- Don't drop the lock just to reacquire it again to check rushjob, this
only wastes time.
- Use msleep() to drop the mutex while sleeping instead of explicitly
unlocking around tsleep.
Reviewed by: pjd
by this driver and largely are not even PCI devices in pcn_chipid.
- Use device_printf(9)/if_printf(9) rather than implementing their
functionality with printf(9).
- Sprinkle some const.
- Only call iwi_stop() if we got far enough along in iwi_attach() to
alloc an ifnet.
- Release the firmware after stopping the interface and detaching the
ifnet.
MFC after: 1 month
Reviewed by: sam
linux siginfo structure. l_sigval uses a l_uintptr_t for sival_ptr so
that sival_ptr is the right size for linux32 on amd64. Since no code
currently uses 'lsi_ptr' this is just a cosmetic nit rather than a bug
fix.
priority class and use this to:
- print "-" instead of a garbage value for ithreads. Print "-" instead
of the unused nice value for kthreads which are (mis)classified as
PRI_TIMESHARE. For such threads, the nice value can be set to nonzero
by root, but it is never used (at least by the 4bsd scheduler). For
ithreads, we didn't even print the unused value.
- print "i<priority>" and "r<priority>" instead of a biased "<priority>"
for idletime and realtime threads, Here <priority> is the priority
parameter to idprio/rtprio(1). Just add the prefix and remove the
bias for now. <priority> has been stored indirectly in the kernel
since 2001/02/12, and even the kernel cannot recover the original
value in all cases. Here we need to handle more cases than pri_to_rtp(),
but actually handle fewer cases, and end up printing garbage after
a thread changes its current priority while in the kernel.
- for idletime and realtime threads, if they are kthreads then add a prefix
of "k" to the previous string.
- for idletime and realtime threads, if they in the FIFO scheduling class
then add a suffix of "F" to the previous string (if it fits; the other
parts of the string are sure to fit unless <priority> is garbage).
label after the sbunlock() part.
This correctly handles calls to sendfile(2) without valid parameters
that was broken in rev. 1.240.
Coverity error: 272162
to be switched to is saved in sc->delayed_next_scr and
the actual switch is performed later. It was possible
to get into the endless loop when attempting to switch
to a closed vty (which is not allowed and beep-alerted
when attempted) and when the visual beep was in effect.
This caused sc->delayed_next_scr to never be reset and
endless attempts to switch to a closed vty and endless
visual beeping. How to repeat:
- boot into single-user
- run "kbdcontrol -b visual"
- quickly press Alt+F2 two times
PR: kern/68016
X-MFC after: 6.2-RELEASE
- Reduce the number of global variables
- Make global objects static
- Use bool consistently
- Sort getopt arguments and their processing
- Add function comments
- Change notlast != 0 into !last
how to change the auditd instance. When using a port/package-based
OpenBSM, changing the auditd pointer may be desirable.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
MFC after: 3 weeks
patch was prepared and committed to priv(9) calls. Add XXX comments
as, in each case, the semantics appear to differ from the TCP/UDP
versions of the calls with respect to jail, and because cr_canseecred()
is not used to validate the query.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
to wakeup on close of the sender. It basically moves
the return (when the asoc has a reader/writer) further
down and gets the wakeup and assoc appending (of the
PD-API event) moved up before the return. It also
moves the flag set right before the return so we can
assure only once adding the PD-API events.
Approved by: gnn
Up to now jot would fail to generate the last character in the range
or skew the integer distribution in a way that would generate the numbers
in the range's limits with half the probability of the rest.
This modification fixes the program, rather than documenting the
strange behavior, as suggested in docs/54879.
Also, correctly specify the range of random(3).
PR: docs/54879
MFC after: 2 weeks
specific privilege names to a broad range of privileges. These may
require some future tweaking.
Sponsored by: nCircle Network Security, Inc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Discussed on: arch@
Reviewed (at least in part) by: mlaier, jmg, pjd, bde, ceri,
Alex Lyashkov <umka at sevcity dot net>,
Skip Ford <skip dot ford at verizon dot net>,
Antoine Brodin <antoine dot brodin at laposte dot net>
privilege for threads and credentials. Unlike the existing suser(9)
interface, priv(9) exposes a named privilege identifier to the privilege
checking code, allowing more complex policies regarding the granting of
privilege to be expressed. Two interfaces are provided, replacing the
existing suser(9) interface:
suser(td) -> priv_check(td, priv)
suser_cred(cred, flags) -> priv_check_cred(cred, priv, flags)
A comprehensive list of currently available kernel privileges may be
found in priv.h. New privileges are easily added as required, but the
comments on adding privileges found in priv.h and priv(9) should be read
before doing so.
The new privilege interface exposed sufficient information to the
privilege checking routine that it will now be possible for jail to
determine whether a particular privilege is granted in the check routine,
rather than relying on hints from the calling context via the
SUSER_ALLOWJAIL flag. For now, the flag is maintained, but a new jail
check function, prison_priv_check(), is exposed from kern_jail.c and used
by the privilege check routine to determine if the privilege is permitted
in jail. As a result, a centralized list of privileges permitted in jail
is now present in kern_jail.c.
The MAC Framework is now also able to instrument privilege checks, both
to deny privileges otherwise granted (mac_priv_check()), and to grant
privileges otherwise denied (mac_priv_grant()), permitting MAC Policy
modules to implement privilege models, as well as control a much broader
range of system behavior in order to constrain processes running with
root privilege.
The suser() and suser_cred() functions remain implemented, now in terms
of priv_check() and the PRIV_ROOT privilege, for use during the transition
and possibly continuing use by third party kernel modules that have not
been updated. The PRIV_DRIVER privilege exists to allow device drivers to
check privilege without adopting a more specific privilege identifier.
This change does not modify the actual security policy, rather, it
modifies the interface for privilege checks so changes to the security
policy become more feasible.
Sponsored by: nCircle Network Security, Inc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Discussed on: arch@
Reviewed (at least in part) by: mlaier, jmg, pjd, bde, ceri,
Alex Lyashkov <umka at sevcity dot net>,
Skip Ford <skip dot ford at verizon dot net>,
Antoine Brodin <antoine dot brodin at laposte dot net>
