embedded into their file_entry descriptor. This is more for
correctness, since these files cannot be bmap'ed/mmap'ed anyways.
Enforce this restriction.
Submitted by: tes@sgi.com
kernel access control.
Teach devfs how to respond to pathconf() _POSIX_MAC_PRESENT queries,
allowing it to indicate to user processes that individual vnode labels
are available.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Invoke appropriate MAC entry points for a number of VFS-related
operations in the Linux ABI module. In particular, handle uselib
in a manner similar to open() (more work is probably needed here),
as well as handle statfs(), and linux readdir()-like calls.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Add MAC support for the UDP protocol. Invoke appropriate MAC entry
points to label packets that are generated by local UDP sockets,
and to authorize delivery of mbufs to local sockets both in the
multicast/broadcast case and the unicast case.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Introduce two ioctls, SIOCGIFMAC, SIOCSIFMAC, which permit user
processes to manage the MAC labels on network interfaces. Note
that this is part of the user process API/ABI that will be revised
prior to 5.0-RELEASE.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Add MAC support for if_ppp. Label packets as they are removed from
the raw PPP mbuf queue. Preserve the mbuf MAC label across various
PPP data-munging and reconstitution operations. Perform access
control checks on mbufs to be transmitted via the interface.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Label packets generated by the gif virtual interface.
Perform access control on packets delivered to gif virtual interfaces.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Invoke appropriate MAC framework entry points to authorize readdir()
operations in the native ABI.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
Make idle process state more consistant.
Add an assert on thread state.
Clean up idleproc/mi_switch() interaction.
Use a local instead of referencing curthread 7 times in a row
(I've been told curthread can be expensive on some architectures)
Remove some commented out code.
Add a little commented out code (completion coming soon)
Reviewed by: jhb@freebsd.org
kernel access control.
Hook up various policy modules to the kernel build.
Note that a number of these modules require futher entry point commits
in the remainder of the kernel to become fully functional, but enough
of the pieces are in place to allow experimentation.
Note also that it would be desirable to not build the mac_*.ko modules
if 'options MAC' is not defined in the kernel configuration, because
the resulting modules are not useful without the kernel option. There
doesn't appear to be precedent for a way to do this -- for example,
we allow ipfw.ko to be built even if 'options NETINET' isn't defined.
Suggests welcomed on the "best" way to do this.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
structure. This prevents a boatload of warnings in the MAC modules,
so we can hook them up to the build.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control
Invoke appropriate MAC framework entry points to authorize a number
of vnode operations, including read, write, stat, poll. This permits
MAC policies to revoke access to files following label changes,
and to limit information spread about the file to user processes.
Note: currently the file cached credential is used for some of
these authorization check. We will need to expand some of the
MAC entry point APIs to permit multiple creds to be passed to
the access control check to allow diverse policy behavior.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Restructure the vn_open_cred() access control checks to invoke
the MAC entry point for open authorization. Note that MAC can
reject open requests where existing DAC code skips the open
authorization check due to O_CREAT. However, the failure mode
here is the same as other failure modes following creation,
wherein an empty file may be left behind.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Invoke an appropriate MAC entry point to authorize execution of
a file by a process. The check is placed slightly differently
than it appears in the trustedbsd_mac tree so that it prevents
a little more information leakage about the target of the execve()
operation.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
the inits/destroys are done without the cache locks held even in the
persistent-lock calls. I may be cheating a little by using the MAC
"already initialized" flag for now.
other references to that vnode as a trace vnode in other processes as well
as in any pending requests on the todo list. Thus, it is possible for a
ktrace request structure to have a NULL ktr_vp when it is destroyed in
ktr_freerequest(). We shouldn't call vrele() on the vnode in that case.
Reported by: bde
pointer and incoming mbuf pointer will be non-NULL in tcp_respond().
