of the rendezvous vnode. - Create mac_copy_socket_label() entry point based on mac_copy_pipe_label() entry point, intended to copy the socket label into temporary storage that doesn't require a socket lock to be held (currently Giant). - Implement mac_copy_socket_label() for various policies. - Expose socket label allocation, free, internalize, externalize entry points as non-static from mac_net.c. - Use mac_socket_label_set() in __mac_set_fd(). MAC-aware applications may now use mac_get_fd(), mac_set_fd(), and mac_get_peer() to retrieve and set various socket labels without directly invoking the getsockopt() interface. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-16 23:31:45 +00:00
void (*mpo_copy_socket_label)(struct label *src,
struct label *dest);
Revised APIs for user process label management; the existing APIs relied on all label parsing occuring in userland, and knowledge of the loaded policies in the user libraries. This revision of the API pushes that parsing into the kernel, avoiding the need for shared library support of policies in userland, permitting statically linked binaries (such as ls, ps, and ifconfig) to use MAC labels. In these API revisions, high level parsing of the MAC label is done in the MAC Framework, and interpretation of label elements is delegated to the MAC policy modules. This permits modules to export zero or more label elements to user space if desired, and support them in the manner they want and with the semantics they want. This is believed to be the final revision of this interface: from the perspective of user applications, the API has actually not changed, although the ABI has. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-22 14:27:44 +00:00
void (*mpo_copy_vnode_label)(struct label *src,
struct label *dest);
int (*mpo_externalize_cred_label)(struct label *label,
Redesign the externalization APIs from the MAC Framework to the MAC policy modules to improve robustness against C string bugs and vulnerabilities. Following these revisions, all string construction of labels for export to userspace (or elsewhere) is performed using the sbuf API, which prevents the consumer from having to perform laborious and intricate pointer and buffer checks. This substantially simplifies the externalization logic, both at the MAC Framework level, and in individual policies; this becomes especially useful when policies export more complex label data, such as with compartments in Biba and MLS. Bundled in here are some other minor fixes associated with externalization: including avoiding malloc while holding the process mutex in mac_lomac, and hence avoid a failure mode when printing labels during a downgrade operation due to the removal of the M_NOWAIT case. This has been running in the MAC development tree for about three weeks without problems. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-06-23 01:26:34 +00:00
char *element_name, struct sbuf *sb, int *claimed);
Revised APIs for user process label management; the existing APIs relied on all label parsing occuring in userland, and knowledge of the loaded policies in the user libraries. This revision of the API pushes that parsing into the kernel, avoiding the need for shared library support of policies in userland, permitting statically linked binaries (such as ls, ps, and ifconfig) to use MAC labels. In these API revisions, high level parsing of the MAC label is done in the MAC Framework, and interpretation of label elements is delegated to the MAC policy modules. This permits modules to export zero or more label elements to user space if desired, and support them in the manner they want and with the semantics they want. This is believed to be the final revision of this interface: from the perspective of user applications, the API has actually not changed, although the ABI has. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-22 14:27:44 +00:00
int (*mpo_externalize_ifnet_label)(struct label *label,
Redesign the externalization APIs from the MAC Framework to the MAC policy modules to improve robustness against C string bugs and vulnerabilities. Following these revisions, all string construction of labels for export to userspace (or elsewhere) is performed using the sbuf API, which prevents the consumer from having to perform laborious and intricate pointer and buffer checks. This substantially simplifies the externalization logic, both at the MAC Framework level, and in individual policies; this becomes especially useful when policies export more complex label data, such as with compartments in Biba and MLS. Bundled in here are some other minor fixes associated with externalization: including avoiding malloc while holding the process mutex in mac_lomac, and hence avoid a failure mode when printing labels during a downgrade operation due to the removal of the M_NOWAIT case. This has been running in the MAC development tree for about three weeks without problems. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-06-23 01:26:34 +00:00
char *element_name, struct sbuf *sb, int *claimed);
Revised APIs for user process label management; the existing APIs relied on all label parsing occuring in userland, and knowledge of the loaded policies in the user libraries. This revision of the API pushes that parsing into the kernel, avoiding the need for shared library support of policies in userland, permitting statically linked binaries (such as ls, ps, and ifconfig) to use MAC labels. In these API revisions, high level parsing of the MAC label is done in the MAC Framework, and interpretation of label elements is delegated to the MAC policy modules. This permits modules to export zero or more label elements to user space if desired, and support them in the manner they want and with the semantics they want. This is believed to be the final revision of this interface: from the perspective of user applications, the API has actually not changed, although the ABI has. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-22 14:27:44 +00:00
int (*mpo_externalize_pipe_label)(struct label *label,
Redesign the externalization APIs from the MAC Framework to the MAC policy modules to improve robustness against C string bugs and vulnerabilities. Following these revisions, all string construction of labels for export to userspace (or elsewhere) is performed using the sbuf API, which prevents the consumer from having to perform laborious and intricate pointer and buffer checks. This substantially simplifies the externalization logic, both at the MAC Framework level, and in individual policies; this becomes especially useful when policies export more complex label data, such as with compartments in Biba and MLS. Bundled in here are some other minor fixes associated with externalization: including avoiding malloc while holding the process mutex in mac_lomac, and hence avoid a failure mode when printing labels during a downgrade operation due to the removal of the M_NOWAIT case. This has been running in the MAC development tree for about three weeks without problems. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-06-23 01:26:34 +00:00
char *element_name, struct sbuf *sb, int *claimed);
Revised APIs for user process label management; the existing APIs relied on all label parsing occuring in userland, and knowledge of the loaded policies in the user libraries. This revision of the API pushes that parsing into the kernel, avoiding the need for shared library support of policies in userland, permitting statically linked binaries (such as ls, ps, and ifconfig) to use MAC labels. In these API revisions, high level parsing of the MAC label is done in the MAC Framework, and interpretation of label elements is delegated to the MAC policy modules. This permits modules to export zero or more label elements to user space if desired, and support them in the manner they want and with the semantics they want. This is believed to be the final revision of this interface: from the perspective of user applications, the API has actually not changed, although the ABI has. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-22 14:27:44 +00:00
int (*mpo_externalize_socket_label)(struct label *label,
Redesign the externalization APIs from the MAC Framework to the MAC policy modules to improve robustness against C string bugs and vulnerabilities. Following these revisions, all string construction of labels for export to userspace (or elsewhere) is performed using the sbuf API, which prevents the consumer from having to perform laborious and intricate pointer and buffer checks. This substantially simplifies the externalization logic, both at the MAC Framework level, and in individual policies; this becomes especially useful when policies export more complex label data, such as with compartments in Biba and MLS. Bundled in here are some other minor fixes associated with externalization: including avoiding malloc while holding the process mutex in mac_lomac, and hence avoid a failure mode when printing labels during a downgrade operation due to the removal of the M_NOWAIT case. This has been running in the MAC development tree for about three weeks without problems. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-06-23 01:26:34 +00:00
char *element_name, struct sbuf *sb, int *claimed);
