in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Add MAC framework entries for posix shm read and write.
Do not allow implicit extension of the underlying memory segment past
the limit set by ftruncate(2) by either of the syscalls. Read and
write returns short i/o, lseek(2) fails with EINVAL when resulting
offset does not fit into the limit.
Discussed with: alc
Tested by: pho
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
future further optimizations where the vm_object lock will be held
in read mode most of the time the page cache resident pool of pages
are accessed for reading purposes.
The change is mostly mechanical but few notes are reported:
* The KPI changes as follow:
- VM_OBJECT_LOCK() -> VM_OBJECT_WLOCK()
- VM_OBJECT_TRYLOCK() -> VM_OBJECT_TRYWLOCK()
- VM_OBJECT_UNLOCK() -> VM_OBJECT_WUNLOCK()
- VM_OBJECT_LOCK_ASSERT(MA_OWNED) -> VM_OBJECT_ASSERT_WLOCKED()
(in order to avoid visibility of implementation details)
- The read-mode operations are added:
VM_OBJECT_RLOCK(), VM_OBJECT_TRYRLOCK(), VM_OBJECT_RUNLOCK(),
VM_OBJECT_ASSERT_RLOCKED(), VM_OBJECT_ASSERT_LOCKED()
* The vm/vm_pager.h namespace pollution avoidance (forcing requiring
sys/mutex.h in consumers directly to cater its inlining functions
using VM_OBJECT_LOCK()) imposes that all the vm/vm_pager.h
consumers now must include also sys/rwlock.h.
* zfs requires a quite convoluted fix to include FreeBSD rwlocks into
the compat layer because the name clash between FreeBSD and solaris
versions must be avoided.
At this purpose zfs redefines the vm_object locking functions
directly, isolating the FreeBSD components in specific compat stubs.
The KPI results heavilly broken by this commit. Thirdy part ports must
be updated accordingly (I can think off-hand of VirtualBox, for example).
Sponsored by: EMC / Isilon storage division
Reviewed by: jeff
Reviewed by: pjd (ZFS specific review)
Discussed with: alc
Tested by: pho
int bindat(int fd, int s, const struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen);
int connectat(int fd, int s, const struct sockaddr *name, socklen_t namelen);
which allow to bind and connect respectively to a UNIX domain socket with a
path relative to the directory associated with the given file descriptor 'fd'.
- Add manual pages for the new syscalls.
- Make the new syscalls available for processes in capability mode sandbox.
- Add capability rights CAP_BINDAT and CAP_CONNECTAT that has to be present on
the directory descriptor for the syscalls to work.
- Update audit(4) to support those two new syscalls and to handle path
in sockaddr_un structure relative to the given directory descriptor.
- Update procstat(1) to recognize the new capability rights.
- Document the new capability rights in cap_rights_limit(2).
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Discussed with: rwatson, jilles, kib, des
- Capability is no longer separate descriptor type. Now every descriptor
has set of its own capability rights.
- The cap_new(2) system call is left, but it is no longer documented and
should not be used in new code.
- The new syscall cap_rights_limit(2) should be used instead of
cap_new(2), which limits capability rights of the given descriptor
without creating a new one.
- The cap_getrights(2) syscall is renamed to cap_rights_get(2).
- If CAP_IOCTL capability right is present we can further reduce allowed
ioctls list with the new cap_ioctls_limit(2) syscall. List of allowed
ioctls can be retrived with cap_ioctls_get(2) syscall.
- If CAP_FCNTL capability right is present we can further reduce fcntls
that can be used with the new cap_fcntls_limit(2) syscall and retrive
them with cap_fcntls_get(2).
- To support ioctl and fcntl white-listing the filedesc structure was
heavly modified.
- The audit subsystem, kdump and procstat tools were updated to
recognize new syscalls.
- Capability rights were revised and eventhough I tried hard to provide
backward API and ABI compatibility there are some incompatible changes
that are described in detail below:
CAP_CREATE old behaviour:
- Allow for openat(2)+O_CREAT.
- Allow for linkat(2).
- Allow for symlinkat(2).
CAP_CREATE new behaviour:
- Allow for openat(2)+O_CREAT.
