freebsd-skq/sys/kern/kern_exec.c

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/*-
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD
*
* Copyright (c) 1993, David Greenman
* All rights reserved.
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
2003-06-11 00:56:59 +00:00
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include "opt_capsicum.h"
#include "opt_hwpmc_hooks.h"
2002-07-01 19:49:04 +00:00
#include "opt_ktrace.h"
#include "opt_vm.h"
2002-07-01 19:49:04 +00:00
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/acct.h>
#include <sys/capsicum.h>
#include <sys/eventhandler.h>
#include <sys/exec.h>
#include <sys/fcntl.h>
#include <sys/filedesc.h>
#include <sys/imgact.h>
#include <sys/imgact_elf.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/lock.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/mutex.h>
#include <sys/namei.h>
#include <sys/priv.h>
#include <sys/proc.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <sys/resourcevar.h>
Switch the vm_object mutex to be a rwlock. This will enable in the future further optimizations where the vm_object lock will be held in read mode most of the time the page cache resident pool of pages are accessed for reading purposes. The change is mostly mechanical but few notes are reported: * The KPI changes as follow: - VM_OBJECT_LOCK() -> VM_OBJECT_WLOCK() - VM_OBJECT_TRYLOCK() -> VM_OBJECT_TRYWLOCK() - VM_OBJECT_UNLOCK() -> VM_OBJECT_WUNLOCK() - VM_OBJECT_LOCK_ASSERT(MA_OWNED) -> VM_OBJECT_ASSERT_WLOCKED() (in order to avoid visibility of implementation details) - The read-mode operations are added: VM_OBJECT_RLOCK(), VM_OBJECT_TRYRLOCK(), VM_OBJECT_RUNLOCK(), VM_OBJECT_ASSERT_RLOCKED(), VM_OBJECT_ASSERT_LOCKED() * The vm/vm_pager.h namespace pollution avoidance (forcing requiring sys/mutex.h in consumers directly to cater its inlining functions using VM_OBJECT_LOCK()) imposes that all the vm/vm_pager.h consumers now must include also sys/rwlock.h. * zfs requires a quite convoluted fix to include FreeBSD rwlocks into the compat layer because the name clash between FreeBSD and solaris versions must be avoided. At this purpose zfs redefines the vm_object locking functions directly, isolating the FreeBSD components in specific compat stubs. The KPI results heavilly broken by this commit. Thirdy part ports must be updated accordingly (I can think off-hand of VirtualBox, for example). Sponsored by: EMC / Isilon storage division Reviewed by: jeff Reviewed by: pjd (ZFS specific review) Discussed with: alc Tested by: pho
2013-03-09 02:32:23 +00:00
#include <sys/rwlock.h>
#include <sys/sched.h>
#include <sys/sdt.h>
#include <sys/sf_buf.h>
#include <sys/shm.h>
#include <sys/signalvar.h>
#include <sys/smp.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/syscallsubr.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <sys/sysent.h>
#include <sys/sysproto.h>
#include <sys/vnode.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#ifdef KTRACE
#include <sys/ktrace.h>
#endif
#include <vm/vm.h>
#include <vm/vm_param.h>
#include <vm/pmap.h>
#include <vm/vm_page.h>
#include <vm/vm_map.h>
#include <vm/vm_kern.h>
#include <vm/vm_extern.h>
#include <vm/vm_object.h>
#include <vm/vm_pager.h>
#ifdef HWPMC_HOOKS
#include <sys/pmckern.h>
#endif
#include <machine/reg.h>
#include <security/audit/audit.h>
#include <security/mac/mac_framework.h>
#ifdef KDTRACE_HOOKS
#include <sys/dtrace_bsd.h>
dtrace_execexit_func_t dtrace_fasttrap_exec;
#endif
SDT_PROVIDER_DECLARE(proc);
SDT_PROBE_DEFINE1(proc, , , exec, "char *");
SDT_PROBE_DEFINE1(proc, , , exec__failure, "int");
SDT_PROBE_DEFINE1(proc, , , exec__success, "char *");
MALLOC_DEFINE(M_PARGS, "proc-args", "Process arguments");
int coredump_pack_fileinfo = 1;
SYSCTL_INT(_kern, OID_AUTO, coredump_pack_fileinfo, CTLFLAG_RWTUN,
&coredump_pack_fileinfo, 0,
"Enable file path packing in 'procstat -f' coredump notes");
int coredump_pack_vmmapinfo = 1;
SYSCTL_INT(_kern, OID_AUTO, coredump_pack_vmmapinfo, CTLFLAG_RWTUN,
&coredump_pack_vmmapinfo, 0,
"Enable file path packing in 'procstat -v' coredump notes");
static int sysctl_kern_ps_strings(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS);
static int sysctl_kern_usrstack(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS);
static int sysctl_kern_stackprot(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS);
static int do_execve(struct thread *td, struct image_args *args,
struct mac *mac_p);
/* XXX This should be vm_size_t. */
SYSCTL_PROC(_kern, KERN_PS_STRINGS, ps_strings, CTLTYPE_ULONG|CTLFLAG_RD|
CTLFLAG_CAPRD|CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, NULL, 0, sysctl_kern_ps_strings, "LU",
"Location of process' ps_strings structure");
/* XXX This should be vm_size_t. */
SYSCTL_PROC(_kern, KERN_USRSTACK, usrstack, CTLTYPE_ULONG|CTLFLAG_RD|
CTLFLAG_CAPRD|CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, NULL, 0, sysctl_kern_usrstack, "LU",
"Top of process stack");
SYSCTL_PROC(_kern, OID_AUTO, stackprot, CTLTYPE_INT|CTLFLAG_RD|CTLFLAG_MPSAFE,
NULL, 0, sysctl_kern_stackprot, "I",
"Stack memory permissions");
u_long ps_arg_cache_limit = PAGE_SIZE / 16;
SYSCTL_ULONG(_kern, OID_AUTO, ps_arg_cache_limit, CTLFLAG_RW,
&ps_arg_cache_limit, 0,
"Process' command line characters cache limit");
static int disallow_high_osrel;
SYSCTL_INT(_kern, OID_AUTO, disallow_high_osrel, CTLFLAG_RW,
&disallow_high_osrel, 0,
"Disallow execution of binaries built for higher version of the world");
static int map_at_zero = 0;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_bsd, OID_AUTO, map_at_zero, CTLFLAG_RWTUN, &map_at_zero, 0,
"Permit processes to map an object at virtual address 0.");
static int
sysctl_kern_ps_strings(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
struct proc *p;
int error;
p = curproc;
#ifdef SCTL_MASK32
if (req->flags & SCTL_MASK32) {
unsigned int val;
val = (unsigned int)p->p_sysent->sv_psstrings;
error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, &val, sizeof(val));
} else
#endif
error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, &p->p_sysent->sv_psstrings,
sizeof(p->p_sysent->sv_psstrings));
return error;
}
static int
sysctl_kern_usrstack(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
struct proc *p;
int error;
p = curproc;
#ifdef SCTL_MASK32
if (req->flags & SCTL_MASK32) {
unsigned int val;
val = (unsigned int)p->p_sysent->sv_usrstack;
error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, &val, sizeof(val));
} else
#endif
error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, &p->p_sysent->sv_usrstack,
sizeof(p->p_sysent->sv_usrstack));
return error;
}
static int
sysctl_kern_stackprot(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
struct proc *p;
p = curproc;
return (SYSCTL_OUT(req, &p->p_sysent->sv_stackprot,
sizeof(p->p_sysent->sv_stackprot)));
}
/*
* Each of the items is a pointer to a `const struct execsw', hence the
* double pointer here.
*/
static const struct execsw **execsw;
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
struct execve_args {
char *fname;
char **argv;
char **envv;
};
#endif
int
sys_execve(struct thread *td, struct execve_args *uap)
{
struct image_args args;
struct vmspace *oldvmspace;
int error;
error = pre_execve(td, &oldvmspace);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
error = exec_copyin_args(&args, uap->fname, UIO_USERSPACE,
uap->argv, uap->envv);
if (error == 0)
error = kern_execve(td, &args, NULL);
post_execve(td, error, oldvmspace);
return (error);
}
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
struct fexecve_args {
int fd;
char **argv;
char **envv;
};
#endif
int
sys_fexecve(struct thread *td, struct fexecve_args *uap)
{
struct image_args args;
struct vmspace *oldvmspace;
int error;
error = pre_execve(td, &oldvmspace);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
error = exec_copyin_args(&args, NULL, UIO_SYSSPACE,
uap->argv, uap->envv);
if (error == 0) {
args.fd = uap->fd;
error = kern_execve(td, &args, NULL);
}
post_execve(td, error, oldvmspace);
return (error);
}
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
struct __mac_execve_args {
char *fname;
char **argv;
char **envv;
struct mac *mac_p;
};
#endif
int
sys___mac_execve(struct thread *td, struct __mac_execve_args *uap)
{
#ifdef MAC
struct image_args args;
struct vmspace *oldvmspace;
int error;
error = pre_execve(td, &oldvmspace);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
error = exec_copyin_args(&args, uap->fname, UIO_USERSPACE,
uap->argv, uap->envv);
if (error == 0)
error = kern_execve(td, &args, uap->mac_p);
post_execve(td, error, oldvmspace);
return (error);
#else
return (ENOSYS);
#endif
}
int
pre_execve(struct thread *td, struct vmspace **oldvmspace)
{
struct proc *p;
int error;
KASSERT(td == curthread, ("non-current thread %p", td));
error = 0;
p = td->td_proc;
if ((p->p_flag & P_HADTHREADS) != 0) {
PROC_LOCK(p);
if (thread_single(p, SINGLE_BOUNDARY) != 0)
error = ERESTART;
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
}
KASSERT(error != 0 || (td->td_pflags & TDP_EXECVMSPC) == 0,
("nested execve"));
*oldvmspace = p->p_vmspace;
return (error);
}
void
post_execve(struct thread *td, int error, struct vmspace *oldvmspace)
{
struct proc *p;
KASSERT(td == curthread, ("non-current thread %p", td));
p = td->td_proc;
if ((p->p_flag & P_HADTHREADS) != 0) {
PROC_LOCK(p);
/*
* If success, we upgrade to SINGLE_EXIT state to
* force other threads to suicide.
*/
if (error == EJUSTRETURN)
thread_single(p, SINGLE_EXIT);
else
thread_single_end(p, SINGLE_BOUNDARY);
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
}
if ((td->td_pflags & TDP_EXECVMSPC) != 0) {
KASSERT(p->p_vmspace != oldvmspace,
("oldvmspace still used"));
vmspace_free(oldvmspace);
td->td_pflags &= ~TDP_EXECVMSPC;
}
}
/*
* XXX: kern_execve has the astonishing property of not always returning to
* the caller. If sufficiently bad things happen during the call to
* do_execve(), it can end up calling exit1(); as a result, callers must
* avoid doing anything which they might need to undo (e.g., allocating
* memory).
*/
int
kern_execve(struct thread *td, struct image_args *args, struct mac *mac_p)
{
AUDIT_ARG_ARGV(args->begin_argv, args->argc,
exec_args_get_begin_envv(args) - args->begin_argv);
AUDIT_ARG_ENVV(exec_args_get_begin_envv(args), args->envc,
args->endp - exec_args_get_begin_envv(args));
return (do_execve(td, args, mac_p));
}
/*
* In-kernel implementation of execve(). All arguments are assumed to be
* userspace pointers from the passed thread.
