This change introduces new jail command hooks that run before and after any
other actions.
The exec.prepare hook can be used for example to invoke a script that checks
if the jail's root exists, creating it if it does not. Since arbitrary
variables in jail.conf can be passed to the command, it can be pretty useful
for templating jails.
An example use case for exec.release would be to remove the filesystem of an
ephemeral jail.
The names "prepare" and "release" are borrowed from the names of similar hooks
in libvirt.
Reviewed by: jamie, manpages, mmacy
Approved by: mmacy (mentor)
MFC after: 1 week
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D24829
description for "jail -e" mode to show that it does not take
additional jail name argument.
Reported by: David Marec <david.marec@davenulle.org>
MFC after: 3 days
This change allows to specify a watchdog(9) timeout for a system
shutdown. The timeout is activated when the watchdogd daemon is
stopped. The idea is to a prevent any indefinite hang during late
stages of the shutdown. The feature is implemented in rc.d/watchdogd,
it builds upon watchdogd -x option.
Note that the shutdown timeout is not actiavted when the watchdogd
service is individually stopped by an operator. It is also not
activated for the 'shutdown' to the single-user mode. In those cases it
is assumed that the operator knows what they are doing and they have
means to recover the system should it hang.
Significant subchanges and implementation details:
- the argument to rc.shutdown, completely unused before, is assigned to
rc_shutdown variable that can be inspected by rc scripts
- init(8) passes "single" or "reboot" as the argument, this is not
changed
- the argument is not mandatory and if it is not set then rc_shutdown is
set to "unspecified"
- however, the default jail management scripts and jail configuration
examples have been updated to pass "jail" to rc.shutdown, just in case
- the new timeout can be set via watchdogd_shutdown_timeout rc option
- for consistency, the regular timeout can now be set via
watchdogd_timeout rc option
- watchdogd_shutdown_timeout and watchdogd_timeout override timeout
specifications in watchdogd_flags
- existing configurations, where the new rc options are not set, should
keep working as before
I am not particularly wed to any of the implementation specifics.
I am open to changing or removing any of them as long as the provided
functionality is the same (or very close) to the proposed one.
For example, I think it can be implemented without using watchdogd -x,
by means of watchdog(1) alone. In that case there would be a small
window between stopping watchdogd and running watchdog, but I think that
that is acceptable.
Reviewed by: bcr (man page changes)
MFC after: 5 weeks
Relnotes: yes
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21221
ed(4) and ep(4) have been removed. fxp(4) remains popular in older
systems, but isn't as future proof as em(4).
Reviewed by: bz, jhb
MFC after: 3 days
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D20311
node is set, allow setting security.bsd.unprivileged_proc_debug per-jail.
In part, this is needed to create jails in which the Address Sanitizer
(ASAN) fully works as ASAN utilizes libkvm to inspect the virtual address
space. Instead of having to allow unprivileged process debugging for the
entire system, allow setting it on a per-jail basis.
The sysctl node is still security.bsd.unprivileged_proc_debug and the
jail(8) param is allow.unprivileged_proc_debug. The sysctl code is now a
sysctl proc rather than a sysctl int. This allows us to determine setting
the flag for the corresponding jail (or prison0).
As part of the change, the dynamic allow.* API needed to be modified to
take into account pr_allow flags which may now be disabled in prison0.
This prevents conflicts with new pr_allow flags (like that of vmm(4)) that
are added (and removed) dynamically.
Also teach the jail creation KPI to allow differences for certain pr_allow
flags between the parent and child jail. This can happen when unprivileged
process debugging is disabled in the parent prison, but enabled in the
child.
Submitted by: Shawn Webb <lattera at gmail.com>
Obtained from: HardenedBSD (45b3625edba0f73b3e3890b1ec3d0d1e95fd47e1, deba0b5078cef0faae43cbdafed3035b16587afc, ab21eeb3b4c72f2500987c96ff603ccf3b6e7de8)
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: HardenedBSD and G2, Inc
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D18319
a list of configured non-wildcard jails with their parameters,
no matter running or not.
The option -e takes separator argument that is used
to separate printed parameters. It will be used with following
additions to system periodic scripts to differentiate parts
of directory tree belonging jails as opposed to host's.
MFC after: 1 month
can see the dmesg buffer (this is the current behavior). When false (the
new default), dmesg will be unavailable to jailed users, whether root or
not.
The security.bsd.unprivileged_read_msgbuf sysctl still works as before,
controlling system-wide whether non-root users can see the buffer.
PR: 211580
Submitted by: bz
Approved by: re@ (kib@)
MFC after: 3 days
However, for post-install configuration, bsdinstall
is not of much use. Point the user to bsdconfig instead.