Revised APIs for user process label management; the existing APIs relied on all label parsing occuring in userland, and knowledge of the loaded policies in the user libraries. This revision of the API pushes that parsing into the kernel, avoiding the need for shared library support of policies in userland, permitting statically linked binaries (such as ls, ps, and ifconfig) to use MAC labels. In these API revisions, high level parsing of the MAC label is done in the MAC Framework, and interpretation of label elements is delegated to the MAC policy modules. This permits modules to export zero or more label elements to user space if desired, and support them in the manner they want and with the semantics they want. This is believed to be the final revision of this interface: from the perspective of user applications, the API has actually not changed, although the ABI has. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-22 14:27:44 +00:00
int (*mpo_externalize_socket_peer_label)(struct label *label,
Redesign the externalization APIs from the MAC Framework to the MAC policy modules to improve robustness against C string bugs and vulnerabilities. Following these revisions, all string construction of labels for export to userspace (or elsewhere) is performed using the sbuf API, which prevents the consumer from having to perform laborious and intricate pointer and buffer checks. This substantially simplifies the externalization logic, both at the MAC Framework level, and in individual policies; this becomes especially useful when policies export more complex label data, such as with compartments in Biba and MLS. Bundled in here are some other minor fixes associated with externalization: including avoiding malloc while holding the process mutex in mac_lomac, and hence avoid a failure mode when printing labels during a downgrade operation due to the removal of the M_NOWAIT case. This has been running in the MAC development tree for about three weeks without problems. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-06-23 01:26:34 +00:00
char *element_name, struct sbuf *sb, int *claimed);
Revised APIs for user process label management; the existing APIs relied on all label parsing occuring in userland, and knowledge of the loaded policies in the user libraries. This revision of the API pushes that parsing into the kernel, avoiding the need for shared library support of policies in userland, permitting statically linked binaries (such as ls, ps, and ifconfig) to use MAC labels. In these API revisions, high level parsing of the MAC label is done in the MAC Framework, and interpretation of label elements is delegated to the MAC policy modules. This permits modules to export zero or more label elements to user space if desired, and support them in the manner they want and with the semantics they want. This is believed to be the final revision of this interface: from the perspective of user applications, the API has actually not changed, although the ABI has. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-22 14:27:44 +00:00
int (*mpo_externalize_vnode_label)(struct label *label,
Redesign the externalization APIs from the MAC Framework to the MAC policy modules to improve robustness against C string bugs and vulnerabilities. Following these revisions, all string construction of labels for export to userspace (or elsewhere) is performed using the sbuf API, which prevents the consumer from having to perform laborious and intricate pointer and buffer checks. This substantially simplifies the externalization logic, both at the MAC Framework level, and in individual policies; this becomes especially useful when policies export more complex label data, such as with compartments in Biba and MLS. Bundled in here are some other minor fixes associated with externalization: including avoiding malloc while holding the process mutex in mac_lomac, and hence avoid a failure mode when printing labels during a downgrade operation due to the removal of the M_NOWAIT case. This has been running in the MAC development tree for about three weeks without problems. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-06-23 01:26:34 +00:00
char *element_name, struct sbuf *sb, int *claimed);
Revised APIs for user process label management; the existing APIs relied on all label parsing occuring in userland, and knowledge of the loaded policies in the user libraries. This revision of the API pushes that parsing into the kernel, avoiding the need for shared library support of policies in userland, permitting statically linked binaries (such as ls, ps, and ifconfig) to use MAC labels. In these API revisions, high level parsing of the MAC label is done in the MAC Framework, and interpretation of label elements is delegated to the MAC policy modules. This permits modules to export zero or more label elements to user space if desired, and support them in the manner they want and with the semantics they want. This is believed to be the final revision of this interface: from the perspective of user applications, the API has actually not changed, although the ABI has. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-22 14:27:44 +00:00
int (*mpo_internalize_cred_label)(struct label *label,
char *element_name, char *element_data, int *claimed);
int (*mpo_internalize_ifnet_label)(struct label *label,
char *element_name, char *element_data, int *claimed);
int (*mpo_internalize_pipe_label)(struct label *label,
char *element_name, char *element_data, int *claimed);
int (*mpo_internalize_socket_label)(struct label *label,
char *element_name, char *element_data, int *claimed);
int (*mpo_internalize_vnode_label)(struct label *label,
char *element_name, char *element_data, int *claimed);
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time, and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence, documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added. Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework, and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD 5.1-RELEASE. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
/*
* Labeling event operations: file system objects, and things that
* look a lot like file system objects.
*/
Slightly change the semantics of vnode labels for MAC: rather than "refreshing" the label on the vnode before use, just get the label right from inception. For single-label file systems, set the label in the generic VFS getnewvnode() code; for multi-label file systems, leave the labeling up to the file system. With UFS1/2, this means reading the extended attribute during vfs_vget() as the inode is pulled off disk, rather than hitting the extended attributes frequently during operations later, improving performance. This also corrects sematics for shared vnode locks, which were not previously present in the system. This chances the cache coherrency properties WRT out-of-band access to label data, but in an acceptable form. With UFS1, there is a small race condition during automatic extended attribute start -- this is not present with UFS2, and occurs because EAs aren't available at vnode inception. We'll introduce a work around for this shortly. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-26 14:38:24 +00:00
void (*mpo_associate_vnode_devfs)(struct mount *mp,
struct label *fslabel, struct devfs_dirent *de,
struct label *delabel, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *vlabel);
int (*mpo_associate_vnode_extattr)(struct mount *mp,
struct label *fslabel, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *vlabel);
void (*mpo_associate_vnode_singlelabel)(struct mount *mp,
struct label *fslabel, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *vlabel);
Remove dm_root entry from struct devfs_mount. It's never set, and is unused. Replace it with a dm_mount back-pointer to the struct mount that the devfs_mount is associated with. Export that pointer to MAC Framework entry points, where all current policies don't use the pointer. This permits the SEBSD port of SELinux's FLASK/TE to compile out-of-the-box on 5.0-CURRENT with full file system labeling support. Approved by: re (murray) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-12-09 03:44:28 +00:00
void (*mpo_create_devfs_device)(struct mount *mp, dev_t dev,
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time, and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence, documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added. Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework, and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD 5.1-RELEASE. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
struct devfs_dirent *de, struct label *label);
Remove dm_root entry from struct devfs_mount. It's never set, and is unused. Replace it with a dm_mount back-pointer to the struct mount that the devfs_mount is associated with. Export that pointer to MAC Framework entry points, where all current policies don't use the pointer. This permits the SEBSD port of SELinux's FLASK/TE to compile out-of-the-box on 5.0-CURRENT with full file system labeling support. Approved by: re (murray) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-12-09 03:44:28 +00:00
void (*mpo_create_devfs_directory)(struct mount *mp, char *dirname,