*/
static int
do_execve(struct thread *td, struct image_args *args, struct mac *mac_p)
{
struct proc *p = td->td_proc;
struct nameidata nd;
struct ucred *oldcred;
struct uidinfo *euip = NULL;
uintptr_t stack_base;
struct image_params image_params, *imgp;
struct vattr attr;
2002-03-19 21:25:46 +00:00
int (*img_first)(struct image_params *);
struct pargs *oldargs = NULL, *newargs = NULL;
struct sigacts *oldsigacts = NULL, *newsigacts = NULL;
#ifdef KTRACE
struct vnode *tracevp = NULL;
struct ucred *tracecred = NULL;
#endif
struct vnode *oldtextvp = NULL, *newtextvp;
int credential_changing;
#ifdef MAC
struct label *interpvplabel = NULL;
Modify the MAC Framework so that instead of embedding a (struct label) in various kernel objects to represent security data, we embed a (struct label *) pointer, which now references labels allocated using a UMA zone (mac_label.c). This allows the size and shape of struct label to be varied without changing the size and shape of these kernel objects, which become part of the frozen ABI with 5-STABLE. This opens the door for boot-time selection of the number of label slots, and hence changes to the bound on the number of simultaneous labeled policies at boot-time instead of compile-time. This also makes it easier to embed label references in new objects as required for locking/caching with fine-grained network stack locking, such as inpcb structures. This change also moves us further in the direction of hiding the structure of kernel objects from MAC policy modules, not to mention dramatically reducing the number of '&' symbols appearing in both the MAC Framework and MAC policy modules, and improving readability. While this results in minimal performance change with MAC enabled, it will observably shrink the size of a number of critical kernel data structures for the !MAC case, and should have a small (but measurable) performance benefit (i.e., struct vnode, struct socket) do to memory conservation and reduced cost of zeroing memory. NOTE: Users of MAC must recompile their kernel and all MAC modules as a result of this change. Because this is an API change, third party MAC modules will also need to be updated to make less use of the '&' symbol. Suggestions from: bmilekic Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-12 03:14:31 +00:00
int will_transition;
#endif
#ifdef HWPMC_HOOKS
struct pmckern_procexec pe;
#endif
int error, i, orig_osrel;
uint32_t orig_fctl0;
static const char fexecv_proc_title[] = "(fexecv)";
imgp = &image_params;
/*
* Lock the process and set the P_INEXEC flag to indicate that
* it should be left alone until we're done here. This is
* necessary to avoid race conditions - e.g. in ptrace() -
* that might allow a local user to illicitly obtain elevated
* privileges.
*/
PROC_LOCK(p);
KASSERT((p->p_flag & P_INEXEC) == 0,
("%s(): process already has P_INEXEC flag", __func__));
p->p_flag |= P_INEXEC;
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
/*
* Initialize part of the common data
*/
bzero(imgp, sizeof(*imgp));
imgp->proc = p;
imgp->attr = &attr;
imgp->args = args;
oldcred = p->p_ucred;
orig_osrel = p->p_osrel;
orig_fctl0 = p->p_fctl0;
#ifdef MAC
Modify the MAC Framework so that instead of embedding a (struct label) in various kernel objects to represent security data, we embed a (struct label *) pointer, which now references labels allocated using a UMA zone (mac_label.c). This allows the size and shape of struct label to be varied without changing the size and shape of these kernel objects, which become part of the frozen ABI with 5-STABLE. This opens the door for boot-time selection of the number of label slots, and hence changes to the bound on the number of simultaneous labeled policies at boot-time instead of compile-time. This also makes it easier to embed label references in new objects as required for locking/caching with fine-grained network stack locking, such as inpcb structures. This change also moves us further in the direction of hiding the structure of kernel objects from MAC policy modules, not to mention dramatically reducing the number of '&' symbols appearing in both the MAC Framework and MAC policy modules, and improving readability. While this results in minimal performance change with MAC enabled, it will observably shrink the size of a number of critical kernel data structures for the !MAC case, and should have a small (but measurable) performance benefit (i.e., struct vnode, struct socket) do to memory conservation and reduced cost of zeroing memory. NOTE: Users of MAC must recompile their kernel and all MAC modules as a result of this change. Because this is an API change, third party MAC modules will also need to be updated to make less use of the '&' symbol. Suggestions from: bmilekic Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-12 03:14:31 +00:00
error = mac_execve_enter(imgp, mac_p);
if (error)
goto exec_fail;
#endif
/*
* Translate the file name. namei() returns a vnode pointer
* in ni_vp among other things.
*
* XXXAUDIT: It would be desirable to also audit the name of the
* interpreter if this is an interpreted binary.
*/
if (args->fname != NULL) {
Switch to use shared vnode locks for text files during image activation. kern_execve() locks text vnode exclusive to be able to set and clear VV_TEXT flag. VV_TEXT is mutually exclusive with the v_writecount > 0 condition. The change removes VV_TEXT, replacing it with the condition v_writecount <= -1, and puts v_writecount under the vnode interlock. Each text reference decrements v_writecount. To clear the text reference when the segment is unmapped, it is recorded in the vm_map_entry backed by the text file as MAP_ENTRY_VN_TEXT flag, and v_writecount is incremented on the map entry removal The operations like VOP_ADD_WRITECOUNT() and VOP_SET_TEXT() check that v_writecount does not contradict the desired change. vn_writecheck() is now racy and its use was eliminated everywhere except access. Atomic check for writeability and increment of v_writecount is performed by the VOP. vn_truncate() now increments v_writecount around VOP_SETATTR() call, lack of which is arguably a bug on its own. nullfs bypasses v_writecount to the lower vnode always, so nullfs vnode has its own v_writecount correct, and lower vnode gets all references, since object->handle is always lower vnode. On the text vnode' vm object dealloc, the v_writecount value is reset to zero, and deadfs vop_unset_text short-circuit the operation. Reclamation of lowervp always reclaims all nullfs vnodes referencing lowervp first, so no stray references are left. Reviewed by: markj, trasz Tested by: mjg, pho Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation MFC after: 1 month Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D19923
2019-05-05 11:20:43 +00:00
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, ISOPEN | LOCKLEAF | LOCKSHARED | FOLLOW |
SAVENAME | AUDITVNODE1, UIO_SYSSPACE, args->fname, td);
}
SDT_PROBE1(proc, , , exec, args->fname);
interpret:
if (args->fname != NULL) {
#ifdef CAPABILITY_MODE
/*
* While capability mode can't reach this point via direct
* path arguments to execve(), we also don't allow
* interpreters to be used in capability mode (for now).
* Catch indirect lookups and return a permissions error.
*/
if (IN_CAPABILITY_MODE(td)) {
error = ECAPMODE;
goto exec_fail;
}
#endif
error = namei(&nd);
if (error)
goto exec_fail;
newtextvp = nd.ni_vp;
imgp->vp = newtextvp;
} else {
AUDIT_ARG_FD(args->fd);
/*
* Descriptors opened only with O_EXEC or O_RDONLY are allowed.
*/
error = fgetvp_exec(td, args->fd, &cap_fexecve_rights, &newtextvp);
if (error)
goto exec_fail;
Switch to use shared vnode locks for text files during image activation. kern_execve() locks text vnode exclusive to be able to set and clear VV_TEXT flag. VV_TEXT is mutually exclusive with the v_writecount > 0 condition. The change removes VV_TEXT, replacing it with the condition v_writecount <= -1, and puts v_writecount under the vnode interlock. Each text reference decrements v_writecount. To clear the text reference when the segment is unmapped, it is recorded in the vm_map_entry backed by the text file as MAP_ENTRY_VN_TEXT flag, and v_writecount is incremented on the map entry removal The operations like VOP_ADD_WRITECOUNT() and VOP_SET_TEXT() check that v_writecount does not contradict the desired change. vn_writecheck() is now racy and its use was eliminated everywhere except access. Atomic check for writeability and increment of v_writecount is performed by the VOP. vn_truncate() now increments v_writecount around VOP_SETATTR() call, lack of which is arguably a bug on its own. nullfs bypasses v_writecount to the lower vnode always, so nullfs vnode has its own v_writecount correct, and lower vnode gets all references, since object->handle is always lower vnode. On the text vnode' vm object dealloc, the v_writecount value is reset to zero, and deadfs vop_unset_text short-circuit the operation. Reclamation of lowervp always reclaims all nullfs vnodes referencing lowervp first, so no stray references are left. Reviewed by: markj, trasz Tested by: mjg, pho Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation MFC after: 1 month Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D19923
2019-05-05 11:20:43 +00:00
vn_lock(newtextvp, LK_SHARED | LK_RETRY);
AUDIT_ARG_VNODE1(newtextvp);
imgp->vp = newtextvp;
}
/*
Switch to use shared vnode locks for text files during image activation. kern_execve() locks text vnode exclusive to be able to set and clear VV_TEXT flag. VV_TEXT is mutually exclusive with the v_writecount > 0 condition. The change removes VV_TEXT, replacing it with the condition v_writecount <= -1, and puts v_writecount under the vnode interlock. Each text reference decrements v_writecount. To clear the text reference when the segment is unmapped, it is recorded in the vm_map_entry backed by the text file as MAP_ENTRY_VN_TEXT flag, and v_writecount is incremented on the map entry removal The operations like VOP_ADD_WRITECOUNT() and VOP_SET_TEXT() check that v_writecount does not contradict the desired change. vn_writecheck() is now racy and its use was eliminated everywhere except access. Atomic check for writeability and increment of v_writecount is performed by the VOP. vn_truncate() now increments v_writecount around VOP_SETATTR() call, lack of which is arguably a bug on its own. nullfs bypasses v_writecount to the lower vnode always, so nullfs vnode has its own v_writecount correct, and lower vnode gets all references, since object->handle is always lower vnode. On the text vnode' vm object dealloc, the v_writecount value is reset to zero, and deadfs vop_unset_text short-circuit the operation. Reclamation of lowervp always reclaims all nullfs vnodes referencing lowervp first, so no stray references are left. Reviewed by: markj, trasz Tested by: mjg, pho Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation MFC after: 1 month Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D19923
2019-05-05 11:20:43 +00:00
* Check file permissions. Also 'opens' file and sets its vnode to
* text mode.
*/
error = exec_check_permissions(imgp);
if (error)
goto exec_fail_dealloc;
imgp->object = imgp->vp->v_object;
if (imgp->object != NULL)
vm_object_reference(imgp->object);
error = exec_map_first_page(imgp);
if (error)
goto exec_fail_dealloc;
imgp->proc->p_osrel = 0;
imgp->proc->p_fctl0 = 0;
/*
* Implement image setuid/setgid.
*
* Determine new credentials before attempting image activators
* so that it can be used by process_exec handlers to determine
* credential/setid changes.
*
* Don't honor setuid/setgid if the filesystem prohibits it or if
* the process is being traced.
*
* We disable setuid/setgid/etc in capability mode on the basis
* that most setugid applications are not written with that
* environment in mind, and will therefore almost certainly operate
* incorrectly. In principle there's no reason that setugid
* applications might not be useful in capability mode, so we may want
* to reconsider this conservative design choice in the future.
*
* XXXMAC: For the time being, use NOSUID to also prohibit
* transitions on the file system.
*/
credential_changing = 0;
credential_changing |= (attr.va_mode & S_ISUID) &&
oldcred->cr_uid != attr.va_uid;
credential_changing |= (attr.va_mode & S_ISGID) &&
oldcred->cr_gid != attr.va_gid;
#ifdef MAC
will_transition = mac_vnode_execve_will_transition(oldcred, imgp->vp,
interpvplabel, imgp);
credential_changing |= will_transition;
#endif
/* Don't inherit PROC_PDEATHSIG_CTL value if setuid/setgid. */
if (credential_changing)
imgp->proc->p_pdeathsig = 0;
if (credential_changing &&
#ifdef CAPABILITY_MODE
((oldcred->cr_flags & CRED_FLAG_CAPMODE) == 0) &&
#endif
(imgp->vp->v_mount->mnt_flag & MNT_NOSUID) == 0 &&
(p->p_flag & P_TRACED) == 0) {
imgp->credential_setid = true;
VOP_UNLOCK(imgp->vp);
imgp->newcred = crdup(oldcred);
if (attr.va_mode & S_ISUID) {
euip = uifind(attr.va_uid);
change_euid(imgp->newcred, euip);
}
vn_lock(imgp->vp, LK_SHARED | LK_RETRY);
if (attr.va_mode & S_ISGID)
change_egid(imgp->newcred, attr.va_gid);
/*
* Implement correct POSIX saved-id behavior.
*
* XXXMAC: Note that the current logic will save the
* uid and gid if a MAC domain transition occurs, even
* though maybe it shouldn't.
*/
change_svuid(imgp->newcred, imgp->newcred->cr_uid);
change_svgid(imgp->newcred, imgp->newcred->cr_gid);
} else {
/*
* Implement correct POSIX saved-id behavior.
*
* XXX: It's not clear that the existing behavior is
* POSIX-compliant. A number of sources indicate that the
* saved uid/gid should only be updated if the new ruid is
* not equal to the old ruid, or the new euid is not equal
* to the old euid and the new euid is not equal to the old
* ruid. The FreeBSD code always updates the saved uid/gid.
* Also, this code uses the new (replaced) euid and egid as
* the source, which may or may not be the right ones to use.
*/
if (oldcred->cr_svuid != oldcred->cr_uid ||
oldcred->cr_svgid != oldcred->cr_gid) {
VOP_UNLOCK(imgp->vp);
imgp->newcred = crdup(oldcred);
vn_lock(imgp->vp, LK_SHARED | LK_RETRY);
change_svuid(imgp->newcred, imgp->newcred->cr_uid);
change_svgid(imgp->newcred, imgp->newcred->cr_gid);
}
}
/* The new credentials are installed into the process later. */
/*
* Do the best to calculate the full path to the image file.
