synaptics or elantech sanity checker.
After packet has been rejected contents of packet buffer is not cleared
with setting of inputbytes counter to 0. So when this packet buffer is
filled again being an element of circular queue, new data appends to old
data rather than overwrites it. This leads to packet buffer overflow
after 10 rounds.
Fix it with setting of packet's inputbytes counter to 0 after rejection.
While here add extra logging of rejected packets.
PR: 222667 (for reference)
Reported by: Neel Chauhan <neel@neelc.org>
Tested by: Neel Chauhan <neel@neelc.org>
MFC after: 1 week
-Wno-error=tautological-constant-compare again (this flag is now out of
-Wextra after upstream https://reviews.llvm.org/rL322901). Otherwise
the MK_SYSTEM_COMPILER logic will not build a cross-tools compiler.
Reported by: jpaetzel, tuexen, Stefan Hagen
The L3 cache controller (Corenet Platform Cache) is listed with one of its
compatible strings as "cache", which this driver can't attach to. Restrict
to a known list of primary cache controller strings, as found in the l2cache
devicetree binding.
Use 'pfctl -k' when blocking a site to kill active tcp connections
from the blocked address.
Fix 'purge' operation for pf, which must dynamically determine which
filters have been created, so the filters can be flushed by name.
MFC after: 2 weeks
Summary:
Some architectures use large (36-bit) physical addresses, with smaller
virtual addresses. Casting between vm_paddr_t (or bus_addr_t) and void * is
considered illegal, so cast through uintptr_t. No functional change on existing
platforms.
Reviewed By: scottl
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D14042
Most consumers of g_metadata_store were passing in partially unallocated
memory, resulting in stack garbage being written to disk labels. Fix them by
zeroing the memory first.
gvirstor repeated the same mistake, but in the kernel.
Also, glabel's label contained a fixed-size string that wasn't
initialized to zero.
PR: 222077
Reported by: Maxim Khitrov <max@mxcrypt.com>
Reviewed by: cem
MFC after: 3 weeks
X-MFC-With: 323314
X-MFC-With: 323338
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D14164
PowerPC Apple hardware, and likely all Open Firmware systems.
The loader would allocate memory for its heap at whatever address Open
Firmware gave it, which would in general be the lowest unallocated address,
usually starting a page or two above 0. As the kernel is linked at 1 MB,
and loader insists on running the kernel at its link address, any heap
larger than 1 MB would overlap the kernel, causing loader memory allocations
to corrupt the kernel and vice versa.
Although r328806 made this problem much worse by increasing the heap size
to 8 MB, causing 88% of the loader heap to overlap with the kernel, the
problem has always existed. The old heap size was 1 MB and, unless that
started exactly at zero, which would cause other problems, some number of
pages of the loader heap still overlapped with the kernel.
This patch solves the issue in two ways and cleans up some related code:
- Moves the loader heap inside of the loader. This guarantees that the
heap will be contiguous with the loader and simplifies the heap
allocation code at no cost, since the heap lives in BSS.
- Moves the loader, previously at 28 MB and dangerously close to the kernel
it loads, a bit higher to 44 MB. This has the effect of breaking loader
on non-embedded PPC machines with < 48 MB of RAM, but we did not support
those anyway.
The fundamental problem is that the way loader loads ELF files is
incredibly fragile, but that can't be fixed without fundamental
architectural changes.
MFC after: 10 days
objects' init functions instead of doing the setup via a constructor
in libc as the init functions may already depend on these handlers
to be in place. This gets us rid of:
- the undefined order in which libc constructors as __guard_setup()
and jemalloc_constructor() are executed WRT __sparc_utrap_setup(),
- the requirement to link libc last so __sparc_utrap_setup() gets
called prior to constructors in other libraries (see r122883).
For static binaries, crt1.o still sets up the user trap handlers.
o Move misplaced prototypes for MD functions in to the MD prototype
section of rtld.h.
o Sprinkle nitems().
superblock, and the kernel will fail to link when UFS is not built
in. This commit makes it depend on a small portion of FFS bits and
thereby fixes build for this situation.
This is intended as an interim bandaid, and the actual superblock
reading code should probably be made independent of UFS, so we do
not need to depend on it (see kib@'s comment in the review for
details), and we will revisit this once the superblock check hashes
are all in place.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D14092
The cross-endian loader change in r328536 (review D12422) broke symbol
loading on (at least) amd64 kernels. Temporarily paper over the issue
by restricting the cross-endian support to only powerpc, until a proper
fix arrives.
Submitted by: royger
* Add the bulk of the ATU table read function
* Correct how the ATU function and WAIT bits work
TODO:
* more testing, figure out how the multi-vlan table stuff works and push that
up to userspace
This extends the set in r316028 to allow all tests to pass or be skipped
on a system without cd9660 support.