Added CAP_LINKAT:
- Allow for linkat(2). ABI: Reuses CAP_RMDIR bit.
- Allow to be target for renameat(2).
Added CAP_SYMLINKAT:
- Allow for symlinkat(2).
Removed CAP_DELETE. Old behaviour:
- Allow for unlinkat(2) when removing non-directory object.
- Allow to be source for renameat(2).
Removed CAP_RMDIR. Old behaviour:
- Allow for unlinkat(2) when removing directory.
Added CAP_RENAMEAT:
- Required for source directory for the renameat(2) syscall.
Added CAP_UNLINKAT (effectively it replaces CAP_DELETE and CAP_RMDIR):
- Allow for unlinkat(2) on any object.
- Required if target of renameat(2) exists and will be removed by this
call.
Removed CAP_MAPEXEC.
CAP_MMAP old behaviour:
- Allow for mmap(2) with any combination of PROT_NONE, PROT_READ and
PROT_WRITE.
CAP_MMAP new behaviour:
- Allow for mmap(2)+PROT_NONE.
Added CAP_MMAP_R:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ).
Added CAP_MMAP_W:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_WRITE).
Added CAP_MMAP_X:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_RW:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE).
Added CAP_MMAP_RX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_WX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_RWX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC).
Renamed CAP_MKDIR to CAP_MKDIRAT.
Renamed CAP_MKFIFO to CAP_MKFIFOAT.
Renamed CAP_MKNODE to CAP_MKNODEAT.
CAP_READ old behaviour:
- Allow pread(2).
- Disallow read(2), readv(2) (if there is no CAP_SEEK).
CAP_READ new behaviour:
- Allow read(2), readv(2).
- Disallow pread(2) (CAP_SEEK was also required).
CAP_WRITE old behaviour:
- Allow pwrite(2).
- Disallow write(2), writev(2) (if there is no CAP_SEEK).
CAP_WRITE new behaviour:
- Allow write(2), writev(2).
- Disallow pwrite(2) (CAP_SEEK was also required).
Added convinient defines:
#define CAP_PREAD (CAP_SEEK | CAP_READ)
#define CAP_PWRITE (CAP_SEEK | CAP_WRITE)
#define CAP_MMAP_R (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | CAP_READ)
#define CAP_MMAP_W (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | CAP_WRITE)
#define CAP_MMAP_X (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | 0x0000000000000008ULL)
#define CAP_MMAP_RW (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_W)
#define CAP_MMAP_RX (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_MMAP_WX (CAP_MMAP_W | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_MMAP_RWX (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_W | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_RECV CAP_READ
#define CAP_SEND CAP_WRITE
#define CAP_SOCK_CLIENT \
(CAP_CONNECT | CAP_GETPEERNAME | CAP_GETSOCKNAME | CAP_GETSOCKOPT | \
CAP_PEELOFF | CAP_RECV | CAP_SEND | CAP_SETSOCKOPT | CAP_SHUTDOWN)
#define CAP_SOCK_SERVER \
(CAP_ACCEPT | CAP_BIND | CAP_GETPEERNAME | CAP_GETSOCKNAME | \
CAP_GETSOCKOPT | CAP_LISTEN | CAP_PEELOFF | CAP_RECV | CAP_SEND | \
CAP_SETSOCKOPT | CAP_SHUTDOWN)
Added defines for backward API compatibility:
#define CAP_MAPEXEC CAP_MMAP_X
#define CAP_DELETE CAP_UNLINKAT
#define CAP_MKDIR CAP_MKDIRAT
#define CAP_RMDIR CAP_UNLINKAT
#define CAP_MKFIFO CAP_MKFIFOAT
#define CAP_MKNOD CAP_MKNODAT
#define CAP_SOCK_ALL (CAP_SOCK_CLIENT | CAP_SOCK_SERVER)
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Reviewed by: Christoph Mallon <christoph.mallon@gmx.de>
Many aspects discussed with: rwatson, benl, jonathan
ABI compatibility discussed with: kib
a process has an auditid/preselection masks specified, and
is jailed, include the zonename (jailname) token as a
part of the audit record.