This is relied on by the MAC code for correctness, as well as
existing code.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD PRoject
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Add support for labeling most out-going ICMP messages using an
appropriate MAC entry point. Currently, we do not explicitly
label packet reflect (timestamp, echo request) ICMP events,
implicitly using the originating packet label since the mbuf is
reused. This will be made explicit at some point.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Instrument chdir() and chroot()-related system calls to invoke
appropriate MAC entry points to authorize the two operations.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Implement two IOCTLs at the socket level to retrieve the primary
and peer labels from a socket. Note that this user process interface
will be changing to improve multi-policy support.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Modify procfs so that (when mounted multilabel) it exports process MAC
labels as the vnode labels of procfs vnodes associated with processes.
Approved by: des
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Modify pseudofs so that it can support synthetic file systems with
the multilabel flag set. In particular, implement vop_refreshlabel()
as pn_refreshlabel(). Implement pfs_refreshlabel() to invoke this,
and have it fall back to the mount label if the file system does
not implement pn_refreshlabel() for the node. Otherwise, permit
the file system to determine how the service is provided.
Approved by: des
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Authorize vop_readlink() and vop_lookup() activities during recursive
path lookup via namei() via calls to appropriate MAC entry points.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Authorize the creation of UNIX domain sockets in the file system
namespace via an appropriate invocation a MAC framework entry
point.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Instrument ctty driver invocations of various vnode operations on the
terminal controlling tty to perform appropriate MAC framework
authorization checks.
Note: VOP_IOCTL() on the ctty appears to be authorized using NOCRED in
the existing code rather than td->td_ucred. Why?
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Instrument the ktrace write operation so that it invokes the MAC
framework's vnode write authorization check.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Instrument the kernel ACL retrieval and modification system calls
to invoke MAC framework entry points to authorize these operations.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
sizes. Previously, the end result was at the mercy of the card's default
setting. This change will reduce the number of buffer underruns for
some users.
PR: kern/37929
Submitted by: Thomas Nystrom <thn@saeab.se>
MFC after: 7 days
and move them into md_uac in struct mdproc. mdproc is protected by the
proc lock. md_flags now is only ever modified by the current thread, so
it doesn't need a lock.
- Rename the constants for all the per-thread MD flags to use MDTD_*
instead of MDP_*.
kernel access control.
Instrument the TCP socket code for packet generation and delivery:
label outgoing mbufs with the label of the socket, and check socket and
mbuf labels before permitting delivery to a socket. Assign labels
to newly accepted connections when the syncache/cookie code has done
its business. Also set peer labels as convenient. Currently,
MAC policies cannot influence the PCB matching algorithm, so cannot
implement polyinstantiation. Note that there is at least one case
where a PCB is not available due to the TCP packet not being associated
with any socket, so we don't label in that case, but need to handle
it in a special manner.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
by pmap_qenter() and pmap_qremove() is pointless. In fact, it probably
leads to unnecessary pmap_page_protect() calls if one of these pages is
paged out after unwiring.
Note: setting PG_MAPPED asserts that the page's pv list may be
non-empty. Since checking the status of the page's pv list isn't any
harder than checking this flag, the flag should probably be eliminated.
Alternatively, PG_MAPPED could be set by pmap_enter() exclusively
rather than various places throughout the kernel.
kernel access control.
Instrument the raw IP socket code for packet generation and delivery:
label outgoing mbufs with the label of the socket, and check the
socket and mbuf labels before permitting delivery to a socket,
permitting MAC policies to selectively allow delivery of raw IP mbufs
to various raw IP sockets that may be open. Restructure the policy
checking code to compose IPsec and MAC results in a more readable
manner.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
controller. Some testing has already been done, but its still greenish.
RAID's has to be setup via the BIOS on the SuperTrak, but all RAID
types are supported by the driver. The SuperTrak rebuilds failed arrays
on the fly and supports spare disks etc etc...
Add "device pst" to your config file to use.
