The flush is needed to prevent cross-process ret2spec, which is not handled
on kernel entry if IBPB is enabled but SMEP is present.
While there, add i386 RSB flush.
Reported by: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com>
Reviewed by: markj, Anthony Steinhauser
Discussed with: philip
admbugs: 961
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 1 week
When turning IBRS mitigation using sysctl, as opposed to loader tunable,
send IPI to tweak MSR on all cores. Right now code only performed MSR write
onr the CPU where sysctl was run.
Properly report hw.ibrs_active for IBRS_ALL. Split hw_ibrs_ibpb_active out
from ibrs_active, to keep the current semantic of guiding kernel entry and
exit handlers.
Reported and tested by: mav
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 1 week
Use the KPI to tweak MSRs in mitigation code.
Reviewed by: markj, scottl
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 1 week
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D22431
This CVE has already been announced in FreeBSD SA-19:26.mcu.
Mitigation for TAA involves either turning off TSX or turning on the
VERW mitigation used for MDS. Some CPUs will also be self-mitigating
for TAA and require no software workaround.
Control knobs are:
machdep.mitigations.taa.enable:
0 - no software mitigation is enabled
1 - attempt to disable TSX
2 - use the VERW mitigation
3 - automatically select the mitigation based on processor
features.
machdep.mitigations.taa.state:
inactive - no mitigation is active/enabled
TSX disable - TSX is disabled in the bare metal CPU as well as
- any virtualized CPUs
VERW - VERW instruction clears CPU buffers
not vulnerable - The CPU has identified itself as not being
vulnerable
Nothing in the base FreeBSD system uses TSX. However, the instructions
are straight-forward to add to custom applications and require no kernel
support, so the mitigation is provided for users with untrusted
applications and tenants.
Reviewed by: emaste, imp, kib, scottph
Sponsored by: Intel
Differential Revision: 22374
Rather than a few scattered places in the tree. Organize flag names in a
contiguous region of specialreg.h.
While here, delete deprecated PCOMMIT from leaf 7.
No functional change.
type, use a table to make it easier to add more in the future, if needed.
Add VirtualBox detection to the table ("VBoxVBoxVBox" is the hypervisor
vendor string to look for.) Also add VM_GUEST_VBOX to the VM_GUEST
enumeration to indicate VirtualBox.
Save the CPUID base for the hypervisor entry that we detected. Driver code
may need to know about it in order to obtain additional CPUID features.
Approved by: bryanv, jhb
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D16305
Microarchitectural buffers on some Intel processors utilizing
speculative execution may allow a local process to obtain a memory
disclosure. An attacker may be able to read secret data from the
kernel or from a process when executing untrusted code (for example,
in a web browser).
Reference: https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00233.html
Security: CVE-2018-12126, CVE-2018-12127, CVE-2018-12130, CVE-2019-11091
Security: FreeBSD-SA-19:07.mds
Reviewed by: jhb
Tested by: emaste, lwhsu
Approved by: so (gtetlow)
Make it more comprehensive on i386, by not setting nx bit for any
mapping, not just adding PF_X to all kernel-loaded ELF segments. This
is needed for the compatibility with older i386 programs that assume
that read access implies exec, e.g. old X servers with hand-rolled
module loader.
Reported and tested by: bde
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 1 week
Effectively all i386 kernels now have two pmaps compiled in: one
managing PAE pagetables, and another non-PAE. The implementation is
selected at cold time depending on the CPU features. The vm_paddr_t is
always 64bit now. As result, nx bit can be used on all capable CPUs.
Option PAE only affects the bus_addr_t: it is still 32bit for non-PAE
configs, for drivers compatibility. Kernel layout, esp. max kernel
address, low memory PDEs and max user address (same as trampoline
start) are now same for PAE and for non-PAE regardless of the type of
page tables used.
Non-PAE kernel (when using PAE pagetables) can handle physical memory
up to 24G now, larger memory requires re-tuning the KVA consumers and
instead the code caps the maximum at 24G. Unfortunately, a lot of
drivers do not use busdma(9) properly so by default even 4G barrier is
not easy. There are two tunables added: hw.above4g_allow and
hw.above24g_allow, the first one is kept enabled for now to evaluate
the status on HEAD, second is only for dev use.
i386 now creates three freelists if there is any memory above 4G, to
allow proper bounce pages allocation. Also, VM_KMEM_SIZE_SCALE changed
from 3 to 1.
The PAE_TABLES kernel config option is retired.
In collaboarion with: pho
Discussed with: emaste
Reviewed by: markj
MFC after: 2 weeks
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D18894
We need to know actual value for the standard extended features before
ifuncs are resolved.
Reported and tested by: madpilot
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 1 week
- Add constants for fields in DR6 and the reserved fields in DR7. Use
these constants instead of magic numbers in most places that use DR6
and DR7.
- Refer to T_TRCTRAP as "debug exception" rather than a "trace trap"
as it is not just for trace exceptions.