Reviewed by: pjd
MFC after: 2 weeks
implement the BSM audit trail format. Rename the kernel versions of the
files to match the userspace filenames so that it's easier to work out
what they correspond to, and therefore ensure they are kept in-sync.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
src/sys/{bsm,security/audit}. There are a few tweaks to help with the
FreeBSD build environment that will be merged back to OpenBSM. No
significant functional changes appear on the kernel side.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation (auditdistd)
Fix path handling for *at() syscalls.
Before the change directory descriptor was totally ignored,
so the relative path argument was appended to current working
directory path and not to the path provided by descriptor, thus
wrong paths were stored in audit logs.
Now that we use directory descriptor in vfs_lookup, move
AUDIT_ARG_UPATH1() and AUDIT_ARG_UPATH2() calls to the place where
we hold file descriptors table lock, so we are sure paths will
be resolved according to the same directory in audit record and
in actual operation.
Sponsored by: FreeBSD Foundation (auditdistd)
Reviewed by: rwatson
MFC after: 2 weeks
Currently when we discover that trail file is greater than configured
limit we send AUDIT_TRIGGER_ROTATE_KERNEL trigger to the auditd daemon
once. If for some reason auditd didn't rotate trail file it will never
be rotated.
Change it by sending the trigger when trail file size grows by the
configured limit. For example if the limit is 1MB, we will send trigger
on 1MB, 2MB, 3MB, etc.
This is also needed for the auditd change that will be committed soon
where auditd may ignore the trigger - it might be ignored if kernel
requests the trail file to be rotated too quickly (often than once a second)
which would result in overwriting previous trail file.
Sponsored by: FreeBSD Foundation (auditdistd)
MFC after: 2 weeks
Currently on each record write we call VFS_STATFS() to get available space
on the file system as well as VOP_GETATTR() to get trail file size.
We can assume that trail file is only updated by the audit worker, so instead
of asking for file size on every write, get file size on trail switch only
(it should be zero, but it's not expensive) and use global variable audit_size
protected by the audit worker lock to keep track of trail file's size.
This eliminates VOP_GETATTR() call for every write. VFS_STATFS() is satisfied
from in-memory data (mount->mnt_stat), so shouldn't be expensive.
Sponsored by: FreeBSD Foundation (auditdistd)
MFC after: 2 weeks
In particular, do not lock Giant conditionally when calling into the
filesystem module, remove the VFS_LOCK_GIANT() and related
macros. Stop handling buffers belonging to non-mpsafe filesystems.
The VFS_VERSION is bumped to indicate the interface change which does
not result in the interface signatures changes.
Conducted and reviewed by: attilio
Tested by: pho
policy configuration, avoid leaking resources following failed calls
to get and set MAC labels by file descriptor.
Reported by: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik at gmail.com> + clang scan-build
MFC after: 3 days
Interface locks and descriptor locks are converted from mutex(9) to rwlock(9).
This greately improves performance: in most common case we need to acquire 1
reader lock instead of 2 mutexes.
- Remove filter(descriptor) (reader) lock in bpf_mtap[2]
This was suggested by glebius@. We protect filter by requesting interface
writer lock on filter change.
- Cover struct bpf_if under BPF_INTERNAL define. This permits including bpf.h
without including rwlock stuff. However, this is is temporary solution,
struct bpf_if should be made opaque for any external caller.
Found by: Dmitrij Tejblum <tejblum@yandex-team.ru>
Sponsored by: Yandex LLC
Reviewed by: glebius (previous version)
Reviewed by: silence on -net@
Approved by: (mentor)
MFC after: 3 weeks
Code should just use the devtoname() function to obtain the name of a
character device. Also add const keywords to pieces of code that need it
to build properly.
MFC after: 2 weeks
It seems strchr() and strrchr() are used more often than index() and
rindex(). Therefore, simply migrate all kernel code to use it.
For the XFS code, remove an empty line to make the code identical to
the code in the Linux kernel.
lock_success/lock_failure, introduced in r228424, by directly skipping
in dtrace_probe.
This mainly helps in avoiding namespace pollution and thus lockstat.h
dependency by systm.h.