*/
if (args->fname != NULL && args->fname[0] == '/')
imgp->execpath = args->fname;
else {
VOP_UNLOCK(imgp->vp);
if (vn_fullpath(td, imgp->vp, &imgp->execpath,
&imgp->freepath) != 0)
imgp->execpath = args->fname;
vn_lock(imgp->vp, LK_SHARED | LK_RETRY);
}
/*
* If the current process has a special image activator it
* wants to try first, call it. For example, emulating shell
* scripts differently.
*/
error = -1;
if ((img_first = imgp->proc->p_sysent->sv_imgact_try) != NULL)
error = img_first(imgp);
/*
* Loop through the list of image activators, calling each one.
* An activator returns -1 if there is no match, 0 on success,
* and an error otherwise.
*/
for (i = 0; error == -1 && execsw[i]; ++i) {
if (execsw[i]->ex_imgact == NULL ||
execsw[i]->ex_imgact == img_first) {
continue;
}
error = (*execsw[i]->ex_imgact)(imgp);
}
if (error) {
Switch to use shared vnode locks for text files during image activation. kern_execve() locks text vnode exclusive to be able to set and clear VV_TEXT flag. VV_TEXT is mutually exclusive with the v_writecount > 0 condition. The change removes VV_TEXT, replacing it with the condition v_writecount <= -1, and puts v_writecount under the vnode interlock. Each text reference decrements v_writecount. To clear the text reference when the segment is unmapped, it is recorded in the vm_map_entry backed by the text file as MAP_ENTRY_VN_TEXT flag, and v_writecount is incremented on the map entry removal The operations like VOP_ADD_WRITECOUNT() and VOP_SET_TEXT() check that v_writecount does not contradict the desired change. vn_writecheck() is now racy and its use was eliminated everywhere except access. Atomic check for writeability and increment of v_writecount is performed by the VOP. vn_truncate() now increments v_writecount around VOP_SETATTR() call, lack of which is arguably a bug on its own. nullfs bypasses v_writecount to the lower vnode always, so nullfs vnode has its own v_writecount correct, and lower vnode gets all references, since object->handle is always lower vnode. On the text vnode' vm object dealloc, the v_writecount value is reset to zero, and deadfs vop_unset_text short-circuit the operation. Reclamation of lowervp always reclaims all nullfs vnodes referencing lowervp first, so no stray references are left. Reviewed by: markj, trasz Tested by: mjg, pho Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation MFC after: 1 month Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D19923
2019-05-05 11:20:43 +00:00
if (error == -1)
error = ENOEXEC;
goto exec_fail_dealloc;
}
/*
* Special interpreter operation, cleanup and loop up to try to
* activate the interpreter.
*/
if (imgp->interpreted) {
exec_unmap_first_page(imgp);
/*
Switch to use shared vnode locks for text files during image activation. kern_execve() locks text vnode exclusive to be able to set and clear VV_TEXT flag. VV_TEXT is mutually exclusive with the v_writecount > 0 condition. The change removes VV_TEXT, replacing it with the condition v_writecount <= -1, and puts v_writecount under the vnode interlock. Each text reference decrements v_writecount. To clear the text reference when the segment is unmapped, it is recorded in the vm_map_entry backed by the text file as MAP_ENTRY_VN_TEXT flag, and v_writecount is incremented on the map entry removal The operations like VOP_ADD_WRITECOUNT() and VOP_SET_TEXT() check that v_writecount does not contradict the desired change. vn_writecheck() is now racy and its use was eliminated everywhere except access. Atomic check for writeability and increment of v_writecount is performed by the VOP. vn_truncate() now increments v_writecount around VOP_SETATTR() call, lack of which is arguably a bug on its own. nullfs bypasses v_writecount to the lower vnode always, so nullfs vnode has its own v_writecount correct, and lower vnode gets all references, since object->handle is always lower vnode. On the text vnode' vm object dealloc, the v_writecount value is reset to zero, and deadfs vop_unset_text short-circuit the operation. Reclamation of lowervp always reclaims all nullfs vnodes referencing lowervp first, so no stray references are left. Reviewed by: markj, trasz Tested by: mjg, pho Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation MFC after: 1 month Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D19923
2019-05-05 11:20:43 +00:00
* The text reference needs to be removed for scripts.
* There is a short period before we determine that
* something is a script where text reference is active.
* The vnode lock is held over this entire period
* so nothing should illegitimately be blocked.
*/
MPASS(imgp->textset);
VOP_UNSET_TEXT_CHECKED(newtextvp);
imgp->textset = false;
/* free name buffer and old vnode */
if (args->fname != NULL)
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
#ifdef MAC
mac_execve_interpreter_enter(newtextvp, &interpvplabel);
#endif
if (imgp->opened) {
VOP_CLOSE(newtextvp, FREAD, td->td_ucred, td);
imgp->opened = 0;
}
vput(newtextvp);
vm_object_deallocate(imgp->object);
imgp->object = NULL;
imgp->credential_setid = false;
if (imgp->newcred != NULL) {
crfree(imgp->newcred);
imgp->newcred = NULL;
}
imgp->execpath = NULL;
free(imgp->freepath, M_TEMP);
imgp->freepath = NULL;
/* set new name to that of the interpreter */
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, ISOPEN | LOCKLEAF | LOCKSHARED | FOLLOW |
SAVENAME, UIO_SYSSPACE, imgp->interpreter_name, td);
args->fname = imgp->interpreter_name;
goto interpret;
}
/*
* NB: We unlock the vnode here because it is believed that none
* of the sv_copyout_strings/sv_fixup operations require the vnode.
*/
VOP_UNLOCK(imgp->vp);
if (disallow_high_osrel &&
P_OSREL_MAJOR(p->p_osrel) > P_OSREL_MAJOR(__FreeBSD_version)) {
error = ENOEXEC;
uprintf("Osrel %d for image %s too high\n", p->p_osrel,
imgp->execpath != NULL ? imgp->execpath : "<unresolved>");
vn_lock(imgp->vp, LK_SHARED | LK_RETRY);
goto exec_fail_dealloc;
}
/* ABI enforces the use of Capsicum. Switch into capabilities mode. */
if (SV_PROC_FLAG(p, SV_CAPSICUM))
sys_cap_enter(td, NULL);
/*
* Copy out strings (args and env) and initialize stack base.
*/
error = (*p->p_sysent->sv_copyout_strings)(imgp, &stack_base);
if (error != 0) {
vn_lock(imgp->vp, LK_SHARED | LK_RETRY);
goto exec_fail_dealloc;
}
/*
* Stack setup.
*/
error = (*p->p_sysent->sv_fixup)(&stack_base, imgp);
if (error != 0) {
vn_lock(imgp->vp, LK_SHARED | LK_RETRY);
goto exec_fail_dealloc;
}
Implement CloudABI's exec() call. Summary: In a runtime that is purely based on capability-based security, there is a strong emphasis on how programs start their execution. We need to make sure that we execute an new program with an exact set of file descriptors, ensuring that credentials are not leaked into the process accidentally. Providing the right file descriptors is just half the problem. There also needs to be a framework in place that gives meaning to these file descriptors. How does a CloudABI mail server know which of the file descriptors corresponds to the socket that receives incoming emails? Furthermore, how will this mail server acquire its configuration parameters, as it cannot open a configuration file from a global path on disk? CloudABI solves this problem by replacing traditional string command line arguments by tree-like data structure consisting of scalars, sequences and mappings (similar to YAML/JSON). In this structure, file descriptors are treated as a first-class citizen. When calling exec(), file descriptors are passed on to the new executable if and only if they are referenced from this tree structure. See the cloudabi-run(1) man page for more details and examples (sysutils/cloudabi-utils). Fortunately, the kernel does not need to care about this tree structure at all. The C library is responsible for serializing and deserializing, but also for extracting the list of referenced file descriptors. The system call only receives a copy of the serialized data and a layout of what the new file descriptor table should look like: int proc_exec(int execfd, const void *data, size_t datalen, const int *fds, size_t fdslen); This change introduces a set of fd*_remapped() functions: - fdcopy_remapped() pulls a copy of a file descriptor table, remapping all of the file descriptors according to the provided mapping table. - fdinstall_remapped() replaces the file descriptor table of the process by the copy created by fdcopy_remapped(). - fdescfree_remapped() frees the table in case we aborted before fdinstall_remapped(). We then add a function exec_copyin_data_fds() that builds on top these functions. It copies in the data and constructs a new remapped file descriptor. This is used by cloudabi_sys_proc_exec(). Test Plan: cloudabi-run(1) is capable of spawning processes successfully, providing it data and file descriptors. procstat -f seems to confirm all is good. Regular FreeBSD processes also work properly. Reviewers: kib, mjg Reviewed By: mjg Subscribers: imp Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D3079
2015-07-16 07:05:42 +00:00
if (args->fdp != NULL) {
/* Install a brand new file descriptor table. */
fdinstall_remapped(td, args->fdp);
args->fdp = NULL;
} else {
/*
* Keep on using the existing file descriptor table. For
* security and other reasons, the file descriptor table
* cannot be shared after an exec.
*/
fdunshare(td);
/* close files on exec */
fdcloseexec(td);
}
/*
* Malloc things before we need locks.
*/
i = exec_args_get_begin_envv(imgp->args) - imgp->args->begin_argv;
/* Cache arguments if they fit inside our allowance */
if (ps_arg_cache_limit >= i + sizeof(struct pargs)) {
newargs = pargs_alloc(i);
bcopy(imgp->args->begin_argv, newargs->ar_args, i);
}
/*
* For security and other reasons, signal handlers cannot
2001-10-09 17:25:30 +00:00
* be shared after an exec. The new process gets a copy of the old
* handlers. In execsigs(), the new process will have its signals
* reset.
*/
if (sigacts_shared(p->p_sigacts)) {
oldsigacts = p->p_sigacts;
newsigacts = sigacts_alloc();
sigacts_copy(newsigacts, oldsigacts);
}
vn_lock(imgp->vp, LK_SHARED | LK_RETRY);
PROC_LOCK(p);
if (oldsigacts)
p->p_sigacts = newsigacts;
/* Stop profiling */
stopprofclock(p);
/* reset caught signals */
execsigs(p);
/* name this process - nameiexec(p, ndp) */
bzero(p->p_comm, sizeof(p->p_comm));
if (args->fname)
bcopy(nd.ni_cnd.cn_nameptr, p->p_comm,
min(nd.ni_cnd.cn_namelen, MAXCOMLEN));
else if (vn_commname(newtextvp, p->p_comm, sizeof(p->p_comm)) != 0)
bcopy(fexecv_proc_title, p->p_comm, sizeof(fexecv_proc_title));
bcopy(p->p_comm, td->td_name, sizeof(td->td_name));
#ifdef KTR
sched_clear_tdname(td);
#endif
1995-05-30 08:16:23 +00:00
/*
* mark as execed, wakeup the process that vforked (if any) and tell
* it that it now has its own resources back
*/
p->p_flag |= P_EXEC;
if ((p->p_flag2 & P2_NOTRACE_EXEC) == 0)
p->p_flag2 &= ~P2_NOTRACE;
if ((p->p_flag2 & P2_STKGAP_DISABLE_EXEC) == 0)
p->p_flag2 &= ~P2_STKGAP_DISABLE;
if (p->p_flag & P_PPWAIT) {
p->p_flag &= ~(P_PPWAIT | P_PPTRACE);
cv_broadcast(&p->p_pwait);
/* STOPs are no longer ignored, arrange for AST */
signotify(td);
}
1995-05-30 08:16:23 +00:00
/*
* Implement image setuid/setgid installation.
*/
if (imgp->credential_setid) {
/*
* Turn off syscall tracing for set-id programs, except for
* root. Record any set-id flags first to make sure that
* we do not regain any tracing during a possible block.
*/
setsugid(p);
#ifdef KTRACE
if (p->p_tracecred != NULL &&
priv_check_cred(p->p_tracecred, PRIV_DEBUG_DIFFCRED))
ktrprocexec(p, &tracecred, &tracevp);
#endif
/*
* Close any file descriptors 0..2 that reference procfs,
* then make sure file descriptors 0..2 are in use.
*
* Both fdsetugidsafety() and fdcheckstd() may call functions
* taking sleepable locks, so temporarily drop our locks.