As usual bugsreports, suggestions etc are welcome...
Development sponsored by: Advanis
Hardware donated by: Promise Inc.
controller. Some testing has already been done, but its still greenish.
RAID's has to be setup via the BIOS on the SuperTrak, but all RAID
types are supported by the driver. The SuperTrak rebuilds failed arrays
on the fly and supports spare disks etc etc...
Add "device pst" to your config file to use.
As usual bugsreports, suggestions etc are welcome...
Development sponsored by: Advanis
Hardware donated by: Promise Inc.
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
When fragmenting an IP datagram, invoke an appropriate MAC entry
point so that MAC labels may be copied (...) to the individual
IP fragment mbufs by MAC policies.
When IP options are inserted into an IP datagram when leaving a
host, preserve the label if we need to reallocate the mbuf for
alignment or size reasons.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Instrument the code managing IP fragment reassembly queues (struct ipq)
to invoke appropriate MAC entry points to maintain a MAC label on
each queue. Permit MAC policies to associate information with a queue
based on the mbuf that caused it to be created, update that information
based on further mbufs accepted by the queue, influence the decision
making process by which mbufs are accepted to the queue, and set the
label of the mbuf holding the reassembled datagram following reassembly
completetion.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
When generating an IGMP message, invoke a MAC entry point to permit
the MAC framework to label its mbuf appropriately for the target
interface.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
When generating an ARP query, invoke a MAC entry point to permit the
MAC framework to label its mbuf appropriately for the interface.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Invoke the MAC framework to label mbuf created using divert sockets.
These labels may later be used for access control on delivery to
another socket, or to an interface.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI LAbs
kernel access control.
Instrument connect(), listen(), and bind() system calls to invoke
MAC framework entry points to permit policies to authorize these
requests. This can be useful for policies that want to limit
the activity of processes involving particular types of IPC and
network activity.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Label mbufs received via kernel tunnel device interfaces by invoking
appropriate MAC framework entry points.
Perform access control checks on out-going mbufs delivered via tunnel
interfaces by invoking appropriate MAC entry points:
NOTE: Currently the label for a tunnel interface is not derived from
the label of the process that opened the tunnel interface. It
probably should be.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Label mbufs received via ethernet-based interfaces by invoking
appropriate MAC framework entry points.
Perform access control checks on out-going mbufs delivered via
ethernet-based interfaces by invoking appropriate MAC entry
points.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Instrument the interface management code so that MAC labels are
properly maintained on network interfaces (struct ifnet). In
particular, invoke entry points when interfaces are created and
removed. MAC policies may initialized the label interface based
on a variety of factors, including the interface name.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
When decompressing data from one mbuf into another mbuf, preserve the
mbuf label by copying it to the new mbuf.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Invoke a MAC framework entry point to authorize reception of an
incoming mbuf by the BPF descriptor, permitting MAC policies to
limit the visibility of packets delivered to particular BPF
descriptors.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Instrument BPF so that MAC labels are properly maintained on BPF
descriptors. MAC framework entry points are invoked at BPF
instantiation and allocation, permitting the MAC framework to
derive the BPF descriptor label from the credential authorizing
the device open. Also enter the MAC framework to label mbufs
created using the BPF device.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Instrument UFS to support per-inode MAC labels. In particular,
invoke MAC framework entry points for generically supporting the
backing of MAC labels into extended attributes. This ends up
introducing new vnode operation vector entries point at the MAC
framework entry points, as well as some explicit entry point
invocations for file and directory creation events so that the
MAC framework can push labels to disk before the directory names
become persistent (this will work better once EAs in UFS2 are
hooked into soft updates). The generic EA MAC entry points
support executing with the file system in either single label
or multilabel operation, and will fall back to the mount label
if multilabel is not specified at mount-time.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Instrument devfs to support per-dirent MAC labels. In particular,
invoke MAC framework when devfs directory entries are instantiated
due to make_dev() and related calls, and invoke the MAC framework
when vnodes are instantiated from these directory entries. Implement
vop_setlabel() for devfs, which pushes the label update into the
devfs directory entry for semi-persistant store. This permits the MAC
framework to assign labels to devices and directories as they are
instantiated, and export access control information via devfs vnodes.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
debugging levels to off by default. Now that debug levels can be
tweaked by sysctl we don't need to go through hoops to get the
different usb parts to produce debug data.