As an added bonus, this also helps in MFC case.
Reviewed by: avg
MFC after: 3 months (or never)
X-MFC: r228424
The SYSCTL_NODE macro defines a list that stores all child-elements of
that node. If there's no SYSCTL_DECL macro anywhere else, there's no
reason why it shouldn't be static.
It seems the D_PSEUDO flag was meant to allow make_dev() to return NULL.
Nowadays we have a different interface for that; make_dev_p(). There's
no need to keep it there.
While there, remove an unneeded D_NEEDMINOR from the gpio driver.
Discussed with: gonzo@ (gpio)
patch modifies makesyscalls.sh to prefix all of the non-compatibility
calls (e.g. not linux_, freebsd32_) with sys_ and updates the kernel
entry points and all places in the code that use them. It also
fixes an additional name space collision between the kernel function
psignal and the libc function of the same name by renaming the kernel
psignal kern_psignal(). By introducing this change now we will ease future
MFCs that change syscalls.
Reviewed by: rwatson
Approved by: re (bz)
and the new setmode and setowner fileops in FreeBSD 9.0:
- Add new MAC Framework entry point mac_posixshm_check_create() to allow
MAC policies to authorise shared memory use. Provide a stub policy and
test policy templates.
- Add missing Biba and MLS implementations of mac_posixshm_check_setmode()
and mac_posixshm_check_setowner().
- Add 'accmode' argument to mac_posixshm_check_open() -- unlike the
mac_posixsem_check_open() entry point it was modeled on, the access mode
is required as shared memory access can be read-only as well as writable;
this isn't true of POSIX semaphores.
- Implement full range of POSIX shared memory entry points for Biba and MLS.
Sponsored by: Google Inc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Approved by: re (kib)
If a selinfo object is recorded (via selrecord()) and then it is
quickly destroyed, with the waiters missing the opportunity to awake,
at the next iteration they will find the selinfo object destroyed,
causing a PF#.
That happens because the selinfo interface has no way to drain the
waiters before to destroy the registered selinfo object. Also this
race is quite rare to get in practice, because it would require a
selrecord(), a poll request by another thread and a quick destruction
of the selrecord()'ed selinfo object.
Fix this by adding the seldrain() routine which should be called
before to destroy the selinfo objects (in order to avoid such case),
and fix the present cases where it might have already been called.
Sometimes, the context is safe enough to prevent this type of race,
like it happens in device drivers which installs selinfo objects on
poll callbacks. There, the destruction of the selinfo object happens
at driver detach time, when all the filedescriptors should be already
closed, thus there cannot be a race.
For this case, mfi(4) device driver can be set as an example, as it
implements a full correct logic for preventing this from happening.
Sponsored by: Sandvine Incorporated
Reported by: rstone
Tested by: pluknet
Reviewed by: jhb, kib
Approved by: re (bz)
MFC after: 3 weeks
to implement fchown(2) and fchmod(2) support for several file types
that previously lacked it. Add MAC entries for chown/chmod done on
posix shared memory and (old) in-kernel posix semaphores.
Based on the submission by: glebius
Reviewed by: rwatson
Approved by: re (bz)
kernel for FreeBSD 9.0:
Add a new capability mask argument to fget(9) and friends, allowing system
call code to declare what capabilities are required when an integer file
descriptor is converted into an in-kernel struct file *. With options
CAPABILITIES compiled into the kernel, this enforces capability
protection; without, this change is effectively a no-op.
Some cases require special handling, such as mmap(2), which must preserve
information about the maximum rights at the time of mapping in the memory
map so that they can later be enforced in mprotect(2) -- this is done by
narrowing the rights in the existing max_protection field used for similar
purposes with file permissions.
In namei(9), we assert that the code is not reached from within capability
mode, as we're not yet ready to enforce namespace capabilities there.
This will follow in a later commit.
Update two capability names: CAP_EVENT and CAP_KEVENT become
CAP_POST_KEVENT and CAP_POLL_KEVENT to more accurately indicate what they
represent.
Approved by: re (bz)
Submitted by: jonathan
Sponsored by: Google Inc
We wish to be able to audit capability rights arguments; this code
provides the necessary infrastructure.