*/
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
VOP_UNLOCK(imgp->vp);
fdsetugidsafety(td);
error = fdcheckstd(td);
vn_lock(imgp->vp, LK_SHARED | LK_RETRY);
if (error != 0)
goto exec_fail_dealloc;
PROC_LOCK(p);
#ifdef MAC
if (will_transition) {
mac_vnode_execve_transition(oldcred, imgp->newcred,
imgp->vp, interpvplabel, imgp);
}
#endif
} else {
o Merge contents of struct pcred into struct ucred. Specifically, add the real uid, saved uid, real gid, and saved gid to ucred, as well as the pcred->pc_uidinfo, which was associated with the real uid, only rename it to cr_ruidinfo so as not to conflict with cr_uidinfo, which corresponds to the effective uid. o Remove p_cred from struct proc; add p_ucred to struct proc, replacing original macro that pointed. p->p_ucred to p->p_cred->pc_ucred. o Universally update code so that it makes use of ucred instead of pcred, p->p_ucred instead of p->p_pcred, cr_ruidinfo instead of p_uidinfo, cr_{r,sv}{u,g}id instead of p_*, etc. o Remove pcred0 and its initialization from init_main.c; initialize cr_ruidinfo there. o Restruction many credential modification chunks to always crdup while we figure out locking and optimizations; generally speaking, this means moving to a structure like this: newcred = crdup(oldcred); ... p->p_ucred = newcred; crfree(oldcred); It's not race-free, but better than nothing. There are also races in sys_process.c, all inter-process authorization, fork, exec, and exit. o Remove sigio->sio_ruid since sigio->sio_ucred now contains the ruid; remove comments indicating that the old arrangement was a problem. o Restructure exec1() a little to use newcred/oldcred arrangement, and use improved uid management primitives. o Clean up exit1() so as to do less work in credential cleanup due to pcred removal. o Clean up fork1() so as to do less work in credential cleanup and allocation. o Clean up ktrcanset() to take into account changes, and move to using suser_xxx() instead of performing a direct uid==0 comparision. o Improve commenting in various kern_prot.c credential modification calls to better document current behavior. In a couple of places, current behavior is a little questionable and we need to check POSIX.1 to make sure it's "right". More commenting work still remains to be done. o Update credential management calls, such as crfree(), to take into account new ruidinfo reference. o Modify or add the following uid and gid helper routines: change_euid() change_egid() change_ruid() change_rgid() change_svuid() change_svgid() In each case, the call now acts on a credential not a process, and as such no longer requires more complicated process locking/etc. They now assume the caller will do any necessary allocation of an exclusive credential reference. Each is commented to document its reference requirements. o CANSIGIO() is simplified to require only credentials, not processes and pcreds. o Remove lots of (p_pcred==NULL) checks. o Add an XXX to authorization code in nfs_lock.c, since it's questionable, and needs to be considered carefully. o Simplify posix4 authorization code to require only credentials, not processes and pcreds. Note that this authorization, as well as CANSIGIO(), needs to be updated to use the p_cansignal() and p_cansched() centralized authorization routines, as they currently do not take into account some desirable restrictions that are handled by the centralized routines, as well as being inconsistent with other similar authorization instances. o Update libkvm to take these changes into account. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Reviewed by: green, bde, jhb, freebsd-arch, freebsd-audit
2001-05-25 16:59:11 +00:00
if (oldcred->cr_uid == oldcred->cr_ruid &&
oldcred->cr_gid == oldcred->cr_rgid)
p->p_flag &= ~P_SUGID;
o Merge contents of struct pcred into struct ucred. Specifically, add the real uid, saved uid, real gid, and saved gid to ucred, as well as the pcred->pc_uidinfo, which was associated with the real uid, only rename it to cr_ruidinfo so as not to conflict with cr_uidinfo, which corresponds to the effective uid. o Remove p_cred from struct proc; add p_ucred to struct proc, replacing original macro that pointed. p->p_ucred to p->p_cred->pc_ucred. o Universally update code so that it makes use of ucred instead of pcred, p->p_ucred instead of p->p_pcred, cr_ruidinfo instead of p_uidinfo, cr_{r,sv}{u,g}id instead of p_*, etc. o Remove pcred0 and its initialization from init_main.c; initialize cr_ruidinfo there. o Restruction many credential modification chunks to always crdup while we figure out locking and optimizations; generally speaking, this means moving to a structure like this: newcred = crdup(oldcred); ... p->p_ucred = newcred; crfree(oldcred); It's not race-free, but better than nothing. There are also races in sys_process.c, all inter-process authorization, fork, exec, and exit. o Remove sigio->sio_ruid since sigio->sio_ucred now contains the ruid; remove comments indicating that the old arrangement was a problem. o Restructure exec1() a little to use newcred/oldcred arrangement, and use improved uid management primitives. o Clean up exit1() so as to do less work in credential cleanup due to pcred removal. o Clean up fork1() so as to do less work in credential cleanup and allocation. o Clean up ktrcanset() to take into account changes, and move to using suser_xxx() instead of performing a direct uid==0 comparision. o Improve commenting in various kern_prot.c credential modification calls to better document current behavior. In a couple of places, current behavior is a little questionable and we need to check POSIX.1 to make sure it's "right". More commenting work still remains to be done. o Update credential management calls, such as crfree(), to take into account new ruidinfo reference. o Modify or add the following uid and gid helper routines: change_euid() change_egid() change_ruid() change_rgid() change_svuid() change_svgid() In each case, the call now acts on a credential not a process, and as such no longer requires more complicated process locking/etc. They now assume the caller will do any necessary allocation of an exclusive credential reference. Each is commented to document its reference requirements. o CANSIGIO() is simplified to require only credentials, not processes and pcreds. o Remove lots of (p_pcred==NULL) checks. o Add an XXX to authorization code in nfs_lock.c, since it's questionable, and needs to be considered carefully. o Simplify posix4 authorization code to require only credentials, not processes and pcreds. Note that this authorization, as well as CANSIGIO(), needs to be updated to use the p_cansignal() and p_cansched() centralized authorization routines, as they currently do not take into account some desirable restrictions that are handled by the centralized routines, as well as being inconsistent with other similar authorization instances. o Update libkvm to take these changes into account. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Reviewed by: green, bde, jhb, freebsd-arch, freebsd-audit
2001-05-25 16:59:11 +00:00
}
/*
* Set the new credentials.
*/
if (imgp->newcred != NULL) {
proc_set_cred(p, imgp->newcred);
crfree(oldcred);
oldcred = NULL;
}
/*
* Store the vp for use in procfs. This vnode was referenced by namei
* or fgetvp_exec.
*/
oldtextvp = p->p_textvp;
p->p_textvp = newtextvp;
#ifdef KDTRACE_HOOKS
/*
* Tell the DTrace fasttrap provider about the exec if it
* has declared an interest.
*/
if (dtrace_fasttrap_exec)
dtrace_fasttrap_exec(p);
#endif
/*
* Notify others that we exec'd, and clear the P_INEXEC flag
* as we're now a bona fide freshly-execed process.
*/
When filt_proc() removes event from the knlist due to the process exiting (NOTE_EXIT->knlist_remove_inevent()), two things happen: - knote kn_knlist pointer is reset - INFLUX knote is removed from the process knlist. And, there are two consequences: - KN_LIST_UNLOCK() on such knote is nop - there is nothing which would block exit1() from processing past the knlist_destroy() (and knlist_destroy() resets knlist lock pointers). Both consequences result either in leaked process lock, or dereferencing NULL function pointers for locking. Handle this by stopping embedding the process knlist into struct proc. Instead, the knlist is allocated together with struct proc, but marked as autodestroy on the zombie reap, by knlist_detach() function. The knlist is freed when last kevent is removed from the list, in particular, at the zombie reap time if the list is empty. As result, the knlist_remove_inevent() is no longer needed and removed. Other changes: In filt_procattach(), clear NOTE_EXEC and NOTE_FORK desired events from kn_sfflags for knote registered by kernel to only get NOTE_CHILD notifications. The flags leak resulted in excessive NOTE_EXEC/NOTE_FORK reports. Fix immediate note activation in filt_procattach(). Condition should be either the immediate CHILD_NOTE activation, or immediate NOTE_EXIT report for the exiting process. In knote_fork(), do not perform racy check for KN_INFLUX before kq lock is taken. Besides being racy, it did not accounted for notes just added by scan (KN_SCAN). Some minor and incomplete style fixes. Analyzed and tested by: Eric Badger <eric@badgerio.us> Reviewed by: jhb Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation MFC after: 2 weeks Approved by: re (gjb) Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D6859
2016-06-27 21:52:17 +00:00
KNOTE_LOCKED(p->p_klist, NOTE_EXEC);
p->p_flag &= ~P_INEXEC;
/* clear "fork but no exec" flag, as we _are_ execing */
p->p_acflag &= ~AFORK;
/*
2005-10-04 04:02:33 +00:00
* Free any previous argument cache and replace it with
* the new argument cache, if any.
*/
oldargs = p->p_args;
p->p_args = newargs;
newargs = NULL;
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
#ifdef HWPMC_HOOKS
/*
* Check if system-wide sampling is in effect or if the
* current process is using PMCs. If so, do exec() time
* processing. This processing needs to happen AFTER the
* P_INEXEC flag is cleared.
*/
if (PMC_SYSTEM_SAMPLING_ACTIVE() || PMC_PROC_IS_USING_PMCS(p)) {
VOP_UNLOCK(imgp->vp);
pe.pm_credentialschanged = credential_changing;
pe.pm_entryaddr = imgp->entry_addr;
PMC_CALL_HOOK_X(td, PMC_FN_PROCESS_EXEC, (void *) &pe);
vn_lock(imgp->vp, LK_SHARED | LK_RETRY);
}
#endif
/* Set values passed into the program in registers. */
(*p->p_sysent->sv_setregs)(td, imgp, stack_base);
VOP_MMAPPED(imgp->vp);
SDT_PROBE1(proc, , , exec__success, args->fname);
exec_fail_dealloc:
if (error != 0) {
p->p_osrel = orig_osrel;
p->p_fctl0 = orig_fctl0;
}
if (imgp->firstpage != NULL)
exec_unmap_first_page(imgp);
if (imgp->vp != NULL) {
if (args->fname)
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
if (imgp->opened)
VOP_CLOSE(imgp->vp, FREAD, td->td_ucred, td);
Switch to use shared vnode locks for text files during image activation. kern_execve() locks text vnode exclusive to be able to set and clear VV_TEXT flag. VV_TEXT is mutually exclusive with the v_writecount > 0 condition. The change removes VV_TEXT, replacing it with the condition v_writecount <= -1, and puts v_writecount under the vnode interlock. Each text reference decrements v_writecount. To clear the text reference when the segment is unmapped, it is recorded in the vm_map_entry backed by the text file as MAP_ENTRY_VN_TEXT flag, and v_writecount is incremented on the map entry removal The operations like VOP_ADD_WRITECOUNT() and VOP_SET_TEXT() check that v_writecount does not contradict the desired change. vn_writecheck() is now racy and its use was eliminated everywhere except access. Atomic check for writeability and increment of v_writecount is performed by the VOP. vn_truncate() now increments v_writecount around VOP_SETATTR() call, lack of which is arguably a bug on its own. nullfs bypasses v_writecount to the lower vnode always, so nullfs vnode has its own v_writecount correct, and lower vnode gets all references, since object->handle is always lower vnode. On the text vnode' vm object dealloc, the v_writecount value is reset to zero, and deadfs vop_unset_text short-circuit the operation. Reclamation of lowervp always reclaims all nullfs vnodes referencing lowervp first, so no stray references are left. Reviewed by: markj, trasz Tested by: mjg, pho Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation MFC after: 1 month Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D19923
2019-05-05 11:20:43 +00:00
if (imgp->textset)
VOP_UNSET_TEXT_CHECKED(imgp->vp);
if (error != 0)
vput(imgp->vp);
else
VOP_UNLOCK(imgp->vp);
}
if (imgp->object != NULL)
vm_object_deallocate(imgp->object);
free(imgp->freepath, M_TEMP);
if (error == 0) {
if (p->p_ptevents & PTRACE_EXEC) {
PROC_LOCK(p);
if (p->p_ptevents & PTRACE_EXEC)
td->td_dbgflags |= TDB_EXEC;
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
}
} else {
exec_fail:
/* we're done here, clear P_INEXEC */
PROC_LOCK(p);
p->p_flag &= ~P_INEXEC;
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
SDT_PROBE1(proc, , , exec__failure, error);
}
if (imgp->newcred != NULL && oldcred != NULL)
crfree(imgp->newcred);
#ifdef MAC
mac_execve_exit(imgp);
mac_execve_interpreter_exit(interpvplabel);
#endif
exec_free_args(args);
/*
* Handle deferred decrement of ref counts.