- Always read DR6 for debug exceptions and only clear TF in the flags
register for user exceptions where DR6.BS is set.
- Clear DR6 before returning from a debug exception handler as
recommended by the SDM dating all the way back to the 386. This
allows debuggers to determine the cause of each exception. For
kernel traps, clear DR6 in the T_TRCTRAP case and pass DR6 by value
to other parts of the handler (namely, user_dbreg_trap()). For user
traps, wait until after trapsignal to clear DR6 so that userland
debuggers can read DR6 via PT_GETDBREGS while the thread is stopped
in trapsignal().
Reviewed by: kib, rgrimes
MFC after: 1 month
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D15189
Speculative Store Bypass (SSB) is a speculative execution side channel
vulnerability identified by Jann Horn of Google Project Zero (GPZ) and
Ken Johnson of the Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC)
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1528.
Updated Intel microcode introduces a MSR bit to disable SSB as a
mitigation for the vulnerability.
Introduce a sysctl hw.spec_store_bypass_disable to provide global
control over the SSBD bit, akin to the existing sysctl that controls
IBRS. The sysctl can be set to one of three values:
0: off
1: on
2: auto
Future work will enable applications to control SSBD on a per-process
basis (when it is not enabled globally).
SSBD bit detection and control was verified with prerelease microcode.
Security: CVE-2018-3639
Tested by: emaste (previous version, without updated microcode)
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 3 days
Resume starts CPU from the init state, which clears any loaded
microcode updates. As result, IBRS MSRs are no longer available,
until the microcode is reloaded.
I have to forcibly clear cpu_stdext_feature3, which assumes that CPUID
leaf 7 reg %ebx does not report anything except Meltdown/Spectre bugs
bits. If future CPUs add new bits there, hw_ibrs_recalculate() and
identify_cpu1()/identify_cpu2() need to be adjusted for that.
Submitted and tested by: Michael Danilov <mike.d.ft402@gmail.com>
PR: 227866
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 1 week
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D15236
It is coded according to the Intel document 336996-001, reading of the
patches posted on lkml, and some additional consultations with Intel.
For existing processors, you need a microcode update which adds IBRS
CPU features, and to manually enable it by setting the tunable/sysctl
hw.ibrs_disable to 0. Current status can be checked in sysctl
hw.ibrs_active. The mitigation might be inactive if the CPU feature
is not patched in, or if CPU reports that IBRS use is not required, by
IA32_ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL bit.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 1 week
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D14029
Kernel Page Table Isolation (KPTI) was introduced in r328083 as a
mitigation for the 'Meltdown' vulnerability. AMD CPUs are not affected,
per https://www.amd.com/en/corporate/speculative-execution:
We believe AMD processors are not susceptible due to our use of
privilege level protections within paging architecture and no
mitigation is required.
Thus default KPTI to off for AMD CPUs, and to on for others. This may
be refined later as we obtain more specific information on the sets of
CPUs that are and are not affected.
Submitted by: Mitchell Horne
Reviewed by: cem
Relnotes: Yes
Security: CVE-2017-5754
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D13971
The implementation of the Kernel Page Table Isolation (KPTI) for
amd64, first version. It provides a workaround for the 'meltdown'
vulnerability. PTI is turned off by default for now, enable with the
loader tunable vm.pmap.pti=1.
The pmap page table is split into kernel-mode table and user-mode
table. Kernel-mode table is identical to the non-PTI table, while
usermode table is obtained from kernel table by leaving userspace
mappings intact, but only leaving the following parts of the kernel
mapped:
kernel text (but not modules text)
PCPU
GDT/IDT/user LDT/task structures
IST stacks for NMI and doublefault handlers.
Kernel switches to user page table before returning to usermode, and
restores full kernel page table on the entry. Initial kernel-mode
stack for PTI trampoline is allocated in PCPU, it is only 16
qwords. Kernel entry trampoline switches page tables. then the
hardware trap frame is copied to the normal kstack, and execution
continues.
IST stacks are kept mapped and no trampoline is needed for
NMI/doublefault, but of course page table switch is performed.
On return to usermode, the trampoline is used again, iret frame is
copied to the trampoline stack, page tables are switched and iretq is
executed. The case of iretq faulting due to the invalid usermode
context is tricky, since the frame for fault is appended to the
trampoline frame. Besides copying the fault frame and original
(corrupted) frame to kstack, the fault frame must be patched to make
it look as if the fault occured on the kstack, see the comment in
doret_iret detection code in trap().
Currently kernel pages which are mapped during trampoline operation
are identical for all pmaps. They are registered using
pmap_pti_add_kva(). Besides initial registrations done during boot,
LDT and non-common TSS segments are registered if user requested their
use. In principle, they can be installed into kernel page table per
pmap with some work. Similarly, PCPU can be hidden from userspace
mapping using trampoline PCPU page, but again I do not see much
benefits besides complexity.