int dirnamelen, struct devfs_dirent *de,
struct label *label);
Integrate a devfs/MAC fix from the MAC tree: avoid a race condition during devfs VOP symlink creation by introducing a new entry point to determine the label of the devfs_dirent prior to allocation of a vnode for the symlink. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-05 18:40:10 +00:00
void (*mpo_create_devfs_symlink)(struct ucred *cred,
Remove dm_root entry from struct devfs_mount. It's never set, and is unused. Replace it with a dm_mount back-pointer to the struct mount that the devfs_mount is associated with. Export that pointer to MAC Framework entry points, where all current policies don't use the pointer. This permits the SEBSD port of SELinux's FLASK/TE to compile out-of-the-box on 5.0-CURRENT with full file system labeling support. Approved by: re (murray) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-12-09 03:44:28 +00:00
struct mount *mp, struct devfs_dirent *dd,
struct label *ddlabel, struct devfs_dirent *de,
struct label *delabel);
Slightly change the semantics of vnode labels for MAC: rather than "refreshing" the label on the vnode before use, just get the label right from inception. For single-label file systems, set the label in the generic VFS getnewvnode() code; for multi-label file systems, leave the labeling up to the file system. With UFS1/2, this means reading the extended attribute during vfs_vget() as the inode is pulled off disk, rather than hitting the extended attributes frequently during operations later, improving performance. This also corrects sematics for shared vnode locks, which were not previously present in the system. This chances the cache coherrency properties WRT out-of-band access to label data, but in an acceptable form. With UFS1, there is a small race condition during automatic extended attribute start -- this is not present with UFS2, and occurs because EAs aren't available at vnode inception. We'll introduce a work around for this shortly. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-26 14:38:24 +00:00
int (*mpo_create_vnode_extattr)(struct ucred *cred,
struct mount *mp, struct label *fslabel,
struct vnode *dvp, struct label *dlabel,
struct vnode *vp, struct label *vlabel,
struct componentname *cnp);
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time, and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence, documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added. Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework, and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD 5.1-RELEASE. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
void (*mpo_create_mount)(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp,
struct label *mntlabel, struct label *fslabel);
void (*mpo_create_root_mount)(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp,
struct label *mountlabel, struct label *fslabel);
void (*mpo_relabel_vnode)(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *vnodelabel, struct label *label);
Slightly change the semantics of vnode labels for MAC: rather than "refreshing" the label on the vnode before use, just get the label right from inception. For single-label file systems, set the label in the generic VFS getnewvnode() code; for multi-label file systems, leave the labeling up to the file system. With UFS1/2, this means reading the extended attribute during vfs_vget() as the inode is pulled off disk, rather than hitting the extended attributes frequently during operations later, improving performance. This also corrects sematics for shared vnode locks, which were not previously present in the system. This chances the cache coherrency properties WRT out-of-band access to label data, but in an acceptable form. With UFS1, there is a small race condition during automatic extended attribute start -- this is not present with UFS2, and occurs because EAs aren't available at vnode inception. We'll introduce a work around for this shortly. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-26 14:38:24 +00:00
int (*mpo_setlabel_vnode_extattr)(struct ucred *cred,
struct vnode *vp, struct label *vlabel,
struct label *intlabel);
Remove dm_root entry from struct devfs_mount. It's never set, and is unused. Replace it with a dm_mount back-pointer to the struct mount that the devfs_mount is associated with. Export that pointer to MAC Framework entry points, where all current policies don't use the pointer. This permits the SEBSD port of SELinux's FLASK/TE to compile out-of-the-box on 5.0-CURRENT with full file system labeling support. Approved by: re (murray) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-12-09 03:44:28 +00:00
void (*mpo_update_devfsdirent)(struct mount *mp,
struct devfs_dirent *devfs_dirent,
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time, and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence, documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added. Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework, and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD 5.1-RELEASE. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
struct label *direntlabel, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *vnodelabel);
/*
* Labeling event operations: IPC objects.
*/
void (*mpo_create_mbuf_from_socket)(struct socket *so,
struct label *socketlabel, struct mbuf *m,
struct label *mbuflabel);
void (*mpo_create_socket)(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so,
struct label *socketlabel);
void (*mpo_create_socket_from_socket)(struct socket *oldsocket,
struct label *oldsocketlabel, struct socket *newsocket,
struct label *newsocketlabel);
void (*mpo_relabel_socket)(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so,
struct label *oldlabel, struct label *newlabel);
void (*mpo_relabel_pipe)(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,
struct label *oldlabel, struct label *newlabel);
void (*mpo_set_socket_peer_from_mbuf)(struct mbuf *mbuf,
struct label *mbuflabel, struct socket *so,
struct label *socketpeerlabel);
void (*mpo_set_socket_peer_from_socket)(struct socket *oldsocket,
struct label *oldsocketlabel, struct socket *newsocket,
struct label *newsocketpeerlabel);
void (*mpo_create_pipe)(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,
struct label *pipelabel);
/*
* Labeling event operations: network objects.
*/
void (*mpo_create_bpfdesc)(struct ucred *cred, struct bpf_d *bpf_d,
struct label *bpflabel);
void (*mpo_create_ifnet)(struct ifnet *ifnet,
struct label *ifnetlabel);
Introduce a MAC label reference in 'struct inpcb', which caches the MAC label referenced from 'struct socket' in the IPv4 and IPv6-based protocols. This permits MAC labels to be checked during network delivery operations without dereferencing inp->inp_socket to get to so->so_label, which will eventually avoid our having to grab the socket lock during delivery at the network layer. This change introduces 'struct inpcb' as a labeled object to the MAC Framework, along with the normal circus of entry points: initialization, creation from socket, destruction, as well as a delivery access control check. For most policies, the inpcb label will simply be a cache of the socket label, so a new protocol switch method is introduced, pr_sosetlabel() to notify protocols that the socket layer label has been updated so that the cache can be updated while holding appropriate locks. Most protocols implement this using pru_sosetlabel_null(), but IPv4/IPv6 protocols using inpcbs use the the worker function in_pcbsosetlabel(), which calls into the MAC Framework to perform a cache update. Biba, LOMAC, and MLS implement these entry points, as do the stub policy, and test policy. Reviewed by: sam, bms Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-18 00:39:07 +00:00
void (*mpo_create_inpcb_from_socket)(struct socket *so,
struct label *solabel, struct inpcb *inp,
struct label *inplabel);
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time, and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence, documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added. Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework, and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD 5.1-RELEASE. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
void (*mpo_create_ipq)(struct mbuf *fragment,
struct label *fragmentlabel, struct ipq *ipq,
struct label *ipqlabel);
void (*mpo_create_datagram_from_ipq)
(struct ipq *ipq, struct label *ipqlabel,
struct mbuf *datagram, struct label *datagramlabel);
void (*mpo_create_fragment)(struct mbuf *datagram,
struct label *datagramlabel, struct mbuf *fragment,
struct label *fragmentlabel);
Switch TCP over to using the inpcb label when responding in timed wait, rather than the socket label. This avoids reaching up to the socket layer during connection close, which requires locking changes. To do this, introduce MAC Framework entry point mac_create_mbuf_from_inpcb(), which is called from tcp_twrespond() instead of calling mac_create_mbuf_from_socket() or mac_create_mbuf_netlayer(). Introduce MAC Policy entry point mpo_create_mbuf_from_inpcb(), and implementations for various policies, which generally just copy label data from the inpcb to the mbuf. Assert the inpcb lock in the entry point since we require consistency for the inpcb label reference. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-12-17 14:55:11 +00:00