sysctl purposes. Also add two fields to struct vnode, v_cachedfs and
v_cachedid, which hold the vnode's device and file id and are filled in
by vn_open_cred() and vn_stat().
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Invoke the necessary MAC entry points to maintain labels on sockets.
In particular, invoke entry points during socket allocation and
destruction, as well as creation by a process or during an
accept-scenario (sonewconn). For UNIX domain sockets, also assign
a peer label. As the socket code isn't locked down yet, locking
interactions are not yet clear. Various protocol stack socket
operations (such as peer label assignment for IPv4) will follow.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Invoke the necessary MAC entry points to maintain labels on vnodes.
In particular, initialize the label when the vnode is allocated or
reused, and destroy the label when the vnode is going to be released,
or reused. Wow, an object where there really is exactly one place
where it's allocated, and one other where it's freed. Amazing.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Invoke additional MAC entry points when an mbuf packet header is
copied to another mbuf: release the old label if any, reinitialize
the new header, and ask the MAC framework to copy the header label
data. Note that this requires a potential allocation operation,
but m_copy_pkthdr() is not permitted to fail, so we must block.
Since we now use interrupt threads, this is possible, but not
desirable.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Invoke the necessary MAC entry points to maintain labels on header
mbufs. In particular, invoke entry points during the two mbuf
header allocation cases, and the mbuf freeing case. Pass the "how"
argument at allocation time to the MAC framework so that it can
determine if it is permitted to block (as with policy modules),
and permit the initialization entry point to fail if it needs to
allocate memory but is not permitted to, failing the mbuf
allocation.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Implement MAC framework access control entry points relating to
operations on mountpoints. Currently, this consists only of
access control on mountpoint listing using the various statfs()
variations. In the future, it might also be desirable to
implement checks on mount() and unmount().
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Invoke the necessary MAC entry points to maintain labels on
mount structures. In particular, invoke entry points for
intialization and destruction in various scenarios (root,
non-root). Also introduce an entry point in the boot procedure
following the mount of the root file system, but prior to the
start of the userland init process to permit policies to
perform further initialization.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Implement inter-process access control entry points for the MAC
framework. This permits policy modules to augment the decision
making process for process and socket visibility, process debugging,
re-scheduling, and signaling.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Invoke the necessary MAC entry points to maintain labels on
process credentials. In particular, invoke entry points for
the initialization and destruction of struct ucred, the copying
of struct ucred, and permit the initial labels to be set for
both process 0 (parent of all kernel processes) and process 1
(parent of all user processes).
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
the number of policy slots to 4.
(Having run a quick errand, time to start on phase 2 of the MAC
integration)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
frees it again. The idea was to perform M_WAITOK allocations in a
process context to reduce the risk of later interrupt-context
M_NOWAIT allocations failing, but in fact this code can be called
from contexts where it is not desirable to sleep (e.g. if_start
routines), so it causes lots of witness "could sleep" warnings.
kernel access control.