*/
if (oldtextvp != NULL)
vrele(oldtextvp);
#ifdef KTRACE
if (tracevp != NULL)
vrele(tracevp);
if (tracecred != NULL)
crfree(tracecred);
#endif
pargs_drop(oldargs);
pargs_drop(newargs);
if (oldsigacts != NULL)
sigacts_free(oldsigacts);
if (euip != NULL)
uifree(euip);
if (error && imgp->vmspace_destroyed) {
/* sorry, no more process anymore. exit gracefully */
exit1(td, 0, SIGABRT);
/* NOT REACHED */
}
#ifdef KTRACE
if (error == 0)
ktrprocctor(p);
#endif
/*
* We don't want cpu_set_syscall_retval() to overwrite any of
* the register values put in place by exec_setregs().
* Implementations of cpu_set_syscall_retval() will leave
* registers unmodified when returning EJUSTRETURN.
*/
return (error == 0 ? EJUSTRETURN : error);
}
int
2018-06-01 13:26:45 +00:00
exec_map_first_page(struct image_params *imgp)
{
vm_object_t object;
vm_page_t m;
int error;
if (imgp->firstpage != NULL)
exec_unmap_first_page(imgp);
object = imgp->vp->v_object;
if (object == NULL)
return (EACCES);
#if VM_NRESERVLEVEL > 0
if ((object->flags & OBJ_COLORED) == 0) {
VM_OBJECT_WLOCK(object);
vm_object_color(object, 0);
VM_OBJECT_WUNLOCK(object);
}
#endif
error = vm_page_grab_valid_unlocked(&m, object, 0,
VM_ALLOC_COUNT(VM_INITIAL_PAGEIN) |
VM_ALLOC_NORMAL | VM_ALLOC_NOBUSY | VM_ALLOC_WIRED);
if (error != VM_PAGER_OK)
return (EIO);
imgp->firstpage = sf_buf_alloc(m, 0);
imgp->image_header = (char *)sf_buf_kva(imgp->firstpage);
return (0);
}
void
exec_unmap_first_page(struct image_params *imgp)
{
vm_page_t m;
if (imgp->firstpage != NULL) {
m = sf_buf_page(imgp->firstpage);
sf_buf_free(imgp->firstpage);
imgp->firstpage = NULL;
vm_page_unwire(m, PQ_ACTIVE);
}
}
/*
* Destroy old address space, and allocate a new stack.
* The new stack is only sgrowsiz large because it is grown
* automatically on a page fault.
*/
int
exec_new_vmspace(struct image_params *imgp, struct sysentvec *sv)
{
int error;
struct proc *p = imgp->proc;
struct vmspace *vmspace = p->p_vmspace;
struct thread *td = curthread;
vm_object_t obj;
struct rlimit rlim_stack;
vm_offset_t sv_minuser, stack_addr;
vm_map_t map;
u_long ssiz;
imgp->vmspace_destroyed = 1;
imgp->sysent = sv;
sigfastblock_clear(td);
/* May be called with Giant held */
EVENTHANDLER_DIRECT_INVOKE(process_exec, p, imgp);
/*
* Blow away entire process VM, if address space not shared,
* otherwise, create a new VM space so that other threads are
* not disrupted
*/
map = &vmspace->vm_map;
if (map_at_zero)
sv_minuser = sv->sv_minuser;
else
sv_minuser = MAX(sv->sv_minuser, PAGE_SIZE);
if (vmspace->vm_refcnt == 1 && vm_map_min(map) == sv_minuser &&
vm_map_max(map) == sv->sv_maxuser &&
cpu_exec_vmspace_reuse(p, map)) {
shmexit(vmspace);
pmap_remove_pages(vmspace_pmap(vmspace));
vm_map_remove(map, vm_map_min(map), vm_map_max(map));
Implement Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) With this change, randomization can be enabled for all non-fixed mappings. It means that the base address for the mapping is selected with a guaranteed amount of entropy (bits). If the mapping was requested to be superpage aligned, the randomization honours the superpage attributes. Although the value of ASLR is diminshing over time as exploit authors work out simple ASLR bypass techniques, it elimintates the trivial exploitation of certain vulnerabilities, at least in theory. This implementation is relatively small and happens at the correct architectural level. Also, it is not expected to introduce regressions in existing cases when turned off (default for now), or cause any significant maintaince burden. The randomization is done on a best-effort basis - that is, the allocator falls back to a first fit strategy if fragmentation prevents entropy injection. It is trivial to implement a strong mode where failure to guarantee the requested amount of entropy results in mapping request failure, but I do not consider that to be usable. I have not fine-tuned the amount of entropy injected right now. It is only a quantitive change that will not change the implementation. The current amount is controlled by aslr_pages_rnd. To not spoil coalescing optimizations, to reduce the page table fragmentation inherent to ASLR, and to keep the transient superpage promotion for the malloced memory, locality clustering is implemented for anonymous private mappings, which are automatically grouped until fragmentation kicks in. The initial location for the anon group range is, of course, randomized. This is controlled by vm.cluster_anon, enabled by default. The default mode keeps the sbrk area unpopulated by other mappings, but this can be turned off, which gives much more breathing bits on architectures with small address space, such as i386. This is tied with the question of following an application's hint about the mmap(2) base address. Testing shows that ignoring the hint does not affect the function of common applications, but I would expect more demanding code could break. By default sbrk is preserved and mmap hints are satisfied, which can be changed by using the kern.elf{32,64}.aslr.honor_sbrk sysctl. ASLR is enabled on per-ABI basis, and currently it is only allowed on FreeBSD native i386 and amd64 (including compat 32bit) ABIs. Support for additional architectures will be added after further testing. Both per-process and per-image controls are implemented: - procctl(2) adds PROC_ASLR_CTL/PROC_ASLR_STATUS; - NT_FREEBSD_FCTL_ASLR_DISABLE feature control note bit makes it possible to force ASLR off for the given binary. (A tool to edit the feature control note is in development.) Global controls are: - kern.elf{32,64}.aslr.enable - for non-fixed mappings done by mmap(2); - kern.elf{32,64}.aslr.pie_enable - for PIE image activation mappings; - kern.elf{32,64}.aslr.honor_sbrk - allow to use sbrk area for mmap(2); - vm.cluster_anon - enables anon mapping clustering. PR: 208580 (exp runs) Exp-runs done by: antoine Reviewed by: markj (previous version) Discussed with: emaste Tested by: pho MFC after: 1 month Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D5603
2019-02-10 17:19:45 +00:00
/*
* An exec terminates mlockall(MCL_FUTURE), ASLR state
* must be re-evaluated.
*/
vm_map_lock(map);
Implement Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) With this change, randomization can be enabled for all non-fixed mappings. It means that the base address for the mapping is selected with a guaranteed amount of entropy (bits). If the mapping was requested to be superpage aligned, the randomization honours the superpage attributes. Although the value of ASLR is diminshing over time as exploit authors work out simple ASLR bypass techniques, it elimintates the trivial exploitation of certain vulnerabilities, at least in theory. This implementation is relatively small and happens at the correct architectural level. Also, it is not expected to introduce regressions in existing cases when turned off (default for now), or cause any significant maintaince burden. The randomization is done on a best-effort basis - that is, the allocator falls back to a first fit strategy if fragmentation prevents entropy injection. It is trivial to implement a strong mode where failure to guarantee the requested amount of entropy results in mapping request failure, but I do not consider that to be usable. I have not fine-tuned the amount of entropy injected right now. It is only a quantitive change that will not change the implementation. The current amount is controlled by aslr_pages_rnd. To not spoil coalescing optimizations, to reduce the page table fragmentation inherent to ASLR, and to keep the transient superpage promotion for the malloced memory, locality clustering is implemented for anonymous private mappings, which are automatically grouped until fragmentation kicks in. The initial location for the anon group range is, of course, randomized. This is controlled by vm.cluster_anon, enabled by default. The default mode keeps the sbrk area unpopulated by other mappings, but this can be turned off, which gives much more breathing bits on architectures with small address space, such as i386. This is tied with the question of following an application's hint about the mmap(2) base address. Testing shows that ignoring the hint does not affect the function of common applications, but I would expect more demanding code could break. By default sbrk is preserved and mmap hints are satisfied, which can be changed by using the kern.elf{32,64}.aslr.honor_sbrk sysctl. ASLR is enabled on per-ABI basis, and currently it is only allowed on FreeBSD native i386 and amd64 (including compat 32bit) ABIs. Support for additional architectures will be added after further testing. Both per-process and per-image controls are implemented: - procctl(2) adds PROC_ASLR_CTL/PROC_ASLR_STATUS; - NT_FREEBSD_FCTL_ASLR_DISABLE feature control note bit makes it possible to force ASLR off for the given binary. (A tool to edit the feature control note is in development.) Global controls are: - kern.elf{32,64}.aslr.enable - for non-fixed mappings done by mmap(2); - kern.elf{32,64}.aslr.pie_enable - for PIE image activation mappings; - kern.elf{32,64}.aslr.honor_sbrk - allow to use sbrk area for mmap(2); - vm.cluster_anon - enables anon mapping clustering. PR: 208580 (exp runs) Exp-runs done by: antoine Reviewed by: markj (previous version) Discussed with: emaste Tested by: pho MFC after: 1 month Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D5603
2019-02-10 17:19:45 +00:00
vm_map_modflags(map, 0, MAP_WIREFUTURE | MAP_ASLR |
MAP_ASLR_IGNSTART);
vm_map_unlock(map);
} else {
error = vmspace_exec(p, sv_minuser, sv->sv_maxuser);
if (error)
return (error);
vmspace = p->p_vmspace;
map = &vmspace->vm_map;
}
Implement Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) With this change, randomization can be enabled for all non-fixed mappings. It means that the base address for the mapping is selected with a guaranteed amount of entropy (bits). If the mapping was requested to be superpage aligned, the randomization honours the superpage attributes. Although the value of ASLR is diminshing over time as exploit authors work out simple ASLR bypass techniques, it elimintates the trivial exploitation of certain vulnerabilities, at least in theory. This implementation is relatively small and happens at the correct architectural level. Also, it is not expected to introduce regressions in existing cases when turned off (default for now), or cause any significant maintaince burden. The randomization is done on a best-effort basis - that is, the allocator falls back to a first fit strategy if fragmentation prevents entropy injection. It is trivial to implement a strong mode where failure to guarantee the requested amount of entropy results in mapping request failure, but I do not consider that to be usable. I have not fine-tuned the amount of entropy injected right now. It is only a quantitive change that will not change the implementation. The current amount is controlled by aslr_pages_rnd. To not spoil coalescing optimizations, to reduce the page table fragmentation inherent to ASLR, and to keep the transient superpage promotion for the malloced memory, locality clustering is implemented for anonymous private mappings, which are automatically grouped until fragmentation kicks in. The initial location for the anon group range is, of course, randomized. This is controlled by vm.cluster_anon, enabled by default. The default mode keeps the sbrk area unpopulated by other mappings, but this can be turned off, which gives much more breathing bits on architectures with small address space, such as i386. This is tied with the question of following an application's hint about the mmap(2) base address. Testing shows that ignoring the hint does not affect the function of common applications, but I would expect more demanding code could break. By default sbrk is preserved and mmap hints are satisfied, which can be changed by using the kern.elf{32,64}.aslr.honor_sbrk sysctl. ASLR is enabled on per-ABI basis, and currently it is only allowed on FreeBSD native i386 and amd64 (including compat 32bit) ABIs. Support for additional architectures will be added after further testing. Both per-process and per-image controls are implemented: - procctl(2) adds PROC_ASLR_CTL/PROC_ASLR_STATUS; - NT_FREEBSD_FCTL_ASLR_DISABLE feature control note bit makes it possible to force ASLR off for the given binary. (A tool to edit the feature control note is in development.) Global controls are: - kern.elf{32,64}.aslr.enable - for non-fixed mappings done by mmap(2); - kern.elf{32,64}.aslr.pie_enable - for PIE image activation mappings; - kern.elf{32,64}.aslr.honor_sbrk - allow to use sbrk area for mmap(2); - vm.cluster_anon - enables anon mapping clustering. PR: 208580 (exp runs) Exp-runs done by: antoine Reviewed by: markj (previous version) Discussed with: emaste Tested by: pho MFC after: 1 month Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D5603
2019-02-10 17:19:45 +00:00
map->flags |= imgp->map_flags;
/* Map a shared page */
obj = sv->sv_shared_page_obj;
if (obj != NULL) {
vm_object_reference(obj);
error = vm_map_fixed(map, obj, 0,
sv->sv_shared_page_base, sv->sv_shared_page_len,
VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_EXECUTE,
VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_EXECUTE,
MAP_INHERIT_SHARE | MAP_ACC_NO_CHARGE);
if (error != KERN_SUCCESS) {
vm_object_deallocate(obj);
return (vm_mmap_to_errno(error));
}
}
/* Allocate a new stack */
if (imgp->stack_sz != 0) {
ssiz = trunc_page(imgp->stack_sz);
PROC_LOCK(p);
lim_rlimit_proc(p, RLIMIT_STACK, &rlim_stack);
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
if (ssiz > rlim_stack.rlim_max)
ssiz = rlim_stack.rlim_max;
if (ssiz > rlim_stack.rlim_cur) {
rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ssiz;
kern_setrlimit(curthread, RLIMIT_STACK, &rlim_stack);
}
} else if (sv->sv_maxssiz != NULL) {
ssiz = *sv->sv_maxssiz;
} else {
ssiz = maxssiz;
}
imgp->eff_stack_sz = lim_cur(curthread, RLIMIT_STACK);
if (ssiz < imgp->eff_stack_sz)
imgp->eff_stack_sz = ssiz;
stack_addr = sv->sv_usrstack - ssiz;
error = vm_map_stack(map, stack_addr, (vm_size_t)ssiz,
obj != NULL && imgp->stack_prot != 0 ? imgp->stack_prot :
sv->sv_stackprot, VM_PROT_ALL, MAP_STACK_GROWS_DOWN);
if (error != KERN_SUCCESS)
return (vm_mmap_to_errno(error));
/*
* vm_ssize and vm_maxsaddr are somewhat antiquated concepts, but they
* are still used to enforce the stack rlimit on the process stack.
