Import of PKCS #1 security fix.
http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20030319.txt
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svn2git
2020-12-20 02:59:44 +00:00
svn path=/vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/; revision=112439
@ -1447,7 +1447,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
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if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
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{
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al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
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/* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
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}
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if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
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@ -1463,30 +1463,29 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
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(p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
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{
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al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
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goto f_err;
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/* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
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/* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
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* (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
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* number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
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* reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
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* made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
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* that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
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* we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
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p[0] = (char)(int) "CAN-2003-0131 patch 2003-03-19";
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}
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}
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if (al != -1)
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{
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#if 0
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goto f_err;
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#else
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/* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
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* against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
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* (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1).
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* But note that due to length and protocol version checking, the
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* attack is impractical anyway (see section 5 in D. Bleichenbacher:
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* "Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the RSA
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* Encryption Standard PKCS #1", CRYPTO '98, LNCS 1462, pp. 1-12).
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*/
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* (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
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ERR_clear_error();
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i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
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p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
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p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
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RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2); /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
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#endif
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}
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s->session->master_key_length=
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