This commit does not, of itself, turn on such auditing for any
system call; that should follow shortly.
Approved by: mentor (rwatson), re (Capsicum blanket)
Sponsored by: Google Inc
constant to indicate that a system call (or perhaps an operation requested
via a system call) is not permitted for a capability mode process.
Submitted by: anderson
Sponsored by: Google, Inc.
Obtained from: Capsicum Project
MFC after: 1 week
PMC/SYSV/...).
No FreeBSD version bump, the userland application to query the features will
be committed last and can serve as an indication of the availablility if
needed.
Sponsored by: Google Summer of Code 2010
Submitted by: kibab
Reviewed by: arch@ (parts by rwatson, trasz, jhb)
X-MFC after: to be determined in last commit with code from this project
incorrectly calling vm_object_page_clean(). They are passing the length of
the range rather than the ending offset of the range.
Perform the OFF_TO_IDX() conversion in vm_object_page_clean() rather than the
callers.
Reviewed by: kib
MFC after: 3 weeks
code associated with overflow or with the drain function. While this
function is not expected to be used often, it produces more information
in the form of an errno that sbuf_overflowed() did.
use '-' in probe names, matching the probe names in Solaris.[1]
Add userland SDT probes definitions to sys/sdt.h.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Discussed with: rwaston [1]
kern.ngroups+1. kern.ngroups can range from NGROUPS_MAX=1023 to
INT_MAX-1. Given that the Windows group limit is 1024, this range
should be sufficient for most applications.
MFC after: 1 month
provide specific macros, AUDIT_ARG_UPATH1() and AUDIT_ARG_UPATH2()
to capture path information for audit records. This allows us to
move the definitions of ARG_* out of the public audit header file,
as they are an implementation detail of our current kernel-internal
audit record, which may change.
Approved by: re (kensmith)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
MFC after: 1 month
to avoid exposing ARG_ macros/flag values outside of the audit code in
order to name which one of two possible vnodes will be audited for a
system call.
Approved by: re (kib)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
MFC after: 1 month
instead of the root/current working directory as the starting point for
lookups. Up to two such descriptors can be audited. Add audit record
BSM encoding for fooat(2).
Note: due to an error in the OpenBSM 1.1p1 configuration file, a
further change is required to that file in order to fix openat(2)
auditing.
Approved by: re (kib)
Reviewed by: rdivacky (fooat(2) portions)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
MFC after: 1 month
contrib/openbsm and a subset also imported into sys/security/audit.
This patch release addresses several minor issues:
- Fixes to AUT_SOCKUNIX token parsing.
- IPv6 support for au_to_me(3).
- Improved robustness in the parsing of audit_control, especially long
flags/naflags strings and whitespace in all fields.
- Add missing conversion of a number of FreeBSD/Mac OS X errnos to/from BSM
error number space.
MFC after: 3 weeks
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: Apple, Inc.
Approved by: re (kib)
system calls:
- Centralize generation of argument tokens for VM addresses in a macro,
ADDR_TOKEN(), and properly encode 64-bit addresses in 64-bit arguments.
- Fix up argument numbers across a large number of syscalls so that they
match the numeric argument into the system call.
- Don't audit the address argument to ioctl(2) or ptrace(2), but do keep
generating tokens for mmap(2), minherit(2), since they relate to passing
object access across execve(2).
Approved by: re (audit argument blanket)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
MFC after: 1 week
rather than as paths, which would lead to them being treated as relative
pathnames and hence confusingly converted into absolute pathnames.
Capture flags to unmount(2) via an argument token.
Approved by: re (audit argument blanket)
MFC after: 3 days
This fixes a problem created by the recent change that allows a large
number of groups per user. The gidset field in struct kaudit_record
is now dynamically allocated to the size needed rather than statically
(using NGROUPS).
Approved by: re@ (kensmith, rwatson), gnn (mentor)
specific macros for each audit argument type. This makes it easier to
follow call-graphs, especially for automated analysis tools (such as
fxr).
In MFC, we should leave the existing AUDIT_ARG() macros as they may be
used by third-party kernel modules.