*/
vmspace->vm_ssize = sgrowsiz >> PAGE_SHIFT;
vmspace->vm_maxsaddr = (char *)stack_addr;
return (0);
}
/*
* Copy out argument and environment strings from the old process address
* space into the temporary string buffer.
*/
int
exec_copyin_args(struct image_args *args, const char *fname,
enum uio_seg segflg, char **argv, char **envv)
{
u_long arg, env;
int error;
bzero(args, sizeof(*args));
if (argv == NULL)
return (EFAULT);
/*
* Allocate demand-paged memory for the file name, argument, and
* environment strings.
*/
error = exec_alloc_args(args);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
/*
* Copy the file name.
*/
error = exec_args_add_fname(args, fname, segflg);
if (error != 0)
goto err_exit;
/*
* extract arguments first
*/
for (;;) {
error = fueword(argv++, &arg);
if (error == -1) {
error = EFAULT;
goto err_exit;
}
if (arg == 0)
break;
error = exec_args_add_arg(args, (char *)(uintptr_t)arg,
UIO_USERSPACE);
if (error != 0)
goto err_exit;
}
/*
* extract environment strings
*/
if (envv) {
for (;;) {
error = fueword(envv++, &env);
if (error == -1) {
error = EFAULT;
goto err_exit;
}
if (env == 0)
break;
error = exec_args_add_env(args,
(char *)(uintptr_t)env, UIO_USERSPACE);
if (error != 0)
goto err_exit;
}
}
return (0);
err_exit:
exec_free_args(args);
return (error);
}
Implement CloudABI's exec() call. Summary: In a runtime that is purely based on capability-based security, there is a strong emphasis on how programs start their execution. We need to make sure that we execute an new program with an exact set of file descriptors, ensuring that credentials are not leaked into the process accidentally. Providing the right file descriptors is just half the problem. There also needs to be a framework in place that gives meaning to these file descriptors. How does a CloudABI mail server know which of the file descriptors corresponds to the socket that receives incoming emails? Furthermore, how will this mail server acquire its configuration parameters, as it cannot open a configuration file from a global path on disk? CloudABI solves this problem by replacing traditional string command line arguments by tree-like data structure consisting of scalars, sequences and mappings (similar to YAML/JSON). In this structure, file descriptors are treated as a first-class citizen. When calling exec(), file descriptors are passed on to the new executable if and only if they are referenced from this tree structure. See the cloudabi-run(1) man page for more details and examples (sysutils/cloudabi-utils). Fortunately, the kernel does not need to care about this tree structure at all. The C library is responsible for serializing and deserializing, but also for extracting the list of referenced file descriptors. The system call only receives a copy of the serialized data and a layout of what the new file descriptor table should look like: int proc_exec(int execfd, const void *data, size_t datalen, const int *fds, size_t fdslen); This change introduces a set of fd*_remapped() functions: - fdcopy_remapped() pulls a copy of a file descriptor table, remapping all of the file descriptors according to the provided mapping table. - fdinstall_remapped() replaces the file descriptor table of the process by the copy created by fdcopy_remapped(). - fdescfree_remapped() frees the table in case we aborted before fdinstall_remapped(). We then add a function exec_copyin_data_fds() that builds on top these functions. It copies in the data and constructs a new remapped file descriptor. This is used by cloudabi_sys_proc_exec(). Test Plan: cloudabi-run(1) is capable of spawning processes successfully, providing it data and file descriptors. procstat -f seems to confirm all is good. Regular FreeBSD processes also work properly. Reviewers: kib, mjg Reviewed By: mjg Subscribers: imp Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D3079
2015-07-16 07:05:42 +00:00
int
exec_copyin_data_fds(struct thread *td, struct image_args *args,
const void *data, size_t datalen, const int *fds, size_t fdslen)
{
struct filedesc *ofdp;
const char *p;
int *kfds;
int error;
memset(args, '\0', sizeof(*args));
ofdp = td->td_proc->p_fd;
if (datalen >= ARG_MAX || fdslen > ofdp->fd_lastfile + 1)
return (E2BIG);
error = exec_alloc_args(args);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
args->begin_argv = args->buf;
args->stringspace = ARG_MAX;
if (datalen > 0) {
/*
* Argument buffer has been provided. Copy it into the
* kernel as a single string and add a terminating null
* byte.
*/
error = copyin(data, args->begin_argv, datalen);
if (error != 0)
goto err_exit;
args->begin_argv[datalen] = '\0';
args->endp = args->begin_argv + datalen + 1;
args->stringspace -= datalen + 1;
/*
* Traditional argument counting. Count the number of
* null bytes.
*/
for (p = args->begin_argv; p < args->endp; ++p)
if (*p == '\0')
++args->argc;
} else {
/* No argument buffer provided. */
args->endp = args->begin_argv;
}
/* Create new file descriptor table. */
kfds = malloc(fdslen * sizeof(int), M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
error = copyin(fds, kfds, fdslen * sizeof(int));
if (error != 0) {
free(kfds, M_TEMP);
goto err_exit;
}
error = fdcopy_remapped(ofdp, kfds, fdslen, &args->fdp);
free(kfds, M_TEMP);
if (error != 0)
goto err_exit;
return (0);
err_exit:
exec_free_args(args);
return (error);
}
struct exec_args_kva {
vm_offset_t addr;
u_int gen;
SLIST_ENTRY(exec_args_kva) next;
};
DPCPU_DEFINE_STATIC(struct exec_args_kva *, exec_args_kva);
static SLIST_HEAD(, exec_args_kva) exec_args_kva_freelist;
static struct mtx exec_args_kva_mtx;
static u_int exec_args_gen;
static void
exec_prealloc_args_kva(void *arg __unused)
{
struct exec_args_kva *argkva;
u_int i;
SLIST_INIT(&exec_args_kva_freelist);
mtx_init(&exec_args_kva_mtx, "exec args kva", NULL, MTX_DEF);
for (i = 0; i < exec_map_entries; i++) {
argkva = malloc(sizeof(*argkva), M_PARGS, M_WAITOK);
argkva->addr = kmap_alloc_wait(exec_map, exec_map_entry_size);
argkva->gen = exec_args_gen;
SLIST_INSERT_HEAD(&exec_args_kva_freelist, argkva, next);
}
}
SYSINIT(exec_args_kva, SI_SUB_EXEC, SI_ORDER_ANY, exec_prealloc_args_kva, NULL);
static vm_offset_t
exec_alloc_args_kva(void **cookie)
{
struct exec_args_kva *argkva;
argkva = (void *)atomic_readandclear_ptr(
(uintptr_t *)DPCPU_PTR(exec_args_kva));
if (argkva == NULL) {
mtx_lock(&exec_args_kva_mtx);
while ((argkva = SLIST_FIRST(&exec_args_kva_freelist)) == NULL)
(void)mtx_sleep(&exec_args_kva_freelist,
&exec_args_kva_mtx, 0, "execkva", 0);
SLIST_REMOVE_HEAD(&exec_args_kva_freelist, next);
mtx_unlock(&exec_args_kva_mtx);
}
*(struct exec_args_kva **)cookie = argkva;
return (argkva->addr);
}
static void
exec_release_args_kva(struct exec_args_kva *argkva, u_int gen)
{
vm_offset_t base;
base = argkva->addr;
if (argkva->gen != gen) {
(void)vm_map_madvise(exec_map, base, base + exec_map_entry_size,
MADV_FREE);
argkva->gen = gen;
}
if (!atomic_cmpset_ptr((uintptr_t *)DPCPU_PTR(exec_args_kva),
(uintptr_t)NULL, (uintptr_t)argkva)) {
mtx_lock(&exec_args_kva_mtx);
SLIST_INSERT_HEAD(&exec_args_kva_freelist, argkva, next);
wakeup_one(&exec_args_kva_freelist);
mtx_unlock(&exec_args_kva_mtx);
}
}
static void
exec_free_args_kva(void *cookie)
{
exec_release_args_kva(cookie, exec_args_gen);
}
static void
exec_args_kva_lowmem(void *arg __unused)
{
SLIST_HEAD(, exec_args_kva) head;
struct exec_args_kva *argkva;
u_int gen;
int i;
gen = atomic_fetchadd_int(&exec_args_gen, 1) + 1;
/*
* Force an madvise of each KVA range. Any currently allocated ranges
* will have MADV_FREE applied once they are freed.
*/
SLIST_INIT(&head);
mtx_lock(&exec_args_kva_mtx);
SLIST_SWAP(&head, &exec_args_kva_freelist, exec_args_kva);
mtx_unlock(&exec_args_kva_mtx);
while ((argkva = SLIST_FIRST(&head)) != NULL) {
SLIST_REMOVE_HEAD(&head, next);
exec_release_args_kva(argkva, gen);
}
CPU_FOREACH(i) {
argkva = (void *)atomic_readandclear_ptr(
(uintptr_t *)DPCPU_ID_PTR(i, exec_args_kva));
if (argkva != NULL)
exec_release_args_kva(argkva, gen);
}
}
EVENTHANDLER_DEFINE(vm_lowmem, exec_args_kva_lowmem, NULL,
EVENTHANDLER_PRI_ANY);
/*
* Allocate temporary demand-paged, zero-filled memory for the file name,
* argument, and environment strings.
*/
int
exec_alloc_args(struct image_args *args)
{
args->buf = (char *)exec_alloc_args_kva(&args->bufkva);
return (0);
}
void
exec_free_args(struct image_args *args)
{
if (args->buf != NULL) {
exec_free_args_kva(args->bufkva);
args->buf = NULL;
}
if (args->fname_buf != NULL) {
free(args->fname_buf, M_TEMP);
args->fname_buf = NULL;
}
Implement CloudABI's exec() call. Summary: In a runtime that is purely based on capability-based security, there is a strong emphasis on how programs start their execution. We need to make sure that we execute an new program with an exact set of file descriptors, ensuring that credentials are not leaked into the process accidentally. Providing the right file descriptors is just half the problem. There also needs to be a framework in place that gives meaning to these file descriptors. How does a CloudABI mail server know which of the file descriptors corresponds to the socket that receives incoming emails? Furthermore, how will this mail server acquire its configuration parameters, as it cannot open a configuration file from a global path on disk? CloudABI solves this problem by replacing traditional string command line arguments by tree-like data structure consisting of scalars, sequences and mappings (similar to YAML/JSON). In this structure, file descriptors are treated as a first-class citizen. When calling exec(), file descriptors are passed on to the new executable if and only if they are referenced from this tree structure. See the cloudabi-run(1) man page for more details and examples (sysutils/cloudabi-utils). Fortunately, the kernel does not need to care about this tree structure at all. The C library is responsible for serializing and deserializing, but also for extracting the list of referenced file descriptors. The system call only receives a copy of the serialized data and a layout of what the new file descriptor table should look like: int proc_exec(int execfd, const void *data, size_t datalen, const int *fds, size_t fdslen); This change introduces a set of fd*_remapped() functions: - fdcopy_remapped() pulls a copy of a file descriptor table, remapping all of the file descriptors according to the provided mapping table. - fdinstall_remapped() replaces the file descriptor table of the process by the copy created by fdcopy_remapped(). - fdescfree_remapped() frees the table in case we aborted before fdinstall_remapped(). We then add a function exec_copyin_data_fds() that builds on top these functions. It copies in the data and constructs a new remapped file descriptor. This is used by cloudabi_sys_proc_exec(). Test Plan: cloudabi-run(1) is capable of spawning processes successfully, providing it data and file descriptors. procstat -f seems to confirm all is good. Regular FreeBSD processes also work properly. Reviewers: kib, mjg Reviewed By: mjg Subscribers: imp Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D3079
2015-07-16 07:05:42 +00:00
if (args->fdp != NULL)
fdescfree_remapped(args->fdp);
}
/*
* A set to functions to fill struct image args.