void (*mpo_create_mbuf_from_inpcb)(struct inpcb *inp,
struct label *inplabel, struct mbuf *m,
struct label *mlabel);
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time, and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence, documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added. Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework, and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD 5.1-RELEASE. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
void (*mpo_create_mbuf_from_mbuf)(struct mbuf *oldmbuf,
struct label *oldlabel, struct mbuf *newmbuf,
struct label *newlabel);
void (*mpo_create_mbuf_linklayer)(struct ifnet *ifnet,
struct label *ifnetlabel, struct mbuf *mbuf,
struct label *mbuflabel);
void (*mpo_create_mbuf_from_bpfdesc)(struct bpf_d *bpf_d,
struct label *bpflabel, struct mbuf *mbuf,
struct label *mbuflabel);
void (*mpo_create_mbuf_from_ifnet)(struct ifnet *ifnet,
struct label *ifnetlabel, struct mbuf *mbuf,
struct label *mbuflabel);
void (*mpo_create_mbuf_multicast_encap)(struct mbuf *oldmbuf,
struct label *oldmbuflabel, struct ifnet *ifnet,
struct label *ifnetlabel, struct mbuf *newmbuf,
struct label *newmbuflabel);
void (*mpo_create_mbuf_netlayer)(struct mbuf *oldmbuf,
struct label *oldmbuflabel, struct mbuf *newmbuf,
struct label *newmbuflabel);
int (*mpo_fragment_match)(struct mbuf *fragment,
struct label *fragmentlabel, struct ipq *ipq,
struct label *ipqlabel);
Introduce two new MAC Framework and MAC policy entry points: mac_reflect_mbuf_icmp() mac_reflect_mbuf_tcp() These entry points permit MAC policies to do "update in place" changes to the labels on ICMP and TCP mbuf headers when an ICMP or TCP response is generated to a packet outside of the context of an existing socket. For example, in respond to a ping or a RST packet to a SYN on a closed port. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 18:21:22 +00:00
void (*mpo_reflect_mbuf_icmp)(struct mbuf *m,
struct label *mlabel);
void (*mpo_reflect_mbuf_tcp)(struct mbuf *m, struct label *mlabel);
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time, and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence, documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added. Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework, and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD 5.1-RELEASE. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
void (*mpo_relabel_ifnet)(struct ucred *cred, struct ifnet *ifnet,
struct label *ifnetlabel, struct label *newlabel);
void (*mpo_update_ipq)(struct mbuf *fragment,
struct label *fragmentlabel, struct ipq *ipq,
struct label *ipqlabel);
Introduce a MAC label reference in 'struct inpcb', which caches the MAC label referenced from 'struct socket' in the IPv4 and IPv6-based protocols. This permits MAC labels to be checked during network delivery operations without dereferencing inp->inp_socket to get to so->so_label, which will eventually avoid our having to grab the socket lock during delivery at the network layer. This change introduces 'struct inpcb' as a labeled object to the MAC Framework, along with the normal circus of entry points: initialization, creation from socket, destruction, as well as a delivery access control check. For most policies, the inpcb label will simply be a cache of the socket label, so a new protocol switch method is introduced, pr_sosetlabel() to notify protocols that the socket layer label has been updated so that the cache can be updated while holding appropriate locks. Most protocols implement this using pru_sosetlabel_null(), but IPv4/IPv6 protocols using inpcbs use the the worker function in_pcbsosetlabel(), which calls into the MAC Framework to perform a cache update. Biba, LOMAC, and MLS implement these entry points, as do the stub policy, and test policy. Reviewed by: sam, bms Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-18 00:39:07 +00:00
void (*mpo_inpcb_sosetlabel)(struct socket *so,
struct label *label, struct inpcb *inp,
struct label *inplabel);
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time, and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence, documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added. Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework, and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD 5.1-RELEASE. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
/*
* Labeling event operations: processes.
*/
void (*mpo_execve_transition)(struct ucred *old, struct ucred *new,
Bring in two sets of changes: (1) Permit userland applications to request a change of label atomic with an execve() via mac_execve(). This is required for the SEBSD port of SELinux/FLASK. Attempts to invoke this without MAC compiled in result in ENOSYS, as with all other MAC system calls. Complexity, if desired, is present in policy modules, rather than the framework. (2) Permit policies to have access to both the label of the vnode being executed as well as the interpreter if it's a shell script or related UNIX nonsense. Because we can't hold both vnode locks at the same time, cache the interpreter label. SEBSD relies on this because it supports secure transitioning via shell script executables. Other policies might want to take both labels into account during an integrity or confidentiality decision at execve()-time. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-11-05 17:51:56 +00:00
struct vnode *vp, struct label *vnodelabel,
struct label *interpvnodelabel,
Add an explicit execlabel argument to exec-related MAC policy entry points, rather than relying on policies to grub around in the image activator instance structure. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-11-08 18:04:00 +00:00
struct image_params *imgp, struct label *execlabel);
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time, and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence, documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added. Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework, and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD 5.1-RELEASE. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
int (*mpo_execve_will_transition)(struct ucred *old,
Bring in two sets of changes: (1) Permit userland applications to request a change of label atomic with an execve() via mac_execve(). This is required for the SEBSD port of SELinux/FLASK. Attempts to invoke this without MAC compiled in result in ENOSYS, as with all other MAC system calls. Complexity, if desired, is present in policy modules, rather than the framework. (2) Permit policies to have access to both the label of the vnode being executed as well as the interpreter if it's a shell script or related UNIX nonsense. Because we can't hold both vnode locks at the same time, cache the interpreter label. SEBSD relies on this because it supports secure transitioning via shell script executables. Other policies might want to take both labels into account during an integrity or confidentiality decision at execve()-time. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-11-05 17:51:56 +00:00
struct vnode *vp, struct label *vnodelabel,
struct label *interpvnodelabel,
Add an explicit execlabel argument to exec-related MAC policy entry points, rather than relying on policies to grub around in the image activator instance structure. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-11-08 18:04:00 +00:00
struct image_params *imgp, struct label *execlabel);
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time, and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence, documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added. Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework, and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD 5.1-RELEASE. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
void (*mpo_create_proc0)(struct ucred *cred);
void (*mpo_create_proc1)(struct ucred *cred);
void (*mpo_relabel_cred)(struct ucred *cred,
struct label *newlabel);
Add a new MAC entry point, mac_thread_userret(td), which permits policy modules to perform MAC-related events when a thread returns to user space. This is required for policies that have floating process labels, as it's not always possible to acquire the process lock at arbitrary points in the stack during system call processing; process labels might represent traditional authentication data, process history information, or other data. LOMAC will use this entry point to perform the process label update prior to the thread returning to userspace, when plugged into the MAC framework. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-02 02:42:38 +00:00
void (*mpo_thread_userret)(struct thread *thread);
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time, and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence, documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added. Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework, and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD 5.1-RELEASE. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
/*
* Access control checks.
