for upcoming 64-bit PowerPC and MIPS support. This renames the COMPAT_IA32
option to COMPAT_FREEBSD32, removes some IA32-specific code from MI parts
of the kernel and enhances the freebsd32 compatibility code to support
big-endian platforms.
Reviewed by: kib, jhb
whether to use source address selection (default) or the primary
jail address for unbound outgoing connections.
This is intended to be used by people upgrading from single-IP
jails to multi-IP jails but not having to change firewall rules,
application ACLs, ... but to force their connections (unless
otherwise changed) to the primry jail IP they had been used for
years, as well as for people prefering to implement similar policies.
Note that for IPv6, if configured incorrectly, this might lead to
scope violations, which single-IPv6 jails could as well, as by the
design of jails. [1]
Reviewed by: jamie, hrs (ipv6 part)
Pointed out by: hrs [1]
MFC After: 2 weeks
Asked for by: Jase Thew (bazerka beardz.net)
- name some columns more closely to the user space variables,
as we do for host.* or allow.* (in the listing) already.
- print pr_childmax (children.max).
- prefix hex values with 0x.
MFC after: 3 weeks
Fix some wrong usages.
Note: this does not affect generated binaries as this argument is not used.
PR: 137213
Submitted by: Eygene Ryabinkin (initial version)
MFC after: 1 month
if (jailed(cred))
left. If you are running with a vnet (virtual network stack) those will
return true and defer you to classic IP-jails handling and thus things
will be "denied" or returned with an error.
Work around this problem by introducing another "jailed()" function,
jailed_without_vnet(), that also takes vnets into account, and permits
the calls, should the jail from the given cred have its own virtual
network stack.
We cannot change the classic jailed() call to do that, as it is used
outside the network stack as well.
Discussed with: julian, zec, jamie, rwatson (back in Sept)
MFC after: 5 days
leaves behind an orphaned vnet. This change ensures that such vnets get
released.
This change affects only options VIMAGE builds.
Submitted by: jamie
Discussed with: bz
Approved by: re (rwatson), julian (mentor)
MFC after: 3 days
with their own virtual network stack. Jails only inheriting a
network stack cannot change anything that cannot be changed from
within a prison.
Reviewed by: rwatson, zec
Approved by: re (kib)
vnet.h, we now use jails (rather than vimages) as the abstraction
for virtualization management, and what remained was specific to
virtual network stacks. Minor cleanups are done in the process,
and comments updated to reflect these changes.
Reviewed by: bz
Approved by: re (vimage blanket)
instead of whatever the parent/system has (which is generally 0). This
mirrors the old-style default used for jail(2) in conjunction with the
security.jail.enforce_statfs sysctl.
Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
in prison_equal_ip4/6 while an inp mutex was held. Locking allprison_lock
can be avoided by making a restriction on the IP addresses associated with
jails:
Don't allow the "ip4" and "ip6" parameters to be changed after a jail is
created. Setting the "ip4.addr" and "ip6.addr" parameters is allowed,
but only if the jail was already created with either ip4/6=new or
ip4/6=disable. With this restriction, the prison flags in question
(PR_IP4_USER and PR_IP6_USER) become read-only and can be checked
without locking.
This also allows the simplification of a messy code path that was needed
to handle an existing prison gaining an IP address list.
PR: kern/136899
Reported by: Dirk Meyer
Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
jails have their own IP stack and don't have access to the parent IP
addresses anyway. Note that a virtual network stack forms a break
between prisons with regard to the list of allowed IP addresses.
Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
"disable", which only allows access to the parent/physical system's
IP addresses when specifically directed. Change the default value of
"host" to "new", and don't copy the parent host values, to insulate
jails from the parent hostname et al.
Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
restrictions) were found to be inadequately described by a boolean.
Define a new parameter type with three values (disable, new, inherit)
to handle these and future cases.
Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
Discussed with: rwatson
additional privileges as well as not restricting the type of
sockets a user can open.
Note: the VIMAGE/vnet fetaure of of jails is still considered
experimental and cannot guarantee that privileged users
can be kept imprisoned if enabled.
Reviewed by: rwatson
Approved by: bz (mentor)
parameter "vnet" when it is created, a new vnet instance will be created
along with the jail. Networks interfaces can be moved between prisons
with an ioctl similar to the one that moves them between vimages.
For now vnets will co-exist under both jails and vimages, but soon
struct vimage will be going away.