*
* NOTE: exec_args_add_fname() must be called (possibly with a NULL
* fname) before the other functions. All exec_args_add_arg() calls must
* be made before any exec_args_add_env() calls. exec_args_adjust_args()
* may be called any time after exec_args_add_fname().
*
* exec_args_add_fname() - install path to be executed
* exec_args_add_arg() - append an argument string
* exec_args_add_env() - append an env string
* exec_args_adjust_args() - adjust location of the argument list to
* allow new arguments to be prepended
*/
int
exec_args_add_fname(struct image_args *args, const char *fname,
enum uio_seg segflg)
{
int error;
size_t length;
KASSERT(args->fname == NULL, ("fname already appended"));
KASSERT(args->endp == NULL, ("already appending to args"));
if (fname != NULL) {
args->fname = args->buf;
error = segflg == UIO_SYSSPACE ?
copystr(fname, args->fname, PATH_MAX, &length) :
copyinstr(fname, args->fname, PATH_MAX, &length);
if (error != 0)
return (error == ENAMETOOLONG ? E2BIG : error);
} else
length = 0;
/* Set up for _arg_*()/_env_*() */
args->endp = args->buf + length;
/* begin_argv must be set and kept updated */
args->begin_argv = args->endp;
KASSERT(exec_map_entry_size - length >= ARG_MAX,
("too little space remaining for arguments %zu < %zu",
exec_map_entry_size - length, (size_t)ARG_MAX));
args->stringspace = ARG_MAX;
return (0);
}
static int
exec_args_add_str(struct image_args *args, const char *str,
enum uio_seg segflg, int *countp)
{
int error;
size_t length;
KASSERT(args->endp != NULL, ("endp not initialized"));
KASSERT(args->begin_argv != NULL, ("begin_argp not initialized"));
error = (segflg == UIO_SYSSPACE) ?
copystr(str, args->endp, args->stringspace, &length) :
copyinstr(str, args->endp, args->stringspace, &length);
if (error != 0)
return (error == ENAMETOOLONG ? E2BIG : error);
args->stringspace -= length;
args->endp += length;
(*countp)++;
return (0);
}
int
exec_args_add_arg(struct image_args *args, const char *argp,
enum uio_seg segflg)
{
KASSERT(args->envc == 0, ("appending args after env"));
return (exec_args_add_str(args, argp, segflg, &args->argc));
}
int
exec_args_add_env(struct image_args *args, const char *envp,
enum uio_seg segflg)
{
if (args->envc == 0)
args->begin_envv = args->endp;
return (exec_args_add_str(args, envp, segflg, &args->envc));
}
int
exec_args_adjust_args(struct image_args *args, size_t consume, ssize_t extend)
{
ssize_t offset;
KASSERT(args->endp != NULL, ("endp not initialized"));
KASSERT(args->begin_argv != NULL, ("begin_argp not initialized"));
offset = extend - consume;
if (args->stringspace < offset)
return (E2BIG);
memmove(args->begin_argv + extend, args->begin_argv + consume,
args->endp - args->begin_argv + consume);
if (args->envc > 0)
args->begin_envv += offset;
args->endp += offset;
args->stringspace -= offset;
return (0);
}
char *
exec_args_get_begin_envv(struct image_args *args)
{
KASSERT(args->endp != NULL, ("endp not initialized"));
if (args->envc > 0)
return (args->begin_envv);
return (args->endp);
}
/*
* Copy strings out to the new process address space, constructing new arg
* and env vector tables. Return a pointer to the base so that it can be used
* as the initial stack pointer.
*/
int
exec_copyout_strings(struct image_params *imgp, uintptr_t *stack_base)
{
int argc, envc;
char **vectp;
char *stringp;
uintptr_t destp, ustringp;
struct ps_strings *arginfo;
struct proc *p;
size_t execpath_len;
int error, szsigcode, szps;
char canary[sizeof(long) * 8];
szps = sizeof(pagesizes[0]) * MAXPAGESIZES;
/*
* Calculate string base and vector table pointers.
Mega-commit for Linux emulator update.. This has been stress tested under netscape-2.0 for Linux running all the Java stuff. The scrollbars are now working, at least on my machine. (whew! :-) I'm uncomfortable with the size of this commit, but it's too inter-dependant to easily seperate out. The main changes: COMPAT_LINUX is *GONE*. Most of the code has been moved out of the i386 machine dependent section into the linux emulator itself. The int 0x80 syscall code was almost identical to the lcall 7,0 code and a minor tweak allows them to both be used with the same C code. All kernels can now just modload the lkm and it'll DTRT without having to rebuild the kernel first. Like IBCS2, you can statically compile it in with "options LINUX". A pile of new syscalls implemented, including getdents(), llseek(), readv(), writev(), msync(), personality(). The Linux-ELF libraries want to use some of these. linux_select() now obeys Linux semantics, ie: returns the time remaining of the timeout value rather than leaving it the original value. Quite a few bugs removed, including incorrect arguments being used in syscalls.. eg: mixups between passing the sigset as an int, vs passing it as a pointer and doing a copyin(), missing return values, unhandled cases, SIOC* ioctls, etc. The build for the code has changed. i386/conf/files now knows how to build linux_genassym and generate linux_assym.h on the fly. Supporting changes elsewhere in the kernel: The user-mode signal trampoline has moved from the U area to immediately below the top of the stack (below PS_STRINGS). This allows the different binary emulations to have their own signal trampoline code (which gets rid of the hardwired syscall 103 (sigreturn on BSD, syslog on Linux)) and so that the emulator can provide the exact "struct sigcontext *" argument to the program's signal handlers. The sigstack's "ss_flags" now uses SS_DISABLE and SS_ONSTACK flags, which have the same values as the re-used SA_DISABLE and SA_ONSTACK which are intended for sigaction only. This enables the support of a SA_RESETHAND flag to sigaction to implement the gross SYSV and Linux SA_ONESHOT signal semantics where the signal handler is reset when it's triggered. makesyscalls.sh no longer appends the struct sysentvec on the end of the generated init_sysent.c code. It's a lot saner to have it in a seperate file rather than trying to update the structure inside the awk script. :-) At exec time, the dozen bytes or so of signal trampoline code are copied to the top of the user's stack, rather than obtaining the trampoline code the old way by getting a clone of the parent's user area. This allows Linux and native binaries to freely exec each other without getting trampolines mixed up.
1996-03-02 19:38:20 +00:00
* Also deal with signal trampoline code for this exec type.
*/
if (imgp->execpath != NULL && imgp->auxargs != NULL)
execpath_len = strlen(imgp->execpath) + 1;
else
execpath_len = 0;
p = imgp->proc;
szsigcode = 0;
arginfo = (struct ps_strings *)p->p_sysent->sv_psstrings;
imgp->ps_strings = arginfo;
if (p->p_sysent->sv_sigcode_base == 0) {
if (p->p_sysent->sv_szsigcode != NULL)
szsigcode = *(p->p_sysent->sv_szsigcode);
}
destp = (uintptr_t)arginfo;
Mega-commit for Linux emulator update.. This has been stress tested under netscape-2.0 for Linux running all the Java stuff. The scrollbars are now working, at least on my machine. (whew! :-) I'm uncomfortable with the size of this commit, but it's too inter-dependant to easily seperate out. The main changes: COMPAT_LINUX is *GONE*. Most of the code has been moved out of the i386 machine dependent section into the linux emulator itself. The int 0x80 syscall code was almost identical to the lcall 7,0 code and a minor tweak allows them to both be used with the same C code. All kernels can now just modload the lkm and it'll DTRT without having to rebuild the kernel first. Like IBCS2, you can statically compile it in with "options LINUX". A pile of new syscalls implemented, including getdents(), llseek(), readv(), writev(), msync(), personality(). The Linux-ELF libraries want to use some of these. linux_select() now obeys Linux semantics, ie: returns the time remaining of the timeout value rather than leaving it the original value. Quite a few bugs removed, including incorrect arguments being used in syscalls.. eg: mixups between passing the sigset as an int, vs passing it as a pointer and doing a copyin(), missing return values, unhandled cases, SIOC* ioctls, etc. The build for the code has changed. i386/conf/files now knows how to build linux_genassym and generate linux_assym.h on the fly. Supporting changes elsewhere in the kernel: The user-mode signal trampoline has moved from the U area to immediately below the top of the stack (below PS_STRINGS). This allows the different binary emulations to have their own signal trampoline code (which gets rid of the hardwired syscall 103 (sigreturn on BSD, syslog on Linux)) and so that the emulator can provide the exact "struct sigcontext *" argument to the program's signal handlers. The sigstack's "ss_flags" now uses SS_DISABLE and SS_ONSTACK flags, which have the same values as the re-used SA_DISABLE and SA_ONSTACK which are intended for sigaction only. This enables the support of a SA_RESETHAND flag to sigaction to implement the gross SYSV and Linux SA_ONESHOT signal semantics where the signal handler is reset when it's triggered. makesyscalls.sh no longer appends the struct sysentvec on the end of the generated init_sysent.c code. It's a lot saner to have it in a seperate file rather than trying to update the structure inside the awk script. :-) At exec time, the dozen bytes or so of signal trampoline code are copied to the top of the user's stack, rather than obtaining the trampoline code the old way by getting a clone of the parent's user area. This allows Linux and native binaries to freely exec each other without getting trampolines mixed up.
1996-03-02 19:38:20 +00:00
/*
* install sigcode
*/
if (szsigcode != 0) {
destp -= szsigcode;
destp = rounddown2(destp, sizeof(void *));
error = copyout(p->p_sysent->sv_sigcode, (void *)destp,
szsigcode);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
}
Mega-commit for Linux emulator update.. This has been stress tested under netscape-2.0 for Linux running all the Java stuff. The scrollbars are now working, at least on my machine. (whew! :-) I'm uncomfortable with the size of this commit, but it's too inter-dependant to easily seperate out. The main changes: COMPAT_LINUX is *GONE*. Most of the code has been moved out of the i386 machine dependent section into the linux emulator itself. The int 0x80 syscall code was almost identical to the lcall 7,0 code and a minor tweak allows them to both be used with the same C code. All kernels can now just modload the lkm and it'll DTRT without having to rebuild the kernel first. Like IBCS2, you can statically compile it in with "options LINUX". A pile of new syscalls implemented, including getdents(), llseek(), readv(), writev(), msync(), personality(). The Linux-ELF libraries want to use some of these. linux_select() now obeys Linux semantics, ie: returns the time remaining of the timeout value rather than leaving it the original value. Quite a few bugs removed, including incorrect arguments being used in syscalls.. eg: mixups between passing the sigset as an int, vs passing it as a pointer and doing a copyin(), missing return values, unhandled cases, SIOC* ioctls, etc. The build for the code has changed. i386/conf/files now knows how to build linux_genassym and generate linux_assym.h on the fly. Supporting changes elsewhere in the kernel: The user-mode signal trampoline has moved from the U area to immediately below the top of the stack (below PS_STRINGS). This allows the different binary emulations to have their own signal trampoline code (which gets rid of the hardwired syscall 103 (sigreturn on BSD, syslog on Linux)) and so that the emulator can provide the exact "struct sigcontext *" argument to the program's signal handlers. The sigstack's "ss_flags" now uses SS_DISABLE and SS_ONSTACK flags, which have the same values as the re-used SA_DISABLE and SA_ONSTACK which are intended for sigaction only. This enables the support of a SA_RESETHAND flag to sigaction to implement the gross SYSV and Linux SA_ONESHOT signal semantics where the signal handler is reset when it's triggered. makesyscalls.sh no longer appends the struct sysentvec on the end of the generated init_sysent.c code. It's a lot saner to have it in a seperate file rather than trying to update the structure inside the awk script. :-) At exec time, the dozen bytes or so of signal trampoline code are copied to the top of the user's stack, rather than obtaining the trampoline code the old way by getting a clone of the parent's user area. This allows Linux and native binaries to freely exec each other without getting trampolines mixed up.