Label IP fragment reassembly queues, permitting security features to
be maintained on those objects. ipq_label will be used to manage
the reassembly of fragments into IP datagrams using security
properties. This permits policies to deny the reassembly of fragments,
as well as influence the resulting label of a datagram following
reassembly.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Label network interface structures, permitting security features to
be maintained on those objects. if_label will be used to authorize
data flow using the network interface. if_label will be protected
using the same synchronization primitives as other mutable entries
in struct ifnet.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Label BPF descriptor objects, permitting security features to be
maintained on those objects. bd_label will be used to authorize
data flow from network interfaces to user processes. BPF
labels are protected using the same synchronization model as other
mutable data in the BPF descriptor.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Replace 'void *' with 'struct mac *' now that mac.h is in the base
tree. The current POSIX.1e-derived userland MAC interface is
schedule for replacement, but will act as a functional placeholder
until the replacement is done. These system calls allow userland
processes to get and set labels on both the current process, as well
as file system objects and file descriptor backed objects.
access control.
Label socket IPC objects, permitting security features to be maintained
at the granularity of the socket. Two labels are stored for each
socket: the label of the socket itself, and a cached peer label
permitting interogation of the remote endpoint. Since socket locking
is not yet present in the base tree, these objects are not locked,
but are assumed to follow the same semantics as other modifiable
entries in the socket structure.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Label pipe IPC objects, permitting security information to be
maintained at the granularity of the pipe object. The label is
shared between the two pipe endpoints in the style of the
pipe mutex, and is maintained using similar conventions. The
label is protected by the pipe mutex.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
access control.
Label process credentials, permitting security information to be
maintained at the granularity of processes and cached credential
objects. cr_label follows the semantics of other entries in struct
ucred: when a credential is exclusively referenced, it may be
modified. Otherwise, it must be treated as immutable. As with
other interesting entries in struct ucred, failing to use the
documented credential management APIs (such as crcopy, crdup, ...)
can result in data corruption or incorrect behavior.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
Label file system mount points, permitting security information to be
maintained at the granularity of the file system. Two labels are
currently maintained: a security label for the mount itself, and
a default label for objects in the file system (in particular, for
file systems not supporting per-vnode labeling directly).
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the operating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
Introduce two node vnode operations required to support MAC. First,
VOP_REFRESHLABEL(), which will be invoked by callers requiring that
vp->v_label be sufficiently "fresh" for access control purposes.
Second, VOP_SETLABEL(), which be invoked by callers requiring that
the passed label contents be updated. The file system is responsible
for updating v_label if appropriate in coordination with the MAC
framework, as well as committing to disk. File systems that are
not MAC-aware need not implement these VOPs, as the MAC framework
will default to maintaining a single label for all vnodes based
on the label on the file system mount point.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
Label vnodes, permitting security information to maintained at the
granularity of the individual file, directory (et al). This data is
protected by the vnode lock and may be read only when holding a shared
lock, or modified only when holding an exclusive lock. Label
information may be considered either the primary copy, or a cached
copy. Individual file systems or kernel services may use the
VCACHEDLABEL flag for accounting purposes to determine which it is.
New VOPs will be introduced to refresh this label on demand, or to
set the label value.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
Label mbuf's with packet header data, permitting in-flight datagrams
to be labeled in the TrustedBSD MAC implementation. Add a questionable
recursive #include of sys/mac.h to maintain the current API for
applications and kernel code including mbuf.h to get 'struct mbuf'
definition.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
kern_mac.c contains the body of the MAC framework. Kernel and
user APIs defined in mac.h are implemented here, providing a front end
to loaded security modules. This code implements a module registration
service, state (label) management, security configuration and policy
composition.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem
entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These
files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework,
and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These
APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD
5.1-RELEASE.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
While I don't think this is the best solution, it certainly is the
fastest and in trying to find bottlenecks in network related code
I want this out of the way, so that I don't have to think about it.
What this means, for mbuf clusters anyway is:
- one less malloc() to do for every cluster allocation (replaced with
a relatively quick calculation + assignment)
- no more free() in the cluster free case (replaced with empty space) :-)
This can offer a substantial throughput improvement, but it may not for
all cases. Particularly noticable for larger buffer sends/recvs.
See http://people.freebsd.org/~bmilekic/code/measure2.txt for a rough
idea.
function. This permits conditionally compiled extensions to the
packet header copying semantic, such as extensions to copy MAC
labels.