Suggested by: brooks
Approved by: re (kib)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
MFC after: 1 week
rlimit RLIMIT_SWAP that limits the amount of swap that may be reserved
for the uid.
The accounting information (charge) is associated with either map entry,
or vm object backing the entry, assuming the object is the first one
in the shadow chain and entry does not require COW. Charge is moved
from entry to object on allocation of the object, e.g. during the mmap,
assuming the object is allocated, or on the first page fault on the
entry. It moves back to the entry on forks due to COW setup.
The per-entry granularity of accounting makes the charge process fair
for processes that change uid during lifetime, and decrements charge
for proper uid when region is unmapped.
The interface of vm_pager_allocate(9) is extended by adding struct ucred *,
that is used to charge appropriate uid when allocation if performed by
kernel, e.g. md(4).
Several syscalls, among them is fork(2), may now return ENOMEM when
global or per-uid limits are enforced.
In collaboration with: pho
Reviewed by: alc
Approved by: re (kensmith)
vnode interlock to protect the knote fields [1]. The locking assumes
that shared vnode lock is held, thus we get exclusive access to knote
either by exclusive vnode lock protection, or by shared vnode lock +
vnode interlock.
Do not use kl_locked() method to assert either lock ownership or the
fact that curthread does not own the lock. For shared locks, ownership
is not recorded, e.g. VOP_ISLOCKED can return LK_SHARED for the shared
lock not owned by curthread, causing false positives in kqueue subsystem
assertions about knlist lock.
Remove kl_locked method from knlist lock vector, and add two separate
assertion methods kl_assert_locked and kl_assert_unlocked, that are
supposed to use proper asserts. Change knlist_init accordingly.
Add convenience function knlist_init_mtx to reduce number of arguments
for typical knlist initialization.
Submitted by: jhb [1]
Noted by: jhb [2]
Reviewed by: jhb
Tested by: rnoland
and used in a large number of files, but also because an increasing number
of incorrect uses of MAC calls were sneaking in due to copy-and-paste of
MAC-aware code without the associated opt_mac.h include.
Discussed with: pjd
modules are loaded by avoiding mbuf label lookups when policies aren't
loaded, pushing further socket locking into MAC policy modules, and
avoiding locking MAC ifnet locks when no policies are loaded:
- Check mac_policies_count before looking for mbuf MAC label m_tags in MAC
Framework entry points. We will still pay label lookup costs if MAC
policies are present but don't require labels (typically a single mbuf
header field read, but perhaps further indirection if IPSEC or other
m_tag consumers are in use).
- Further push socket locking for socket-related access control checks and
events into MAC policies from the MAC Framework, so that sockets are
only locked if a policy specifically requires a lock to protect a label.
This resolves lock order issues during sonewconn() and also in local
domain socket cross-connect where multiple socket locks could not be
held at once for the purposes of propagatig MAC labels across multiple
sockets. Eliminate mac_policy_count check in some entry points where it
no longer avoids locking.
- Add mac_policy_count checking in some entry points relating to network
interfaces that otherwise lock a global MAC ifnet lock used to protect
ifnet labels.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
makes it easier for first-time users to configure and work with biba as
remote acess is still allowed. Effectively, this means that, by default,
only local security properties, not distributed ones, are enforced.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
might arise from WITNESS not understanding its locking protocol, which
should be deadlock-free. Currently these warnings generally don't occur,
but as object locking is pushed into policies for some object types, they
would otherwise occur more often.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
count of the number of registered policies.
Rather than unconditionally locking sockets before passing them into MAC,
lock them in the MAC entry points only if mac_policy_count is non-zero.
This avoids locking overhead for a number of socket system calls when no
policies are registered, eliminating measurable overhead for the MAC
Framework for the socket subsystem when there are no active policies.
Possibly socket locks should be acquired by policies if they are required
for socket labels, which would further avoid locking overhead when there
are policies but they don't require labeling of sockets, or possibly
don't even implement socket controls.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
- Add rm_init_flags() and accept extended options only for that variation.
- Add a flags space specifically for rm_init_flags(), rather than borrowing
the lock_init() flag space.
- Define flag RM_RECURSE to use instead of LO_RECURSABLE.