Reviewed by: 0mp, bcr
Approved by: 0mp, bcr
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D16751
created and before exec.start is called. [1]
- Bump __FreeBSD_version.
This allows to attach ZFS datasets and various other things to be
done before any command/service/rc-script is started in the new
jail.
PR: 228066 [1]
Reviewed by: jamie [1]
Submitted by: Stefan Grönke <stefan@gronke.net> [1]
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D15330 [1]
This patch adds a new sysctl(8) knob "security.jail.vmm_allowed",
by default this option is disable.
Submitted by: Shawn Webb <shawn.webb____hardenedbsd.org>
Reviewed by: jamie@ and myself.
Relnotes: Yes.
Sponsored by: HardenedBSD and G2, Inc.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D16057
It allows locking or unlocking physical pages in memory within a jail
This allows running elasticsearch with "bootstrap.memory_lock" inside a jail
Reviewed by: jamie@
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D16342
by doing most of the work in a new function prison_add_vfs in kern_jail.c
Now a jail-enabled filesystem need only mark itself with VFCF_JAIL, and
the rest is taken care of. This includes adding a jail parameter like
allow.mount.foofs, and a sysctl like security.jail.mount_foofs_allowed.
Both of these used to be a static list of known filesystems, with
predefined permission bits.
Reviewed by: kib
Differential Revision: D14681
You may now optionally specify allow.noreserved_ports to prevent root
inside a jail from using privileged ports (less than 1024)
PR: 217728
Submitted by: Matt Miller <mattm916@pulsar.neomailbox.ch>
Reviewed by: jamie, cem, smh
Relnotes: yes
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D10202
sysvmsg, sysvsem, and sysvshm, with the following bahavior:
inherit: allow full access to the IPC primitives. This is the same as
the current setup with allow.sysvipc is on. Jails and the base system
can see (and moduly) each other's objects, which is generally considered
a bad thing (though may be useful in some circumstances).
disable: all no access, same as the current setup with allow.sysvipc off.
new: A jail may see use the IPC objects that it has created. It also
gets its own IPC key namespace, so different jails may have their own
objects using the same key value. The parent jail (or base system) can
see the jail's IPC objects, but not its keys.
PR: 48471
Submitted by: based on work by kikuchan98@gmail.com
MFC after: 5 days
jail's creation parameters. This allows the kernel version to be reliably
spoofed within the jail whether examined directly with sysctl or
indirectly with the uname -r and -K options.
The values can only be set at jail creation time, to eliminate the need
for any locking when accessing the values via sysctl.
The overridden values are inherited by nested jails (unless the config for
the nested jails also overrides the values).
There is no sanity or range checking, other than disallowing an empty
release string or a zero release date, by design. The system
administrator is trusted to set sane values. Setting values that are
newer than the actual running kernel will likely cause compatibility
problems.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D1948
Relnotes: yes
This allows for CARP interfaces to be used in jails e.g.
ip4.addr = "em0|10.10.1.20/32 vhid 1 pass MyPass advskew 100"
Before this change using exec.prestart to configure a CARP address
would result in the wrong MAC being broadcast on startup as jail creates
IP aliases to support ip[4|6].addr before exec.prestart is executed.
PR: 191832
Reviewed by: jamie
MFC after: 1 week
X-MFC-With: r269340
Phabric: D528
Sponsored by: Multiplay
Replace usage of "prison" with "jail", since that term has mostly dropped
out of use. Note once at the beginning that the "prison" term is equivalent,
but do not use it otherwise. [1]
Some grammar issues.
Some mdoc formatting fixes.
Consistently use \(em for em dashes, with spaces around it.
Avoid contractions.
Prefer ssh to telnet.
PR: docs/176832 [1]
Approved by: hrs (mentor)
r261266:
Add a jail parameter, allow.kmem, which lets jailed processes access
/dev/kmem and related devices (i.e. grants PRIV_IO and PRIV_KMEM_WRITE).
This in conjunction with changing the drm driver's permission check from
PRIV_DRIVER to PRIV_KMEM_WRITE will allow a jailed Xorg server.
/dev/kmem and related devices (i.e. grants PRIV_IO and PRIV_KMEM_WRITE).
This in conjunction with changing the drm driver's permission check from
PRIV_DRIVER to PRIV_KMEM_WRITE will allow a jailed Xorg server.
Submitted by: netchild
MFC after: 1 week
mount.devfs but mounts fdescfs. The mount happens just after
mount.devfs.
- rc.d/jail now displays whole error message from jail(8) when a jail
fails to start.
Approved by: re (gjb)