Reviewed by: zec, julian
Approved by: bz (mentor)
and used in a large number of files, but also because an increasing number
of incorrect uses of MAC calls were sneaking in due to copy-and-paste of
MAC-aware code without the associated opt_mac.h include.
Discussed with: pjd
The system hostname is now stored in prison0, and the global variable
"hostname" has been removed, as has the hostname_mtx mutex. Jails may
have their own host information, or they may inherit it from the
parent/system. The proper way to read the hostname is via
getcredhostname(), which will copy either the hostname associated with
the passed cred, or the system hostname if you pass NULL. The system
hostname can still be accessed directly (and without locking) at
prison0.pr_host, but that should be avoided where possible.
The "similar information" referred to is domainname, hostid, and
hostuuid, which have also become prison parameters and had their
associated global variables removed.
Approved by: bz (mentor)
by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any
parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents,
but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style
dot-separated strings.
Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which
contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root
directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the
global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel.
Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which
should not cause any problems for code that properly uses
securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge().
Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and
set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for
backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system
call.
Approved by: bz (mentor)
virtualized instances of hostname and domainname, as well as a new top-level
virtualization struct vimage, which holds pointers to struct vnet and struct
vprocg. Struct vprocg is likely to become replaced in the near future with
a new jail management API import.
As a consequence of this change, change struct ucred to point to a struct
vimage, instead of directly pointing to a vnet.
Merge vnet / vimage / ucred refcounting infrastructure from p4 / vimage
branch.
Permit kldload / kldunload operations to be executed only from the default
vimage context.
This change should have no functional impact on nooptions VIMAGE kernel
builds.
Reviewed by: bz
Approved by: julian (mentor)
OSD-based jail extensions. This allows the Linux MIB to accessed via
jail_set and jail_get, and serves as a demonstration of adding jail support
to a module.
Reviewed by: dchagin, kib
Approved by: bz (mentor)
interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added:
* jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails.
This replaces jail(2).
* jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the
security.jail.list sysctl.
* jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail.
Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be
set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system
call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2).
Approved by: bz (mentor)
jail doesn't support. This involves a new function prison_check_af,
like prison_check_ip[46] but that checks only the family.
With this change, most of the errors generated by jailed sockets
shouldn't ever occur, at least until jails are changeable.
Approved by: bz (mentor)
return zero on success and an error code otherwise. The possible errors
are EADDRNOTAVAIL if an address being checked for doesn't match the
prison, and EAFNOSUPPORT if the prison doesn't have any addresses in
that address family. For most callers of these functions, use the
returned error code instead of e.g. a hard-coded EADDRNOTAVAIL or
EINVAL.
Always include a jailed() check in these functions, where a non-jailed
cred always returns success (and makes no changes). Remove the explicit
jailed() checks that preceded many of the function calls.
Approved by: bz (mentor)
After running a `make buildkernel', I noticed most of the Giant locks in
sysctl are only caused by a very small amount of sysctl's:
- sysctl.name2oid. This one is locked by SYSCTL_LOCK, just like
sysctl.oidfmt.
- kern.ident, kern.osrelease, kern.version, etc. These are just constant
strings.
- kern.arandom, used by the stack protector. It is already protected by
arc4_mtx.
I also saw the following sysctl's show up. Not as often as the ones
above, but still quite often:
- security.jail.jailed. Also mark security.jail.list as MPSAFE. They
don't need locking or already use allprison_lock.
- kern.devname, used by devname(3), ttyname(3), etc.
This seems to reduce Giant locking inside sysctl by ~75% in my primitive
test setup.
outside the prison_states array.
When checking if there is a name configured for the prison, check the
first character to not be '\0' instead of checking if the char array
is present, which it always is. Note, that this is different for the
*jailname in the syscall.
Found with: Coverity Prevent(tm)
CID: 4156, 4155
MFC after: 4 weeks (just that I get the mail)
Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch.
This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple
addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well.
Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without
an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with
restricted process view, no networking,..
SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well.
Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor
sets after creation.
Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name
in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from
within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes
or as audit-token in the future.
DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging.
Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit
systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where
possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management
utilities.
Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features.
A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been
used by various patches floating around the last years.
Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes.
Special thanks to:
- Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches
and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches.
- Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their
help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support.
- Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions,
suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages.
- John Baldwin (jhb) for his help.
- Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes
on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people
who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and
other channels.
- My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this.
Reviewed by: (see above)
MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail)
X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