*/
int (*mpo_check_bpfdesc_receive)(struct bpf_d *bpf_d,
struct label *bpflabel, struct ifnet *ifnet,
struct label *ifnetlabel);
int (*mpo_check_cred_relabel)(struct ucred *cred,
struct label *newlabel);
int (*mpo_check_cred_visible)(struct ucred *u1, struct ucred *u2);
int (*mpo_check_ifnet_relabel)(struct ucred *cred,
struct ifnet *ifnet, struct label *ifnetlabel,
struct label *newlabel);
int (*mpo_check_ifnet_transmit)(struct ifnet *ifnet,
struct label *ifnetlabel, struct mbuf *m,
struct label *mbuflabel);
Introduce a MAC label reference in 'struct inpcb', which caches the MAC label referenced from 'struct socket' in the IPv4 and IPv6-based protocols. This permits MAC labels to be checked during network delivery operations without dereferencing inp->inp_socket to get to so->so_label, which will eventually avoid our having to grab the socket lock during delivery at the network layer. This change introduces 'struct inpcb' as a labeled object to the MAC Framework, along with the normal circus of entry points: initialization, creation from socket, destruction, as well as a delivery access control check. For most policies, the inpcb label will simply be a cache of the socket label, so a new protocol switch method is introduced, pr_sosetlabel() to notify protocols that the socket layer label has been updated so that the cache can be updated while holding appropriate locks. Most protocols implement this using pru_sosetlabel_null(), but IPv4/IPv6 protocols using inpcbs use the the worker function in_pcbsosetlabel(), which calls into the MAC Framework to perform a cache update. Biba, LOMAC, and MLS implement these entry points, as do the stub policy, and test policy. Reviewed by: sam, bms Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-18 00:39:07 +00:00
int (*mpo_check_inpcb_deliver)(struct inpcb *inp,
struct label *inplabel, struct mbuf *m,
struct label *mlabel);
Add MAC checks for various kenv() operations: dump, get, set, unset, permitting MAC policies to limit access to the kernel environment. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-11-01 20:46:53 +00:00
int (*mpo_check_kenv_dump)(struct ucred *cred);
int (*mpo_check_kenv_get)(struct ucred *cred, char *name);
int (*mpo_check_kenv_set)(struct ucred *cred, char *name,
char *value);
int (*mpo_check_kenv_unset)(struct ucred *cred, char *name);
Merge kld access control checks from the MAC tree: these access control checks permit policy modules to augment the system policy for permitting kld operations. This permits policies to limit access to kld operations based on credential (and other) properties, as well as to perform checks on the kld being loaded (integrity, etc). Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-11-19 22:12:42 +00:00
int (*mpo_check_kld_load)(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *vlabel);
int (*mpo_check_kld_stat)(struct ucred *cred);
int (*mpo_check_kld_unload)(struct ucred *cred);
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time, and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence, documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added. Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework, and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD 5.1-RELEASE. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
int (*mpo_check_mount_stat)(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp,
struct label *mntlabel);
int (*mpo_check_pipe_ioctl)(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,
struct label *pipelabel, unsigned long cmd, void *data);
Break out mac_check_pipe_op() into component check entry points: mac_check_pipe_poll(), mac_check_pipe_read(), mac_check_pipe_stat(), and mac_check_pipe_write(). This is improves consistency with other access control entry points and permits security modules to only control the object methods that they are interested in, avoiding switch statements. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 16:59:37 +00:00
int (*mpo_check_pipe_poll)(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,
struct label *pipelabel);
int (*mpo_check_pipe_read)(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,
struct label *pipelabel);
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time, and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence, documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added. Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework, and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD 5.1-RELEASE. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
int (*mpo_check_pipe_relabel)(struct ucred *cred,
struct pipe *pipe, struct label *pipelabel,
struct label *newlabel);
Break out mac_check_pipe_op() into component check entry points: mac_check_pipe_poll(), mac_check_pipe_read(), mac_check_pipe_stat(), and mac_check_pipe_write(). This is improves consistency with other access control entry points and permits security modules to only control the object methods that they are interested in, avoiding switch statements. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 16:59:37 +00:00
int (*mpo_check_pipe_stat)(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,
struct label *pipelabel);
int (*mpo_check_pipe_write)(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,
struct label *pipelabel);
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time, and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence, documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added. Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework, and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD 5.1-RELEASE. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
int (*mpo_check_proc_debug)(struct ucred *cred,
struct proc *proc);
int (*mpo_check_proc_sched)(struct ucred *cred,
struct proc *proc);
int (*mpo_check_proc_signal)(struct ucred *cred,
struct proc *proc, int signum);
int (*mpo_check_socket_bind)(struct ucred *cred,
struct socket *so, struct label *socketlabel,
struct sockaddr *sockaddr);
int (*mpo_check_socket_connect)(struct ucred *cred,
struct socket *so, struct label *socketlabel,
struct sockaddr *sockaddr);
Rename mac_check_socket_receive() to mac_check_socket_deliver() so that we can use the names _receive() and _send() for the receive() and send() checks. Rename related constants, policy implementations, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-15 18:51:27 +00:00
int (*mpo_check_socket_deliver)(struct socket *so,
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time, and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence, documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added. Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework, and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD 5.1-RELEASE. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
struct label *socketlabel, struct mbuf *m,
struct label *mbuflabel);
Rename mac_check_socket_receive() to mac_check_socket_deliver() so that we can use the names _receive() and _send() for the receive() and send() checks. Rename related constants, policy implementations, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-15 18:51:27 +00:00
int (*mpo_check_socket_listen)(struct ucred *cred,
struct socket *so, struct label *socketlabel);
Integrate mac_check_socket_send() and mac_check_socket_receive() checks from the MAC tree: allow policies to perform access control for the ability of a process to send and receive data via a socket. At some point, we might also pass in additional address information if an explicit address is requested on send. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-06 14:39:15 +00:00
int (*mpo_check_socket_receive)(struct ucred *cred,
struct socket *so, struct label *socketlabel);
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time, and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence, documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added. Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework, and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD 5.1-RELEASE. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
int (*mpo_check_socket_relabel)(struct ucred *cred,
struct socket *so, struct label *socketlabel,
struct label *newlabel);
Integrate mac_check_socket_send() and mac_check_socket_receive() checks from the MAC tree: allow policies to perform access control for the ability of a process to send and receive data via a socket. At some point, we might also pass in additional address information if an explicit address is requested on send. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-06 14:39:15 +00:00
int (*mpo_check_socket_send)(struct ucred *cred,
struct socket *so, struct label *socketlabel);
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time, and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence, documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added. Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework, and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD 5.1-RELEASE. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
int (*mpo_check_socket_visible)(struct ucred *cred,
struct socket *so, struct label *socketlabel);
