containing the jailid, path, hostname, ip and the command used to start
the jail.
PR: misc/89883
Submitted by: L. Jason Godsey <lannygodsey -at- yahoo.com>
Reviewed by: phk
MFC after: 1 week
behaviour of chflags within a jail. If set to 0 (the default), then a
jailed root user is treated as an unprivileged user; if set to 1, then
a jailed root user is treated the same as an unjailed root user.
This is necessary to allow "make installworld" to work inside a jail,
since it attempts to manipulate the system immutable flag on certain
files.
Discussed with: csjp, rwatson
MFC after: 2 weeks
about the risks of enabling raw sockets in prisons.
Because raw sockets can be used to configure and interact
with various network subsystems, extra caution should be
used where privileged access to jails is given out to
untrusted parties. As such, by default this option is disabled.
A few others and I are currently auditing the kernel
source code to ensure that the use of raw sockets by
privledged prison users is safe.
Approved by: bmilekic (mentor)
o getpwnam(3) returns NULL and does not set errno when the user does
not exist. Bail out with "no such user" instead of "Unknown error: 0".
PR: bin/67262
Submitted by: demon (-U flag)
MFC after: 3 weeks
(1) Document the notion of using jail(8) to run "virtual servers" or
just to constrain specific applications. If only running specific
applications, some configuration steps are unnecessary (such as
editing rc.conf).
(2) Add some more subsection headers to break up the bigger chunks of
text.
(3) Clarify the problems associated with applications binding all IP
addresses in the host, and attempt to be more specific about
potential application problems. Document how to force sshd to
bind the the right socket.
(4) Suggest that in a jailed application scenario, you might want to
have the host syslogd listen on the socket in the jail, rather
than running syslogd in the jail.
(5) Catch another reference to /stand/sysinstall.
Approved by: re (bmah implicitly)
tell them that they also need to use devfs rules to prevent
inappropriate devices from appearing in the jail; add an Xref. In
earlier versions of this man page, the user was instructed to use
sh MAKEDEV jail, which only created a minimal set of device nodes.
o Add jexec(8) to execute a command in an existing jail.
o Add -j option for killall(1) to kill all processes in a specified
jail.
o Add -i option to jail(8) to output jail ID of newly created jail.
NO_MAKEDEV_INSTALL and NO_MAKEDEV_RUN. The former implying the latter.
The names imply what they do. The last commit by DES based on a PR defeated
the original idea behind NO_MAKEDEV, which was not to run MAKEDEV, but to do
the installation of MAKEDEV. This should satisfy both parties on the MAKEDEV
challenge.
Reflect this in the documentation.
a simple make world; while this does a bit more work, it means that
jail(8) doesn't have to be kept in sync with /usr/src/Makefile{,.inc1}
which is a moving target. MFC candidate.
Submitted by: FUJISHIMA Satsuki <sf@FreeBSD.org>
Reviewed by: phk
Also pointed out by: Phil Kernick <Phil@Kernick.org>
* Use a sub-section (Ss) instead of a section (Sh) for
"Sysctl MIB Entries".
* Use a tagged list (Bl, El and It) instead of sub-sections (Ss) for
the actual MIB entries.
* Mark paths up as such (Pa).
* Mark defined values up as such (Dv).
BSD-style license, as an add-on to phk's beerware license. Please fedex
some beer to phk.
- Add a ``make depend'' line to the jail-building, which fixes openssl,
among other things. Suggested by: kris
- Add ``newaliases'' to the list of things to do when setting up a new
jail, so that the jailed sendmail doesn't complain.
- Correct references to ``kern.jail.set_hostname_allowed'' which now read
``jail.set_hostname_allowed''.
- Add a reference to sysctl.conf where the sysctl can easily be set in
a persistent way.
- Add a list of cross references to the man page.
- Fix a formatting nit or two.
instructions so as to reduce warnings during jail startup, etc.
Add a somewhat bolder warning recommending the use of
kern.jail.set_hostname to limit jail renamining.
userland in a safer way. Using the NO_MAKEDEV argument in make
distribution prevents the creation of a number of unsafe device nodes
in the jailed /dev, including disk devices, and more. This depends
on an earlier commit to /etc/Makefile to provide the NO_MAKEDEV
support.
Approved by: jkh
This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process
is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with
additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do.
For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a
prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what
it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers".
Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP
communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own
hostname.
Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is
that each customer can run their own particular version of apache
and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors.
It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail
still takes a little knowledge.
A few notes:
I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them.
The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces.
mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable.
/proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for
jailed processes.
Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison.
There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging.
Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!)
If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into
more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome!
Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome.
Have fun...
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Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
