When we bring in geli into the boot loader, we are single threaded so
we don't have to worry about locking. We have no mutexes, and don't need
to use them, so comment it out.
MFC After: 3 days
Use this in GELI to print out a different message when accelerated
software such as AESNI is used vs plain software crypto.
While here, simplify the logic in GELI a bit for determing which type
of crypto driver was chosen the first time by examining the
capabilities of the matched driver after a single call to
crypto_newsession rather than making separate calls with different
flags.
Reviewed by: delphij
Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D25126
This removes support for reading and writing volumes using the
following algorithms:
- Triple DES
- Blowfish
- MD5 HMAC integrity
In addition, this commit adds an explicit whitelist of supported
algorithms to give a better error message when an invalid or
unsupported algorithm is used by an existing volume.
Reviewed by: cem
Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D24343
- The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session
initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct
crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define
how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes
include:
- COMPRESS (for compression/decompression)
- CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption)
- DIGEST (computing and verifying digests)
- AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM)
- ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate)
Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to
support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode
for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.)
The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as
before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and
switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs
encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth
keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression
algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.)
- Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This
doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might
support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined
for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been
added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This
method returns a negative value on success (similar to how
device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick
the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware
(e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software
(cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this
is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session,
you will no longer get a session using accelerated software.
Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software
crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software.
Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before.
- Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop'
structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed.
A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer
in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add
more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for
zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate
input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this).
Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane:
- CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv'
member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the
IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset.
- CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated
and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with
CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE.
If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it
can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in
the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set
CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE.
The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop.
crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD.
Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range,
but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext
(and they had to be adjacent).
crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of
the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation
(COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the
AAD region empty.
If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting
location is marked by crp_digest_start.
Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction
of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the
operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest
mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the
request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed
digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode
requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires
this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own
authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do
this, though there are no in-tree consumers.
To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session
cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer
set crp_sesssion directly.
- Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via
crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the
crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a
driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight.
- crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and
crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the
first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier
to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as
separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver
writers to use.
- bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer.
This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that
use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types.
- Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD
and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers.
- Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in
device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session
is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the
session.
- GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher
key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used.
- For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process'
callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This
function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it
simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in
'process'.
It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there
is some duplication.
- I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC
as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it.
- Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA
mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored.
This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but
the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST
flag.
- I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for
sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well
as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support
all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM.
- I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages
of which many are written from scratch.
- I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified
that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested
the following drivers:
- cryptosoft
- aesni (AES only)
- blake2
- ccr
and the following consumers:
- cryptodev
- IPsec
- ktls_ocf
- GELI (lightly)
I have not tested the following:
- ccp
- aesni with sha
- hifn
- kgssapi_krb5
- ubsec
- padlock
- safe
- armv8_crypto (aarch64)
- glxsb (i386)
- sec (ppc)
- cesa (armv7)
- cryptocteon (mips64)
- nlmsec (mips64)
Discussed with: cem
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
Similar to what was done for device_printfs in r347229.
Convert g_print_bio() to a thin shim around g_format_bio(), which acts on an
sbuf; documented in g_bio.9.
Reviewed by: markj
Discussed with: rlibby
Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21165
provider grows, GELI will expand automatically and will move the metadata
to the new location of the last sector.
This functionality is turned on by default. It can be turned off with the
-R flag, but it is not recommended - if the underlying provider grows and
automatic expansion is turned off, it won't be possible to attach this
provider again, as the metadata is no longer located in the last sector.
If the automatic expansion is turned off and the underlying provider grows,
GELI will only log a message with the previous size of the provider, so
recovery can be easier.
Obtained from: Fudo Security
If the 'n' flag is provided the provided key number will be used to
decrypt device. This can be used combined with dryrun to verify if the key
is set correctly. This can be also used to determine which key slot we want to
change on already attached device.
Reviewed by: allanjude
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D15309
Mainly focus on files that use BSD 2-Clause license, however the tool I
was using misidentified many licenses so this was mostly a manual - error
prone - task.
The Software Package Data Exchange (SPDX) group provides a specification
to make it easier for automated tools to detect and summarize well known
opensource licenses. We are gradually adopting the specification, noting
that the tags are considered only advisory and do not, in any way,
superceed or replace the license texts.
This patch adds a general mechanism for providing encryption keys to the
kernel from the boot loader. This is intended to enable GELI support at
boot time, providing a better mechanism for passing keys to the kernel
than environment variables. It is designed to be extensible to other
applications, and can easily handle multiple encrypted volumes with
different keys.