PDPE pages for the kernel half of the user page tables are
pre-allocated during boot because we need to know pml4 entries which
are copied to the top-level paging structure page, in advance on a new
pmap creation. I enforce this to avoid iterating over the all
existing pmaps if a new PDPE page is needed for PTI kernel mappings.
The iteration is a known problematic operation on i386.
The need to flush hidden kernel translations on the switch to user
mode make global tables (PG_G) meaningless and even harming, so PG_G
use is disabled for PTI case. Our existing use of PCID is
incompatible with PTI and is automatically disabled if PTI is
enabled. PCID can be forced on only for developer's benefit.
MCE is known to be broken, it requires IST stack to operate completely
correctly even for non-PTI case, and absolutely needs dedicated IST
stack because MCE delivery while trampoline did not switched from PTI
stack is fatal. The fix is pending.
Reviewed by: markj (partially)
Tested by: pho (previous version)
Discussed with: jeff, jhb
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 2 weeks
Add cpuctl(4) ioctl CPUCTL_EVAL_CPU_FEATURES which forces re-read of
cpu_features, cpu_features2, cpu_stdext_features, and
std_stdext_features2.
The intent is to allow the kernel to see the changes in the CPU
features after micocode update. Of course, the update is not atomic
across variables and not synchronized with readers. See the man page
warning as well.
Reviewed by: imp (previous version), jilles
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 1 week
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D13770
Populate the lapics arrays and call cpu_add/lapic_create in the setup
phase instead. Also store the max APIC ID found in the newly
introduced max_apic_id global variable.
This is a requirement in order to make the static arrays currently
using MAX_LAPIC_ID dynamic.
Sponsored by: Citrix Systems R&D
MFC after: 1 month
Reviewed by: kib
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D11911
reduces diff between amd64 and i386. Also, it fixes a regression introduced
in r322076, i.e., identify_hypervisor() failed to identify some hypervisors.
This function assumes cpu_feature2 is already initialized.
Reported by: dexuan
Tested by: dexuan
but it was broken since r273800 (and r278522, its MFC to stable/10) because
identify_cpu() is called too late, i.e., after init_param1().
MFC after: 3 days
Reject attempts to read from or memory map offsets in /dev/mem that are
beyond the maximum-supported physical address of the current CPU.
Reviewed by: kib
MFC after: 1 month
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D7408
- Make !KDB config buildable.
- Simplify interface to nmi_handle_intr() by evaluating panic_on_nmi
in one place, namely nmi_call_kdb(). This allows to remove do_panic
argument from the functions, and to remove i386/amd64 duplication of
the variable and sysctl definitions. Note that now NMI causes
panic(9) instead of trap_fatal() reporting and then panic(9),
consistently for NMIs delivered while CPU operated in ring 0 and 3.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 2 weeks
On several Intel chipsets, diagnostic NMIs sent from BMC or NMIs
reporting hardware errors are broadcasted to all CPUs.
When kernel is configured to enter kdb on NMI, the outcome is
problematic, because each CPU tries to enter kdb. All CPUs are
executing NMI handlers, which set the latches disabling the nested NMI
delivery; this means that stop_cpus_hard(), used by kdb_enter() to
stop other cpus by broadcasting IPI_STOP_HARD NMI, cannot work. One
indication of this is the harmless but annoying diagnostic "timeout
stopping cpus".
Much more harming behaviour is that because all CPUs try to enter kdb,
and if ddb is used as debugger, all CPUs issue prompt on console and
race for the input, not to mention the simultaneous use of the ddb
shared state.
Try to fix this by introducing a pseudo-lock for simultaneous attempts
to handle NMIs. If one core happens to enter NMI trap handler, other
cores see it and simulate reception of the IPI_STOP_HARD. More,
generic_stop_cpus() avoids sending IPI_STOP_HARD and avoids waiting
for the acknowledgement, relying on the nmi handler on other cores
suspending and then restarting the CPU.
Since it is impossible to detect at runtime whether some stray NMI is
broadcast or unicast, add a knob for administrator (really developer)
to configure debugging NMI handling mode.
The updated patch was debugged with the help from Andrey Gapon (avg)
and discussed with him.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 2 weeks
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D8249
The 'cpu' and 'cpu_class' variables were always set to the same value
on amd64 and are legacy holdovers from i386. Remove them entirely on
amd64.
Reviewed by: imp, kib (older version)
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D7888
Some BIOSes disable AMD Topology extension on AMD Family 15h notebook
processors. We re-enable the extension, so that we can properly discover
core and cache topology. Linux seems to do the same.
Reported by: Johannes Dieterich <dieterich.joh@gmail.com>
Reviewed by: jhb, kib
Tested by: Johannes Dieterich <dieterich.joh@gmail.com>
(earlier version)
MFC after: 3 weeks
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D5883
Simplify and unify placeholder type definitions.
Reviewed by: jhb
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D5771
new headers x86/include x86_var.h and x86_smp.h.
Reviewed by: emaste, jhb
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D4358
