Recommit r353293 "[LLD][ELF] - Set DF_STATIC_TLS flag for i386 target."
With the following changes:
1) Compilation fix:
std::atomic<bool> HasStaticTlsModel = false; ->
std::atomic<bool> HasStaticTlsModel{false};
2) Adjusted the comment in code.
Initial commit message:
DF_STATIC_TLS flag indicates that the shared object or executable
contains code using a static thread-local storage scheme.
Patch checks if IE/LE relocations were used to check if the code uses
a static model. If so it sets the DF_STATIC_TLS flag.
Differential revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D57749
Pull in r353378 from upstream lld trunk (by George Rimar):
[LLD][ELF] - Set DF_STATIC_TLS flag for X64 target
This is the same as D57749, but for x64 target.
"ELF Handling For Thread-Local Storage" p41 says
(https://www.akkadia.org/drepper/tls.pdf):
R_X86_64_GOTTPOFF relocation is used for IE TLS models.
Hence if linker sees this relocation we should add DF_STATIC_TLS flag.
Differential revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D57821
This adds support to lld for the DF_STATIC_TLS flag in shared objects,
which signals to the dynamic linker that the shared object requires
static thread local storage.
See also: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D19072
MFC after: 1 week
Refactoring. NFC.
Pull in r352435 from upstream lld trunk (by Rui Ueyama):
Attempt to fix build failure with GCC 5.4.
Pull in r352482 from upstream lld trunk (by George Rimar):
[ELF] - Remove dead `readBfdName` declaration. NFC.
`readBfdName` was removed recently.
Pull in r352606 from upstream lld trunk (by me):
Recognize FreeBSD specific BFD names in OUTPUT_FORMAT
Summary:
After rLLD344952 ("Add OUTPUT_FORMAT linker script directive
support"), using BFD names such as `elf64-x86-64-freebsd` the
`OUTPUT_FORMAT` linker script command does not work anymore,
resulting in errors like:
```
ld: error: /home/dim/src/clang800-import/stand/efi/loader/arch/amd64/ldscript.amd64:2: unknown output format name: elf64-x86-64-freebsd
>>> OUTPUT_FORMAT("elf64-x86-64-freebsd", "elf64-x86-64-freebsd", "elf64-x86-64-freebsd")
>>> ^
```
To fix this, recognize a `-freebsd` suffix in BFD names, and also set
`Configuration::OSABI` to `ELFOSABI_FREEBSD` for those cases.
Add and/or update several test cases to check for the correct results
of these new `OUTPUT_FORMAT` arguments.
Reviewers: ruiu, atanasyan, grimar, hokein, emaste, espindola
Reviewed By: ruiu
Subscribers: nemanjai, javed.absar, arichardson, krytarowski, kristof.beyls, kbarton, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D57283
Don't mess up RelIplt symbols during relocatable processing
Summary:
During upgrading of the FreeBSD source tree with lld 7.0.0, I noticed
that it started complaining about crt1.o having an "index past the
end of the symbol table".
Such a symbol table looks approximately like this, viewed with
readelf -s (note the Ndx field being messed up):
Symbol table '.symtab' contains 4 entries:
Num: Value Size Type Bind Vis Ndx Name
0: 00000000 0 NOTYPE LOCAL DEFAULT UND
1: 00000000 0 SECTION LOCAL DEFAULT 1
2: 00000000 0 NOTYPE WEAK HIDDEN RSV[0xffff] __rel_iplt_end
3: 00000000 0 NOTYPE WEAK HIDDEN RSV[0xffff] __rel_iplt_start
At first, it seemed that recent ifunc relocation work had caused this:
<https://reviews.freebsd.org/rS339351>, but it turned out that it was
due to incorrect processing of the object files by lld, when using -r
(a.k.a. --relocatable).
Bisecting showed that rL324421 ("Convert a use of Config->Static") was
the commit where this new behavior began. Simply reverting it solved
the issue, and the __rel_iplt symbols had an index of UND again.
Looking at Rafael's commit message, I think he simply missed the
possibility of --relocatable being in effect, so I have added an
additional check for it.
I also added a simple regression test case.
Reviewers: grimar, ruiu, emaste, espindola
Reviewed By: ruiu
Subscribers: arichardson, krytarowski, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D53515
This fixes a problem in lld where it places incorrect indexes for ifunc
related symbols in crt1.o and friends, making it impossible to link most
normal programs with it.
ELF spec says that for SHT_REL and SHT_RELA sh_link should reference the
associated string table and sh_info should reference the "section to
which the relocation applies." ELF Tool Chain's elfcopy / strip use
this (in part) to control whether or not the relocation entry is copied
to the output.