Instrument sysarch() MD privileged I/O access interfaces with a MAC check, mac_check_sysarch_ioperm(), permitting MAC security policy modules to control access to these interfaces. Currently, they protect access to IOPL on i386, and setting HAE on Alpha. Additional checks might be required on other platforms to prevent bypass of kernel security protections by unauthorized processes. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-06 04:47:47 +00:00
int (*mpo_check_sysarch_ioperm)(struct ucred *cred);
Permit MAC policies to instrument the access control decisions for system accounting configuration and for nfsd server thread attach. Policies might use this to protect the integrity or confidentiality of accounting data, limit the ability to turn on or off accounting, as well as to prevent inappropriately labeled threads from becoming nfs server threads. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-11-04 15:13:36 +00:00
int (*mpo_check_system_acct)(struct ucred *cred,
struct vnode *vp, struct label *vlabel);
int (*mpo_check_system_nfsd)(struct ucred *cred);
Hook up mac_check_system_reboot(), a MAC Framework entry point that permits MAC modules to augment system security decisions regarding the reboot() system call, if MAC is compiled into the kernel. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-27 07:03:29 +00:00
int (*mpo_check_system_reboot)(struct ucred *cred, int howto);
Introduce mac_check_system_settime(), a MAC check allowing policies to augment the system policy for changing the system time. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-11-03 02:39:42 +00:00
int (*mpo_check_system_settime)(struct ucred *cred);
Merge from MAC tree: rename mac_check_vnode_swapon() to mac_check_system_swapon(), to reflect the fact that the primary object of this change is the running kernel as a whole, rather than just the vnode. We'll drop additional checks of this class into the same check namespace, including reboot(), sysctl(), et al. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-27 06:54:06 +00:00
int (*mpo_check_system_swapon)(struct ucred *cred,
struct vnode *vp, struct label *label);
Provide a mac_check_system_swapoff() entry point, which permits MAC modules to authorize disabling of swap against a particular vnode. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-05 23:50:15 +00:00
int (*mpo_check_system_swapoff)(struct ucred *cred,
struct vnode *vp, struct label *label);
Implement mac_check_system_sysctl(), a MAC Framework entry point to permit MAC policies to augment the security protections on sysctl() operations. This is not really a wonderful entry point, as we only have access to the MIB of the target sysctl entry, rather than the more useful entry name, but this is sufficient for policies like Biba that wish to use their notions of privilege or integrity to prevent inappropriate sysctl modification. Affects MAC kernels only. Since SYSCTL_LOCK isn't in sysctl.h, just kern_sysctl.c, we can't assert the SYSCTL subsystem lockin the MAC Framework. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-27 07:12:34 +00:00
int (*mpo_check_system_sysctl)(struct ucred *cred, int *name,
u_int namelen, void *old, size_t *oldlenp, int inkernel,
void *new, size_t newlen);
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time, and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence, documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added. Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework, and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD 5.1-RELEASE. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
int (*mpo_check_vnode_access)(struct ucred *cred,
While 'mode_t' seemed like a good idea for the access mode argument for MAC access() and open() checks, the argument actually has an int type where it becomes available. Switch to using 'int' for the mode argument throughout the MAC Framework and policy modules. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-30 17:56:57 +00:00
struct vnode *vp, struct label *label, int acc_mode);
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time, and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence, documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added. Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework, and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD 5.1-RELEASE. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
int (*mpo_check_vnode_chdir)(struct ucred *cred,
struct vnode *dvp, struct label *dlabel);
int (*mpo_check_vnode_chroot)(struct ucred *cred,
struct vnode *dvp, struct label *dlabel);
int (*mpo_check_vnode_create)(struct ucred *cred,
struct vnode *dvp, struct label *dlabel,
struct componentname *cnp, struct vattr *vap);
int (*mpo_check_vnode_delete)(struct ucred *cred,
struct vnode *dvp, struct label *dlabel,
Move to C99 sparse structure initialization for the mac_policy_ops structure definition, rather than using an operation vector we translate into the structure. Originally, we used a vector for two reasons: (1) We wanted to define the structure sparsely, which wasn't supported by the C compiler for structures. For a policy with five entry points, you don't want to have to stick in a few hundred NULL function pointers. (2) We thought it would improve ABI compatibility allowing modules to work with kernels that had a superset of the entry points defined in the module, even if the kernel had changed its entry point set. Both of these no longer apply: (1) C99 gives us a way to sparsely define a static structure. (2) The ABI problems existed anyway, due to enumeration numbers, argument changes, and semantic mismatches. Since the going rule for FreeBSD is that you really need your modules to pretty closely match your kernel, it's not worth the complexity. This submit eliminates the operation vector, dynamic allocation of the operation structure, copying of the vector to the structure, and redoes the vectors in each policy to direct structure definitions. One enourmous benefit of this change is that we now get decent type checking on policy entry point implementation arguments. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-30 18:48:51 +00:00
struct vnode *vp, struct label *label,
struct componentname *cnp);
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time, and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence, documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added. Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework, and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD 5.1-RELEASE. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
int (*mpo_check_vnode_deleteacl)(struct ucred *cred,
struct vnode *vp, struct label *label, acl_type_t type);
Add mac_check_vnode_deleteextattr() and mac_check_vnode_listextattr(): explicit access control checks to delete and list extended attributes on a vnode, rather than implicitly combining with the setextattr and getextattr checks. This reflects EA API changes in the kernel made recently, including the move to explicit VOP's for both of these operations. Obtained from: TrustedBSD PRoject Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 13:53:01 +00:00
int (*mpo_check_vnode_deleteextattr)(struct ucred *cred,
struct vnode *vp, struct label *label, int attrnamespace,
const char *name);
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time, and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence, documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added. Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework, and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD 5.1-RELEASE. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
int (*mpo_check_vnode_exec)(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
Add an explicit execlabel argument to exec-related MAC policy entry points, rather than relying on policies to grub around in the image activator instance structure. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-11-08 18:04:00 +00:00
struct label *label, struct image_params *imgp,
struct label *execlabel);
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time, and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence, documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added. Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework, and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD 5.1-RELEASE. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
int (*mpo_check_vnode_getacl)(struct ucred *cred,
struct vnode *vp, struct label *label, acl_type_t type);
int (*mpo_check_vnode_getextattr)(struct ucred *cred,
struct vnode *vp, struct label *label, int attrnamespace,
const char *name, struct uio *uio);
Merge support for mac_check_vnode_link(), a MAC framework/policy entry point that instruments the creation of hard links. Policy implementations to follow. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-05 18:11:36 +00:00
int (*mpo_check_vnode_link)(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
struct label *dlabel, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *label, struct componentname *cnp);