This mechanism is currently used by the pending GELI EFI work.
Additionally, this mechanism can potentially be used to interface with
GRUB, opening up options for coreboot+GRUB configurations with completely
encrypted disks.
Another benefit over the existing system is that it does not require
re-deriving the user key from the password at each boot stage.
Most of this patch was written by Eric McCorkle. It was extended by
Allan Jude with a number of minor enhancements and extending the keybuf
feature into boot2.
GELI user keys are now derived once, in boot2, then passed to the loader,
which reuses the key, then passes it to the kernel, where the GELI module
destroys the keybuf after decrypting the volumes.
Submitted by: Eric McCorkle <eric@metricspace.net> (Original Version)
Reviewed by: oshogbo (earlier version), cem (earlier version)
MFC after: 3 weeks
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: ScaleEngine Inc.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9575
The PBKDF2 in sys/geom/eli/pkcs5v2.c is around half the speed it could be
GELI's PBKDF2 uses a simple benchmark to determine a number of iterations
that will takes approximately 2 seconds. The security provided is actually
half what is expected, because an attacker could use the optimized
algorithm to brute force the key in half the expected time.
With this change, all newly generated GELI keys will be approximately 2x
as strong. Previously generated keys will talk half as long to calculate,
resulting in faster mounting of encrypted volumes. Users may choose to
rekey, to generate a new key with the larger default number of iterations
using the geli(8) setkey command.
Security of existing data is not compromised, as ~1 second per brute force
attempt is still a very high threshold.
PR: 202365
Original Research: https://jbp.io/2015/08/11/pbkdf2-performance-matters/
Submitted by: Joe Pixton <jpixton@gmail.com> (Original Version), jmg (Later Version)
Reviewed by: ed, pjd, delphij
Approved by: secteam, pjd (maintainer)
MFC after: 2 weeks
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D8236
This flag indicates that the user wishes to use the GELIBOOT feature to boot from a fully encrypted root file system.
Currently, GELIBOOT does not support key files, and in the future when it does, they will be loaded differently.
Due to the design of GELI, and the desire for secrecy, the GELI metadata does not know if key files are used or not, it just adds the key material (if any) to the HMAC before the optional passphrase, so there is no way to tell if a GELI partition requires key files or not.
Since the GELIBOOT code in boot2 and the loader does not support keys, they will now only attempt to attach if this flag is set. This will stop GELIBOOT from prompting for passwords to GELIs that it cannot decrypt, disrupting the boot process
PR: 208251
Reviewed by: ed, oshogbo, wblock
Sponsored by: ScaleEngine Inc.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D5867
The upcoming GELI support in the loader reuses parts of this code
Some ifdefs are added, and some code is moved outside of existing ifdefs
The HMAC parts of GELI are broken out into their own file, to separate
them from the kernel crypto/openssl dependant parts that are replaced
in the boot code.
Passed the GELI regression suite (tools/regression/geom/eli)
Files=20 Tests=14996
Result: PASS
Reviewed by: pjd, delphij
MFC after: 1 week
Sponsored by: ScaleEngine Inc.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D4699
cperciva's libmd implementation is 5-30% faster
The same was done for SHA256 previously in r263218
cperciva's implementation was lacking SHA-384 which I implemented, validated against OpenSSL and the NIST documentation
Extend sbin/md5 to create sha384(1)
Chase dependancies on sys/crypto/sha2/sha2.{c,h} and replace them with sha512{c.c,.h}
Reviewed by: cperciva, des, delphij
Approved by: secteam, bapt (mentor)
MFC after: 2 weeks
Sponsored by: ScaleEngine Inc.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D3929
GELI is used on a SSD or inside virtual machine, so that guest can tell
host that it is no longer using some of the storage.
Enabling BIO_DELETE passthru comes with a small security consequence - an
attacker can tell how much space is being really used on encrypted device and
has less data no analyse then. This is why the -T option can be given to the
init subcommand to turn off this behaviour and -t/T options for the configure
subcommand can be used to adjust this setting later.
PR: 198863
Submitted by: Matthew D. Fuller fullermd at over-yonder dot net
This commit also includes a fix from Fabian Keil freebsd-listen at
fabiankeil.de for 'configure' on onetime providers which is not strictly
related, but is entangled in the same code, so would cause conflicts if
separated out.
Before this change the IV-Key was used to generate encryption keys,
which was incorrect, but safe - for the XTS mode this key was unused
anyway and for CBC mode it was used differently to generate IV
vectors, so there is no risk that IV vector collides with encryption
key somehow.
Bump version number and keep compatibility for older versions.