- Define flag RM_NOWITNESS to allow an rmlock to be exempt from WITNESS
checking; this wasn't possible previously as rm_init() always passed
LO_WITNESS when initializing an rmlock's struct lock.
- Add RM_SYSINIT_FLAGS().
- Rename embedded mutex in rmlocks to make it more obvious what it is.
- Update consumers.
- Update man page.
by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any
parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents,
but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style
dot-separated strings.
Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which
contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root
directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the
global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel.
Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which
should not cause any problems for code that properly uses
securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge().
Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and
set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for
backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system
call.
Approved by: bz (mentor)
the VFS. Now all the VFS_* functions and relating parts don't want the
context as long as it always refers to curthread.
In some points, in particular when dealing with VOPs and functions living
in the same namespace (eg. vflush) which still need to be converted,
pass curthread explicitly in order to retain the old behaviour.
Such loose ends will be fixed ASAP.
While here fix a bug: now, UFS_EXTATTR can be compiled alone without the
UFS_EXTATTR_AUTOSTART option.
VFS KPI is heavilly changed by this commit so thirdy parts modules needs
to be recompiled. Bump __FreeBSD_version in order to signal such
situation.
MAC_BOOLEAN -> MAC_POLICY_BOOLEAN
MAC_BOOLEAN_NOSLEEP -> MAC_POLICY_BOOLEANN_NOSLEEP
MAC_CHECK -> MAC_POLICY_CHECK
MAC_CHECK_NOSLEEP -> MAC_POLICY_CHECK_NOSLEEP
MAC_EXTERNALIZE -> MAC_POLICY_EXTERNALIZE
MAC_GRANT -> MAC_POLICY_GRANT
MAC_GRANT_NOSLEEP -> MAC_POLICY_GRANT_NOSLEEP
MAC_INTERNALIZE -> MAC_POLICY_INTERNALIZE
MAC_PERFORM -> MAC_POLICY_PERFORM_CHECK
MAC_PERFORM_NOSLEEP -> MAC_POLICY_PERFORM_NOSLEEP
This frees up those macro names for use in wrapping calls into the MAC
Framework from the remainder of the kernel.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
login(1) isn't quite ready for them yet on 64-bit systems as it continues
to use the conventions of the old version of the API.
Reported by: stas, Jakub Lach <jakub_lach at mailplus.pl>
- Add and use mapping of fcntl(2) commands to new BSM constant space.
- Adopt (int) rather than (long) arguments to a number of auditon(2)
commands, as has happened in Solaris, and add compatibility code to
handle the old comments.
Note that BSM_PF_IEEE80211 is partially but not fully removed, as the
userspace OpenBSM 1.1alpha5 code still depends on it. Once userspace
is updated, I'll GCC the kernel constant.
MFC after: 2 weeks
Sponsored by: Apple, Inc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Portions submitted by: sson
audit_bsm_fcntl.c contain utility routines to map local fcntl
commands into BSM constants. Adaptation to the FreeBSD kernel
environment will follow in a future commit.
Sponsored by: Apple, Inc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
MFC after: 2 weeks
when someone is passing new rules, not when he only want to read them.
Because of this bug, even if the given rules were incorrect, they
ended up in rule_string.
- Add missing protection for rule_string when coping it.
Reviewed by: rwatson
MFC after: 1 week
improve performance:
- Eliminate custom reference count and condition variable to monitor
threads entering the framework, as this had both significant overhead
and behaved badly in the face of contention.
- Replace reference count with two locks: an rwlock and an sx lock,
which will be read-acquired by threads entering the framework
depending on whether a give policy entry point is permitted to sleep
or not.
- Replace previous mutex locking of the reference count for exclusive
access with write acquiring of both the policy list sx and rw locks,
which occurs only when policies are attached or detached.
- Do a lockless read of the dynamic policy list head before acquiring
any locks in order to reduce overhead when no dynamic policies are
loaded; this a race we can afford to lose.
- For every policy entry point invocation, decide whether sleeping is
permitted, and if not, use a _NOSLEEP() variant of the composition
macros, which will use the rwlock instead of the sxlock. In some
cases, we decide which to use based on allocation flags passed to the
MAC Framework entry point.