Add mac_check_vnode_deleteextattr() and mac_check_vnode_listextattr(): explicit access control checks to delete and list extended attributes on a vnode, rather than implicitly combining with the setextattr and getextattr checks. This reflects EA API changes in the kernel made recently, including the move to explicit VOP's for both of these operations. Obtained from: TrustedBSD PRoject Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-21 13:53:01 +00:00
int (*mpo_check_vnode_listextattr)(struct ucred *cred,
struct vnode *vp, struct label *label, int attrnamespace);
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time, and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence, documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added. Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework, and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD 5.1-RELEASE. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
int (*mpo_check_vnode_lookup)(struct ucred *cred,
struct vnode *dvp, struct label *dlabel,
struct componentname *cnp);
Sync from MAC tree: break out the single mmap entry point into seperate entry points for each occasion: mac_check_vnode_mmap() Check at initial mapping mac_check_vnode_mprotect() Check at mapping protection change mac_check_vnode_mmap_downgrade() Determine if a mapping downgrade should take place following subject relabel. Implement mmap() and mprotect() entry points for labeled vnode policies. These entry points are currently not hooked up to the VM system in the base tree. These changes improve the consistency of the access control interface and offer more flexibility regarding limiting access to vnode mmaping. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-06 02:46:26 +00:00
int (*mpo_check_vnode_mmap)(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *label, int prot);
void (*mpo_check_vnode_mmap_downgrade)(struct ucred *cred,
struct vnode *vp, struct label *label, int *prot);
int (*mpo_check_vnode_mprotect)(struct ucred *cred,
struct vnode *vp, struct label *label, int prot);
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time, and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence, documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added. Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework, and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD 5.1-RELEASE. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
int (*mpo_check_vnode_open)(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
While 'mode_t' seemed like a good idea for the access mode argument for MAC access() and open() checks, the argument actually has an int type where it becomes available. Switch to using 'int' for the mode argument throughout the MAC Framework and policy modules. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-30 17:56:57 +00:00
struct label *label, int acc_mode);
Pass active_cred and file_cred into the MAC framework explicitly for mac_check_vnode_{poll,read,stat,write}(). Pass in fp->f_cred when calling these checks with a struct file available. Otherwise, pass NOCRED. All currently MAC policies use active_cred, but could now offer the cached credential semantic used for the base system security model. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 19:04:53 +00:00
int (*mpo_check_vnode_poll)(struct ucred *active_cred,
struct ucred *file_cred, struct vnode *vp,
Break out mac_check_vnode_op() into three seperate checks: mac_check_vnode_poll(), mac_check_vnode_read(), mac_check_vnode_write(). This improves the consistency with other existing vnode checks, and allows policies to avoid implementing switch statements to determine what operations they do and do not want to authorize. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 16:43:25 +00:00
struct label *label);
Pass active_cred and file_cred into the MAC framework explicitly for mac_check_vnode_{poll,read,stat,write}(). Pass in fp->f_cred when calling these checks with a struct file available. Otherwise, pass NOCRED. All currently MAC policies use active_cred, but could now offer the cached credential semantic used for the base system security model. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 19:04:53 +00:00
int (*mpo_check_vnode_read)(struct ucred *active_cred,
struct ucred *file_cred, struct vnode *vp,
Break out mac_check_vnode_op() into three seperate checks: mac_check_vnode_poll(), mac_check_vnode_read(), mac_check_vnode_write(). This improves the consistency with other existing vnode checks, and allows policies to avoid implementing switch statements to determine what operations they do and do not want to authorize. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 16:43:25 +00:00
struct label *label);
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time, and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence, documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added. Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework, and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD 5.1-RELEASE. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
int (*mpo_check_vnode_readdir)(struct ucred *cred,
struct vnode *dvp, struct label *dlabel);
int (*mpo_check_vnode_readlink)(struct ucred *cred,
struct vnode *vp, struct label *label);
int (*mpo_check_vnode_relabel)(struct ucred *cred,
struct vnode *vp, struct label *vnodelabel,
struct label *newlabel);
int (*mpo_check_vnode_rename_from)(struct ucred *cred,
struct vnode *dvp, struct label *dlabel, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *label, struct componentname *cnp);
int (*mpo_check_vnode_rename_to)(struct ucred *cred,
struct vnode *dvp, struct label *dlabel, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *label, int samedir,
struct componentname *cnp);
int (*mpo_check_vnode_revoke)(struct ucred *cred,
struct vnode *vp, struct label *label);
int (*mpo_check_vnode_setacl)(struct ucred *cred,
struct vnode *vp, struct label *label, acl_type_t type,
struct acl *acl);
int (*mpo_check_vnode_setextattr)(struct ucred *cred,
struct vnode *vp, struct label *label, int attrnamespace,
const char *name, struct uio *uio);
int (*mpo_check_vnode_setflags)(struct ucred *cred,
struct vnode *vp, struct label *label, u_long flags);
int (*mpo_check_vnode_setmode)(struct ucred *cred,
struct vnode *vp, struct label *label, mode_t mode);
int (*mpo_check_vnode_setowner)(struct ucred *cred,
struct vnode *vp, struct label *label, uid_t uid,
gid_t gid);
int (*mpo_check_vnode_setutimes)(struct ucred *cred,
struct vnode *vp, struct label *label,
struct timespec atime, struct timespec mtime);
Pass active_cred and file_cred into the MAC framework explicitly for mac_check_vnode_{poll,read,stat,write}(). Pass in fp->f_cred when calling these checks with a struct file available. Otherwise, pass NOCRED. All currently MAC policies use active_cred, but could now offer the cached credential semantic used for the base system security model. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 19:04:53 +00:00
int (*mpo_check_vnode_stat)(struct ucred *active_cred,
struct ucred *file_cred, struct vnode *vp,
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time, and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence, documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added. Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework, and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD 5.1-RELEASE. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
struct label *label);
Pass active_cred and file_cred into the MAC framework explicitly for mac_check_vnode_{poll,read,stat,write}(). Pass in fp->f_cred when calling these checks with a struct file available. Otherwise, pass NOCRED. All currently MAC policies use active_cred, but could now offer the cached credential semantic used for the base system security model. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 19:04:53 +00:00
int (*mpo_check_vnode_write)(struct ucred *active_cred,
struct ucred *file_cred, struct vnode *vp,
Break out mac_check_vnode_op() into three seperate checks: mac_check_vnode_poll(), mac_check_vnode_read(), mac_check_vnode_write(). This improves the consistency with other existing vnode checks, and allows policies to avoid implementing switch statements to determine what operations they do and do not want to authorize. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 16:43:25 +00:00
struct label *label);
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time, and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence, documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added. Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework, and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD 5.1-RELEASE. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
};
struct mac_policy_conf {
char *mpc_name; /* policy name */
char *mpc_fullname; /* policy full name */
struct mac_policy_ops *mpc_ops; /* policy operations */
int mpc_loadtime_flags; /* flags */
int *mpc_field_off; /* security field */
int mpc_runtime_flags; /* flags */
LIST_ENTRY(mac_policy_conf) mpc_list; /* global list */
};
/* Flags for the mpc_loadtime_flags field. */
#define MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_NOTLATE 0x00000001