LLVM PR 37538 https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=37538
Approved by: re (kib)
Obtained from: llvm r344226 (backported for 6.0)
[ELF] - Allow LLD to produce file symbols.
This is for PR36716 and
this enables emitting STT_FILE symbols.
Output size affect is minor:
lld binary size changes from 52,883,408 to 52,949,400
clang binary size changes from 83,136,456 to 83,219,600
Differential revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D45261
This fixes a regression in lld that made it stop emitting STT_FILE
symbols, which ctfmerge relies upon to uniquify function table entries
that reference STB_LOCAL symbols. Consequently, ctfmerge stopped
emitting entries for static functions into the function table, and
dtrace no longer gets type info for them.
Approved by: re (kib)
Reported by: markj
PR: 230444
MFC after: 3 days
The current kernel ifunc implementation creates a PLT entry for each
ifunc definition. ifunc calls therefore consist of a call to the
PLT entry followed by an indirect jump. The jump target is written
during boot when the kernel linker resolves R_[*]_IRELATIVE relocations.
This implementation is defined by requirements for userland code, where
text relocations are avoided. This requirement is not present for the
kernel, so the implementation has avoidable overhead (namely, an extra
indirect jump per call).
Address this for now by adding a special option to the static linker
to inhibit PLT creation for ifuncs. Instead, relocations to ifunc call
sites are passed through to the output file, so the kernel linker can
enumerate such call sites and apply PC-relative relocations directly
to the text section. Thus the overhead of an ifunc call becomes exactly
the same as that of an ordinary function call. This option is only for
use by the kernel and will not work for regular programs.
The final form of this optimization is up for debate; for now, this
change is simple and static enough to be acceptable as an interim
solution.
Reviewed by: emaste
Discussed with: arichardson, dim
MFC after: 1 month
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D16748
The Tag_ABI_VFP_args build attribute controls the procedure call
standard used for floating point parameters on ARM. The values are:
0 - Base AAPCS (FP Parameters passed in Core (Integer) registers
1 - VFP AAPCS (FP Parameters passed in FP registers)
2 - Toolchain specific (Neither Base or VFP)
3 - Compatible with all (No use of floating point parameters)
If the Tag_ABI_VFP_args build attribute is missing it has an implicit
value of 0.
We use the attribute in two ways:
* Detect a clash in calling convention between Base, VFP and Toolchain.
we follow ld.bfd's lead and do not error if there is a clash between an
implicit Base AAPCS caused by a missing attribute. Many projects
including the hard-float (VFP AAPCS) version of glibc contain assembler
files that do not use floating point but do not have Tag_ABI_VFP_args.
* Set the EF_ARM_ABI_FLOAT_SOFT or EF_ARM_ABI_FLOAT_HARD ELF header flag
for Base or VFP AAPCS respectively. This flag is used by some ELF
loaders.
References:
* Addenda to, and Errata in, the ABI for the ARM Architecture for
Tag_ABI_VFP_args
* Elf for the ARM Architecture for ELF header flags
Fixes LLVM PR36009
PR: 229050
Obtained from: llvm r338377 by Peter Smith
[ELF] Update addends in non-allocatable sections for REL targets when
creating a relocatable output.
LLVM PR: 37735
LLVM Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D48929
PR: 225128
Obtained from: LLVM r336799 by Igor Kudrin
A non-alloc note section should not have a PT_NOTE program header.
Found while linking ghc (Haskell compiler) with lld on FreeBSD. Haskell
emits a .debug-ghc-link-info note section (as the name suggests, it
contains link info) as a SHT_NOTE section without SHF_ALLOC set.
For this case ld.bfd does not emit a PT_NOTE segment for
.debug-ghc-link-info. lld previously emitted a PT_NOTE with p_vaddr = 0
and FreeBSD's rtld segfaulted when trying to parse a note at address 0.
LLVM PR: https://llvm.org/pr37361
LLVM review: https://reviews.llvm.org/D46623
PR: 226872
Reviewed by: dim
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Strip @VER suffices from the LTO output.
This fixes pr36623.
The problem is that we have to parse versions out of names before LTO
so that LTO can use that information.
When we get the LTO produced .o files, we replace the previous symbols
with the LTO produced ones, but they still have @ in their names.
We could just trim the name directly, but calling parseSymbolVersion
to do it is simpler.
This is a follow-up to r331366, since we discovered that lld could
append version strings to symbols twice, when using Link Time
Optimization.
MFC after: 3 months
X-MFC-With: r327952
6.0.0 (branches/release_60 r324090).
This introduces retpoline support, with the -mretpoline flag. The
upstream initial commit message (r323155 by Chandler Carruth) contains
quite a bit of explanation. Quoting:
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of
the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today,
specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection",
and is one of the two halves to Spectre.