As with the move to rwlocks/rmlocks in pfil, this may trigger witness
warnings, but these should (generally) be false positives as all
acquisition of the locks is for read with two very narrow exceptions
for policy load/unload, and those code blocks should never acquire
other locks.
Sponsored by: Google, Inc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Discussed with: csjp (idea, not specific patch)
not there is an audit record hung off of td_ar on the current thread.
Test this flag instead of td_ar when auditing syscall arguments or
checking for an audit record to commit on syscall return. Under
these circumstances, td_pflags is much more likely to be in the cache
(especially if there is no auditing of the current system call), so
this should help reduce cache misses in the system call return path.
MFC after: 1 week
Reported by: kris
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
extended attribute get/set; in the case of get an uninitialized user
buffer was passed before the EA was retrieved, making it of relatively
little use; the latter was simply unused by any policies.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: Google, Inc.
naming by renaming certain "proc" entry points to "cred" entry points,
reflecting their manipulation of credentials. For some entry points,
the process was passed into the framework but not into policies; in
these cases, stop passing in the process since we don't need it.
mac_proc_check_setaudit -> mac_cred_check_setaudit
mac_proc_check_setaudit_addr -> mac_cred_check_setaudit_addr
mac_proc_check_setauid -> mac_cred_check_setauid
mac_proc_check_setegid -> mac_cred_check_setegid
mac_proc_check_seteuid -> mac_cred_check_seteuid
mac_proc_check_setgid -> mac_cred_check_setgid
mac_proc_check_setgroups -> mac_cred_ceck_setgroups
mac_proc_check_setregid -> mac_cred_check_setregid
mac_proc_check_setresgid -> mac_cred_check_setresgid
mac_proc_check_setresuid -> mac_cred_check_setresuid
mac_proc_check_setreuid -> mac_cred_check_setreuid
mac_proc_check_setuid -> mac_cred_check_setuid
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: Google, Inc.
privilege grants so that dtrace can be more easily used to monitor
the security decisions being generated by the MAC Framework following
policy invocation.
Successful access control checks will be reported by:
mac_framework:kernel:<entrypoint>:mac_check_ok
Failed access control checks will be reported by:
mac_framework:kernel:<entrypoint>:mac_check_err
Successful privilege grants will be reported by:
mac_framework:kernel:priv_grant:mac_grant_ok
Failed privilege grants will be reported by:
mac_framework:kernel:priv_grant:mac_grant_err
In all cases, the return value (always 0 for _ok, otherwise an errno
for _err) will be reported via arg0 on the probe, and subsequent
arguments will hold entrypoint-specific data, in a style similar to
privilege tracing.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: Google, Inc.
wrapper macros that allow trace points and arguments to be declared
using a single macro rather than several. This means a lot less
repetition and vertical space for each trace point.
Use these macros when defining privilege and MAC Framework trace points.
Reviewed by: jb
MFC after: 1 week
contrib/openbsm (svn merge) and src/sys/{bsm,security/audit} (manual
merge).
OpenBSM history for imported revision below for reference.
MFC after: 1 month
Sponsored by: Apple, Inc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
OpenBSM 1.1 beta 1
- The filesz parameter in audit_control(5) now accepts suffixes: 'B' for
Bytes, 'K' for Kilobytes, 'M' for Megabytes, and 'G' for Gigabytes.
For legacy support no suffix defaults to bytes.
- Audit trail log expiration support added. It is configured in
audit_control(5) with the expire-after parameter. If there is no
expire-after parameter in audit_control(5), the default, then the audit
trail files are not expired and removed. See audit_control(5) for
more information.
- Change defaults in audit_control: warn at 5% rather than 20% free for audit
partitions, rotate automatically at 2mb, and set the default policy to
cnt,argv rather than cnt so that execve(2) arguments are captured if
AUE_EXECVE events are audited. These may provide more usable defaults for
many users.
- Use au_domain_to_bsm(3) and au_socket_type_to_bsm(3) to convert
au_to_socket_ex(3) arguments to BSM format.
- Fix error encoding AUT_IPC_PERM tokens.