Reviewed by: bmilekic
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
has gone away instead of spinning in the interrupt handler. This stops
my machine from hanging when I eject a rl(4)-based cardbus card.
Reviewed by: imp
with a general purpose front end entry point for user applications
to invoke. The MAC framework will route the system call to the
appropriate policy by name.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
special actions for safety. One of these is to make sure that file descriptors
0..2 are in use, by opening /dev/null for those that are not already open.
Another is to close any file descriptors 0..2 that reference procfs. However,
these checks were made out of order, so that it was still possible for a
set-user-ID or set-group-ID process to be started with some of the file
descriptors 0..2 unused.
Submitted by: Georgi Guninski <guninski@guninski.com>
is that some cards built around fm801 chip have the same device ID, only
have radio tuner onboard, but no sound capabilities. Therefore, with such
card inserted and `device pcm' in kernel the user has a big problem, as
the fm801 driver effectively hangs the machine when trying to initialise
nonexistent ac97 codecs (it does 500 retries with 1 second interval!).
It would be better if MediaForte's engeneers were smart enough to put
different device ID into such cards, but it isn't an option.
MFC after: 2 weeks
be swapped out. Do not put such the thread directly back to the run
queue.
Spotted by: David Xu <davidx@viasoft.com.cn>
While I am here, s/PS_TIMEOUT/TDF_TIMEOUT/.
vm_page_sleep_busy() with vm_page_sleep_if_busy(). At the same time,
increase the scope of the page queues lock. (This should significantly
reduce the locking overhead in vm_object_page_remove().)
o Apply some style fixes.
swapped in, we do not have to ask for the scheduler thread to do
that.
- Assert that a process is not swapped out in runq functions and
swapout().
- Introduce thread_safetoswapout() for readability.
- In swapout_procs(), perform a test that may block (check of a
thread working on its vm map) first. This lets us call swapout()
with the sched_lock held, providing a better atomicity.
conventions for _mcount and __cyg_profile_func_enter are different, so
statistical profiling kernels build and link but don't actually work.
IWBNI one could tell gcc to only generate calls to the former.
Define uintfptr_t properly for userland, but not for the kernel (I hope).
except for the fact tha they are presently swapped out. Also add a process
flag to indicate that the process has started the struggle to swap
back in. This will be needed for the case where multiple threads
start the swapin action top a collision. Also add code to stop
a process fropm being swapped out if one of the threads in this
process is actually off running on another CPU.. that might hurt...
Submitted by: Seigo Tanimura <tanimura@r.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp>
<stdint.h>. Previously, parts were defined in <machine/ansi.h> and
<machine/limits.h>. This resulted in two problems:
(1) Defining macros in <machine/ansi.h> gets in the way of that
header only defining types.
(2) Defining C99 limits in <machine/limits.h> adds pollution to
<limits.h>.
problems with the firmware and will result in a) poor performance and
b) the inability to associate certain types of cards (most notibly
cisco).
Idea obtained from OpenBSD, but I implemented it by clearing the
IFF_PROMISC flag rather than the refusing to honor it downstream.
1.131 is slightly broken, and I would commit the fix to that here, but it
has been reported that any deviation from the original code is causing
problems with some 82557 chips, causing them to lock hard.
Until those issues have been figured out, going back to the original
code is the best plan.
Frustrated: Silby
so that the data is less likely to be inconsistent if SYSCTL_OUT() blocks.
If the data is large, wire the output buffer instead.
This is somewhat less than optimal, since the handler could skip the copy
if it knew that the data was static.
If the data is dynamic, we are still not guaranteed to get a consistent
copy since another processor could change the data while the copy is in
progress because the data is not locked. This problem could be solved if
the generic handlers had the ability to grab the proper lock before the
copy and release it afterwards.
