Fix it by putting back the link of machine to sys/i386/include rather
than ../../include (aka sys/pc98/include). I had a stale machine link
on my first test.
Not sure what the "right" fix is, but this unbreaks things.
new files: kern.pre.mk, which contains most of the definitions, and
kern.post.mk, which contains most of the rules.
I've tested this on i386 and pc98. I have had feedback on the sparc64
port, but no reports from anybody on alpha, ia64 or powerpc. I
appologize in advance if I've broken you.
Reviewed by: jake, jhb, arch@
should also whine if the old pccardd is used, but that's a little
harder than it sounds.
This also has the effect of fixing a typo that was in the last
version I committed.
as suser_td(td) works as well as suser_xxx(NULL, p->p_ucred, 0);
This simplifies upcoming changes to suser(), and causes this code
to use the right credential (well, largely) once the td->td_ucred
changes are complete. There remains some redundancy and oddness
in this code, which should be rethought after the next batch of
suser and credential changes.
in vfs_syscalls.c. Although it did save some indirection, many of
those savings will be obscured with the impending commit of suser()
changes, and the result is increased code complexity. Also, once
p->p_ucred and td->td_ucred are distinguished, this will make
vfs_mount() use the correct thread credential, rather than the
process credential.
debug another process based on their respective {effective,additional,
saved,real} gid's. p1 is only permitted to debug p2 if its effective
gids (egid + additional groups) are a strict superset of the gids of
p2. This implements properly the security test previously incorrectly
implemented in kern_ktrace.c, and is consistent with the kernel
security policy (although might be slightly confusing for those more
familiar with the userland policy).
o Restructure p_candebug() logic so that various results are generated
comparing uids, gids, credential changes, and then composed in a
single check before testing for privilege. These tests encapsulate
the "BSD" inter-process debugging policy. Other non-BSD checks remain
seperate. Additional comments are added.
Submitted by: tmm, rwatson
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Reviewed by: petef, tmm, rwatson
o Make <stdint.h> a symbolic link to <sys/stdint.h>.
o Move most of <sys/inttypes.h> into <sys/stdint.h>, as per C99.
o Remove <sys/inttypes.h>.
o Adjust includes in sys/types.h and boot/efi/include/ia64/efibind.h
to reflect new location of integer types in <sys/stdint.h>.
o Remove previously symbolicly linked <inttypes.h>, instead create a
new file.
o Add MD headers <machine/_inttypes.h> from NetBSD.
o Include <sys/stdint.h> in <inttypes.h>, as required by C99; and
include <machine/_inttypes.h> in <inttypes.h>, to fill in the
remaining requirements for <inttypes.h>.
o Add additional integer types in <machine/ansi.h> and
<machine/limits.h> which are included via <sys/stdint.h>.
Partially obtain from: NetBSD
Tested on: alpha, i386
Discussed on: freebsd-standards@bostonradio.org
Reviewed by: bde, fenner, obrien, wollman
the config file. This fixes the breakage caused by the recent change
in the behavior of device_add_child for ata (which shows soren's
reservations were well founded).
Submitted by: OGAWA Takaya <t-ogawa@triaez.kaisei.org>
really be moved elsewhere: p_candebug() encapsulates the security
policy decision, whereas the P_INEXEC check has to do with "correctness"
regarding race conditions, rather than security policy.
Example: even if no security protections were enforced (the "uids are
advisory" model), removing P_INEXEC could result in incorrect operation
due to races on credential evaluation and modification during execve().
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
o Reorder and synchronize #include's, including moving "opt_cap.h" to
above system includes.
o Introduce #ifdef'd kern.security.capabilities sysctl tree, including
kern.security.capabilities.enabled, which defaults to 0.
The rest of the file remains stubs for the time being.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
o POSIX.1e capabilities authorize overriding of VEXEC for VDIR based
on CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH, but of !VDIR based on CAP_DAC_EXECUTE. Add
appropriate conditionals to vaccess() to take that into account.
o Synchronization cap_check_xxx() -> cap_check() change.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
- Introduce cap_check_td() to reflect suser_td()
- Introduce non-portable cap_from_text2_np(), which converts a
text-form capability to an internal form relative to an existing
capability, and non-portable cap_to_text2_np(), which accepts
a flag argument specifying more about the text output format.
- Introduce CTT_* flags controlling the behavior of
cap_to_text2_np().
Submitted by: tmm
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
If zero bytes are allocated, return pointer to the middle of page-zero
(which is protected) so that the program will crash if it dereferences
this illgotten pointer.
Inspired & Urged by: Theo de Raadt <deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org>
