possible to have different probe/attach semantics between the two
systems and yet still use the same driver for both.
Compatibility methods for OLDCARD drivers. We use these routines to make
it possible to call the OLDCARD driver's probe routine in the context that
it expects. For OLDCARD these are implemented as pass throughs to the
device_{probe,attach} routines. For NEWCARD they are implemented such
such that probe becomes strictly a matching routine and attach does both
the old probe and old attach.
compat devices should use the following:
/* Device interface */
DEVMETHOD(device_probe), pccard_compat_probe),
DEVMETHOD(device_attach), pccard_compat_attach),
/* Card interface */
DEVMETHOD(card_compat_match, foo_match), /* newly written */
DEVMETHOD(card_compat_probe, foo_probe), /* old probe */
DEVMETHOD(card_compat_attach, foo_attach), /* old attach */
This will allow a single driver binary image to be used for both
OLDCARD and NEWCARD.
Drivers wishing to not retain OLDCARD compatibility needn't do this.
ep driver minorly updated.
sn driver updated more than minorly. Add module dependencies to allow
module to load. Also change name to if_sn. Add some debugging code.
attempt to fix the cannot allocate memory problem I'd been seeing.
Minor formatting nits.
on directories.
o Allow privileged processes in jail() to create inodes with the
setgid bit set even if they are not a member of the group denoted
by the file creation gid. This occurs due to inherited gid's from
parent directories on file creation, allowing a user to create a
file with a gid that is not in the creating process's credentials.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
and UFS file flags. Here's what the comment says, for reference:
Privileged processes in jail() are permitted to modify
arbitrary user flags on files, but are not permitted
to modify system flags.
In other words, privilege does allow a process in jail to modify user
flags for objects that the process does not own, but privilege will
not permit the setting of system flags on the file.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
remove the setuid/setgid bits by virtue of a change to a file with those
bits set, even if the process doesn't own the file, or isn't a group
member of the file's gid.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
safe as suser() no longer sets ASU.
o Note that in some cases, the PRISON_ROOT flag is used even though no
process structure is passed, to indicate that if a process structure
(and hence jail) was available, it would be ok. In the long run,
the jail identifier should probably be moved to ucred, as the uidinfo
information was.
o Some uid 0 checks remain relating to the quota code, which I'll leave
for another day.
Reviewed by: phk, eivind
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
- The ability to specify elements by volume tag instead of their actual
physical location. e.g., instead of:
chio move slot 3 slot 4
you would now use:
chio move voltag FOO slot 4
- The ability to return an element to its previous location, as specified
by the source element. e.g., instead of:
chio move drive 0 slot 4
you would now use:
chio return drive 0
or
chio return voltag FOO
These features will obviously only work with changers that support volume
tags and/or source element IDs. chio(1) should fail gracefully if the user
attempts to use these new features and the source element ID or volume tag
are not found.
PR: bin/21178
Submitted by: "C. Stephen Gunn" <csg@waterspout.com>
Reviewed by: ken
If a user decides to forego a make depend during "make buildkernel",
they should get what they deserve if no previous make depend has
been run for that kernel. Instead, the build process includes
special instructions to unconditionally rebuild aicasm. When aicasm
moved to its own directory, this hack broke.
Correct the hack until a get buy off on killing it.