Summary:
First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that
this is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero
blog post for details:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative
execution of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by
poisoning the prediction of indirect branches with the address of
that gadget. The gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a
side channel for reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a
load of secret data followed by a branch on the loaded value and then
a load of some predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing
of the processors cache to determine which direction the branch took
*in the speculative execution*, and in turn what one bit of the
loaded value was. Due to the nature of these timing side channels and
the branch predictor on Intel processors, this allows an attacker to
leak data only accessible to a privileged domain (like the kernel)
back into an unprivileged domain.
The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect
branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In
many cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches
and a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering
switches in this way and the first step of this patch is to disable
jump-table lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite
explicit indirectbr sequences into a switch over integers.
However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We
introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect
calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as a
trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86.
Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures
the processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known
location. The retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto
the stack by the call with the desired target of the original
indirect call. The result is a predicted return to the next
instruction after a call (which can be used to trap speculative
execution within an infinite loop) and an actual indirect branch to
an arbitrary address.
On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by
using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this
device. For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register
and so several different retpoline variants are introduced to use a
scratch register if one is available in the calling convention and to
otherwise use direct stack push/pop sequences to pass the target
address.
This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog
post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886
We also support a target feature that disables emission of the
retpoline thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users
want them. These are particularly useful in environments like
kernels that routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch
their thunk to different code sequences. They can write this custom
thunk and use `-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to
`-mretpoline`. In this case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_r11
```
or on 32-bit:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_eax
__llvm_external_retpoline_ecx
__llvm_external_retpoline_edx
__llvm_external_retpoline_push
```
And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in
the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl`
instruction.
There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF
binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to
generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection.
The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are
from precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we
have found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on
them here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for
retpoline-ed configurations for completeness.
For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the
compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this
particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all*
libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic
executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z
retpolineplt` (or use similar functionality from some other linker).
We strongly recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows
the retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller.
When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the
Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications
running typic al workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately
2%) even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely
due to the small number of indirect branches that occur in
performance sensitive paths of the kernel.
When using these patches on statically linked applications,
especially C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more
dramatic performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch,
indirect-, or virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from
10% to 50%.
However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance
impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically
reduce the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting
them to direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to
lower switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++
applications, we *strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call
targets are statically linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both
PGO and ThinLTO. Well tuned servers using all of these techniques saw
5% - 10% overhead from the use of retpoline.
We will add detailed documentation covering these components in
subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality
available as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd
really like to get these patches landed and backported ASAP for
obvious reasons. We're planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0
release streams and get a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked
ASAP for distros and vendors.
This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month:
Eric, Reid, Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit
due to the time sensitive nature of landing this and the need to
backport it. Huge thanks to everyone who helped out here, and
everyone at Intel who helped out in discussions about how to craft
this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at Google, but not an LLVM
contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline design.
Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer
Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723
MFC after: 3 months
X-MFC-With: r327952
PR: 224669
The root problem is that we were creating a PT_LOAD just for the header.
That was technically valid, but inconvenient: we should not be making
the ELF discontinuous.
The solution is to allow a section with LMAExpr to be added to a PT_LOAD
if that PT_LOAD doesn't already have a LMAExpr.
LLVM PR: 36017
Obtained from: LLVM r323625 by Rafael Espindola
If two sections are in the same PT_LOAD, their relatives offsets,
virtual address and physical addresses are all the same.
[Rafael] initially wanted to have a single global LMAOffset, on the
assumption that every ELF file was in practiced loaded contiguously in
both physical and virtual memory.
Unfortunately that is not the case. The linux kernel has:
LOAD 0x200000 0xffffffff81000000 0x0000000001000000 0xced000 0xced000 R E 0x200000
LOAD 0x1000000 0xffffffff81e00000 0x0000000001e00000 0x15f000 0x15f000 RW 0x200000
LOAD 0x1200000 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000001f5f000 0x01b198 0x01b198 RW 0x200000
LOAD 0x137b000 0xffffffff81f7b000 0x0000000001f7b000 0x116000 0x1ec000 RWE 0x200000
The delta for all but the third PT_LOAD is the same:
0xffffffff80000000. [Rafael] thinks the 3rd one is a hack for implementing
per cpu data, but we can't break that.
Obtained from: LLVM r323456 by Rafael Espindola
This fixes the crash reported at [LLVM] PR36083.
The issue is that we were trying to put all the sections in the same
PT_LOAD and crashing trying to write past the end of the file.
This also adds accounting for used space in LMARegion, without it all
3 PT_LOADs would have the same physical address.
Obtained from: LLVM r323449 by Rafael Espindola