#define MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_UNLOADOK 0x00000002
Move MAC label storage for mbufs into m_tags from the m_pkthdr structure, returning some additional room in the first mbuf in a chain, and avoiding feature-specific contents in the mbuf header. To do this: - Modify mbuf_to_label() to extract the tag, returning NULL if not found. - Introduce mac_init_mbuf_tag() which does most of the work mac_init_mbuf() used to do, except on an m_tag rather than an mbuf. - Scale back mac_init_mbuf() to perform m_tag allocation and invoke mac_init_mbuf_tag(). - Replace mac_destroy_mbuf() with mac_destroy_mbuf_tag(), since m_tag's are now GC'd deep in the m_tag/mbuf code rather than at a higher level when mbufs are directly free()'d. - Add mac_copy_mbuf_tag() to support m_copy_pkthdr() and related notions. - Generally change all references to mbuf labels so that they use mbuf_to_label() rather than &mbuf->m_pkthdr.label. This required no changes in the MAC policies (yay!). - Tweak mbuf release routines to not call mac_destroy_mbuf(), tag destruction takes care of it for us now. - Remove MAC magic from m_copy_pkthdr() and m_move_pkthdr() -- the existing m_tag support does all this for us. Note that we can no longer just zero the m_tag list on the target mbuf, rather, we have to delete the chain because m_tag's will already be hung off freshly allocated mbuf's. - Tweak m_tag copying routines so that if we're copying a MAC m_tag, we don't do a binary copy, rather, we initialize the new storage and do a deep copy of the label. - Remove use of MAC_FLAG_INITIALIZED in a few bizarre places having to do with mbuf header copies previously. - When an mbuf is copied in ip_input(), we no longer need to explicitly copy the label because it will get handled by the m_tag code now. - No longer any weird handling of MAC labels in if_loop.c during header copies. - Add MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS flag to Biba, MLS, mac_test. In mac_test, handle the label==NULL case, since it can be dynamically loaded. In order to improve performance with this change, introduce the notion of "lazy MAC label allocation" -- only allocate m_tag storage for MAC labels if we're running with a policy that uses MAC labels on mbufs. Policies declare this intent by setting the MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS flag in their load-time flags field during declaration. Note: this opens up the possibility of post-boot policy modules getting back NULL slot entries even though they have policy invariants of non-NULL slot entries, as the policy might have been loaded after the mbuf was allocated, leaving the mbuf without label storage. Policies that cannot handle this case must be declared as NOTLATE, or must be modified. - mac_labelmbufs holds the current cumulative status as to whether any policies require mbuf labeling or not. This is updated whenever the active policy set changes by the function mac_policy_updateflags(). The function iterates the list and checks whether any have the flag set. Write access to this variable is protected by the policy list; read access is currently not protected for performance reasons. This might change if it causes problems. - Add MAC_POLICY_LIST_ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE() to permit the flags update function to assert appropriate locks. - This makes allocation in mac_init_mbuf() conditional on the flag. Reviewed by: sam Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-04-14 20:39:06 +00:00
#define MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS 0x00000004
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time, and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence, documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added. Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework, and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD 5.1-RELEASE. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
/* Flags for the mpc_runtime_flags field. */
#define MPC_RUNTIME_FLAG_REGISTERED 0x00000001
Move to C99 sparse structure initialization for the mac_policy_ops structure definition, rather than using an operation vector we translate into the structure. Originally, we used a vector for two reasons: (1) We wanted to define the structure sparsely, which wasn't supported by the C compiler for structures. For a policy with five entry points, you don't want to have to stick in a few hundred NULL function pointers. (2) We thought it would improve ABI compatibility allowing modules to work with kernels that had a superset of the entry points defined in the module, even if the kernel had changed its entry point set. Both of these no longer apply: (1) C99 gives us a way to sparsely define a static structure. (2) The ABI problems existed anyway, due to enumeration numbers, argument changes, and semantic mismatches. Since the going rule for FreeBSD is that you really need your modules to pretty closely match your kernel, it's not worth the complexity. This submit eliminates the operation vector, dynamic allocation of the operation structure, copying of the vector to the structure, and redoes the vectors in each policy to direct structure definitions. One enourmous benefit of this change is that we now get decent type checking on policy entry point implementation arguments. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-30 18:48:51 +00:00
#define MAC_POLICY_SET(mpops, mpname, mpfullname, mpflags, privdata_wanted) \
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time, and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence, documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added. Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework, and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD 5.1-RELEASE. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
static struct mac_policy_conf mpname##_mac_policy_conf = { \
#mpname, \
mpfullname, \
Move to C99 sparse structure initialization for the mac_policy_ops structure definition, rather than using an operation vector we translate into the structure. Originally, we used a vector for two reasons: (1) We wanted to define the structure sparsely, which wasn't supported by the C compiler for structures. For a policy with five entry points, you don't want to have to stick in a few hundred NULL function pointers. (2) We thought it would improve ABI compatibility allowing modules to work with kernels that had a superset of the entry points defined in the module, even if the kernel had changed its entry point set. Both of these no longer apply: (1) C99 gives us a way to sparsely define a static structure. (2) The ABI problems existed anyway, due to enumeration numbers, argument changes, and semantic mismatches. Since the going rule for FreeBSD is that you really need your modules to pretty closely match your kernel, it's not worth the complexity. This submit eliminates the operation vector, dynamic allocation of the operation structure, copying of the vector to the structure, and redoes the vectors in each policy to direct structure definitions. One enourmous benefit of this change is that we now get decent type checking on policy entry point implementation arguments. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-30 18:48:51 +00:00
mpops, \
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time, and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence, documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added. Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework, and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD 5.1-RELEASE. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
mpflags, \
privdata_wanted, \
0, \
}; \
static moduledata_t mpname##_mod = { \
#mpname, \
mac_policy_modevent, \
&mpname##_mac_policy_conf \
}; \
Declare a module service "kernel_mac_support" when MAC support is enabled and the kernel provides the MAC registration and entry point service. Declare a dependency on that module service for any MAC module registered using mac_policy.h. For now, hard code the version as 1, but once we've come up with a versioning policy, we'll move to a #define of some sort. In the mean time, this will prevent loading a MAC module when 'options MAC' isn't present, which (due to a bug in the kernel linker) can result if the MAC module is preloaded via loader.conf. This particular evil recommended by: peter Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI LAbs
2002-08-12 02:00:21 +00:00
MODULE_DEPEND(mpname, kernel_mac_support, 1, 1, 1); \
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time, and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence, documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added. Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework, and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD 5.1-RELEASE. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
DECLARE_MODULE(mpname, mpname##_mod, SI_SUB_MAC_POLICY, \
SI_ORDER_MIDDLE)
int mac_policy_modevent(module_t mod, int type, void *data);
#define LABEL_TO_SLOT(l, s) (l)->l_perpolicy[s]
#endif /* !_SYS_MAC_POLICY_H */
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