764d8cef56
rev 1.66. This fix contains both belt and suspenders. Belt: ignore packets where src == dst and srcport == dstport in TCPS_LISTEN. These packets can only legitimately occur when connecting a socket to itself, which doesn't go through TCPS_LISTEN (it goes CLOSED->SYN_SENT->SYN_RCVD-> ESTABLISHED). This prevents the "standard" "land" attack, although doesn't prevent the multi-homed variation. Suspenders: send a RST in response to a SYN/ACK in SYN_RECEIVED state. The only packets we should get in SYN_RECEIVED are 1. A retransmitted SYN, or 2. An ack of our SYN/ACK. The "land" attack depends on us accepting our own SYN/ACK as an ACK; in SYN_RECEIVED state; this should prevent all "land" attacks. We also move up the sequence number check for the ACK in SYN_RECEIVED. This neither helps nor hurts with respect to the "land" attack, but puts more of the validation checking in one spot. PR: kern/5103 |
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.. | ||
libalias | ||
fil.c | ||
icmp_var.h | ||
if_atm.c | ||
if_atm.h | ||
if_ether.c | ||
if_ether.h | ||
if_fddi.h | ||
igmp_var.h | ||
igmp.c | ||
igmp.h | ||
in_cksum.c | ||
in_hostcache.c | ||
in_hostcache.h | ||
in_pcb.c | ||
in_pcb.h | ||
in_proto.c | ||
in_rmx.c | ||
in_systm.h | ||
in_var.h | ||
in.c | ||
in.h | ||
ip_auth.c | ||
ip_auth.h | ||
ip_compat.h | ||
ip_divert.c | ||
ip_fil.c | ||
ip_fil.h | ||
ip_frag.c | ||
ip_frag.h | ||
ip_ftp_pxy.c | ||
ip_fw.c | ||
ip_fw.h | ||
ip_icmp.c | ||
ip_icmp.h | ||
ip_input.c | ||
ip_log.c | ||
ip_mroute.c | ||
ip_mroute.h | ||
ip_nat.c | ||
ip_nat.h | ||
ip_output.c | ||
ip_proxy.c | ||
ip_proxy.h | ||
ip_state.c | ||
ip_state.h | ||
ip_var.h | ||
ip.h | ||
ipl.h | ||
mlf_ipl.c | ||
mln_ipl.c | ||
raw_ip.c | ||
tcp_debug.c | ||
tcp_debug.h | ||
tcp_fsm.h | ||
tcp_input.c | ||
tcp_output.c | ||
tcp_reass.c | ||
tcp_seq.h | ||
tcp_subr.c | ||
tcp_timer.c | ||
tcp_timer.h | ||
tcp_timewait.c | ||
tcp_usrreq.c | ||
tcp_var.h | ||
tcp.h | ||
tcpip.h | ||
udp_usrreq.c | ||
udp_var.h | ||
udp.h |