MFC after: 2 weeks
start only one worker thread. For software crypto it will start by default
N worker threads where N is the number of available CPUs.
This is not optimal if hardware crypto is AES-NI, which uses CPU for AES
calculations.
Change that to always start one worker thread for every available CPU.
Number of worker threads per GELI provider can be easly reduced with
kern.geom.eli.threads sysctl/tunable and even for software crypto it
should be reduced when using more providers.
While here, when number of threads exceeds number of CPUs avilable don't
reduce this number, assume the user knows what he is doing.
Reported by: Yuri Karaban <dev@dev97.com>
MFC after: 3 days
with older FreeBSD versions:
- Add -V option to 'geli init' to specify version number. If no -V is given
the most recent version is used.
- If -V is given don't allow to use features not supported by this version.
- Print version in 'geli list' output.
- Update manual page and add table describing which GELI version is
supported by which FreeBSD version, so one can use it when preparing GELI
device for older FreeBSD version.
Inspired by: Garrett Cooper <yanegomi@gmail.com>
MFC after: 3 days
was not updated to pass CRD_F_KEY_EXPLICIT flag to opencrypto. This resulted in
always using first key.
We need to support providers created with this bug, so set special
G_ELI_FLAG_FIRST_KEY flag for GELI provider in integrity mode with version
smaller than 6 and pass the CRD_F_KEY_EXPLICIT flag to opencrypto only if
G_ELI_FLAG_FIRST_KEY doesn't exist.
Reported by: Anton Yuzhaninov <citrin@citrin.ru>
MFC after: 1 week
create reasonably large cache for the keys that is filled when
needed. The previous version was problematic for very large providers
(hundreds of terabytes or serval petabytes). Every terabyte of data
needs around 256kB for keys. Make the default cache limit big enough
to fit all the keys needed for 4TB providers, which will eat at most
1MB of memory.
MFC after: 2 weeks
Before this change if you wanted to suspend your laptop and be sure that your
encryption keys are safe, you had to stop all processes that use file system
stored on encrypted device, unmount the file system and detach geli provider.
This isn't very handy. If you are a lucky user of a laptop where suspend/resume
actually works with FreeBSD (I'm not!) you most likely want to suspend your
laptop, because you don't want to start everything over again when you turn
your laptop back on.
And this is where geli suspend/resume steps in. When you execute:
# geli suspend -a
geli will wait for all in-flight I/O requests, suspend new I/O requests, remove
all geli sensitive data from the kernel memory (like encryption keys) and will
wait for either 'geli resume' or 'geli detach'.
Now with no keys in memory you can suspend your laptop without stopping any
processes or unmounting any file systems.
When you resume your laptop you have to resume geli devices using 'geli resume'
command. You need to provide your passphrase, etc. again so the keys can be
restored and suspended I/O requests released.
Of course you need to remember that 'geli suspend' won't clear file system
cache and other places where data from your geli-encrypted file system might be
present. But to get rid of those stopping processes and unmounting file system
won't help either - you have to turn your laptop off. Be warned.
Also note, that suspending geli device which contains file system with geli
utility (or anything used by 'geli resume') is not very good idea, as you won't
be able to resume it - when you execute geli(8), the kernel will try to read it
and this read I/O request will be suspended.
but because of a bug it was a no-op, so we were still using offsets in native
byte order for the host. Do it properly this time, bump version to 4 and set
the G_ELI_FLAG_NATIVE_BYTE_ORDER flag when version is under 4.
MFC after: 2 weeks
This way one will be able to use provider encrypted on eg. i386 on
eg. sparc64. This doesn't really buy us much today, because UFS isn't
endian agnostic.
We retain backward compatibility by setting G_ELI_FLAG_NATIVE_BYTE_ORDER
flag on devices with version number less than 2 and not converting the
offset.
case panic on sparc64.
The problem is in MD5(9) implementation. The Encode() function takes
'unsigned char *output' as its first argument, which is then assigned to
'u_int32_t *op'. If the 'output' argument is not 4 byte aligned (and in
geli(8) case it is not), sparc64 machine will panic.
I don't know how to fix MD5(9) in a clean way, so I'm implementing a
work-around in geli(8).
Reported by: brueffer
MFC after: 3 days
sizeof(struct g_eli_metadata) will return the exact number of bytes needed
for storing it on the disk.
Without this change GELI was unusable on amd64 (and probably other 64-bit
archs), because sizeof(struct g_eli_metadata) was greater than 512 bytes
and geli(8) was failing on assertion.
Reported by: Michael Reifenberger <mike@Reifenberger.com>
MFC after: 3 days