1996-03-02 19:38:20 +00:00
/*
* Copy the image path for the rtld.
*/
if (execpath_len != 0) {
destp -= execpath_len;
destp = rounddown2(destp, sizeof(void *));
imgp->execpathp = (void *)destp;
error = copyout(imgp->execpath, imgp->execpathp, execpath_len);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
}
/*
* Prepare the canary for SSP.
*/
arc4rand(canary, sizeof(canary), 0);
destp -= sizeof(canary);
imgp->canary = (void *)destp;
error = copyout(canary, imgp->canary, sizeof(canary));
if (error != 0)
return (error);
imgp->canarylen = sizeof(canary);
/*
* Prepare the pagesizes array.
*/
destp -= szps;
destp = rounddown2(destp, sizeof(void *));
imgp->pagesizes = (void *)destp;
error = copyout(pagesizes, imgp->pagesizes, szps);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
imgp->pagesizeslen = szps;
/*
* Allocate room for the argument and environment strings.
*/
destp -= ARG_MAX - imgp->args->stringspace;
destp = rounddown2(destp, sizeof(void *));
ustringp = destp;
if (imgp->sysent->sv_stackgap != NULL)
imgp->sysent->sv_stackgap(imgp, &destp);
if (imgp->auxargs) {
/*
* Allocate room on the stack for the ELF auxargs
* array. It has up to AT_COUNT entries.
*/
destp -= AT_COUNT * sizeof(Elf_Auxinfo);
destp = rounddown2(destp, sizeof(void *));
}
vectp = (char **)destp;
/*
* Allocate room for the argv[] and env vectors including the
* terminating NULL pointers.
*/
vectp -= imgp->args->argc + 1 + imgp->args->envc + 1;
/*
* vectp also becomes our initial stack base
*/
*stack_base = (uintptr_t)vectp;
stringp = imgp->args->begin_argv;
argc = imgp->args->argc;
envc = imgp->args->envc;
/*
* Copy out strings - arguments and environment.
*/
error = copyout(stringp, (void *)ustringp,
ARG_MAX - imgp->args->stringspace);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
/*
* Fill in "ps_strings" struct for ps, w, etc.
*/
imgp->argv = vectp;
if (suword(&arginfo->ps_argvstr, (long)(intptr_t)vectp) != 0 ||
suword32(&arginfo->ps_nargvstr, argc) != 0)
return (EFAULT);
/*
* Fill in argument portion of vector table.
*/
for (; argc > 0; --argc) {
if (suword(vectp++, ustringp) != 0)
return (EFAULT);
while (*stringp++ != 0)
ustringp++;
ustringp++;
}
/* a null vector table pointer separates the argp's from the envp's */
if (suword(vectp++, 0) != 0)
return (EFAULT);
imgp->envv = vectp;
if (suword(&arginfo->ps_envstr, (long)(intptr_t)vectp) != 0 ||
suword32(&arginfo->ps_nenvstr, envc) != 0)
return (EFAULT);
/*
* Fill in environment portion of vector table.
*/
for (; envc > 0; --envc) {
if (suword(vectp++, ustringp) != 0)
return (EFAULT);
while (*stringp++ != 0)
ustringp++;
ustringp++;
}
/* end of vector table is a null pointer */
if (suword(vectp, 0) != 0)
return (EFAULT);
if (imgp->auxargs) {
vectp++;
error = imgp->sysent->sv_copyout_auxargs(imgp,
(uintptr_t)vectp);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
}
return (0);
}
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
/*
* Check permissions of file to execute.
* Called with imgp->vp locked.
* Return 0 for success or error code on failure.
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
*/
int
exec_check_permissions(struct image_params *imgp)
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
{
struct vnode *vp = imgp->vp;
struct vattr *attr = imgp->attr;
struct thread *td;
Switch to use shared vnode locks for text files during image activation. kern_execve() locks text vnode exclusive to be able to set and clear VV_TEXT flag. VV_TEXT is mutually exclusive with the v_writecount > 0 condition. The change removes VV_TEXT, replacing it with the condition v_writecount <= -1, and puts v_writecount under the vnode interlock. Each text reference decrements v_writecount. To clear the text reference when the segment is unmapped, it is recorded in the vm_map_entry backed by the text file as MAP_ENTRY_VN_TEXT flag, and v_writecount is incremented on the map entry removal The operations like VOP_ADD_WRITECOUNT() and VOP_SET_TEXT() check that v_writecount does not contradict the desired change. vn_writecheck() is now racy and its use was eliminated everywhere except access. Atomic check for writeability and increment of v_writecount is performed by the VOP. vn_truncate() now increments v_writecount around VOP_SETATTR() call, lack of which is arguably a bug on its own. nullfs bypasses v_writecount to the lower vnode always, so nullfs vnode has its own v_writecount correct, and lower vnode gets all references, since object->handle is always lower vnode. On the text vnode' vm object dealloc, the v_writecount value is reset to zero, and deadfs vop_unset_text short-circuit the operation. Reclamation of lowervp always reclaims all nullfs vnodes referencing lowervp first, so no stray references are left. Reviewed by: markj, trasz Tested by: mjg, pho Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation MFC after: 1 month Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D19923
2019-05-05 11:20:43 +00:00
int error;
td = curthread;
/* Get file attributes */
error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, attr, td->td_ucred);
if (error)
return (error);
#ifdef MAC
error = mac_vnode_check_exec(td->td_ucred, imgp->vp, imgp);
if (error)
return (error);
#endif
/*
* 1) Check if file execution is disabled for the filesystem that
* this file resides on.
* 2) Ensure that at least one execute bit is on. Otherwise, a
* privileged user will always succeed, and we don't want this
* to happen unless the file really is executable.
* 3) Ensure that the file is a regular file.
*/
if ((vp->v_mount->mnt_flag & MNT_NOEXEC) ||
(attr->va_mode & (S_IXUSR | S_IXGRP | S_IXOTH)) == 0 ||
(attr->va_type != VREG))
return (EACCES);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
/*
* Zero length files can't be exec'd
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
*/
if (attr->va_size == 0)
return (ENOEXEC);
/*
* Check for execute permission to file based on current credentials.
*/
error = VOP_ACCESS(vp, VEXEC, td->td_ucred, td);
if (error)
return (error);
/*
* Check number of open-for-writes on the file and deny execution
* if there are any.
Switch to use shared vnode locks for text files during image activation. kern_execve() locks text vnode exclusive to be able to set and clear VV_TEXT flag. VV_TEXT is mutually exclusive with the v_writecount > 0 condition. The change removes VV_TEXT, replacing it with the condition v_writecount <= -1, and puts v_writecount under the vnode interlock. Each text reference decrements v_writecount. To clear the text reference when the segment is unmapped, it is recorded in the vm_map_entry backed by the text file as MAP_ENTRY_VN_TEXT flag, and v_writecount is incremented on the map entry removal The operations like VOP_ADD_WRITECOUNT() and VOP_SET_TEXT() check that v_writecount does not contradict the desired change. vn_writecheck() is now racy and its use was eliminated everywhere except access. Atomic check for writeability and increment of v_writecount is performed by the VOP. vn_truncate() now increments v_writecount around VOP_SETATTR() call, lack of which is arguably a bug on its own. nullfs bypasses v_writecount to the lower vnode always, so nullfs vnode has its own v_writecount correct, and lower vnode gets all references, since object->handle is always lower vnode. On the text vnode' vm object dealloc, the v_writecount value is reset to zero, and deadfs vop_unset_text short-circuit the operation. Reclamation of lowervp always reclaims all nullfs vnodes referencing lowervp first, so no stray references are left. Reviewed by: markj, trasz Tested by: mjg, pho Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation MFC after: 1 month Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D19923
2019-05-05 11:20:43 +00:00
*
* Add a text reference now so no one can write to the
* executable while we're activating it.
*
* Remember if this was set before and unset it in case this is not
* actually an executable image.
*/
Switch to use shared vnode locks for text files during image activation. kern_execve() locks text vnode exclusive to be able to set and clear VV_TEXT flag. VV_TEXT is mutually exclusive with the v_writecount > 0 condition. The change removes VV_TEXT, replacing it with the condition v_writecount <= -1, and puts v_writecount under the vnode interlock. Each text reference decrements v_writecount. To clear the text reference when the segment is unmapped, it is recorded in the vm_map_entry backed by the text file as MAP_ENTRY_VN_TEXT flag, and v_writecount is incremented on the map entry removal The operations like VOP_ADD_WRITECOUNT() and VOP_SET_TEXT() check that v_writecount does not contradict the desired change. vn_writecheck() is now racy and its use was eliminated everywhere except access. Atomic check for writeability and increment of v_writecount is performed by the VOP. vn_truncate() now increments v_writecount around VOP_SETATTR() call, lack of which is arguably a bug on its own. nullfs bypasses v_writecount to the lower vnode always, so nullfs vnode has its own v_writecount correct, and lower vnode gets all references, since object->handle is always lower vnode. On the text vnode' vm object dealloc, the v_writecount value is reset to zero, and deadfs vop_unset_text short-circuit the operation. Reclamation of lowervp always reclaims all nullfs vnodes referencing lowervp first, so no stray references are left. Reviewed by: markj, trasz Tested by: mjg, pho Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation MFC after: 1 month Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D19923
2019-05-05 11:20:43 +00:00
error = VOP_SET_TEXT(vp);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
Switch to use shared vnode locks for text files during image activation. kern_execve() locks text vnode exclusive to be able to set and clear VV_TEXT flag. VV_TEXT is mutually exclusive with the v_writecount > 0 condition. The change removes VV_TEXT, replacing it with the condition v_writecount <= -1, and puts v_writecount under the vnode interlock. Each text reference decrements v_writecount. To clear the text reference when the segment is unmapped, it is recorded in the vm_map_entry backed by the text file as MAP_ENTRY_VN_TEXT flag, and v_writecount is incremented on the map entry removal The operations like VOP_ADD_WRITECOUNT() and VOP_SET_TEXT() check that v_writecount does not contradict the desired change. vn_writecheck() is now racy and its use was eliminated everywhere except access. Atomic check for writeability and increment of v_writecount is performed by the VOP. vn_truncate() now increments v_writecount around VOP_SETATTR() call, lack of which is arguably a bug on its own. nullfs bypasses v_writecount to the lower vnode always, so nullfs vnode has its own v_writecount correct, and lower vnode gets all references, since object->handle is always lower vnode. On the text vnode' vm object dealloc, the v_writecount value is reset to zero, and deadfs vop_unset_text short-circuit the operation. Reclamation of lowervp always reclaims all nullfs vnodes referencing lowervp first, so no stray references are left. Reviewed by: markj, trasz Tested by: mjg, pho Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation MFC after: 1 month Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D19923
2019-05-05 11:20:43 +00:00
imgp->textset = true;
/*
* Call filesystem specific open routine (which does nothing in the
* general case).
*/
error = VOP_OPEN(vp, FREAD, td->td_ucred, td, NULL);
if (error == 0)
imgp->opened = 1;
return (error);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
}
/*
* Exec handler registration
*/
int
exec_register(const struct execsw *execsw_arg)
{
const struct execsw **es, **xs, **newexecsw;
u_int count = 2; /* New slot and trailing NULL */
if (execsw)
for (es = execsw; *es; es++)
count++;
newexecsw = malloc(count * sizeof(*es), M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
xs = newexecsw;
if (execsw)
for (es = execsw; *es; es++)
*xs++ = *es;
*xs++ = execsw_arg;
*xs = NULL;
if (execsw)
free(execsw, M_TEMP);
execsw = newexecsw;
return (0);
}
int
exec_unregister(const struct execsw *execsw_arg)
{
const struct execsw **es, **xs, **newexecsw;
int count = 1;
if (execsw == NULL)
panic("unregister with no handlers left?\n");
for (es = execsw; *es; es++) {
if (*es == execsw_arg)
break;
}
if (*es == NULL)
return (ENOENT);
for (es = execsw; *es; es++)
if (*es != execsw_arg)
count++;
newexecsw = malloc(count * sizeof(*es), M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
xs = newexecsw;
for (es = execsw; *es; es++)
if (*es != execsw_arg)
*xs++ = *es;
*xs = NULL;
if (execsw)
free(execsw, M_TEMP);
execsw = newexecsw;
return (0);
}