This may duplicate work done in other sysctl handlers in the kernel which
also copy the data, possibly while a lock is held, before calling they call
a generic handler to output the data. These handlers should probably call
SYSCTL_OUT() directly.
SYSCTL_OUT() from blocking while locks are held. This should
only be done when it would be inconvenient to make a temporary copy of
the data and defer calling SYSCTL_OUT() until after the locks are
released.
userland for libc/gmon to compile, so the typedef in <machine/types.h>
isn't good enough. This is really ugly since we end up with the
actual value which uintfptr_t is typedef'd from, in multiple places.
This is bug for bug compatible with the other FreeBSD architectures.
Noticed by: sparc64 tinderbox
ruleset. If we do, that means there's a ruleset loop (10 includes 20
include 30 includes 10), which will quickly cause a double fault due
to stack overflow (since "include" is implemented by recursion).
(Previously, we only checked that X didn't include X.)
not responding) then drop any data on the outgoing queue in
soisdisconnected because there is no way to get it to its destination
any longer.
The only objection to this patch I got on -net was from Terry, who
wasn't sure that the condition in question could arise, so I provided
some example code.
basically maps all of physical memory 1:1 to a range of virtual addresses
outside of normal kva. The advantage of doing this instead of accessing
phsyical addresses directly is that memory accesses will go through the
data cache, and will participate in the normal cache coherency algorithm
for invalidating lines in our own and in other cpus' data caches. So
we don't have to flush the cache manually or send IPIs to do so on other
cpus. Also, since the mappings never change, we don't have to flush them
from the tlb manually.
This makes pmap_copy_page and pmap_zero_page MP safe, allowing the idle
zero proc to run outside of giant.
Inspired by: ia64
implementation. This flag will indicate that the security label
in the vnode is currently valid, and therefore doesn't need to
be refreshed before an access control decision can be made. Most
file systems (or stdvops) will set this flag after they load the
MAC label from disk the first time to prevent redundant disk I/O;
some file synthetic file systems (procfs, for example) may not.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
MAC support will be merged into the main tree over the next week in
reasonable size chunks; much more to follow.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
during execve() to use a 'credential_changing' variable. This makes it
easier to have outstanding patchsets against this code, as well as to
add conditionally defined clauses.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
since it breaks mtx_owned() on spin mutexes when used outside of
mtx_assert(). Unfortunately we currently use it in the i386 MD code
and in the sio(4) driver.
Reported by: bde
o reduce the extra-long ID names.
o TI-1510, 1520 and 4510 support.
o MFUNC is the name of the register on TI 1200 and newer chips (except
125x and 1450). Initialize it in the func routine, but only
if NO_MFUNC isn't set.
o better comments about above workaround
o register definitions for MFUNC.
o move zoom video disable to a better place.
o Rename the insanely long PCIC bridge ids.
o Add my copyright to pccbb.c
o Add support for the TI-1510, TI-1520 and TI-4510 series of upcoming
bridges.
o Init MFUNC if it is zero and the TI part has a MFUNC register
at offset 0x8c (1030, 1130 and 1131 don't have anything there, the
1250,1251,1251B and 1450 have a different thing there. The rest
have it. TI is likely to only do MFUNC from now on. The IRQMUX
in the 1250 series of chips needs no tweaks.
o Adjust to new exca interface.
o Add comments about TI chips that I learned in talking to an
engineer at TI.
o Add register definitions for MFUNC.
o Create CB_TI125X chipset type.
o Protect .h against multiple includes.
o eliminate the pointers to the read/write routines. The
bus_space_read routines can cope since we have the offset
field.
o Print a warning if the requested map address is > 16M and
your chipset doesn't support the extended ExCA registers.
of the Netgear GA302-T. I changed the symbolic names in the
submitter's patch to reflect the part number of the chip instead
of the board.
PR: kern/38988
Submitted by: Brad Chapman <chapmanb@arches.uga.edu>
MFC after: 2 days