A better approach using tar is possible, but this works today.
Obtained from: CheriBSD
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D10516
6.0.0 (branches/release_60 r324090).
This introduces retpoline support, with the -mretpoline flag. The
upstream initial commit message (r323155 by Chandler Carruth) contains
quite a bit of explanation. Quoting:
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of
the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today,
specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection",
and is one of the two halves to Spectre.
Summary:
First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that
this is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero
blog post for details:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative
execution of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by
poisoning the prediction of indirect branches with the address of
that gadget. The gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a
side channel for reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a
load of secret data followed by a branch on the loaded value and then
a load of some predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing
of the processors cache to determine which direction the branch took
*in the speculative execution*, and in turn what one bit of the
loaded value was. Due to the nature of these timing side channels and
the branch predictor on Intel processors, this allows an attacker to
leak data only accessible to a privileged domain (like the kernel)
back into an unprivileged domain.
The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect
branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In
many cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches
and a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering
switches in this way and the first step of this patch is to disable
jump-table lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite
explicit indirectbr sequences into a switch over integers.
However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We
introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect
calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as a
trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86.
Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures
the processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known
location. The retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto
the stack by the call with the desired target of the original
indirect call. The result is a predicted return to the next
instruction after a call (which can be used to trap speculative
execution within an infinite loop) and an actual indirect branch to
an arbitrary address.
On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by
using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this
device. For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register
and so several different retpoline variants are introduced to use a
scratch register if one is available in the calling convention and to
otherwise use direct stack push/pop sequences to pass the target
address.
This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog
post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886
We also support a target feature that disables emission of the
retpoline thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users
want them. These are particularly useful in environments like
kernels that routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch
their thunk to different code sequences. They can write this custom
thunk and use `-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to
`-mretpoline`. In this case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_r11
```
or on 32-bit:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_eax
__llvm_external_retpoline_ecx
__llvm_external_retpoline_edx
__llvm_external_retpoline_push
```
And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in
the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl`
instruction.
There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF
binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to
generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection.
The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are
from precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we
have found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on
them here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for
retpoline-ed configurations for completeness.
For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the
compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this
particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all*
libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic
executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z
retpolineplt` (or use similar functionality from some other linker).
We strongly recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows
the retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller.
When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the
Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications
running typic al workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately
2%) even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely
due to the small number of indirect branches that occur in
performance sensitive paths of the kernel.
When using these patches on statically linked applications,
especially C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more
dramatic performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch,
indirect-, or virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from
10% to 50%.
However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance
impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically
reduce the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting
them to direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to
lower switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++
applications, we *strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call
targets are statically linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both
PGO and ThinLTO. Well tuned servers using all of these techniques saw
5% - 10% overhead from the use of retpoline.
We will add detailed documentation covering these components in
subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality
available as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd
really like to get these patches landed and backported ASAP for
obvious reasons. We're planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0
release streams and get a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked
ASAP for distros and vendors.
This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month:
Eric, Reid, Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit
due to the time sensitive nature of landing this and the need to
backport it. Huge thanks to everyone who helped out here, and
everyone at Intel who helped out in discussions about how to craft
this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at Google, but not an LLVM
contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline design.
Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer
Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723
MFC after: 3 months
X-MFC-With: r327952
PR: 224669
* Refactor the initial learning configuration (port learning, address expiry,
handling address moving between ports, etc, etc) into a separate HAL routine
* and ensure that it's consistent between switch chips - the AR8216,8316,724x,9331
SoCs all share the same switch code.
* .. the AR8327 needs doing - the defaults seem OK for now
* .. the AR9340 is different but it's also programmed now.
* Add support for flushing a single port worth of ATU entries
* Add support for fetching the ATU table from AR8216 and derived chips
Tested:
* AR9344, Carambola 2
TODO:
* Further testing on other chips
* Add AR9340 support
* Add AR8327 support
Stop leaking kernel pointers though theses sysctls and make sure that the
padding in the structures is zeroed on allocation to avoid other leaks.
Reviewed by: gordon, kib
Obtained from: CheriBSD
MFC after: 1 week
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D13459
preference to LIBFICL{,32}. LIBFICL{,32} are now always defined, but
LDR_INTERP{,32} is defined empty when building w/o forth (aka the
simple interpreter) and defined to LIBFICL{,32} when we are building
forth.
I had thought that this would be useful. However it was committed too
late, and wound up being unused. It's in the way of future work now,
so retire it rather than bring it forward.
